

Liberal Democracy: Dead End or Cross-Roads?

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Abstract

The end of the twentieth century witnessed a wave of optimism regarding the future of Liberalism and democracy in the contemporary world. One of these absolute optimists is Francis Fukuyama who, following in the steps of the hegelian idealism and encouraged by the fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc, declares liberal democracy a global winner. He perceives no further threat to this ideology and to the state system that it underlies, and foresees no future clashes of ideologies. In building his theory, however, he sees communism as the unique ideology and state system opposed to liberal democracy. The current paper contrasts Fukuyama's "end of history" with some recent events in the Middle East. The aim is to determine whether Fukuyama's discussion is entitled to be declared universal in nature.

The following analysis is aimed at supporting my argument that none of the three main claims of Fukuyama's end of history theory "no viable alternatives to liberalism," "the end of mankind's ideological evolution," and "no alternatives to the Western liberal democratic state" stays on solid ground when applied to the Muslim world. My research is centered on the question of whether Fukuyama's claim is viable in light of the Middle Eastern specific reality.

Fukuyama maintains that with the fall of communism, Western liberal democracy and the liberal state became absolute winners of the clash between ideologies and state systems, respectively, with no further potential for conflict with alternatives, or for change. First in 1989 and then in 1992, he stated that "the triumph of the West ... is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable alternatives to Western liberalism,"¹ then as a possible "end of history" which in his interpretation is "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."²

Reactions to Fukuyama's theory arose as early as 1989. As Fukuyama himself acknowledges, his argument provoked a blaze of commentary and controversy all over the world.³ Among his first critics were Allan Bloom, Pierre Hassner, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Stephen Sestano who argued that "liberalism may have won, but it may be decisively unsatisfactory;" that Fukuyama's theory instigates a decrease in alertness in international affairs; that he seems oblivious to poverty which is still omnipresent in the world and poses a real threat to liberal democracy; that he should have gone further back in time, to Aristotle, who taught us that all

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¹Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 3.

² *Ibid.*, 4.

³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992): 11.

forms of government, democracy included, are inherently unstable; that it would be frightening to see how the "basic principles of the liberal democratic state can no longer be improved on" when its main exponent, the United States, finds itself exhausted from trying to solve the new, post-Cold War problems that confront it; and that just because power takes on new forms, it will not cease to exist.⁴

An indirect line of criticism seems to be set up by Huntington's "clash of civilizations" and by scholars such as Ronald Inglehart, Harrison Lawrence and others, who followed in his steps and warned that some countries have never been democratic and many may never become so or, even if they do, there will be limits on their progress beyond which they will never go. In the same vein it is argued that there are important differences among civilizations in terms of political and economic development and that the obvious roots of these differences are in the peculiarities of their cultures;⁵ that economic success is experienced not only by the individualist liberal Westerner but also by the family-oriented Easterner living in a still traditional society; that the international dialogue of the future may become structured not in divergent political and economic terms but according to the reality of the nine different 'cultures' into which the population of the world is divided.⁶

In what follows, a step-by-step discussion of Fukuyama's three-fold argument, tempered with empirical evidence on the local reality and the latest evolution of events in the Middle East, will help determine whether Fukuyama's theory stands the test of history and of regional specificity, and whether it deserves further criticism or praise.

"No Viable Alternatives to Liberalism"

Main Ideological Tradition in the Middle East

If by "viable" alternatives to Western liberalism Fukuyama means able to live, grow and develop, then, when he did not count in Political Islam, he left out the fiercest adversary of liberal democracy in the Middle East and in the Muslim world as a whole. Political Islam is a full-fledged ideology adopted by most Muslims. It has its own theoreticians and promoters.

Also known as Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic radicalism and Wahhabism, this currently predominant Islamic ideology has its roots in the major tradition of revivalist Islam, which is extremely radical in its assertions and beliefs, and extremely critical of the Western liberal democracy and of the Muslim deviants who adopt it. Founded in the eighteenth century by Muhammad ibn' Abd al-Wahhab, the revivalist movement does not recognize the authority of the other two traditions, which are the tradition and the liberal tradition. Although they, too, were of Islamic inspiration, these two traditions were seen as unqualified to interpret Islam, as not sufficiently mindful to the letter of Islamic doctrine, and as not placing enough emphasis on

⁴ Bloom, Allan, Pierre Hassner, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Stephen Sestanovich, "Responses to Fukuyama," *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 35.

⁵ Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996): 29.

⁶ Inglehart, Ronald, "Culture and Democracy" (p. 80-97) in Harrison, Lawrence E. and Samuel P. Huntington ed., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Behaviour* (New York: Basic Books, 2000): 81.

the Arabic language, the holy idiom of the Prophet Muhammad. The Islamists do not have much consideration for the political institutions of their countries, either, which they see as illegitimate "usurpers of God's sovereignty".⁷

Political Islam, a "populist-cultural-religious force,"⁸ gathered unprecedented force after the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1978-79 and in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. It has become a challenge for the governments of many Islamic countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa such as Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. This is just one of the many examples of revivalist upheaval at a time of crisis, when the system cannot cope with the internal and external problems that confront it. This is a recurrent pattern in the social and political life of the region. Political Islam is fuelled by worldly frustration and denial, and by the socio-economic and political problems experienced by the Muslim society. In practice, Political Islam translates into a strong desire to introduce a divine order in the political life of the respective countries and into sheer hatred for the secular state. One of its most important theoreticians, Hasan al-Turabi, very much in the trend of Marxist historical determinism, announces that the course of history will inevitably lead to the "establishment of the Islamic state",⁹ as the ultimate form of government.

Extremism

Not only does Political Islam have the most followers of all the three traditions, but it has developed several forms of extremism that practice terrorism as a weapon against liberal democracy and its most prominent representatives. The best known and most efficient extremist organization of this type, Al-Qaeda, posed on September 11, 2001 a real threat to the United States, one of the world's leading liberal democratic countries, and caused events with serious implications for the future of the region.

Al-Qaeda's underpinning ideology derives from an Islamic religious movement known as Salafiyya,¹⁰ a branch of the revivalist tradition that clearly rejects democracy and Liberalism, and Western values in general. The Salafis' main purpose is to take the Muslim world back to the seventh century of the common era, the time of Prophet Muhammad, when the civilization of Islam was not threatened by "the hyper-sexualized, commercialized culture of the West".¹¹

Al-Qaeda's leader, Osama ("young lion" in Arabic) bin Laden, is a Saudi multimillionaire, "a turbaned Robin Hood, hiding out not in the forests of Nottingham during the Middle Ages, but in the mountains of almost medieval Afghanistan who enjoys worldwide celebrity".¹² He has a "global network of lieutenants and supporters".¹³ He has sufficient

⁷ Kurzman, Charles, ed., *Liberal Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1998): 5-6.

⁸ Faksh, Mahmud A, *The Future of Islam in the Middle East. Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia* (Westport: Praeger, 1997): xi.

⁹ *Ibid.*, xii.

¹⁰ Doran, Michael Scott, "Somebody Else's Civil War," *Foreign Affairs* 1, 81 (January/ February 2002): 23.

¹¹ Bergen, Peter L., *Holy War, Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: The Free Press, 1998): 2.

¹² *Ibid.*, 44.

¹³ *Ibid.*

financial resources to operate independent of support from outside the organization. Perhaps ironically, a world in which globalization advances at a rapid pace fuelled by modern technology such as the Internet allows his message to be taken up in the blink of an eye to holy warriors in various parts of the world. According to a statement of the U.S. State Department in 1996, "bin Laden is the most significant financial sponsor of Islamic extremist activities in the world today".¹⁴ He and his terrorist network are seen by the United States as a real threat not only to the country itself but to liberal democracy as a whole since they are in perpetual conflict with its values.¹⁵

What if Islamism Did Not Exist?

There are voices, however, who assure us that Islamism will share the fate of communism.¹⁶ Would this scenario bring a more optimistic perspective of Liberalism and democracy to the Middle East? Would potential conflict be thus eliminated? A brief review of Islamic attitudes, values and beliefs, as opposed to the Western ones, and of the current human rights situation in the region will help us answer this question.

By going back to Locke, Kant, Hegel and Marx, Fukuyama acknowledges the long tradition of philosophical, religious, and political ideology ingrained in Christianity. This tradition, through centuries of distilling and refining, has led to the birth of democracy and Liberalism, the two symbiotic pillars of the modern liberal democratic state.¹⁷ The concept of democracy as a form of government goes back to the Greek philosophers.¹⁸ But in the West, democracy is more than a form of government: it is a mentality rooted in Christianity and humanism, and relies on "respect for the moral personality of man"¹⁹ whose infinite value in the eyes of God is strongly emphasized. However, Fukuyama seems oblivious to the fact that not every part of the world relies on the same 'cultural' tradition.

Not only is there hardly any democratic tradition in the Middle East but the very religious beliefs of its inhabitants lead to a completely different vision of Man, who exists only to please God. This is in spite of the fact that there are voices asserting that the Qur'an the holy book of Islam which lies at the heart of every aspect of human life and activity if properly interpreted, could set the stage for true democracy in that part of the world, and that the concept of *shura* which stands for social consensus in decision-making,²⁰ for the ruler's obligation to consult the people is proof of this democratic potential. Most thinkers and analysts agree that the Islamic model does not match the Western one, that each reflects a different set of values

¹⁴ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁶ Faksh, Mahmud A, *The Future of Islam in the Middle East. Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia* (Westport: Praeger, 1997): xv.

¹⁷ Ross, Alf, *Why Democracy?* (Copenhagen: Harvard University Press, 1952): 136.

¹⁸ Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991): 5.

¹⁹ Ross, *Why Democracy?*, 137.

²⁰ Filali-Ansari, Abdou, "Can Modern Rationality Shape a New Religiosity? Mohamed Abed Jabri and the Paradox of Islam and Modernity" (p. 156-171) in Cooper, John, Ronald Nettler, and Mohamed Mahmoud, ed., *Islam and Modernity*. (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1998; I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000): 159.

and concepts.²¹ This part of the world has its own attitudes, values and beliefs strongly rooted in religion, which shapes a completely different 'culture'.²² "When Westerners talk about political ideas, they naturally hark back to the Magna Carta, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution. Muslims go back to the Qur'an and the *hadith* (verse) to derive good principles about good governance and concepts of social and economic justice".²³

Liberal democracy cannot exist in the absence of human rights. The status of women and their rights in these countries is a telling example of how unprepared for democracy the Middle East is. Despite the fact that many of them are members of the United Nations (Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria) and in this position have undertaken binding legal obligations through ratification of a whole body of legislation on human rights, these countries are obviously not satisfied with what they perceive as tools for secularization and westernization in the form of human rights arguments. The international human rights law is, in many respects, not compatible with the Islamic ideology, culture and religion, and with *shari'a*, the Islamic law, whose various interpretations has affected women's rights in Islam. Women are not only absent from the public debate and from public life in general, they do not have elementary rights such as the right to marriage based on free choice and consent. Marriage in Islam is still imposed on women. The notion of a woman interacting freely with males, and the idea that she could choose a husband on her own are deeply offensive in Islam and are perceived to threat to existing social order.²⁴

Could Liberal Democracy be Exported to the Middle East?

If liberal democracy cannot be adopted from within, the only chance to bring it to the Middle East would be to have it imposed from without. This is the alleged motif behind the wars waged by the U.S. against Afghanistan and Iraq. Both wars were allegedly underlain by the liberal belief that "promoting freedom will produce peace"²⁵ in the region as expressed by President Bush in his speeches. On various occasions, he stated that "what happens in the Middle East matters to America [because] the bitterness of that region can bring violence and suffering to [its] own cities", and that the United States "support[s] the advance of freedom in the Middle East because it is [its] founding principle, and because it is in [its] national interest."²⁶ There are voices among political scientists asserting that Iraq and its oil are nothing but instruments enabling the US to maintain its hegemony in the world in the post-Cold War era. This argument deserves further scrutiny. However, our focus is on the extension of liberal democracy to the Middle East and Northern Africa and, as a result, the United States is brought into discussion only as a possible or impossible vehicle for this transfer.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Inglehart, Ronald, "Culture and Democracy" (p. 80-97) in Harrison, Lawrence E. and Samuel P. Huntington ed., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Behaviour* (New York: Basic Books, 2000): 79.

²³ Fuller, Graham E., "The Future of Political Islam," *Foreign Affairs* 2, 81 (March/April 2002): 50.

²⁴ Ali, Shaheen Sardar, *Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law. Equal Before Allah, Unequal Before Man?* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002): 159.

²⁵ Doyle, Michael W. "Liberalism and World Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 4, 80 (December 1986): 1151.

²⁶ Remarks by the President in Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina, May 9, 2003

Once achieved, peace in the Middle East could create the grounds for capitalism and democracy, which, in turn, would prevent further terrorist attacks against liberal democracy, and could allow the Middle Easterners to embrace liberal ideology. A democratic post-Saddam Iraq could become a model of democracy in the region. However, peace, democracy and capitalism are only very remote possibilities in the Middle East as the current situation attests. Both Afghanistan and Iraq are difficult countries. Neither has a unified population with a common national identity. The society is formed of many, often antagonistic, tribes, armed and ready to fight each other. This is a major barrier to democracy because elections held under ethnic and religious tensions could generate a government controlled by one group to the detriment of the others. Free and fair elections could thus trigger conflict instead of liberty and democracy.²⁷ As Huntington puts it, governments produced by elections may be democratic and at the same time undesirable because they are not able to adopt policies serving equally everyone's interests.²⁸

The process of democratization imposed from outside is slow, fragile, and, above all, very costly. "Without a full-fledged, long-term military occupation", no progress on the path introducing "effective modern democratic state structures" can be guaranteed in Afghanistan.²⁹ And since the international community is already giving signs of fatigue, the ambition to turn Afghanistan into a modern state with a democratic government is giving room to the alternative of a "loose national mediation committee" rooted in the local reality.³⁰ Iraq's future seems to be even more uncertain than Afghanistan's. The actual reform plan that the Bush administration has thus far set out does not seem to be very promising in terms of ability to produce radical changes in the Arab world. Iraq used to be a full autocracy in which the leader was held in power by an extensive security apparatus used to repress the civilian population, and divided to rule. Thus, the opening brought by the Americans may become the beginning of a civil war in the name of revenge for past atrocities, and not the dawn of liberal democracy. Analysts see its future tightly connected to the timing of elections. Early elections might provoke civil conflict and thus not be conducive to commitment to the new institutions built on a democratic basis. Late elections, on the other hand, enhance the Iraqis' overt frustration with the presence of the U.S. troops perceived as an occupational force and have potential to jeopardize the whole democratization process.³¹ Other problems remain unsolved for the foreseeable future, which delay the democratization and liberalization process in the country, such as security fears,

²⁷ Ottaway, Marina and Judith Yaphe, "Political Reconstruction in Iraq: A Reality Check," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (March 27, 2003): 4, <http://www.ceip.org>.

²⁸ Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991): 10.

²⁹ Ottaway, Marina and Anatol Lieven, "Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* 12 (January 2002): 1, <http://www.ceip.org>.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

³¹ Ottaway, Marina and Thomas Carothers, "The Right Road to Sovereignty in Iraq," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* 27 (October 2003): 1, <http://www.ceip.org>.

internal border disputes, lack of national cohesion, potential of intervention by the neighboring countries, etc.³²

To make things worse, the very credibility of the United States as a pro-democratic actor is affected by its excessively long indulgence in accepting and co-operating with the full autocracies of the region. Besides, they are trying to separate Islam from politics, which reflects their ignorance of the intricate relationship between the two and of the fact that Islamism has no real ideological rival in this part of the world.³³ The United States' sometimes ambiguous interests in the stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf and of strategically critical Egypt led it to undergo peacemaking actions to contain the radical opponents of peace (Iraq, Iran, Libya) and leave friendly Arab regimes to take care of their internal problems at will. Without ignoring political reform in its entirety, the US "just tinkered with it on the margins".³⁴ It is thus hard to see in the United States a reliable vehicle of liberal democracy in that part of the world.

b) "The End of Mankind's Ideological Evolution"

Liberal Islam

Hardly known to the Western audience and not too well received at home because of the negative connotations of the term 'liberal' in parts of the Islamic world where it is "associated with foreign domination, unfettered capitalism, hostility to Islam,"³⁵ Liberalism, nevertheless, exists in the Middle East. It was initiated by Shah Wali-Allah (India, 1703-1762), a revivalist thinker with 'liberal' religious views. His interpretation of the holy book is considerably more humanistic than that of Revivalism. It talks about opposition to theocracy, support for democracy, guarantees of the rights of women and non-Muslims in Islamic countries, defense of freedom of thought, and belief in the potential for human progress. However, at this early stage, like Revivalism, Liberal Islam does not depart from religion and only very few of its promoters have a Western view and attitude towards Liberalism and democracy. "The similarity of liberal Islam and Western Liberalism does not imply that liberal Muslims are stale and reassuring imitators of Western philosophy. Many of their writings are firmly rooted in Qur'anic exegesis, in the lives of the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslims, and in traditional Islamic forms of debate".³⁶

Only in the nineteenth century did Liberal Islam begin to distinguish itself more clearly from Revivalism, promoted by a wave of intellectuals schooled in the West. On the intellectual plane, liberals began to separate *ijtihad* from *taqlid*, reason from authority, respectively. *Ijtihad* allowed Islam to be interpreted in accordance with the perceived needs of the modern age. But

³² Byman, Daniel, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities," *International Security* 1, 28 (Summer 2003): 61.

³³ Fuller, Graham E., "The Future of Political Islam," *Foreign Affairs* 2, 81 (March/April 2002): 3.

³⁴ Indyk, Martin, "Back to the Bazaar," *Foreign Affairs* 1, 81 (January/February 2002): 77.

³⁵ Kurzman, Charles, ed., *Liberal Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1998): 5.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

none of these needs were liberal in the Western sense: need to resist European rule or acquiesce.³⁷ Many liberals of this period are still the product of religious education.

Probably the closest resemblance between Western Liberalism and Liberal Islam is their respect for modernity. Through education reform, promoters of Liberal Islam managed to introduce in schools disciplines such as engineering, military science, medicine and natural sciences, comparative legal studies and social science, modern languages. Journalists trained in these schools laid a timid foundation for liberal communication with the masses through media. Cairo became a central site for liberals to visit and study, just as Mecca and Medina had been for revivalist a century earlier. Liberals reached the apogee of their power in the first two decades of the twentieth century.³⁸

c) "No Alternatives to the Western Liberal Democrat State"

Forms of human government typical to the Middle East

As long as there is oil in the Middle East, autocracy as a form of government will be hard to remove from the region, and liberalization and democratization will have no true support. Partial opening is possible, though, as has been already seen in the 'liberalized autocracies'³⁹ of the region. Islamic states have seen almost every possible type of regime other than a democratic one: the region has had its fair share of "monarchical, socialist, secular nationalist, Islamist, military junta..."⁴⁰ The unifying thread of these different types of regimes is their authoritarian rule underlain by 'rentierism'. The oil-rent state is common in the Middle East. In these countries, oil is the blessing of those in power and the curse of the ordinary people living in poverty since the government controls a monopoly on it and therefore derives substantial revenues from rents received from foreign countries. "These rents allow the state to become autonomous from society and unaccountable to its citizens."⁴¹ This way the "state can usually resist much of the pressure for reform and political accountability."⁴² It reduces its role to the preservation of citizens' traditional entitlements. The rentier state is opposed to the Western production states, where the government uses its fiscal tools to obtain revenue from the population who agrees to be taxed in return for having its interests and needs catered to. Another difference between the two lies in the very large non-private sector typical to the Middle Eastern state, in which the government is the almost exclusive employer and spender: in 1985, public spending accounted for forty percent of Tunisia's GNP, and forty-eight percent in Egypt⁴³. We can already see how 'rentierism' has a detrimental effect on economic development and political liberalization. With money from rents, the state responds only to those concerns

³⁷ Kurzman, ed., *Liberal Islam*, 8.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

³⁹ Kazemi, Farhad and Augustus Richard Norton. *Hardliners and Softliners in the Middle East* in Handelman, Howard and Mark Tessler, ed. *Democracy and Its Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin America and the Middle East* (Notre Dame: University of Notre dame Press, 1999): 69.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁴¹ Kazemi and Norton. *Hardliners and Softliners in the Middle East*, 70.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 72.

of the population deemed necessary for staying in power and discourages the formation of an independent bourgeoisie. By co-opting the members of the bourgeoisie in state-funded economic projects, the government motivates them to remain loyal to the state and not to push for reform. The oil rent perpetuates authoritarian governments in countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Gulf states, etc.⁴⁴

Implicit in 'rentierism' is the concept of 'clientalism' also practiced by Middle Eastern countries.⁴⁵ 'Clientalist' economies involve "obligations of cooperating parties which are implicit rather than explicit and take the form of gift giving."⁴⁶ As opposed to the market economies, where interactions among individuals rely on contracts and where neutrality of the relationship is thus ensured, the economic relationships and social interactions of the 'clientalist' state members rest on "kinship and ethnicity."⁴⁷ "Gift giving reinforces a sense of trust and enduring obligation among the parties."⁴⁸ This economic climate cannot foster or even accommodate the development of free markets as an essential prerequisite for Liberalism. Fukuyama acclaimed the triumph of consumerism all over the world but the mere presence of western products in Middle Eastern markets unaccompanied by sound underlying free market principles cannot be equaled to ⁴⁸victory.

Conclusions

The argument that Western liberal democracy and the liberal state become absolute winners of the clash between ideologies and state systems, respectively, with no further potential for conflict with alternatives, or for change derived from Fukuyama's theory on the "end of history" does not have straightforward and immediate application in the Middle east. In the Middle East, liberal democracy can either run into a dead end, if Political Islam manages to keep it away from the region and 'rentierism' and 'clientalism' further marginalize it, or be at a cross-roads from where its development can take a new turn, adjusted to the Islamic reality, as the existence of presently timid Liberal Islam suggests. At present, the social, political and economic situation of the region is complicated and does not lend itself well to short-term optimistic scenarios. Since the Middle East is not a negligible part of the world, the announcement of the triumph of liberal democracy and its universality announced by Fukuyama is premature.

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⁴⁴ Ibid., 74.

⁴⁵ Mousseau, Michael, "Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror," *International Security* 3, 27 (Winter 2002/03): 10.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁷ Mousseau, "Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror," 12.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

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