

The Changing Practices and Meaning of Sovereignty in Venezuela

Kanika Bhattacharya

Abstract

The multi-pronged response to the political turmoil in Venezuela that culminated in the coup of 2002 solidified trends of energetic and issue-based interventionism that are increasingly becoming the norm in Latin America. They reveal the region's staunch commitment to representative democracy, and more importantly, as this paper investigates, a dramatic and probably irreversible shift in the meaning and practices associated with the central principle that governs interstate relations: sovereignty and its corollary, non-interventionism.

The spate of political turmoil in Venezuela that culminated in the coup of 2002 may have been perceived to be yet another incident that gave strength to the stereotype about political instability in Latin America. The immediate, collective and multi-pronged response to this upheaval, however, solidified other more positive trends. The trends were of energetic and issue-based interventionism. They revealed not only the region's staunch commitment to representative democracy, but, more importantly for the purposes of this paper, a dramatic and probably irreversible¹ shift in the meaning and practices associated with the central principle that governs interstate relations: sovereignty and its corollary, non-interventionism.

Sovereignty has traditionally been understood as having an internal and external dimension. At the internal level, it has been taken to mean exclusive authority of the state over a particular territorial space. Externally, it requires mutual recognition and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereigns.² This definition, however, has been understood to embody an ideal that has never quite existed in practice.³ At the onset, the separation of the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty, while being

Kanika Bhattacharya is a fourth year International Relations Honours student at Mount Allison University.

¹This statement is similar to remarks made by Kathryn Sikkink in her article titled "Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices" (Pg. 705), *Houston Journal of International Law*, 1996.

²Christopher Clapham, "Sovereignty and the Third World State."; Alan James, "The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society."; James Mayall, "Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self-Determination."; William Wallace, "The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox."; Daniel Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority and International Society." in *Political Studies XLVII Special Issue*, (1999): 522-537; 457-473; 474-502; 503-521; 566-589. Also Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood, the Basis of International Society* (London: Alan and Unwin, 1986); and Janice E. Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research." *International Studies Quarterly* 39, No. 2: 528-565.

³Stephen D Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia." *International Security* 20, No.3 (Winter 1995-96): 115-151; Thomas Biersteker, "State, Sovereignty and Territory" In *Handbook of International Relations*. Eds Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth E. Simmons. (London, Sage Publications, 2000): 157-176; Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, "Introduction" and "Conclusion" and Alexander B. Murphy, "The Sovereign State system as political-territorial ideal: historical and contemporary considerations." In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 81-120, 1-22, 278-287.

analytically convenient, may not reflect political reality. Hard demarcation of boundaries dividing the state from the larger international community and substate from superstate interests belie actual fluid reality. In Venezuela itself, internal groups participated with outside forces to collectively negotiate terms with the government in power.

Sovereignty has in fact always been in a state of flux. Realists and Liberals recognize that sovereignty has historically taken the shape of state manipulations.⁴ At the same time, Institutionalists and Post-Structuralists point out that sovereignty, as a social status of states in the international community, is embedded within a larger cultural framework that must vary with time and place.⁵ The dominant response to the shifts in practices of sovereignty is a debate about whether sovereignty is 'dead'⁶ or has 'a lot of life still left'.⁷ Both sides of the debate concentrate on how much sovereignty has eroded and whether, given its eroded state, it can still be called sovereignty at all. This debate however, in its emphasis of macro trends, ignores both the small surges that are actually shaping sovereignty, and the reversible trajectory that it takes. Regional political practices in Latin America have been the composite of the various facets of the Inter American System comprising the states as also the Organization of American States (OAS), Rio Treaty and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), civil society groups and 'transnational issue networks'.⁸ Policy regarding sovereignty has oscillated between the rigid non-interventionism of the Calvo, Drago and Estrada doctrines and interventionist Pan-Americanism as first espoused by Vicuña and Alberdi.⁹ In the last two decades however, issue based collective action and interventionism have been becoming the dominant mode, as evidenced most dramatically in the strengthening interventionist dynamic of OAS actions, including those in Nicaragua, Haiti, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Ecuador and Peru.

⁴ Most notably Stephen D Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia." *International Security* 20, No.3 (Winter 1995-96): 115-151 and Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979).

⁵ Meyer 1980 and Young 1986 in David Strang, "Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism," in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Eds. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁶ Christopher Clapham, "Sovereignty and the Third World State."; Paul Taylor, "The United Nations in the 1990s, Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue of Sovereignty."; William Wallace, "The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox."; Daniel Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority and International Society." in *Political Studies* XLVII Special Issue, (1999): 522-537; 538-565; 503-521; 566-589.

⁷ Robert Jackson, "Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape."; Alan James, "The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society."; James Mayall, "Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self-Determination." *Political Studies* XLVII Special Issue, (1999): 428; 431-456; 474-502. Also Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood, the Basis of International Society* (London: Alan and Unwin, 1986); and Janice E. Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research." *International Studies Quarterly* 39, No. 2: 528-565 and Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, "Introduction," in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 4-8.

⁸ Pope G. Atkins. "The Inter-American System," in *Latin America in the International Political System*. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995) and Kathryn Sikkink. "Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America." *International Organization* 47, 3 (Summer 1993): 411-441.

⁹ Pope G. Atkins. "The Inter-American System," in *Latin America in the International Political System*. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995): 220-223.

In their emphasis on outcomes, the two sides of the debate fail to take note of the manner in which sovereignty has been changing.¹⁰ Constructivism attempts to bridge this conceptual gap. Constructivists have emphasized norms and meanings as shaping political reality. In consonance with this larger philosophy, they see sovereignty as a set of inter-subjective understandings, expressed in practices.¹¹ At first glance this definition may appear simple, but in fact it opens up conceptual space for a dynamic and contextual understanding of sovereignty. If sovereignty is not a fixed establishment but rather a set of practices, then it is open to negotiation and renegotiation. Precise 'issues of contestation' become determinants of the nature and direction of such negotiation, as do the historic, geographic, cultural, economic and political environment of that time and place.¹² The negotiations could be at the initiative of myriad agents¹³ and organized around issue lines leading occasionally to the emergence of some strange bedfellows. Visualizing practice, structure and agency in a mutually impacting relationship builds a more comprehensive cause and effect understanding of the forces that shape sovereignty. However, the comprehensiveness and ideational nature of this conceptualization makes sovereignty hard to define in any exactitude, a limitation acknowledged by the Constructivist school.

Using aspects of the constructivist analytical template described later, this paper attempts to draw out the changes in the practices and underlying meanings of sovereignty before and after the coup in Venezuela. This paper finds that in the last two decades, the meaning and practices of sovereignty in Latin America have changed in three important ways: first, there is growing conviction that popular sovereignty, as facilitated by representative democracy, is the only legitimate form of sovereignty. Second, regional interventionism, whether supportive or

¹⁰Thomas Biersteker, "State, Sovereignty and Territory" In *Handbook of International Relations*. Eds Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth E. Simmons. (London, Sage Publications, 2000): 157-176; Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, "Introduction" and "Conclusion" *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 1-22, 278-287.

¹¹Kathryn Sikkink. "Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America." *International Organization* 47, 3 (Summer 1993): 411-441; Kathryn Sikkink. "Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices," *Houston Journal of International Law* 19, 3 (spring 1997): 705-729; Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, "Introduction" and "Conclusion", Alexander B. Murphy, "The Sovereign State system as political-territorial ideal: historical and contemporary considerations." In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 81-120, 1-22, 278-287; Thomas Biersteker, "State, Sovereignty and Territory" In *Handbook of International Relations*. Eds Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth E. Simmons. (London, Sage Publications, 2000): 157-176; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, 2 (spring 1992): 391-425.

¹²Thomas Biersteker, "State, Sovereignty and Territory" In *Handbook of International Relations*. Eds Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth E. Simmons. (London, Sage Publications, 2000): 157-176.

¹³Kathryn Sikkink. "Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America." *International Organization* 47, 3 (Summer 1993): 411-441 and Kathryn Sikkink. "Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices," *Houston Journal of International Law* 19, 3 (spring 1997): 705-729. Also Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, "Introduction" and "Conclusion", Alexander B. Murphy, "The Sovereign State system as political-territorial ideal: historical and contemporary considerations." In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 1-22, 278-287.

punitive, is no longer shirked when it is in defense of democracy and the sovereignty of the people. The structure shaping sovereignty practices is flexible and multilayered. It is developing new extents of cross border communication and multi-pronged efficiency around specific issues. Third, the growing importance accorded to civil society groups by multilateral organizations and international pressure groups may usher in the benefits of sovereignty on a sub state level. Venezuela is the most recent demonstration of these broad trends that have been revolutionizing interstate relations in the hemisphere. A remarkable feature of the multilateral response to the coup and subsequent political crisis in Venezuela is the direct link forged between the OAS, Carter Center and other international NGOs, and the domestic civil society. This link appears at times to have even circumvented the government, and may illustrate a more inclusive and dynamic direction for sovereignty practices in the hemisphere.

Before detailing the pre and post coup shift in practices of sovereignty, I will attempt to contextualize them. First, I will give a brief overview of the broad trends that have shaped sovereignty and intervention for democracy in Latin America. Then, I will provide a similar overview of the meanings that sovereignty and defense of democracy have taken in Venezuela. This will form the 'Before Coup' picture for sovereignty practices in Venezuela. It is with this background that I will approach the dynamic trends that have emerged for sovereignty practices after the coup.

The Context: The Shifting Shape of Sovereignty in Latin America

Global Trends

Certain dramatic trends in international relations have become apparent in the decades following World War II. The first is the development of multilateral efforts to secure self-determination not for all states, but rather for all peoples. The second is the proliferation of international issue-based networks and an increasingly well-informed international media that augments pressure on states to ensure that their democratic institutions are maintained. Thomas Franck's three building blocs of democracy self determination, free political expression and participatory electoral processes¹⁴ have strengthened from being unclearly defined moral urges in the 1960s, to legal imperatives in the 1980s and 90s. Even more remarkable has been the almost world wide shift away from state centred approaches for understanding democracy. States are increasingly being perceived as only a part of the foundation for democracy to thrive in a country, and efforts to defend democracy are becoming concerned more with people than with governments. The UN Doctrine regarding self-determinism, for instance, has changed emphasis from state and territory in 1960 to become a fundamental and universal right of all peoples and binding on all governments in 1991. The Annex to Resolution 1541 established at the 15th General Assembly meeting in December 1960 laid down the right of colony inhabitants to determine their political rights. In proceeding legislation the right of self-

¹⁴Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to democratic Governance," *The American Journal of International Law* 86, 1 (January 1992): 46-91.

determinism expanded progressively until established as a basic right of all peoples under Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.¹⁵

The growing commitment to democracy and protection of human rights has resulted in a proliferation of NGOs, 'transnational issue networks'¹⁶ and media groups dedicated to keep violating governments in check. In the 1970s and 1980s, more human rights and pro-democracy NGOs were established than ever before (tabulations reveal an exponential growth trend for NGOs worldwide: 38 in 1950, 72 in 1960, 103 in 1970, 138 in 1980 and 275 in 1990).¹⁷ NGOs have also increased their effectiveness by developing communication networks that link diverse groups. In recent years the links have involved grass roots actors and domestic issue groups too.¹⁸ Latin America has been at the forefront of such regional grass root linkages, in large measure due to the close cross-cultural exchanges in the region. This has resulted in an international demonstration effect as original groups in the region inspired others to follow their example or establish links with them.¹⁹

Issues that were once strictly internal have now been expanded to allow multilateral intervention in a world becoming smaller and more densely linked than ever before. Ascertaining free and fair elections is no longer a subject within a country's sole domain, but rather, the interest of institutions such as the UN, the Carter Center, the OAS and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Since the first UN election monitoring exercise in Ghana in 1956, countries as diverse as Latvia, Zambia, Bangladesh and Nicaragua have invited the scrutiny of international institutions to ensure proper electoral democracy.²⁰ In the last fifteen years, pro-democracy intervention has achieved legal backing. Countries in Europe and the Americas, most notably the members of the CSCE (in 1991) and the OAS (in 2001), have codified their collective belief that issues relating to democracy are of legitimate concern to the international community.

The Cultural Framework and International Community

The political culture of Latin America is characterized by shared security and economic issues resulting in multi-pronged Pan Americanism. In recent decades, the most vigorous collective action in the region has been in defense of democracy. Notable instances of this include the OAS intervention in Haiti (repeatedly since 1991), Peru (1992, 2000), Venezuela (1992), Guatemala (1993), Dominican Republic (1994), Paraguay (1996, 1999), Ecuador (2000) and most recently the response to the 2002 coup in Venezuela.

¹⁵ GA Res.1541, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No 16), *supra* note 31, at 29. To note the progression towards greater inclusiveness in the UN doctrine regarding self-determinism, see also Annex to GA Res.2625, *supra* note 31, principle 4 and finally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967) entered into force Mar.23, 1976) and ratified by 113 states in November 1991.

¹⁶ Kathryn Sikkink. "Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America." *International Organization* 47, 3 (Summer 1993): 411-441.

¹⁷ Kathryn Sikkink. "Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices," *Houston Journal of International Law* 19, 3 (spring 1997): 705-729.

¹⁸ Kathryn Sikkink. "Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices," *Houston Journal of International Law* 19, 3 (spring 1997): 705-729.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 14: 69-75.

The pan American defense of democracy regime has been constructed over the span of more than a century, and is the collective effort of several diplomats, scholars, issue networks and political leaders. In recent years it has also reflected the efforts of grass roots actors and domestic NGOs (most notably of those in Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Colombia as discussed in Leilah Landim and Andre Thompson's case studies;²¹ also of Chile and Guatemala). The first exhortation for collective action to promote democracy came from Chilean Pedro Felix Vicuña in 1837. He envisaged a "Great American Congress" to support democratic governments and popular revolutions and to oppose tyrannies.²²

However, this Pan American doctrine was impeded by the other strand that has characterized Latin American political culture: i.e. the fear of US interventionism. The philosophy of regional interaction in the Americas has been a tug of war between non-interventionist dogma as exemplified by the Calvo (1868), Drago (1902) and Estrada (1930) doctrines, and proposals favoring interventionism for democracy, such as those drafted by Alberdi (1844), Tobar (1907) and Rodriguez (1945-46).²³ The noninterventionist proposals had at their core the view that nonintervention is an absolute legal obligation and that the commitment to democracy is a relative moral obligation.²⁴ Unpleasant histories of US heavy handedness in the region made the noninterventionist side stronger. However, it must be stressed that in spirit, Latin American noninterventionism has been less an end value, and more a means to secure other desired goals, particularly prevention of illegitimate interventions by the US.²⁵ In fact, much of the noninterventionist doctrine was in direct response to US interference. For instance, the Drago doctrine that was adopted at the Montevideo Conference was a response to the interventionist Monroe doctrine. The Estrada doctrine adopted as part of the OAS charter in 1948, was born of the fear that the pro-democracy Tobar plan would create an opening for US interference in the region.²⁶ The end of the Cold War and subsequent end of democracy as a US tool to gain access to other countries eased much of the tension surrounding this debate. Pro-democracy ideas that had been bubbling under the surface became the dominant commitment shaping regional interaction.

As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a drastic change in the scope of multilateral intervention as well as the norms for intervention in Latin America. The OAS has attempted to expand its domain from the traditional 'firefighter approach' to crisis prevention;²⁷ it has enhanced its electoral monitoring capabilities and has overseen elections in over a third of its member countries. Norm change has been spurred through the increasingly interventionist procedures inscribed in its regulation: the pro-

²¹ See Leila Landim and Andres Thomson, "Non Governmental Organizations and Philanthropy in Latin America: An Overview," *Voluntas*, vol. 8, no.4 (1997), pgs. 337 to 350.

²² Pope G. Atkins. "The Inter-American System," in *Latin America in the International Political System*. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995).

²³ *Ibid.*, 22: 220-225.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 222.

²⁵ Sikkink, 1997, 719.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁷ Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler. "Passing the Test: The OAS, The InterAmerican Democratic Charter, and the Crisis in Venezuela." Working Paper.

democracy rewriting of the standard for intervention in the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias (1985), the creation of an immediate action group to address crisis through Resolution 1080 (1991), the establishment of representative democracy as a requisite for OAS membership through the Washington Protocol (1992, took effect 1997) and most recently, the establishment of democracy as a fundamental human right through the Inter American Democratic Charter (2001). The emerging OAS goal is of rapid and flexible response to shaky democracies in the region.²⁸

Civil Society and Domestic Institutions

Civil society in Latin America is increasingly segmented, mobilized and politically aware.²⁹ The most vocal segment of civil society has historically been made up of well-educated, politically charged people that have settled into NGOs and other politically relevant stations. In recent years, less elite groups—trade unions, evangelical institutions, the Catholic Church and micro-networks—have become more politically aware and have helped shape countries' politics.³⁰ There has also been a proliferation of externally assisted issue networks that maintain links with multilateral institutions.³¹ In the realm of democracy protection, the OAS has encouraged citizen participation in a host of its activities, especially to identify potential problems and make recommendations to its election monitoring task forces. Further, the OAS has established a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy that provides training and assistance to strengthen the democratic procedures of member states. The overarching goal is to ensure citizen participation in democracy.³²

Recent events in Latin America underscore the importance of civil society, and popular sovereignty as the emerging norm *de jure*. In January 2000, Ecuadorians took to the streets and forced Jamil Mahuad to resign. A few months later, the Peruvians did the same to Fujimori, and in January 2001, popular protests drove out President Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina. The Venezuelan coup of April 2002 made it the most recent of such instances of People Power. The new means charting sovereignty practices are of the international norms cascade—a rapid shift towards recognizing the legitimacy of new norms, and 'international and regional action on

²⁸ Ibid., 27.

²⁹ Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink. "The International Dimension of Democratization and Human Rights in Latin America." in *Democracy in Latin America: (Re)constructing Political Society*, eds. Manuel Antonio Gerretón and Edward Newman. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), Micheal Shifter. "Latin American democratization: The Civil Society Puzzle," in *Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*, eds. Ottoway and Carothers. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000). Moises Naim. "Democracy dictates Latin America's future," *Financial Times* (London). April 26, pg.13. Also Ibid., 16 and 18.

³⁰ Micheal Shifter. "Latin American democratization: The Civil Society Puzzle," in *Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*, eds. Ottoway and Carothers. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).

³¹ Ibid., 30.

³² For information on other citizen-centered programs, see UPD Information Paper. "History of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy" <http://www.oas.org/Introduction/history.htm>

behalf of these norms'³³ and how well regional institutions reflect and respond to the norms, but gaining in importance is how civil society conforms to, or changes, these norms.³⁴

The Constructivist Template

A layered conception of sovereignty helps in establishing links between issues or agents previously considered to be unconnected, thus affording a more comprehensive understanding of the institution. There are, however, certain core aspects of the constructivist conception that may be applied as an analytical template in order to facilitate an all-inclusive picture. These aspects highlight the main structures and agents that are the harbingers of change for the meaning of sovereignty within its spatial and temporal location:

1. **Global Trends:** Global and regional events and ideas may effect sovereignty as well as the history of practices of sovereignty and nonintervention, and the issues under contest in the region.
2. **The Cultural Framework and International Community:** All practices (of sovereignty or otherwise) must necessarily be embedded within a larger cultural framework.³⁵ The levels of political consciousness, inherent isolationist tendencies, openness to change, and global connectivity are some of the culturally determined behaviours that play a significant role in understanding the trends in sovereignty practices. The nature and power of multilateral organizations in the region could significantly colour regional sovereignty practices. In some cases, these institutions have maintained close ties with domestic civil society groups and NGOs, and have collectively impacted sovereignty norms.
3. **Domestic Institutions and Social Environment:** The nature of civil society groups on the local and regional level (their external links, priorities, levels of fragmentation and of mobilization etc.) may affect the nature of their initiatives. These groups may be significant agents for internal pressure and external tie-ups. Domestic institutions may also include the administrative and defense units of the country. In Venezuela, the judiciary and the armed forces are significant internal pressure groups impacting sovereignty practices from within.
4. **The Regime:** The nature of the regime in a particular country, and equally important, the regimes of the majority of surrounding countries, may be shapers of the nature of

³³Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink. "The International Dimension of Democratization and Human Rights in Latin America." in *Democracy in Latin America: (Re)constructing Political Society*, eds. Manuel Antonio Gerretton and Edward Newman. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001): 284.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 33.

³⁵David Strang, "Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism," in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Eds. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

sovereignty practices in the region, in their impact on regional priority issues and the nature and frequency of interstate dialogue.

Applying the Template to the Venezuelan Crisis

The crisis and response in Venezuela are a microcosm of the challenges and practices that define the region. Having given a broad overview of the nature and direction of these practices, I now apply relevant aspects of the constructivist template to the situation in Venezuela in the months preceding the coup. I will attempt to extract the chief structures shaping ideas about sovereignty that were later strengthened through the OAS response. Basically, this section finds that regional currents legitimizing popular sovereignty as the only true sovereignty, are reflected in the actions of the Venezuelan populace that culminated in the coup of April 2002. The Venezuelan instance reveals a highly mobilized and energized civil society that ended up connecting with multilateral organizations and actively participating in crisis resolution. The idea that sovereignty means exclusive jurisdiction over domestic issues is thus challenged from both within and without. There is a growing link between domestic and international groups that may in fact usher the benefits of sovereignty legitimacy, authority and a place in international forums as well as political imaginations to the sub state level. Civil society institutions are granted space in mixed forums that include international, regional and state actors. This new empowerment may ease the barriers civil society actors face in making their voices heard, and may grant some authority and gravity to their concerns.

Sovereignty Practices before the Coup

Venezuela's civil society is fragmented along social and economic issues (Naim 2002).³⁶ However, the months immediately before and after the crisis saw unusual collectivities form amongst various factions around grievances with Chávez's regime. Before Chávez, the single emotion that bound various factions was resentment with the widely pervasive corruption that characterized the Punto Fijo system the rigged two party monopoly that Jennifer McCoy calls partyarchy³⁷ that was the forty-year-old norm in Venezuela. Hugo Chávez emerged as a glimmer of hope promising to eliminate poverty and clean up the political infrastructure of the country. His landslide victory in the 1998 elections revealed not just how weary Venezuelans had become of the two leading parties, but also how fervently they clung to the hope that Chávez and all he promised would return them to their days of oil-rich glory. By this time, vast sections of the civil society had not only become politically aware, but also active shapers of the country's politics. In fact, although Chávez was a favorite among sections of the trade union and business community, it is primarily less active evangelical institutions and the country's majority poor that shot him to power.³⁸

When Chávez's reign lapsed into hubris and incompetence, the civil society, already mobilized and energized, did not retreat into silence. Chávez's suspiciously authoritarian

³⁶ Moises Naim, "Democracy dictates Latin America's future," *Financial Times* (London), April 26, 2002, 13.

³⁷ Jennifer L. McCoy, "Chavez and the End of 'Partyarchy' in Venezuela," *Journal of Democracy* 10, 3 (1999) 474-502.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 30.

constitution and 49 revolutionary laws, deemed to have been passed without consultation with the opposition, raised an immediate outcry among the business community and political parties³⁹. The constitution increased the role of the state in the economy, significantly diminished political representation by abrogating the Senate, loosened civilian control of the military and potentially secured the presidency for Chávez till 2012. The laws included economic, social and political reforms that would redistribute private land without compensation and tighten control of the state oil company PDVSA.⁴⁰

People's grievances against Chávez resulted in the development of a heterogeneous coalition of diverse civil groups. This reflects an interesting feature of Latin American civil society that is emerging in the pro-democracy regime. Unusual linkages of civil organizations are being created around specific issues. In Venezuela, such links spanned business, labor, the Catholic Church and media groups, and were supported by vast sections of the middle class.⁴¹ The emerging mammoth issue group organized several multi-sectoral and multi-class demonstrations and even developed ad-hoc committees to work out ideas for the institutional impeachment of Chávez.⁴²

Another feature of Venezuelan civil society that emerged in the months prior to the coup was its eagerness to fit in with regional support structures. In this context, constructivist scholars Kathryn Sikkink and Ellen Lutz suggest that civil society often actively transforms identity to become more in conjunction with regional and international political practices.⁴³ Venezuela proves this theory in two ways. Firstly, in recent years there has been a wave of hands-on action towards popular sovereignty in Latin America. This is in the form of civil society led rebellion against undemocratic leadership. In 2000 Ecuadorians took to the streets and forced Jamil Mahuad to resign. A few months later, the Peruvians did the same to Fujimori, and in January 2001 popular protests drove out President Fernando de la Rúa. One cannot ignore that the Venezuelan coup is the most recent of a series of popular revolutions that have attempted to oust authoritarian Latin American leaders in the last three years. Time and again there has been exasperation with undemocratic leadership in the region, but since the pro-democracy regime has gained acceptance such exasperation appears to have become more radical and even extra-constitutional, thus effectively destabilizing the sovereign power structure within national borders. Secondly, in Venezuela certain factions of civil society appeared to actively grasp for external support of their actions, particularly from Washington. A striking example of this is that CIA director George Tenet and secretary of state Colin Powell's comments that Chávez was being undemocratic were magnified to become prescriptions for the opposition in Venezuela. Both comments promptly made front-page news in Venezuela and were celebrated by leading

³⁹Steve Ellner and Fred Rosen, "The Remarkable Rise and Fall of Hugo Chavez," *NACLA Report of the Americas* 36, 1 (July/ August 2002) 9-15; Omar G. Encarnación, "Venezuela's Civil Society Coup," *World Policy Journal* (Summer 2002).

⁴⁰Omar G. Encarnación, "Venezuela's Civil Society Coup," *World Policy Journal* (Summer 2002).

⁴¹Staff Reporter. "After the coup, the reckoning." *The Economist*, April 25th, 2002.

⁴²Steve Ellner and Fred Rosen, "The Remarkable Rise and Fall of Hugo Chavez," *NACLA Report of the Americas* 36, 1 (July/ August 2002) 9-15.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 33: 290.

civil society agents as a green signal from Washington.⁴⁴

The other determinant of sovereignty practices before the coup was the domestic institutional makeup. This includes the armed forces and the judiciary. Both institutions were involved in opposing Chávez, and their actions had grave implications for the government's leadership and sovereign hold. Ironically, Chávez himself is to blame for politicizing both the armed forces and the judiciary. He stuffed courtrooms with loyalist judges, and put officers he hoped were loyal into key commands in the army.⁴⁵ This politicization showed in the military led coup, and in the subsequent opposition he has faced by Supreme Court judges. Although the actions of both institutions appear to be urged more by partisan politics rather than need for proper democracy, the widespread (although not wholehearted) public support for their actions magnify the power they have to shape sovereignty practices. When Chávez was reinstated, the officers responsible for the coup were let off by a sympathetic Supreme Court amidst great cheers from the public. The emergence of domestic institutional actors standing up to the government encouraged civil society actors who had long wanted to make their voices heard. When international delegates came in to Caracas, they sought input from military representatives as well as civil society ones.⁴⁶

Basically, social and political borders in the months leading up to the coup were softening both within the country, as well as in relation to other countries. Venezuelan civil society, long divided, now began forming unusual coalitions along issue lines. It may even be suggested that civil society began organizing in patterns similar to those in surrounding countries, and was encouraged by the regional emphasis on democracy and popular sovereignty as the only legitimate sovereignty. The traditional sovereignty of the government in power was being deconstructed from both within and without. International scrutiny and criticism, particularly from the US, was making Chávez's position vulnerable. Domestic institutions such as the judiciary and the military grew dissentious and civil society took matters into its own hands and revoked the supreme authority of the government. Taken together, these actions destabilized the norm that the government is the unquestioned authority within a country's borders. Although major aspects of this picture are temporary and anti-democratic, the wave of radical pro-democracy activity also brought with it the seed for positive multilateral intervention, which would help stabilize Venezuela, and solidify a new and dynamic mechanism for crisis resolution.

The coup itself was a three-day whirlwind event. On April 11 2002, the general strike led by CTV (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela), the leading trade union of Venezuela and FEDECAMARAS, the leading business association, culminated in a street demonstration outside Chávez's official residence and spurred nationwide violence. In the early hours of the next morning Army Commander Lucas Rincon declared that Chávez had resigned and Pedro Carmona, the head of FEDECAMARAS (Federación de Camaras de Comercio y Producción),

⁴⁴Ibid., 41.

⁴⁵Staff Reporter. "The Americas: Chavez and the judges: Politics in Venezuela." and "A tragic and dangerous stalemate." *The Economist*, August 17 and October 10, 2002.

⁴⁶Staff Reporter. "The Americas: Chavez and the judges: Politics in Venezuela." *The Economist*, August 17, 2002.

took over as head of state, as Chávez was held at a military base. However, Carmona had only started to establish the basic policies of his government before sections of the air force rebelled against the new 'unconstitutional' regime and spurred a capital wide Counter Coup movement on April 13. The violence of the 13th ended early on the morning of the 14th, when Hugo Chávez was reinstated as the president of Venezuela.

Sovereignty Practices After the Coup

Burgeoning power of the armed forces and judiciary aside, which is probably limited to their peculiar politicization in Venezuela, the after coup events fortify certain dynamic and probably irreversible trends that are shaping sovereignty practices in the region. The emerging picture is of an increasingly efficient multi-pronged response that, after invitation by host government, significantly shapes its sovereign domain. Four developments characterize the shift in sovereignty practices. Firstly, the new structure determining sovereignty practices is both multilayered and multi-spatial. Its forums involve many groups of participants, and are held in several places throughout the region. This helps to construct a decentralized, rapid and flexible response to a domestic crisis anywhere in the region.

Secondly, the new structure urges hitherto unparalleled levels of openness and transparency in the international arena. The task forces of the multilateral pro-democracy regime are responsible for monitoring, criticizing and making recommendations about the domestic situation and policies. The results are multiple forums in which countries must air dirty laundry that under traditional sovereignty regulations had been theirs to hide.

Thirdly, sovereignty no longer resides exclusively with the government of the country. Rather, legitimate sovereignty lies in democratic institutions, which is in the citizens of the country.

Finally, the new structure has created links between multilateral and domestic issue groups. This has ushered more direct citizen participation and in the future may establish the benefits of sovereignty at the sub state level.

The Structure in which Sovereignty is Being Altered

The collective action network for the Venezuelan crisis spanned multilateral organizations, research groups, development agencies, media networks, human rights monitors, press fraternities, business councils, labor organizations and educational groups, both domestic and international.⁴⁷ The crisis response team active in the Venezuelan instance reflected an expansion of groups that are collectively shaping regional politics, and the norms of regional interaction. The infrastructure for regular monitoring of the Venezuelan situation came from the Rio Group, the OAS, the Carter Center, Group of Friends of Venezuela and the UNDP. From the domestic arena there were representatives of the government, the 34 NGO and political party strong Coordinadora Democrática, the state oil company, the media, the Catholic Church, National Assembly leaders, CTV and FEDECAMARAS who participated in the negotiations. Further, the establishment of various cities as head quarters for all organizations enhanced the

⁴⁷Stephen Johnson. "Rebuilding Democracy in Venezuela," The Heritage Foundation policy research and analysis Backgrounder #1545 (May 6, 2002). <http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1545.cfm>.

decentralized and multi-agency efficiency that characterized much of the response. The broad spectrum of interests covered in this lineup more closely reflects the array of political units that in fact shape political norms. Shifts in sovereignty practices are considerably strengthened with each OAS action in the realm of democracy defense due to the development of such dynamic and far-reaching networks.

New Levels of Intervention and Openness

The agencies and organizations of the multilateral pro-democracy regime are responsible for monitoring, criticizing and making recommendations about the domestic situation and policies. The response to the Venezuelan crisis is the most recent of this dynamic, persistent and interventionist stance. The day that the coup occurred, OAS Secretary General César Gaviria issued a public statement condemning the coup and calling for peaceful conduct by protestors and the government.⁴⁸ Even as he prepared for an on site visit to investigate the crisis situation on behalf of the other OAS members, the Rio Group who happened to be meeting that day issued a collective statement calling for immediate OAS action in support of democracy in the country.⁴⁹ Other organizations such as the Carter Center and the UNDP also rapidly mobilized to support peaceful negotiations and soon after so did the Group of Friends for Venezuela (consisting of the diplomatic heads of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain, Portugal and USA). In the year following the coup, Gaviria made 7 visits to Venezuela, and each time provided in depth reports of his investigations at General Assembly and Permanent Council meetings held shortly after. Representatives of the Carter Center visited Caracas on several occasions, provided detailed reports at Permanent Council meetings, and drafted the proposals that would ultimately break the domestic deadlock.

The immediate outcome of such a multi-pronged effort by the regional community was an almost complete breakdown of traditional sovereignty norms. On the 18th of April 2002, a few days after the coup, the nitty-gritty of the Venezuelan crisis polarized civil society, dissentious armed forces, human rights violations, etc. was laid out before OAS member states for scrutiny and recommendations. Future investigations made with the sole intent of keeping tabs on Venezuela would stand the same treatment. The emerging regional environment appears to be one in which borders are rescinding in significance, as issues of democracy and human rights come to the forefront. A problem in the maintenance of democratic institutions in a particular country has become legitimate cause for concern for the entire regional community.

In Venezuela there were, predictably, instances wherein certain factions of society most notably the government and opposition members urged a return to other norms of sovereignty convenient to them. On the part of the state this was reflected in the upholding of traditional sovereignty norms when politically suitable. I refer here primarily to the testy thanks

⁴⁸ César Gaviria, "Statement of the OAS Secretary General on the situation in Venezuela (E-078-02)," (statement issued on April 11, 2002)

<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>

⁴⁹ Rio Group. "Rio Group Document on Venezuela" (document presented at the meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, Washington D.C., May 28, 2002).

<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>

given by the Venezuelan representative to OAS members at the OAS Permanent Council meeting held on the 28th of May, a little more than a month after the coup, with the clear message that the situation was now a domestic problem.⁵⁰ On the part of civil society, it meant preferring extra-constitutional movements for popular sovereignty rather than the negotiations that the OAS had to offer. A glaring example of this is when the Coordinadora Democrática disregarded Carter's proposals and pursued radical and occasionally violent methods to oust Chávez. Incredibly, multilateral efforts in Venezuela succeeded in overcoming these setbacks. At the core of their success are well-defined priorities, flexible action plans, impressive communication networks and a more inclusive decision making framework.

The Shift Away from State-Centered Sovereignty

In the Protocol of the Cartagenas de Indias (1985), the OAS members declared that the promotion of representative democracy is grounds to soften noninterventionist dictates.⁵¹ The protocol marked a milestone in the shift towards the conviction that actions to pressure a dictatorial government in fact do not violate the principal of non-interventionism, since the principal derives its clout from internationally recognized popular sovereignty.⁵² In other words, popular sovereignty emerges as the legitimate form of sovereignty, and thus the only one warranting non-intervention. This development was underscored in The Inter-American Democratic Charter (2001), which emphasized the role of citizens in the democratic process and the inviolability of their rights. The practices of the OAS and others in Venezuela suggest this shift, but more accurately, they emphasize the shift away from state-centered conceptions of sovereignty. Sovereignty is no longer the unquestioned possession of the state, but rather, of democratic institutions.⁵³ A statement of this shift was made in the wording of Gaviria's first statement in response to the situation in Venezuela. Gaviria called for the restoration of the freedom of the press. He and others took no steps to urge the reinstatement of Chávez. Even later when it became clear that Chávez had not resigned but been ousted, Gaviria declared that Chávez's removal was 'fait accompli' and did not ask for his reinstatement.⁵⁴ The prime concern of the Rio group, too, was the 'normalization of democratic institutions.'⁵⁵ The re-establishment

⁵⁰ Ibid., 27.

⁵¹ This is a special amendment to Chapter 1 of the OAS Charter as established under the Special General Assembly held in Cartagena, Colombia in 1985. It states: "Representative democracy is an indispensable condition for stability, peace, and development of the region." The following phrase was added as one of the organization's essential purposes: "to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principal of nonintervention."

⁵² Heraldo Muñoz, "The Right to Democracy in the Americas," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 40, 1(Spring 1998): 1-18.

⁵³ Ibid., 48, 49 and 27.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 48; César Gaviria, "Address by the Secretary General of the OAS, report pursuant to Resolution CP/RES.811(1315/02) Situation in Venezuela" (presented at the OAS Permanent Council meeting, Washington D.C., 18th April, 2002).

<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>

⁵⁵ Ibid., 49.

of Chávez and his cabinet was not seen as part of the necessary action to defend the constitutional order.⁵⁶

Cautious to the political vagaries of the days following the coup, at the OAS meeting of April 12 the Venezuelan representative was prohibited from sitting at the table. It was thus a forum unrepresentative of the Venezuelan government that first scrutinized the Venezuelan situation and devised collective action plans.

The immediate concerns shared by multilateral groups were the re-establishment of democratic procedure and safety of the people against human rights violation. The response to the Venezuelan crisis suggests a growing trend in regional politics and recognition. The upper echelons of governmental power are less essential in the definition of democratic institutions. The domestic structures gaining in importance under the pro-democracy efforts are more people centered democratic institutions such as free press and other civil liberties.

The Growing Connection between Regional and Local Agency

A remarkable feature of the negotiations in Venezuela was the degree of connection between multilateral organizations such as the OAS and Group of Friends, and domestic civil society organizations. In order to get an understanding of the crisis that was more in consonance with ground reality, OAS task forces talked with many civil society organizers throughout Caracas in the days following the coup. The citizens' grievances and recommendations were then included in reports presented to multilateral decision making bodies such as the Permanent Council and the General Assembly. This tactic is similar to the one developed for accurate monitoring of electoral procedures in member countries. However, the OAS response in Venezuela took multilateral citizen interaction a step further by communicating with sections of the civil society on a regular basis, and requesting constant updates on the domestic situation from them. The underlying goal is of comprehensive understanding of the crisis at any given time. For instance, the Group of Friends had regular updates from Gaviria and the Venezuelan Ambassador Jorge Valero, but also opposition leader Timoteo Zambrano as well as local media representatives.

After the initial disharmony, the link between regional and local agencies strengthened, and the desire to reach amicable conclusions was reinforced by such communication. In fact, mid-way through the negotiating process, civil groups such as CTV and FEDECAMARAS began coordinating directly with the OAS. The CTV immediately informed Gaviria of its intention to strike, showed willingness for agreement facilitated by the OAS, and when the deadlock could not be broken, revealed that the Forum could continue irrespective of the strike.

The negotiating table at work in Venezuela was the epitome of the more inclusive approach to conflict resolution. This approach involves domestic and regional pressure groups, and may usher a new degree of openness and cross-boundary communication around specific issues. Not only were Carter Center, OAS, UNDP, host government and the opposition

⁵⁶César Gaviria, "Address by the Secretary General of the OAS, report pursuant to Resolution CP/RES.811(1315/02) Situation in Venezuela" (presented at the OAS Permanent Council meeting, Washington D.C., 18th April, 2002).

<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>

participants at the meetings, but also Catholic bishops, media executives, national Assembly leaders, civil society leaders, CTV, FEDECAMARAS, and members of the diplomatic corps representing the US, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Argentina, Spain, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, Italy and the UK.⁵⁷ The expanded involvement of multilateral agents is enhancing regional forums. More importantly, the emerging links between multilateral and domestic groups may result in the percolation of regional action plans and an international norms cascade to the grass root level. Domestic groups may build more efficient tool kits to focus multilateral attention on future crisis situations, as well as to organize around specific issues in a constitutional manner. The new degree of mobilization and connectivity this affords could encourage the development of inter-country civil society issue groups, and bring forth the benefits of sovereignty at the substate level.

Conclusion

The dynamic processes that characterize the defense of democracy regime are changing the political landscape of Latin America, and the political imaginations of its citizens. Sovereignty processes have shown the most dramatic shifts. A region that historically supported non-interventionism has now softened its borders to allow for issue based collective action. The proliferation of pressure groups and increased levels of cross-boundary communication between various issue networks at the international, regional and local level are diversifying efficient tool kits for democracy protection, even as they are homogenizing regional priorities.

This research indicates that sovereignty practices in Latin America are being redefined to include new degrees of issue-based interventionism. The multilateral response to Venezuela's crisis was a strong step in this direction. The flexible and inclusive structure that has been created for democracy protection is encouraging dynamic and result-oriented collective action. Recognition practices have also altered, being now granted only to representative democracies and the popular sovereignty that they represent. The new degree of inter-country openness and transparency may result in more harmonious and progressive understandings of democratic procedure. From the ground up, Venezuela reflects an older trend of extra-constitutional behavior for reclamation of popular sovereignty. However, there is also an unprecedented level of communication within civil groups, and between regional and local agencies. The development of such communication networks may focus the benefits of sovereignty at the sub state level.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

⁵⁷ Jimmy Carter, "Statement of Former President Jimmy Carter at the conclusion of his trip to Venezuela," (issued on July 9, 2002) <http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>

- Anon. 2002. Venezuelan business and labor groups bring country to a halt. NACLA Report on the Americas 35 (4): 47-48.
- Atkins, G. Pope. 1995. The Inter-American System. In *Latin America in the International Political System*. San Francisco: Westview Press
- Beasley-Murray, John. 2002. Venezuela: The revolution will not be televised. NACLA Report on the Americas 36 (1): 16-20.
- Bhattacharya, Kanika. 2003. Dated Summary of the Political Crisis and OAS Response in Venezuela: December 1999 to May 29, 2003. Working paper.
- Biersteker, Thomas J. 2000. State Sovereignty and Territory. In *Handbook of International Relations*. Edited by Thomas Risse and Beth E. Simmons. London: Sage Publications.
- Biersteker, Thomas J. and Cynthia Weber, eds. 1996. *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-22, 278-287.
- Bloomfield, Richard. 1994. Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime. In *Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean*. Edited by Carl Kaysen, Robert A. Pastor, and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge Massachusetts: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Carter, Jimmy. 2002. Statement of Former President Jimmy Carter at the conclusion of his trip to Venezuela. Statement issued on July 9.
<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>
- Clapham, Christopher. 1999. Sovereignty and the Third World State. *Political Studies* Vol. XLVII Special Issue: 522-537.
- Cooper, Ander and Thomas Legler. 2001. The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership. *Latin American Politics and Society* (formerly *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*) 43: 103-126
- Cooper, Ander and Thomas Legler. 2003. Passing the Test: The OAS, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and the Crisis in Venezuela. Working paper.
- Economist, The.
2002. After the coup, the reckoning. Caracas, April 18th.
2002. Tales from a failed coup. Caracas, April 25th.

2002. Chavez at Bay. Caracas, May 2nd.
 2002. Weathering the Storm. Caracas, July 25th.
 2002. Poor, but fervently Loyal. Caracas, August 29th.
 2002. The Americas: Chavez and the judges: Politics in Venezuela. London, August 17th.
 2002. A tragic and dangerous stalemate. Caracas, October 10th.
 2002. The Americas: Chavez and the judges: Politics in Venezuela. London, August 17th.
 All available from online archives at www.economist.com

Encarnación, Omar G. 2002. Venezuela's Civil Society Coup. *World Policy Journal*

Ellner, Steve and Fred Rosen. 2002. The Remarkable Rise and Fall of Hugo Chavez. *NACLA Report on the Americas* 36 (1): 9-15.

Farer, Tom, ed. 1996. *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, Chapters 1, 2, 5.

Franck, Thomas M. 1992. The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance. *The American Journal of International Law* 86 (1): 46-91.

Gaviria, César. 2002. Statement of the OAS Secretary General on the situation in Venezuela (E-078-02). Statement issued on April 11.
<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>

- . 2002. Address by the Secretary General of the OAS, report pursuant to Resolution CP/RES.811(1315/02) Situation in Venezuela. Statement presented at the OAS Permanent Council meeting, April 18, in Washington D.C.
<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>

Jackson, Robert. 1999. Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape. *Political Studies*, Vol. XLVII Special Issue: 431-456.

James, Alan. 1986. *Sovereign Statehood, the Basis of International Society*. London: Alan and Unwin.

- . 1999. The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society. *Political Studies*, Vol. XLVII Special Issue: 457-473.

Johnson, Stephen. 2002. Rebuilding Democracy in Venezuela. Backgrounder # 1545, The Heritage Foundation policy research and analysis, May 6.
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1545.cfm>

- . 2003. How the OAS can export Democracy to the UN. Executive Memorandum #868, The Heritage Foundation policy research and analysis, March 25.
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/em868.cfm>
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1995-1996. Compromising Westphalia. *International Security* 20 (3): 115-151.
- Lander, Luis and Margarita Lopez-Maya. 2002. Venezuela's Oil Reform and Chavismo. *NACLA Report on the Americas* 36 (1): 21-23.
- Lutz, Ellen and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. The International Dimension of Democratization and Human Rights in Latin America." In *Democracy in Latin America: (Re)constructing Political Society*, Edited by Manuel Antonio Gerreton and Edward Newman. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Mayall, James. 1999. Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self-Determination. *Political Studies*, Vol. XLVII Special Issue: 474-502.
- McCoy, Jennifer L. 1999. Chavez and the End of "Partyarchy" in Venezuela. *Journal of Democracy* 10 (3): 474-502.
- Murphy, Alexander B. 1996. The Sovereign State system as political-territorial ideal: historical and contemporary considerations. In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Edited by Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Muñoz, Heraldo, ed. 1996. *Latin American Nations in World Politics*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- . 1998. The Right to Democracy in the Americas. *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 40 (1): 1-18.
- Moises Naim. 2002. Democracy dictates Latin America's future. *Financial Times (London)*, April 26, 13.
- Philpott, Daniel. 1999. Westphalia, Authority and International Society. *Political Studies* XLVII Special Issue: 566-589.
- Rio Group. 2002. Rio Group Document on Venezuela. Document presented at the meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, May 28, in Washington D.C.
<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.upd.oas.org>

- Rosen, Fred. 1999. Chavez and Democracy in Venezuela. *NACLA Report on the Americas* 3: 5-7.
- Sanchez, Fabiola. 2002. Venezuelan's Strike for Elections. *Washington Post*, October 22, Online edition, www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A62233-2002oct22
- Shifter, Michael. 2000. Latin American democratization: The Civil Society Puzzle. In *Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*, edited by Ottoway and Carothers. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America. *International Organization* 47, 3: 411-441.
- . 1997. Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices. *Houston Journal of International Law* 19, 3: 705-729.
- Smith, Steve. 2001. Reflectivist and Constructivist approaches to international theory. In *The Globalization of World Politics*. 2nd Ed. Edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Strang, David. 1996. Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism. In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, edited by Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Paul. 1999. The United Nations in the 1990s, Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue of Sovereignty. *Political Studies XLVII Special Issue*: 538-565.
- Thomson, Janice E. 1995. State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research. *International Studies Quarterly* 39, 2: 528-565.
- Various Authors. 2002. Declaration on democracy in Venezuela (AG/CG/doc.16/02). Document adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the OAS, June 4, in Bridgetown, Barbados, www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/AGcgdoc16_02.htm
- Venezuelan Delegation to the OAS. 2002. The Current Situation in Venezuela (OEA/Ser.P CP/doc.3616/02). Document presented at the meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, May 28, in Washington D.C.
- Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of

Power Politics. *International Organization* 46, 2: 391-425.

Wallace, William. The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox. *Political Studies* XLVII Special Issue: 503-521.