

and empowerment to women, they also provide a focus on educating male members of the community on the effects of FGM. For example, the alternative rite of passage in Kenya provides men with education regarding the negative effects of FGM, and after, they commit to eliminating FGM as a prerequisite for marriage.³⁹ The inclusion and engagement of male members of society in these programs is a key component of their success. FGM is closely linked to the status of women and their "marriageability" and thus, it is imperative that "FGM lose its position as a criterion of marriage in men's eyes."⁴⁰ This will serve to effectively alter a powerful social and cultural convention that necessitates the practice of FGM, representing substantial progress for change.

The implementation of a legal framework for the prohibition of FGM can only be successful once the cultural conventions influencing the continuation of the practice have been effectively changed. Indeed, unless legal prohibitions are "accompanied by sustained educational efforts at the grassroots and community level, the chances of the elimination of FGM are probably slim."⁴¹ Cultural and grassroots approaches have been the most successful methods in terms of achieving commitment to behavioural change at the community level, demonstrated by the case studies focusing on the "Circumcision Through Words" and Tostan programs. While international advocacy efforts and national legislation play an important role in the fight against FGM, these initiatives have been limited in their ability to impact the rural communities where FGM is most commonly practiced. While it is clear that there has been significant progress in the fight against FGM, the practice remains a widespread issue in Africa. Further implementation of educational community-based programs, complemented by continued international initiatives and government legislation, will offer the most effective strategy in the continued struggle to eliminate the practice of FGM.

³⁹ Chelala, "An Alternative Way," 126.

⁴⁰ Finke, "Genital Mutilation as an Expression," 17.

⁴¹ Chelala, "An Alternative Way," 126.

Camping with the Enemy: the United States, Pakistan and the War in Afghanistan

Adam G. Rousselle

INTRODUCTION

The United States and its NATO allies have committed themselves to a stable and secure Afghanistan. Pakistan's role in this endeavour is crucial; however, the country has not only proven itself an unreliable partner, but also dangerous liability with an uncontrollable military apparatus which many suspect maintains ties to the Afghan insurgency. These factors have understandably caused a dramatic cooling of relations between the United States and Pakistan as of late. However, Pakistan's cooperation in the Afghan mission not only remains essential but, as this article will demonstrate, is now more important to success in Afghanistan than ever.

At this point, the situation in which the United States and its allies find itself with regard to Pakistan is reminiscent of a comment made by President Lyndon Johnson in 1971. Johnson had been considering dismissing J. Edgar Hoover from his position as First Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation because he had long been acting on his own accord and overstepping the authority of the president and congress. While this was indeed problematic, Johnson also understood the cost to his administration which would accompany Hoover's alienation. His quote on this matter is as relevant to the subject of this article as it was to his own predicament:

"It's probably better to have him inside the tent pissing out, than outside the tent pissing in"

This metaphor for an unpleasant camping trip succinctly summarizes the central argument of this article: Pakistan's questionable behaviour can be accepted and utilized in a compromising strategy, or ignored and antagonized to the detriment of the NATO mission and regional

security as a whole.

This article will propose that Pakistan will play a role in Afghanistan's future long after NATO forces have withdrawn, regardless of whether or not this is desired by the international community. At this crucial time, the way in which Pakistan directs its efforts in regard to Afghanistan may still be influenced, though not fully controlled. If the United States and NATO are to achieve success in Afghanistan, they must have Pakistan's cooperation, however unpleasant its vision for the country's future may be. Most importantly, this article will argue in favour of a long-term strategy of security cooperation between the United States and Pakistan which transcends the periodic relevance Pakistan has had to U.S. foreign policy objectives at various points in history.

For this reason, we must first examine the roots of this conflict and chronologically examine how relations developed between the United States and Pakistan to their present state in the context of regional security. It is through this examination that a pattern of behaviour in the United States' foreign policy toward Pakistan will become apparent.

HISTORICAL ROOTS

During the Cold War, Pakistan's geographical position between India, China and the Soviet Union made it a natural partner of the United States. Pakistan was desperately lacking in allies due to its poisonous relationship with India, the legacy of colonialism from Europe, and its aversion to the communist powers of the Soviet Union and China. The United States was a global power which lacked partners in the region and thus became the best possible solution for Pakistan's much needed external support.

Throughout its history as a state, Pakistan's primary interest has been security. It has always been militarily and economically weaker than its primary rival India. Meanwhile the security interests of the United States have always been mainly focused north of the country: first to the Soviet Union, then to Afghanistan.

While Pakistan desperately needed assistance from

the United States, Washington's global strategy left it in a precarious position. For example: by 1965 U.S. economic aid to Pakistan amounted to roughly 3 billion dollars, while economic aid to India exceeded 6 billion dollars. U.S. military assistance to Pakistan that year was 1.5 billion dollars and though India only received 84.5 million dollars in American military supplies, the superior economic aid to India gave it the ability to purchase military hardware to a much greater extent than Pakistan's own resources would allow¹. The issue of Washington's dual interest in these bitter rivals is a continued dilemma which has no clear foreseeable solution.

Pakistan's security issues led the country to make its military a primary focus early in its history. Though its relationship with the United States had undoubtedly strengthened the country's economic and military strength in its early years, the allocation of resources to the military and the subsequent empowering thereof has had a stifling effect on Pakistan's political and economic spheres. While India has seen extensive economic growth, particularly over the past two decades, Pakistan's economy remains relatively weak. This problem in no small part contributed to by the strain of massive military spending and high levels of corruption both in the military and among Pakistan's landed elites, whose interests often coincide with those of the military.

Further straining for Pakistan is the fractured nature of its elites and society as a whole. Though the country was unified by religious nationalism in 1947, it is divided by its many ethnicities and languages over a vast territory. A multitude of elite factions compete for control, whose visions for the country range from democracy, to military rule, to Islamism and multiple hybrid variants thereof. While security remains a priority for Pakistan's decision makers, the way in which this is pursued varies greatly.

The root of the United States' problems in Afghanistan can be traced to December 27th, 1979 when the Soviet Union sent its first wave of

¹ A.S. Khan, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changing International Scenario," *The Muslim World* Vol. 96 (2006): 236-237.

combat troops across the its southern border to Afghanistan to aid the beleaguered communist government of Hafizullah Amin. Pakistan's effectively open border with Afghanistan and India's closeness to the Soviet Union made its military dictator, Zia ul-Haq fear for the survival of his country.² Pakistan's strategic location, particularly in relation to the Arabian Sea was a cause of concern for many in the West who had long feared Soviet military build up.

A common problem every modern state had encountered when attempting to gain control of the Pashtun-dominated territories of contemporary Afghanistan and Pakistan is the sheer difficulty of the task itself. The first Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-1842 resulted in the horrific massacre of all but a handful of the occupying troops, and the Second Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-1880 produced only a nominal victory for the British who withdrew after heavy losses, installing a regime which was barely capable of controlling the country itself. Historically, the constant inter-tribal conflict among the Pashtun people has ceased only when united by their common aversion to an overarching government attempting to impose laws and collect taxes.³

Historically, a modern military, with its superior technology and troop discipline has always found the initial invasion of Afghanistan easy, with cities falling quickly under their control and an agreeable government ready to be installed. This was indeed the case with the Soviet Union, who quickly took the major cities of Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul and Kandahar and established military and air force bases to solidify their control. They found President Amin disagreeable and replaced him with his rival Babrak Karmal. Amin was murdered in a bloody siege of Tajbeg Palace in Kabul on December 27th, 1979 – the same day as the invasion to 'assist' his government.⁴ Though

Amin fell with relative ease, problems would arise when trying to control the country's rural vast majority which had proven impossible to every previous government of Afghanistan.

The Soviet response to the dilemma of Afghanistan's countryside was to launch what was effectively a war against the civilian population in an attempt to route insurgent fighters. Centuries-old irrigation systems were destroyed, driving millions from their traditional farmlands. Landmines disguised as toys and candies were used to lure and cripple children so their parents would have to tend to them and thus not participate in the insurgency. Massacres from Hind helicopter gunships targeting villages whose only form of resistance were anachronistic rifles incapable of penetrating the gunships' armour plating became commonplace.⁵ These are just some of the atrocities committed by the Soviet Army during the war. Millions of refugees fled to neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan only to face violence and starvation in overcrowded refugee camps. For many, the justification for supporting the Afghan insurgency carried as much weight on moral grounds as it did as a strategy of containment against the Soviet Union.

Pakistan's role in the insurgency would be crucial. The Pashtun of the northernmost reaches of the British Raj, which would be inherited by Pakistan, were given special status and largely left to their own affairs in what is now Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Regions (FATA) within the Northwest Frontier Province. The border separating Pashtun living in modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan was created by Sir Mortimer Durand in 1894 by drawing an arbitrary line which often cut through villages and pasturelands in an effort to divide the people on either side. However, the lack of control over the territory known as "Pashtunistan" by either state has led to what is effectively an open border to this day. Pakistan's Pashtun minority of nearly 36 million is almost three times as large as Afghanistan's roughly 13 million Pashtun plurality, making Pakistan's northern regions a

² Geraint Hughes, "The Soviet Afghan War, 1978-1989: An Overview," *Defence Studies* 8 (3) (2008): 234.

³ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban*. (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press): 155-219.

⁴ "Timeline: The Soviet War in Afghanistan," BBC World News, February 27, 2009.

⁵ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History*, 255.

natural safe haven for those fleeing Afghanistan.⁶ These factors, coupled with Islamabad's opposition to the war, made Pakistan the ideal starting point from which lend foreign support to a covert war.

Though initially reluctant, the United States would eventually launch the largest covert war in its history against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This required the re-kindling of cool relations with Pakistan, which had become strained in the 1970s. Aid to Pakistan increased dramatically and the country's emerging nuclear weapons programme went largely overlooked. Furthermore, all money and arms directed to the Afghan insurgency would be given directly to the Pakistani government whose elite Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) would oversee its allocation. The ISI is Pakistan's premier intelligence agency which has the unique power to conduct intelligence activities both domestically and abroad.⁷ This manoeuvrability has given the ISI an enormous amount of power and the ability to act with considerable independence.

The United States logistically understood the way to effectively undermine a foreign force occupying Afghanistan. A 1985 CIA report regarding Afghanistan stated that "...as long as insurgents have access to strong external support and open borders, the Soviets would find it difficult to control much of the (Afghan) countryside."⁸ With this basic knowledge, the United States understood that it was indirectly engaged in a battle which it could almost certainly claim victory. This reality however, would prove highly problematic in recent years.

Pakistan brimmed with weapons and ammunition as countries such as France, the United Kingdom and China 'donated' their surplus arms. The Pakistani government would eventually complain that these countries were simply "dumping" arms,

many of which not in working order, in an effort to dispose of them.⁹ The result was a society more militarized than ever before.

The amount of money allocated to the war effort by the CIA was equally matched by Saudi Arabia and private donors in the Arab Persian Gulf States under the auspices of aiding a *Mujahedeen* or *Holy War* against atheistic communist influences. The regime under General Zia ul-Haq had been pursuing the Islamization of Pakistani society since coming to power in 1978, instituting many sharia-based reforms. Saudi donors began establishing religious schools dedicated to the extreme Sunni sect of Wahhabism throughout Pakistan, particularly in the impoverished Pashtun-dominated Northwest Frontier Province. In 1971 there were roughly 900 religious schools in all of Pakistan, by the end of the Soviet-Afghan War that number had risen to roughly 45,000 officially registered schools and many more unregistered operations.¹⁰ This would have a profound long-term effect on Pakistani society whose consequences can be seen throughout the country today.

In addition to money, American partners such as Saudi Arabia, other Arab states and private individuals encouraged ideologically charged young men to go to Pakistan to assist their Muslim brothers in the Afghan Mujahedeen. These young men, many from upper-middle class backgrounds found difficulty adapting to guerrilla warfare in an impoverished area where most people did not speak their language. In turn, local forces often complained of the young Arabs' poor fighting skills, showboating and overall lack of commitment: many of the so-called "Afghan Arabs" simply stayed on the Pakistani side of the border.¹¹ Though their presence had little overall effect on the war effort, and was often a hindrance to it, the experience of participants such as Ayman

⁶ CIA World Factbook, "Country Profile: Afghanistan."; CIA World Factbook, "Country Profile: Pakistan"

⁷ Shaun Gregory, "The ISI and the War on Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30 (2007):1016.

⁸ E.C. Leventis, "The Waziristan Accord," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11(4) (2007): 24

⁹ Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2008): 114.

¹⁰ A.Z. Hilali, "The Challenges to Pakistan's Domestic Security," *Journal of Third World Studies*, 19 (1) (2002): 87.

¹¹ Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 342.

al-Zawahiri and Osama Bin Laden would have a profound effect on global events to come.

Despite the numerous future ramifications involved with assisting the Afghan Mujahedeen, its overall success cannot be disputed. The Soviet Union withdrew its combat forces on February 15th, 1989, ending nearly a decade of persistent inhuman atrocities committed both by and against the occupying forces.¹² However, the problems of an arms influx, religious ideological charging and a power vacuum in Afghanistan would only be exacerbated by the usual cycle of American relations with Pakistan.

Just as in the 1970s, Pakistan's relevance to American foreign policy appeared to have disintegrated by the end of the Soviet-Afghan War. In 1990 military and economic assistance to Pakistan were suspended as punishment for Pakistan's previously overlooked nuclear program.¹³ This drastic end to Pakistan's 1980s windfall of assistance also came at a time when the United States was pursuing much closer ties to India, whose growing economy became increasingly difficult to ignore. With the loss of legitimate channels for obtaining new American military hardware and a struggling economy, Pakistan was once again left in a position of extreme vulnerability and to pursue alternate means of attaining security.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet withdrawal left the communist government of Muhammad Najibullah to fend for itself, albeit with extensive material assistance from Moscow. The seven major Sunni parties of the Afghan Mujahedeen were brought together to form the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) to overthrow Najibullah and unify the country. The first clashes between the AIG and Najibullah's forces led to the humiliating defeat of the AIG, whose tenuous alliance disintegrated, plunging the country into a brutal civil war. Najibullah's government would not fall until

1992, outlasting the very government in Moscow which had facilitated its rise.¹⁴ Afghanistan was left in a state of unparalleled violent chaos.

For Pakistan, having a functioning, friendly state in Afghanistan has always been in its interest for the reasons of having a much needed regional ally, pacifying its own Pashtun population, and possibly for "strategic depth" wherein the Pakistani army would have territory in which it could retreat in the event of a war with India. Islamabad initially allied with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun Islamist with ties to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, as their favoured warlord during the Afghan Civil War. Hekmatyar struggled for control of Afghanistan against the Tajik warlord Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Uzbek Aburrashid Dostum, and multiple others.¹⁵ The inability of any of these warlords to gain control of the country led to dismay in Islamabad as millions of dollars worth of arms and supplies were being handed over to no avail.

The scale of damage wrought by the Soviet army in Afghanistan's countryside had now been applied to its cities which became battlegrounds for opposing warlords. While violence and anarchy had long existed in Afghanistan, the extent of destruction and the power of the modern weapons used had caused devastation and mass frustration throughout the country.

In the summer of 1994 in southern Afghanistan near Kandahar, a local strongman raped several girls in his area. A religious leader named Mullah Mohammed Omar ordered his students to execute this man and intimidate his followers. From this starting point, the movement grew rapidly in proportion to society's desire for law and order. Omar's followers grew in rank, filling requests for assistance throughout the region.¹⁶ The group called itself the "Taliban", derived from the Farsi/ Pashtu word "talib" meaning "student". The brutality with which it executed its extreme interpretation of Islam was accepted by a society desperate for anything resembling security.

¹² BBC World News, "Timeline: The Soviet War in Afghanistan," BBC World News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm>.

¹³ Khan, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changing International Scenario," 242.

¹⁴ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History*, 269.

¹⁵ Gregory, "The ISI and the War on Terrorism," 1018.

¹⁶ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History*, 279.

Pakistan understood the potential of the Taliban movement. In 1994 Pakistan's Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar, with the assent of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto began funnelling arms and ammunition to the Taliban through the ISI. The Taliban's Wahhabist-influenced ideology was also favoured by Saudi Arabia, who is also believed to have offered extensive financial support. The ISI promoted Mullah Omar as the sole leader of the Taliban, believing him to be the most likely to remain under their influence. With external support, the Taliban was able to take Kabul in 1996, brutally torturing and executing the ousted communist leader Mohammad Najibullah and claiming control over most of the country. Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries in the world to recognize the Taliban's sovereignty over Afghanistan that year.¹⁷ As the Taliban consolidated their power and made their presence known, countries in the region and around the world cringed at their draconian brutality, particularly toward women and girls.

It was during this time that we find one of the best examples of the fractured nature of Pakistan's governing structure. Democratically elected politicians like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were accountable to the military and ISI, which viewed themselves as the "custodians of national security." By the early 1990s, Islamist sympathies were widespread in the senior ranks of Pakistan's military and ISI as it was believed to be an effective method of spreading Pakistan's influence in the region. Though Bhutto was particularly uncomfortable with groups like the Taliban and pushed for a broad-based coalition in Afghanistan, she was largely powerless to stop her country's outpouring of support to them.¹⁸ The power held by senior leaders in Pakistan's military cannot be understated and their cooperation is essential to any kind of successful partnership with Islamabad.

In Afghanistan, the former Mujahedeen warlords

that had inflicted so much damage on the country in the early 1990s were pushed to the north of the country. They collaborated to form what became known as the Northern Alliance and their ranks consisted of every major ethnic group in the country except Pashtun, the largest ethnic group. The one major exception was a man named Hamid Karzai, who had fled the south of the country and joined the Northern Alliance after his father was assassinated, apparently by Taliban operatives.¹⁹ Karzai's ancestry, education and calm demeanour made him an excellent spokesman and leader for the Northern Alliance; however his shortcomings, both personal and circumstantial, would eventually become problematic.

The United States' response to events in the region was to further withdraw in a semi-antagonistic fashion. Further economic sanctions were imposed on Pakistan following its first successful nuclear test in 1998. General Pervez Musharraf's 1999 rise to power through a military coup caused further alarm in Washington and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Pakistan's civilian governing institutions. As Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff, Musharraf was instrumental in maintaining Pakistan's hard line against India through the Kargil conflict as well as continuing to support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States responded by completely severing economic relations with Pakistan due to a law calling for such action to be taken against countries whose governments came to power by displacing a government which was democratically elected. Policymakers in the United States had even considered labelling Pakistan a terrorist state at this time due to its territory being made available to militant Islamic groups acting in Kashmir, Afghanistan and elsewhere.²⁰ However, with ties largely severed nearly a decade prior, the United States could do little to stop Pakistan's alarming behaviour short of potentially dangerous and costly military threats. As Pakistan desperately and destructively attempted to improve its security situation, the United States could do little more than observe the oncoming dangers

¹⁷ Gregory, "The ISI and the War on Terrorism," 1019.

¹⁸ Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 348-354.

¹⁹ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History*, 307.

²⁰ Khan, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changing International Scenario," 242.

posed by this behaviour.

In 1996 Mullah Omar accepted guests into his country, an action which would eventually cost thousands of lives and come at the detriment of his regime. After having been expelled by the Sudanese in response to pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Osama Bin Laden and his closest al-Qaeda supporters arrived in Afghanistan in 1996. Bin Laden's assistance to the Taliban was appreciated, but his external activities were cause for alarm. Al-Qaeda's orchestration attacks on American targets in East Africa in 1998 led to cruise missile attacks on his camps in Afghanistan by the United States. Another attack on the USS Cole in 2000 was not even met with retaliation, which many claim led to Bin Laden's frustration.²¹ Al-Qaeda's next attack on September 11th, 2001 reverberated throughout the world and provoked the wrath for which Bin Laden apparently had hoped.

It is from this context that we can see pattern of United States – Pakistan relations. When Pakistan was left to its own devices due to its perceived irrelevance to American foreign policy objectives, the vulnerable position with which it found itself compelled it toward behaviour which was ultimately came at the detriment of global security. By empowering the Taliban, Pakistan provided a safe haven for a malevolent force intent on attacking the United States. Though Pakistan had long been developing a nuclear programme, the fact that achieved its first successful detonation during this period of vulnerability was perhaps no accident. The 1990s produced a region with a dangerously radical state harbouring even more dangerous radicals as well as the nuclear armament of the bitter rival of another nuclear-armed state.

From this perspective, it can be agreed by most that situation like that of the 1990's in South Asia should be avoided. Is the region heading in this direction again? In order to answer this question, we must examine the efforts of NATO and Pakistan with regard to the current war in

Afghanistan.

CURRENT CONTEXT

An American invasion of Afghanistan soon became an inevitability following the attacks of September 11th, 2001. Many high-level officials in the United States held Pakistan partially responsible for the attack for facilitating the rise of those who harboured the perpetrators. Some believe that it was, in fact the ISI who facilitated Bin Laden's initial meetings with the Taliban.²² However, to effectively invade and occupy Afghanistan, the United States would logistically need Pakistan. This need was twofold as it required Pakistani ascent as a supply route as well as the cooperation of its own military in eradicating Taliban support in its northern reaches.

Whether it was Bush official Richard Armitage's alleged threat to bomb Pakistan 'into the stone-age' or Musharraf's understanding of the benefit American support would bring to his country, Pakistan offered its full assistance to the United States. Sanctions imposed on Pakistan were lifted, civilian and military aid was lavished and criticism of Musharraf's governance was no longer voiced.²³ With Pakistan's new relevance to American foreign policy, the cycle of relations between the two countries would be proven once more.

In order to hunt al-Qaeda, the United States deemed it necessary to first overthrow the Taliban. However, the initial American military commitment to Afghanistan was astonishingly sparse: President Bush quipped "what's the use of using \$2 million missiles to hit a \$10 tent." Reluctant to engage ground troops, the United States relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to route the Taliban while it offered air support. The Taliban were toppled with relative ease, much of which can be attributed to the willingness of the Pashtun in the south to overthrow them. This demonstrates that their rule was only accepted for the security which was provided. It may also

²² Gregory, "The ISI and the War on Terrorism," 1019.

²³ Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 388.

²¹ Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 344-346.

be partially attributed to Taliban having stripped many of these people of their primary source of income from heroin production a year prior.²⁴ Nevertheless, Taliban came to an end and the opportunity to form a new government to provide desperately needed security presented itself.

The government formed in Kabul was nearly entirely comprised of war lords and drug barons of the Northern Alliance, reputed to be brutal and corrupt. Further troubling was the fact that most of the Northern Alliance was comprised of the country's Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen and Hazara minorities, with a notable lack of representation the country's dominant Pashtun population²⁵. The notable exception, of course was the ethnic Pashtun President Hamid Karzai, whose leadership has proven problematic for a number of notable reasons, including corruption and a lack of accountability.

The Taliban had largely slipped away when overrun by the Northern Alliance. Al-Qaeda re-enforced its position in the Tora Bora region and, following the ineffectiveness of the poorly equipped Northern Alliance fighters, the United States attacked their position in December of 2001. Though many al-Qaeda operatives were killed in the ensuing battle, Bin Laden, Zawahiri and other top al-Qaeda members were not to be found²⁶. While the top leadership of the Taliban and al-Qaeda had largely escaped, mostly to Pakistan's FATA region, the United States became increasingly occupied with other foreign policy concerns, such as the pursuit of non-existent weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The security the people of Afghanistan had desired was left in the hands of the new government and an insufficient number of NATO coalition troops. An opportunity was lost; the peace which ensued would not be long lasting.

Pakistan's commitment to the United States would prove to be problematic for President Musharraf. The first problem was severing ties

with groups with which it had substantial ties like the Taliban. Musharraf worked to sever ties between his top officials and the ISI with the Taliban,²⁷ however, the events to come suggest that these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. The American occupation of Afghanistan would require the pacification of Pakistan's unruly Federally Administered Tribal Region (FATA), which had long served as a base of external support to Afghanistan. In July of 2002, the Pakistani government dispatched approximately 80,000 troops to the border areas of FATA for the first time since 1947 in search of Taliban and Al Qaeda members.²⁸ This operation would not produce the results desperately required for the successful occupation of Afghanistan.

Almost immediately after Islamabad's military operation, a violent resistance eventually began in response to what was perceived as an incursion by a foreign army. The way in which the Pakistani military conducted its operations has been described as the "indiscriminate use of force and human rights violations."²⁹ As a conventional military force, the Pakistani military remains virtually incapable of embracing a strategy of counterinsurgency which would enable it to "hold areas and win the support of locals." As a result, the operations caused considerable local devastation and displacement of populations, particularly in the Banjur and Swat regions.³⁰ This attempt at pacification would serve to exacerbate a coming dilemma.

Initially, the Pakistani military operations were met with success in the eyes of policymakers in Washington. Throughout 2002 the paramilitary Frontier Corps raided weapons caches in the South Waziristan agency of FATA, the regular army assaulted al-Qaeda troops entering in South Waziristan during *Operation Kazha Punga*, regular army troops entered areas in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies of FATA to pursue al-Qaeda operatives fleeing Afghanistan, and the military,

²⁴ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History*, 307-309.

²⁵ Ibid, 309.

²⁶ Ibid, 392-393.

²⁷ Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 290.

²⁸ Leventis, "The Waziristan Accord," 24.

²⁹ Ibid, 25.

³⁰ Christine Fair, C. and Seth G. Jones. "Pakistan's War Within." *Survival* 51(6) (2009): 162.

police and intelligence services collaborated in operations against insurgents in Baluchistan province.³¹ Additionally, Pakistan's ISI was able to track and locate the Al Qaeda operative and reported mastermind of the 9/11 hijackings Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in Rawalpindi in March of 2003. During these early years Pakistan became instrumental in the capture and extradition of several suspects wanted by the United States.³² Because the occupation of Afghanistan was not initially problematic, Pakistan's cooperation proved initially successful.

Despite successes, the Pakistani government found its operations increasingly difficult. In addition to dealing with the divided loyalties of tribal leaders, thousands of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens and Arabs had flocked to the FATA to assist in the Mujahedeen efforts. What became known as the "Waziristan Conflict" had major security ramifications throughout Pakistan. December of 2003 saw two assassination attempts on President Musharraf, both traced to militants from North and South Waziristan. Terrorist incidents throughout the country have inclined at shocking rates since 2002. It is estimated that between 2004 and 2006, the Pakistani military lost between 1000 and 3000 men as a direct result of the "war in Waziristan". Despite this, the Pakistani military has refused to adopt a counterinsurgency focus has instead opted to maintain the military's conventional focus best suited to combating India as opposed to handling this burgeoning domestic threats.³³ For Pakistan, a solution was required which would best serve its own strategic interests.

The government of Pakistan attempted to gain support among combatants in FATA as early as 2004. The first attempt, known as the "Shaka ideal" saw five South Waziristan tribal leaders accused of harbouring Al Qaeda members "surrender" to the Pakistani government and "pledge loyalty" in return for leniency. In return the government

released 155 of the 163 tribesmen captured in March of 2004 and gave the so-called foreign terrorists until the end of April to surrender and receive a pardon. A general amnesty was offered to all combatants except top members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The amnesty date was extended twice, but Islamabad failed to locate any foreign operatives in Waziristan: violence increased and cross border movement continued. A similar second deal was offered in February of 2005 with further concessions from Islamabad but it too ended in a failure of stem cross border movement, decrease local violence or locate foreign operatives.³⁴ Most importantly, both deals saw the combatants compensated by Islamabad and permitted to keep their arms, some of which were "offered" to the military in a "ceremonial gesture." Both deals were seen as surrender by Islamabad to the majority of locals in FATA. Between negotiations the Pakistani military continued operations in the FATA region utilising the same strategy of largely indiscriminate use of force with little or no success.³⁵ Policymakers in Pakistan were increasingly finding themselves in a situation with no immediate remedy.

On September 5th, 2006 in the town of Miranshah, North Waziristan tribal leaders and representatives of the Pakistani government came to an agreement known as the first "Waziristan Accord." The treaty has been viewed by some as an "unconditional surrender" on the part of the Pakistani government to the tribes of the area, the Taliban and al-Qaeda in an attempt to keep the conflict from spilling over to other parts of the country,³⁶ though it could be more aptly described as a reaffirmation of the 'status quo' since the area had previously been controlled by Taliban loyalists prior to the operations. The meeting was attended by approximately 500 elders, parliamentarians and government officials and was signed by Dr. Fakhr-i-Alam, a political agent of North Waziristan. Also in attendance were seven members of the Taliban *shura* (advisory

³¹ Fair and Jones, "Pakistan's War Within," 162.

³² Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, "Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 31 (2008): 782.

³³ Leventis, "The Waziristan Accord," 24.

³⁴ Leventis, "The Waziristan Accord," 25-26.

³⁵ Fair and Jones, "Pakistan's War Within," 171.

³⁶ Leventis, "The Waziristan Accord," 25.

council).³⁷ Immediately following the agreement, violence against government troops on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line decreased somewhat, but insurgent violence in Afghanistan increased dramatically – violence which was aimed at American and NATO troops.

Like previous attempts at reaching an agreement, the first Waziristan Accord was not sustainable: violence has continued from both sides and new attempts at agreements have been made with varying success. With the Afghan insurgency crucially linked to supplies and supporters in Pakistan, attempts at the reaffirmation of the status-quo of lawlessness and Taliban control in key areas of FATA is undoubtedly counter to the interests of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan – at least as long as their troops are engaged in combat operations against the Taliban. Because of Pakistan's unwillingness or inability to stem the flow of supplies and people across the border into Afghanistan, the United States sought an alternative to Pakistani cooperation on this matter.

Beginning in 2004, the United States began bombing areas suspected of harbouring enemy combatants in FATA using predator drone aircraft. The first attack in June was carried out against Nek Muhammad Wazir, one of the tribal leaders in the Shakai deal who had vowed to continue his Jihad against the United States by supporting the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Though the Pakistani government initially attempted to take responsibility in an attempt to control the public backlash, the increased frequency of attacks made it undeniable that the United States was responsible. The Pakistani government would subsequently officially protest the incursions on their soil, particularly in relation to the loss of innocent civilians. The transition from the Bush administration to that of Obama in January of 2009 saw no change in this policy and the administration's first bombing took place just three days after the president's inauguration with the frequency of attacks being far greater than

that of his predecessors.³⁸ Though these attacks have undeniably been effective in hitting "high value targets", the effects they have had on the civilian population in Pakistan's FATA has had a strenuous effect on relations between it and the United States.

In 2006 the Taliban re-emerged in southern Afghanistan as a well-trained, well armed fighting force numbering in the thousands. They flocked over the Pakistani border to attack the mainly American, Canadian, British and Dutch troops in the region – by the end of the year coalition casualties had risen fifty per cent from the previous year, spread evenly between the United States and the other NATO allies. Having come out of Pakistan's wretchedly impoverished FATA, the battered Taliban clearly had some source of support from within Pakistan. In the spring the resurgent forces were not only numerous and disciplined, but were also armed with more sophisticated weapons than the mere Soviet-era Ak-47's found in households on both sides of the border. The Pakistani military had managed to maintain control over weapons depots containing sophisticated explosives such as IED's (improvised explosive device/ roadside bombs) and RPG's (rocket-propelled grenades).³⁹ There are few who doubt that ISI operatives were again collaborating with the Taliban.

Recently leaked documents from Wikileaks also indicate that the United States intelligence community believed members of the Pakistani military were behind these actions.⁴⁰ Though Pakistan has thus far denied these reports, evidence favours the contrary. If these accusations are true, they indicate that Pakistan is at best incapable of controlling its military and intelligence units on a massive scale and at worst operating as an enemy of the NATO forces in

³⁷ Leventis, "The Waziristan Accord," 26.

³⁸ B.G. Williams, "The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 33: 874-876.

³⁹ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History*, 335-336.

⁴⁰ BBC World News, "Pakistan denies Wikileaks reports that it 'aided Taliban,'" BBC World News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10758188>.

Afghanistan.

In addition to Pakistan's inability to suppress insurgent groups in its own territory, another incentive for supporting the Taliban was the fact that the new government in Kabul had developed close ties to India. Relations between the US-supported, Northern Alliance-based government in Kabul and Islamabad were cool from the beginning due to Pakistan's role in the rise of the Taliban. Meetings between Musharraf and Karzai were always strained with the two even refusing to shake hands at the White House 2006. While personal relations between current Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari and Karzai are better on a personal level, the two governments remain at odds with Kabul's continued accusations of Pakistani support for the Taliban. Conversely, relations between Kabul and Delhi remain strong.⁴¹ From the point of view of policy makers in Pakistan's military, it would be counter-intuitive to support a government which is close to India. For this reason, it is possible that assistance to the Taliban insurgents is may be coming from very powerful members of Pakistan's military with the strategic interests of the state in mind.

In the summer of 2008 the Indian embassy in Kabul was bombed by Taliban agents prompting accusations of ISI involvement from Afghanistan, India, and the United States. Though Pakistani President Zardari vehemently denied the accusations, many believe the perpetrators operated outside his authority.⁴² Considering the strategic logic behind the bombing, it is conceivable and likely that a very high ranking member of Pakistan's military-political elite ordered the attack.

MOVING FORWARD

At present, the two primary sides fighting for

control of Afghanistan are locked in what William Zartman has termed a "hurting stalemate" where neither is making significant progress, yet suffering heavy casualties. It is at this point that ideals are often put aside in favour of a compromise. At present the United States is supporting talks between members of the Taliban and the Afghan government and many believe is engaged in direct talks with the Taliban. It is also expected that Pakistan will also play a significant role in the discussions.⁴³ Regardless of whether or not Pakistan cooperates closely with the United States and NATO, it will almost certainly play a crucial role in the future of Afghanistan.

The United States and the Afghan governments have entered into talks with the Taliban. However, as an underground force, the Taliban is a loosely associated, fragmented group with a diverse membership. One group believed to have entered into negotiations is the Quetta Shura, named for the Pakistani city in which they were founded. Another group, the Haqqani network of North Waziristan has longstanding ties to the ISI and is regarded as more malicious and susceptible to Pakistani control and is thus believed to not be of interest to the negotiators. It is believed that the Obama administration is attempting to gain some Taliban support in the provinces to create the conditions for troop reduction and a handover of power to Kabul.⁴⁴ However, the fact the Taliban's reported second in command Mullah Baradar remains in Pakistani custody after being arrested while apparently travelling to Afghanistan for negotiations with President Karzai remains problematic.⁴⁵ What is most problematic is that it is unlikely that those in the Pakistan's military and intelligence units which are supporting their own Taliban factions will allow their interests to be circumvented and will thus likely continue the insurgency. For this reason, Pakistan and its supported factions must also be integrated into the negotiation process.

⁴¹ MSNBC News, "Bush urges Karzai, Musharraf to co-operate," MSNBC News, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15025606/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/.

⁴² The Sunday Times, "Rogue Pakistan Spies aid Taliban in Afghanistan," The Sunday Times (London), <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article4449330.ece>.

⁴³ Steve Coll, "Gauging U.S.-Taliban Talks," The Council on Foreign Relations, 2011. <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/gauging-us-taliban-talks/p24214>.

⁴⁴ Coll, "Gauging U.S. – Taliban Talks."

⁴⁵ Coll, Steve. "U.S. – Taliban Talks" *Foreign Policy*, 2010.

While the funding of the Afghan insurgency can be attributed to rogue elements in the military and ISI, the civilian government has also worked against the interests of the NATO mission with the closure of the Afghan border passes to supply caravans on September 30th, 2010. The closures were in protest of an American helicopter attack which accidentally killed two members of Pakistan's military and caused supply trucks to be left in the open where 30 were firebombed by the Taliban, killing several NATO personnel. NATO is reliant on forty per cent of its supplies from Pakistan, while the remainder come from Afghanistan's northern neighbours and by air.⁴⁶ Pakistan's response demonstrates that the country's opposition to the Afghan war pervades the civilian political realm just as it does the military.

The September-October border closure also demonstrates that the United States has over-relied on Pakistan as a partner in its war effort. Further troubling is the fact that opportunities with other potential partners were squandered during the Bush era. In 2005 the government of Uzbekistan forced the closure of the American airbase in its country in response to Washington's criticism of its use of force on its citizens during the Andizhan uprising.⁴⁷ Ironically, the United States continued to heavily rely on Pakistan, which had allegedly committed much greater atrocities against its own citizens during the FATA campaign. Perhaps more frustrating is the fact that negotiations with Iran in Bonn, Germany over the reconstruction of Afghanistan were ended by the Bush administration.⁴⁸ Given that every president since Ronald Reagan has sought a rapprochement with Iran and that Iran's actions in Afghanistan have been cause for concern recently demonstrates the blatant short-sightedness of this diplomatic failure. The

over-reliance on Pakistan has been detrimental to the NATO campaign and the squandering of opportunities with other potential partners in the region is mind boggling.

Though the Obama administration has bolstered the Northern Supply route into Afghanistan by regaining closer relations with Uzbekistan and seeking a NATO-Russia rapprochement,⁴⁹ this does not solve the issue of Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. Though over-reliance on Pakistan has damaged the mission, Pakistan must have an integral role in the negotiation process for Afghan security. Because Pakistan and its military elite will continue to have a significant regional presence long after the NATO forces withdraw, the best solution is one which takes their interests into consideration. A balance must be found in the way the United States pursues relations with its troubled partner.

CONCLUSION

Due to the aforementioned reasons, relations between the United States and Pakistan are tense at present. In November 2010, President Obama visited India where he discussed a civil nuclear deal and visited the Taj Hotel in Mumbai which was the site of the 2008 attack widely blamed on Pakistani militants. Though President Obama has not gone as far as his NATO ally, British Prime Minister David Cameron in calling Pakistan "an exporter of terror," the United States still appears distancing itself from Islamabad.⁵⁰ If it were not for the consequences for failure in Afghanistan and the direct problem this poses to NATO troops in the region, a distancing from Pakistan would be completely justified; however, in this context of the problem at hand it is even more dangerous to leave the Pakistan to its own devices.

⁴⁶ BBC World News, "Militants attack Nato tanker convoy in Pakistan," BBC World News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11463490>.

⁴⁷ Mark Kramer, "Russian Policy Toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: Recent Trends and Future Prospects," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 55 (6) (2008): 5.

⁴⁸ Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, 484-485.

⁴⁹ BBC World News, "NATO and Russia promise 'fresh start' at Lisbon Summit," *BBC World News*, November 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11799097>.

⁵⁰ David Nakamura, "Obama's India Trip stirs fears in Pakistan about power balance," *The Washington Post*, November 5, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/04/AR2010110407525.html>.

It was at this point where Lyndon Johnson's quotation about camping with enemies becomes relevant. The interests of Pakistan's governing forces, particularly those in the military must be taken into consideration when negotiating the future of Afghanistan. If they are not, Pakistan's actions will continue to have a negative impact on the NATO mission and will likely result in a civil war and/or a government in Afghanistan which will have not been formed with the consideration of the interests of countries which have poured billions of dollars and thousands of lives into its occupation for the past decade. Despite their past actions, Pakistan's interests must be heavily incorporated into a compromise deal. This requires a strong consideration of the true security interests of the Pakistani state, particularly in the eyes of the country's military elite.

Negotiating with the Taliban may not necessarily lead to the kind of brutality their presence brought to Afghanistan in the 1990s. It is important to note that the overthrow of the Taliban was contributed to by ordinary citizens as well as from the Northern Alliance with American air support. While outside actors can have a significant impact on the future of Afghanistan through the aiding of proxies, the country's fate ultimately lies in the hands of its people. After the brutality of civil war, the people of Afghanistan desired the security delivered by the Taliban; however, this does not mean they would tolerate such an imposition today. Any compromise reached must be accepted by the people of Afghanistan. This will ultimately be the greatest challenge to the uneasy partnership of this protracted war.

The pattern in United States-Pakistan relations identified in this article is one which involves close cooperation and assistance from the United States in times of relevance its immediate foreign policy objectives, followed by indifference and semi- antagonistic policies when this relevance is less apparent. If the United States is following historical continuity by distancing itself from Pakistan at present, the consequences will be failure in Afghanistan and a region left to deal with Pakistan's often reckless behaviour in the pursuit

of its security. In order to have an influence on Pakistan in the future, the United States must continue to offer it some form of incentive to cooperate. For this reason, the United States must maintain some kind of partnership with Pakistan.

The future cooperation between the United States and Pakistan must be carefully formulated by Washington in the long-term. It must not be so close that it overlooks Pakistan's negative actions such as it did in the 1980s. However, should also it be so distant that it removes the power to punish negative actions by carefully removing incentives as it was in the 1990s when relied-upon incentives were removed simply due to their lack of perceived relevance. Most importantly, it should be noted that Pakistan has proven itself unreliable in this recent war and while the United States must remain close to Islamabad, they must not come to rely too heavily on the country for major foreign policy objectives without first carefully considering Pakistan's own security interests which may run counter to those of Washington.

This article cannot make precise policy suggestions to eminently more experienced policy makers in Washington and elsewhere. Rather, it humbly indicates the necessity of continued dialogue and cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. In the short-term, this is essential to any kind of a successful conclusion to the current war in Afghanistan; however, history has demonstrated that this cooperation should also be maintained as part of a long-term strategy in such a volatile region. Pakistan's actions and potential actions must each be considered carefully when formulating any kind of strategy for relations in South Asia. In order to have moderating effect on regional volatility, the United States and the world must work closely with Pakistan to both incentivise actions which are positive and punish those which are negative without resorting potentially disastrous uses of military force. Though this may be at times unpleasant, Lyndon Johnson's quotation reminds us that the alternative is much less productive.