

the proposed harmonized theory, it is in helping one's self that foreign states are also being helped. In this way, as liberalists suggest occurred in the European Union, at times individual interests are forgone for the good of the "superpower."³³

With aims of cooperation and a common goal between states – which is ultimately to achieve the greatest amount of security for ones neighbors and thus benefit one's self – relative gains no longer exist. Where structural realists valued relative gains, and used them to dictate state participation, given reviewed incentive, relative gains become absolute gains for all, as when other states gain the home state also gains.

Lastly, Waltz claims that bipolar state organization is normative. Liberalists claim that "unipolarity" in conjunction with "international institutions" is the ideal form of state organization.³⁴ Both systems of unipolarity and bipolarity imply that there is division in intention and goals, though given the harmonized idea of security as a common end, there should ideally be no division. It is for this reason that either multipolarity between many economically and culturally similar states exists as the organizing principle, or that there be one inclusive state representing all the countries in the world.

It is thus believed that though it is an outstanding political theory, Waltz's structural realism is exclusive, limiting itself to the understanding of historic Western-based politics and thought. Therefore, it is through a harmonization of the three theories – Waltz's structural realism, liberalism and constructivism, that a comprehensive and inclusive theory is established. As there are many theoretical dichotomies that arise when comparing structural realism to both liberalism and constructivism, it is difficult to assign one theory as being most persuasive. Each specializes in addressing a facet of state relation. For this reason, an amalgamation of elements of the three aforementioned theories is recommended to arrive at a workable model.

³³ Michael Cox, *From the cold War to the War on Terror*, 75.

³⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory*, 54.

The Impact of Clientelism on Sudan and the Implications for a Sustainable Peace

Geoffrey Campbell

Sudan's history, riddled with internal and external conflicts, has provided the basis for hundreds of books to be written regarding the issues of war and peace in Sudan. Over the last fifty years, the world has witnessed numerous attempts by Sudanese leaders to be outspoken about peace while at the same time waging war.¹ In order to understand the complex nature of conflict in Sudan, it is imperative to have an understanding of the role that identity has played in Sudan's history. The account provided here does not portend to be comprehensive in either the breadth or depth of Sudan's long and complicated history, but will examine the crucial elements in many recent conflicts in Sudan's tumultuous history. Specifically, this paper will argue that clientelism has made a crucial impact on Sudan's tumultuous history by promoting conflict and therefore, resolving clientelist policies is crucial to building a sustainable peace in Sudan.

Sudan's political situation is complex which reflects its long history tormented by the legacy of colonialism. In order to provide context, this paper will now briefly outline Sudan's history from colonial times to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad, a religious leader declared that he was the mahdi, the divinely inspired deliverer of the Islamic faith.² He took advantage of the widespread resentment that the "exploitation and maladministration" under colonial rule by leading declaring jihad, or holy war against the British, which unified western and central Sudan, further culminated in a nationalist

¹ Iyob, Ruth and Gilbert M Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 13.

² John H. Clarke, "Mohammed Ahmed, (The Mahdi) Messiah of the Sudan," *The Journal of Negro Education* 30.2 (1961): 157.

revolt which overthrew the capital of Khartoum³ and freed the country from sixty years of colonial oppression.⁴

Sudan was not long thereafter retaken by an Anglo-Egyptian force and was ruled in theory jointly by Egypt and Britain. However, in reality, Britain exercised effective control of the country during this period.

In 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt agreed to Sudanese self-governance, which led to its independence in 1956 under a provisional constitution. The constitution did not mention two crucial issues that still impact the country to this day: "the secular or Islamic character of the state and its federal or unitary structure."⁵ In 1958, there was a coup d'état led by General Ibrahim Abboud who pursued a policy of Arabization and Islamicization for the North and South of Sudan. This increased opposition to his rule by the primarily non-Muslim South and he was eventually overthrown in 1964. The Southern leaders divided into two factions, one in favour of a federation between North and South and another in favour of 'self-determination', which in fact means succession as "it was assumed the south would vote for independence if given the choice."⁶

For sixteen years, from independence until a coup d'état in 1969, governments in Sudan failed to agree on a permanent constitution or to cope with the problems of "factionalism, economic stagnation, and ethnic dissidence."⁷ This period of Sudanese history has had a strong impact on Sudan's current conditions. The main feature of Sudanese politics in this period has often been generalized as a time of 'Arab' Muslim assertion of Islam in society and a domination of the South by refusing it self-determination.

However, in May 1969, Colonel Gaafar Muhammad Nimeri led a group of communist

and socialist military officers to seize power. He replaced Abboud's policy of Islamicization with socialism and outlined a policy of autonomy for the South. After a failed coup attempt by communists in his government he ordered a "massive purge" of communists, which alienated the Soviet Union and led it to withdraw its support.⁸ Despite official policies ceding authority to the South, most southerners had believed since Independence that the more powerful North would subsume the South. This led to minor mutinies and disorganised rebellions eventually united to fight for succession of the South. The two sides eventually came to negotiations under Nimeri with perhaps the most important action during his rule: the Addis Ababa peace agreement between the central government and southern rebels in 1972, which gave the South limited autonomy.

The agreement was not supported by secularist or Islamic Northern parties (which he saw as more important than Southern support) so Nimeri changed course and announced a policy of national reconciliation. In 1979, when Chevron discovered oil in the South, Northern parties pressured Nimeir to appropriate the wealth derived from oil and thereby contravene the peace accord which gave financial independence to the South. Only four years later, in 1983, Nimeri cancelled the peace treaty by abolishing the Southern region, replacing English with Arabic as the official language of the South, and ordered the transfer of southern soldiers to northern command. As Nimeri reverted to Islamicization, he announced that punishments drawn from Shari'a (Islamic) law would be carried out. This was a very controversial step, even among Muslims in the country.⁹

Also in 1983, John Garang, then an army officer was sent to put down the rebellion of troops that refused to relocate to the North but instead also defected and helped found the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A). This set off a civil war that would last twenty-two years.¹⁰ Shortly thereafter, in 1985 a popular

³ Department of State, "Background Note: Sudan," Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs, Nov. 9, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm>.

⁴ Clarke, "Mohammed Ahmed, (The Mahdi) Messiah of the Sudan," 157.

⁵ Department of State, "Background Note: Sudan."

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Department of State, "Background Note: Sudan."

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Gray Phombeah, "Obituary: John Garang," BBC News, 3 August 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/af-rica/2134220.stm>.

uprising caused by repressive tactics of the regime, economic collapse and the war in the South overthrew the Nimeri government. The government held new elections and there were steps towards a new peace with the South, but radical Muslims refused to allow the South to be exempt from Shari'a law.¹¹

In 1989, General Umar al-Bashir along with Islamic army officers overthrew the government and instituted a policy of even further Islamicization. He supported Islamic terrorist groups in Algeria while Khartoum was established as a base for radical Islamist terrorist groups within the country, providing safe haven and logistical support to Osama Bin Laden. The 1990s were a period of increasing alienation by those on the periphery of Sudan because the Bashir government was seen as unresponsive to the concerns of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This alienation from the power centre in Khartoum led to growing sympathy towards and support of the rebel cause led by the SPLM.¹² John Garang, then leader of the SPLM spoke in a radio address to the people of Sudan in May, 1985:

"The SPLA/SPLM belongs to all those who work in the factories and earn so little...to those who wash carts...to those forgotten citizens who crowd under very difficult conditions...and in the slums of our cities...to those in the North who have been callously displaced from your ancestral homes...to you the Nuba and Baggaras of the Centre, to you the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit of the West, to you all, the SPLA is yours....It is often forgotten that the Sudan is not just North and South, The Sudan is also West, East and Centre, no matter what definitions you wish to attach to these labels....All patriots must appreciate the reality that we are a new breed of Sudanese who will not accept being fossilized into sub-citizens in the "Regions."¹³

It is this new vision for the country, one in which

all people can be heard by their government, which mobilised people in support of the SPLM. Iyob and Khadiagala stress the importance of this new relationship between political leaders and rebels. They argue that these "long-term strategic [alliances]... can bring about Sudan's transformation from a morn caliphate to a multinational state capable of governing the inhabitants of the west, south, north, and center as full fledged citizens of the nations".¹⁴ In response to popular support for the SPLM/A, Khartoum was to both wage war against the rebels and at the same time attempt to breed resentment between the rebels by "highlighting tribal divisions".¹⁵ This led to rebel factions uniting behind Colonel John Gurang SPLM which was able to operate with the help of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, partially due to Bashier's support of radical Islamist groups.¹⁶

The 1990s brought regional efforts to end the fighting. From an initial peace agreement through the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) which had "mixed" results but led to a Declaration of Principles (DOP) with an aim to identify the essential elements necessary to a just and comprehensive peace settlement, namely the "relationship between religion and the state, power sharing, wealth sharing, and the right of self-determination for the South".¹⁷ The Sudanese Government, after major military defeats to the SPLA, signed the DOP in 1997. In that year the government signed agreements with other rebel factions which moved them to Khartoum in order to work for the central government or for them to engage militarily against the SPLA. In 2002, GOS and SPLM/A reached an agreement on the role of the state and religion and the south's right to self-determination. This talk led to further declarations, which culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January, 2005. John Garang was appointed first vice-president of Sudan but died in a helicopter

¹¹ Department of State, "Background Note: Sudan."

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M Khadiagala. *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 56.

¹⁴ Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M Khadiagala. *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 56.

¹⁵ Department of State, "Background Note: Sudan."

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Department of State, "Background Note: Sudan."

crash after only three weeks in office.¹⁸

The combined weight of international isolation and domestic economic pressures led to the International Governmental Authority on Development Initiative in 1993.¹⁹ Various rounds of talks proceeded but eventually collapsed in 1994. Bashir declared that he could resolve the conflict "through the barrel of a gun... without the SPLA".²⁰ This led countries within the region namely Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda to oppose Bashir. These countries then "became conduits of military political, and diplomatic support to the SPLA."²¹

In response to Sudan's continued destabilising effects in the region, the United States then pursued the "Frontline Strategy" in 1995 of "expanding economic and diplomatic sanctions against Sudan and strengthening the military capacity of regional states to meet the escalation of the civil war."²² The United States' goals were to "deter Sudanese support for terrorism and extremism, end the north-south civil conflict... and end the humanitarian crisis."²³ This was done by providing economic and military support to the rebels via Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. This aid "became critical to the SPLA's execution of the guerrilla war."²⁴ By 1996, the military effectiveness of the Frontline strategy was evident. "Posing the greatest challenge to the government since 1994, the offensive led to the capture of a string of towns and garrisons."²⁵ A year later, the SPLA's "impressive military gains tilted the balance of power on the battlefield, leading to [John] Garang's claims about the end of the war."²⁶ However, when further negotiations made little progress, the United States announced new sanctions against Khartoum which in turn

had little effect in ending the civil war.²⁷ Instead, it was the military position of each side that determined the tone of the negotiations. As Meghan L. O'Sullivan writes in her book about the effect of sanctions, "Neither Khartoum nor the SPLM had approached the talks with a deep commitment to resolving the conflict. The seriousness with which each side regarded the negotiations largely depended on its position on the battlefield."²⁸ IGAD underwent fits of progress and stagnation until the September 11th, 2001. Terrorist attacks "altered Sudanese-US relations in a more propitious direction" because Khartoum wanted to "break out of pariah status as a former supporter of Al-Qaida."²⁹ Sudan had years earlier, at US insistence, asked Bin Laden's al-Qaeda to leave Sudan.³⁰ It now "publicly supported the international coalition actions against the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban in Afghanistan." Such opposition increased anti-terrorism actions in other countries and Sudan remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list.³¹

At the same time there existed "convergence of interests" among members of IGAD. There was international pressure for renewed peace talks. The United States mediated a six-month moderated cease-fire and joined with other nations in setting a new agenda in 2002 that led to the Machakos Protocol. The Protocol was historic because it "represented a mutual renunciation of previously 'non-negotiable' items such as the Islamization of Southern Sudan on the government side and the secularization of the entire country on the SPLA

¹⁸ Phombeah, "Obituary: John Garang."

¹⁹ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 103-104.

²⁰ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 107.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 109.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Meghan L. O'Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, (R.R. Donnelley, 2003), 265.

²⁸ O'Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, 264-265.

²⁹ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 121.

³⁰ Veronica Nmoma, "The Shift in United States-Sudan Relations: A Troubled Relationship and the Need for Mutual Cooperation," *Journal of Conflict Studies* (2006): 53-54.

³¹ Embassy of the United States Khartoum Sudan, "US-Sudan Relations," Embassy of the United States Khartoum Sudan, http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html.

side.”³² Furthermore, renewed fighting in 2002 led to increased urgency in creating cease fire arrangements.

In an effort to sustain negotiations, the United States passed the Sudan Peace Act in 2002, which would lead to further US sanctions on Sudan if the president could not confirm that both parties were “negotiating in good faith.” It simultaneously held out the possibility of normalised relations. Both parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities and negotiations continued. In order to speed the negotiations along the United States convened a UN Security Council session in Kenya to “press the parties to conclude a comprehensive peace accord”.³³ This was achieved on January 9th, 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi.

The CPA was an “internationally recognised permanent cease-fire and subsequent verification of redeployment of government and SPLA forces.”³⁴ It included a protocol on power sharing measures between North and South which would mean the creation of “government of national unity inspired by democracy, respect for human rights, justice, devolution of power to the states the government of southern Sudan, and good governance.”³⁵ The Agreement also included a wealth sharing protocol that detailed arrangements for the sharing of oil revenues between North and South.³⁶ Perhaps most importantly for Sudan moving forward was the creation of the Government of Southern Sudan’s inclusion of a timetable for a popular referendum on sovereignty for Southern Sudan and whether the oil rich region of Abyei would become part of the North or South. The Agreement, may be one that, as Bashir claimed, “ends the war and makes a new contract for the Sudanese to share their

wealth and defend their country”.³⁷

Sudan’s complex political history reflects its long history of colonialism. Sudan was a collection of independent kingdoms until 1820-1821, when Egypt conquered and unified northern Sudan. However, the vast areas of the South were never effectively controlled by the Egyptians and remained an area inhabited by “fragmented tribes.”³⁸ Due to maladministration by the Egyptians, there was a nationalist revolt overtook the capital. However, not long after, the state was reinvaded by an Anglo-Egyptian force, and the territory when then controlled primarily by the British. The British maintained control both through the use of “brutal military repression” and, perhaps more importantly for the future of the country, through strategies of “divide, ‘re-identify’, co-opt and rule”.³⁹ As Daniel N. Posner summed up in his book, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, nearly all African countries have multi-dimensional ethnic differences which are understood by voters to “convey information about how politicians distribute patronage.”⁴⁰ He continues by stating that “[a]lmost all have local cleavages defined by tribal affiliation or clan membership and national-scale divisions based on religion, language, or region.”⁴¹

The large ethnic differences, coupled along with the legacy of clientelism from the time of decolonisation, contributes to how Africans view the state. In short, “Africa is a region whose poverty and weak government institutions lead citizens to view the state as a resource to be consumed by the ethnic kin of those who control its offices.”⁴² This belief cannot be detached from the history of colonialism and the way in which Africans were forced to rapidly absorb

³² Iyob and M Khadiagala. *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 122

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 124

³⁵ Iyob and Khadiagala. *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 123

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Iyob and Khadiagala. *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 125

³⁸ Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan.”

³⁹ Alison J Ayers, “Sudan’s civil war: the global-historical constitution of political violence,” *Review of African Political Economy* (2010): 157.

⁴⁰ Daniel N. Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 256.

⁴¹ Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 256

⁴² Ibid.

power form colonial powers. Allen continues to describe the introduction of clientelist politics as "a device for dealing effectively with the imposed decolonisation strategies of Britain, France and Belgium, lead over the next decade and half to the phenomenon known at the time as 'political decay': the rapid growth of politicised communalism, political conflict and violence, abuse of political and human rights, and corruption."⁴³

One of the prime examples of the deterioration

that can be brought on by the excesses of clientelism is evidenced by the decades of civil war that Sudan has experienced. By exploiting some and privileging other groups, the British "exacerbated tensions between the different regions" and widened the gap between both modernity and tradition among Sudan's elites and underclass. As former Sudanese Foreign Minister Mansour Khalid writes, this "set the ground for post-colonial class formation and the rise of the northern bourgeoisie that has since dominated Sudanese politics."⁴⁴ British rule aggravated the already radicalised hierarchies by "privileging and co-opting a narrow northern elite which self-consciously identified as 'Arab.'"⁴⁵ The Jellabas', northern Arabised Muslims, social standing was thus confirmed and further empowered as colonists sought to use them to 'influence the whole population.'⁴⁶ These elites, "through British patronage and the manner in which independence was negotiated" helped to ensure, "for the greatest part of Sudan's history, a total monopoly on political power, garnering all the wealth derived from the exercise of such power amongst themselves."⁴⁷

Although Khalid's explanations for further events may be distorted because of his affiliation with

"Sudan's conflicts have been oversimplified to resemble a fight between caricatures of 'Arab/Non-African/nonblack' and 'African/non-Arab/black' protagonists engaged in a zero-sum, game of hegemonic competition."

guerrilla groups, African Scholar Nadir A. L. Mohammed, in the *Review of African Political Economy*, wrote that Khaled's explanation of the "roots of the problem" (the divide and rule policy of the British) was excellent.⁴⁸ Those in power stayed in power because they could reproduce their advantages, however, to lose power "was to risk never having the means to regain it. This simple and readily appreciated fact was to have a profound effect on political behaviour and the political systems that emerged in or from the 1950s."⁴⁹

In Sudan, this led the underprivileged classes of people to unite under the SPLA militant group in hopes of overthrowing the government and increasing their own standards of living. As Berman writes, "Patron-client networks remain the fundamental state-society linkage in circumstances of social crisis and uncertainty and have extended to the very centre of the state. This accounts for the personalistic, materialistic and opportunistic character of African politics."⁵⁰ This cycle of violence will continue until the government of Sudan ensures that all groups of people are considered in the transfer of goods to citizens and not just the privileged few.

With this understanding of some of the major issues that have helped shape modern Sudan, one can analyse the main causes of conflicts that have ravaged the country. As demonstrated, a major factor behind conflict in Sudan has been the role of conflicting ethnic and religious identities. Although it is far beyond the reach of this essay to analyse the many varied ethnic

⁴³ Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 305

⁴⁴ Ayers, "Sudan's civil war: the global-historical constitution of political violence," 157.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 157-158.

⁴⁸ Nadir A. L. Mohammed, "Briefing: The Government They Deserve," *Review of African Political Economy* (1993):130.

⁴⁹ Michael L. Ross, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," *World Politics* 51.2 (1999): 304.

⁵⁰ Bruce J. Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs* 97.388 (1998): 305.

and religious groups that make up Sudan, it is important to note that early conflicts have an effect on present negotiations. As Sudan was a collection of indigenous communities, each with its own power structure, it has been difficult to “fit in the institutional garb of modern statehood.”⁵¹ Sudan’s conflicts have been oversimplified to resemble a fight between caricatures of “Arab/Non-African/nonblack” and ‘African/non-Arab/black’ protagonists engaged in a zero-sum, game of hegemonic competition.”⁵² This ignores the fact that there are many different cultural and ethnic groups in Sudan who have felt disenfranchised by the power centre. This together leads many to argue that “that the raging conflicts are all manifestations of the continuing quest of Sudan’s multiethnic inhabitants for a more equitable membership in a Sudanese polity that recognizes the worth of each and all within it—in short, citizenship”.⁵³

As Iyob and Khadiagala write, it is important to have an “awareness of the rise and ebb of violence from the grassroots, where communities empowered and armed by the Khartoum government seek to secure water, land, and pasturage to ensure the survival of their particular communities at the expense of others.” This inequality has led some to hope for a new Sudan based on the principle of citizenship for those ‘disenfranchised Sudanese alienated by Khartoum’s hegemonic elites’.⁵⁴ While it would be an act of oversimplification to attempt to summarise the varied ethnic groups and their economic disparities here, there are key characteristics in conflicts that have driven Sudanese politics in recent history. These include primarily relate to three overlapping dimensions that unite many Sudanese in struggle against Khartoum: “a traditional conflict over scarce resources, the polarization of Sudanic communities—inextricably linked through ties of history, kinship, and culture; and the demands of political inclusion and economic integration by

marginalized regions.”⁵⁵ These factors are among the key influences in Sudanese politics.

These demands for political inclusion, a share over limited resources, and economic integration are major parts of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The ability to comment on what the future of Sudan holds as the post CPA-era in Sudan is something entirely new in its 54 year history since independence. The US has played a strong role in the peace negotiations and will continue to be an interested party in Sudan’s future. Unfortunately, the vast majority of the academic literature on the possible future of Sudan was written before the CPA and is therefore too outdated for a discussion about the specifics of contemporary Sudanese politics. However, general recommendations regarding US policy towards Sudan still hold true. In 2003, O’Sullivan wrote that “[t]he United States can best ensure ongoing Sudanese assistance if it makes clear to Sudan that continued cooperation will lead to better U.S (sic) relations in general, and Sudan’s eventual removal from the U.S. terrorism list more specifically.”⁵⁶ The US Secretary of State Clinton spoke about the crucial importance of respecting the vote results of the referendum on Southern succession:

“And regardless of the outcome, the will of the people must be respected by all parties in Sudan and around the world. Because we have already seen the alternative. The alternative, the unacceptable alternative, is Sudan’s past, more than four decades of recurring conflict, two million people dead, millions more displaced, simmering tensions that stall development and perpetuate poverty, then erupt again to darken the lives of another generation of Sudanese children.”⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Ibid, 160.

⁵⁶ O’Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, 276.

⁵⁷ Hilary Clinton, “Clinton’s Remarks at U.N. Security Council Meeting on Sudan,” 16 November 2010, *America.gov*. <http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2010/November/20101116140445su0.9675061.html?CP.rss=true>.

⁵¹ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 36.

⁵² Ibid, 27.

⁵³ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 27.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 55.

This follows the argument by Iyob and Khadiagala about long-term peace in Sudan. "Peace, if it is to be sustained, must not only provide for the large and well-known communities but also nurture the aspirations for social justice and equity of those Sudanese whose histories have been rendered illegible and illegitimate by elite groups seeking to consolidate their hegemony over Africa's giant nation. The numerous and sustained inter-communal encounters and exchanges of the past resulted in the fusion of cultures, ethnicities, and identities which need to be considered in creating twenty-first century Sudan."⁵⁸ In practical terms this means a devolution of power from the centre to the periphery.

In *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, Douglas Johnson writes that this may finally be a possibility. "Every internationally-sponsored peace forum has ended at the same place: determination as the principle on which the war is to be resolved. The dilution of this principle has come through alternative initiatives outside formal mediation."⁵⁹ This has been made possible due to countries not pressuring Khartoum to allow for a real devolution of power from the centre. Writing before the CPA was agreed upon, Johnson asserted that they were "denied a final vote on their own future, and a decision on the form of government under which [they] were to live as one people was deferred to a never-realized future".⁶⁰ However, this yet to be realised future of self-determination may in fact finally be fulfilled under the referendum on self determination of the South required by the CPA.

The Berghof Foundation for Peace Support came to the same conclusion on their "Sudanese Conflict Analysis and Systemic Conflict Transition" paper. It wrote that, in addition to the logistical steps that need to be taken, there also needs to be a process of inclusiveness and a shift from marginalization to a "genuine devolution of power" from Khartoum to the South. Among

these steps, ensuring that there is real power sharing agreements and that Southern Sudanese "share politically and administratively in all the affairs of the country" is crucial.⁶¹ It also declares that devolution of power needs "to be done as a political development priority. People at the grass roots want to see themselves effectively taking decisions that affect their lives and conditions. At that level, there is a need to set up a structure that will help in ensuring that power is indeed devolved to the grass roots to avoid any sort of marginalization."⁶²

To emphasise the cost of war and to pressure governments to pursue peace, *Frontier Economics* partnered with civil society organisations to provide an economic impact of a return to war. They estimated that it would cost in excess of \$100 billion dollars to Sudan and the world community over ten years.⁶³ They wrote that the only truly peaceful scenario would be one in which "Both sides accept the referendum result (succession) and outstanding issues of contention are resolved quickly."⁶⁴ There is an evident concurrence in these three studies on the necessity of a decentralization of power based on the will of the Sudanese people.

Only in time will Sudan's path become known, whether it is one in which clientelism is finally (albeit gradually) eliminated from life in Sudan, or one where yet again there will be degradation between the North and South. This latter option threatens a return to conflict or a continuation of low-level violence in which there is no reconciliation while the former may herald a new era of peace and independence.

⁵⁸ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 26.

⁵⁹ Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 180.

⁶⁰ Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 180

⁶¹ "Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation," *Berghoff Foundation for Peace Support*, Jan. 2006, http://www.berghofpeacesupport.org/publications/SUD_Sudan_Options_for_Systemic_Conflict_Transformation.pdf.

⁶² "Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation," 78.

⁶³ "The Cost of Future Conflict in Sudan." *Frontier Economics*, http://www.frontiereconomics.com/_library/pdfs/frontier%20report%20the%20cost%20of%20future%20conflict%20in%20sudan.pdf.

⁶⁴ "The Cost of Future Conflict in Sudan." *Frontier Economics*, 6.