

The Somali Insecurity Dilemma:

How Insecurity and Underdevelopment are Ensured in a Failed State

Eilish Elliott

A central government is vital to the functioning of a state as the institution responsible for collecting taxes and appropriately allocating these funds to provide social programs and security to all citizens.¹² Without such a body carrying out these tasks, the state is susceptible to collapse. When this happens, the country is designated a “failed state”.³ Somalia, a country on the Horn of Africa, is one such failed state. There has not been a central government in place in the country since 1991 when the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre fell, earning the country the title of the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in post-colonial history.⁴ The lack of a central governing body has led to instability, protracted conflict, high levels of insecurity, and low growth. Citizens have relied on a number of less conventional institutions, including traditional clan groups, local legal systems, and external actors, to provide for them. These have seen varying levels of success, but have largely

proved to be insufficient replacements for a government. The actors on their own have not been able to provide adequate security to the population they look to protect, and the instability that remains in the country prevents the economy from adequately functioning as well.⁵ Both their individual weaknesses and inability to work together exacerbate Somalia’s insecurity and suggest the sustenance of instability in the future. This paper, then, seeks to serve two purposes: to explain the makeshift structures that have arisen since the state collapse to provide for the Somali people and how these have proven insufficient, and to explain the country’s insecurity dilemma to demonstrate the role these actors play in exacerbating the problem.

An insecurity dilemma is said to “emerge from the paradoxical situation that weak states are relatively free from serious external threat, while simultaneously the weak state itself poses a serious security threat to major parts of its population.”⁶ In Somalia, this results from the makeshift security actors seeking to provide security to their portion of the population, and unintentionally challenge other segments of the population in the process just by

“THE MAKE-SHIFT ACTORS THAT HAVE EMERGED SINCE THE STATE’S COLLAPSE HAVE PROVEN NOT ONLY INSUFFICIENT IN FILLING THE CURRENT SECURITY NEEDS OF CITIZENS, BUT ALSO PRESENT A GRAVE THREAT TO SOMALIA’S FUTURE STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT.”

¹ Markus V. Höhne, “Political Identity, Emerging State Structures, and Conflict in Northern Somalia,” *The Journal of Modern African States* 44 (2006): 410, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876301>.

² Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 1.

³ Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia*, 1.

⁴ Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” *International Security* 31 (2006): 74, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137508>.

⁵ Jutta Bakonyi and Kirsti Stuvøy, “Violence and Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia and Angola,” *Review of African Political Economy* 32 (2005): 368, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056240500329379>.

⁶ Georg Sørensen, “After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Liberal Values,” *Security Dialogue* 38 (2007): 365.

becoming more powerful themselves.⁷ This breeds competition and stifles the possibility for cooperation among the different actors of the ad-hoc governance structure. Both of these results increase the insecurity of the population as a whole. As a third component of Somalia's complex insecurity dilemma, individual security actors often purposefully hinder the functioning of any body that emerges with the potential to become a central governing body. This is a result of the fear that a new government could be as repressive as the last regime Somalis experienced. In this way, despite thinking they are protecting their populations, the local security actors are almost certainly ensuring future insecurity, because an effective central government is very much necessary in Somalia for the country to see success in the future.⁸ The current externally-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is not necessarily an ideal candidate for a central government and the lack of support may be justified, but the greater concern is that makeshift governance actors will prevent future, appropriate governmental bodies from succeeding. As a result of the complex insecurity dilemma they have both created and become entangled in, the make-shift actors that have emerged since the state's collapse have proven not only insufficient in filling the current security needs of citizens, but also present a grave threat to Somalia's future stability and development.

The Somali state gained its independence in 1960, at which time a government was formed representing parties and clans from across the

territory.⁹ Though this government had flaws, relative democracy survived in the country until Major General Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in 1969.¹⁰ Barre ran a relatively stable but repressive state and many suffered under his leadership, causing many strong warlords in the country to come together in hopes of ending his reign. Increased military and political coordination among his many enemies eventually led to an erosion of his power, and the dictator finally fled Mogadishu, the Somali capital, in 1991.¹¹ The state collapse that followed not only halted any programs that were functioning, but led the two strongest warlords, backed by factional militias of other clans, to fight for control of the state, creating chaos and disorder that directly threatened the security of the population. With no group ever emerging the victor, there was no replacement central government and conflict and lawlessness have persisted as a result.¹² The war caused further damage by deepening the divisions in an already fragile society, leaving self-provision as the only feasible means of survival at the time as clans.¹³ Since 1991, many other actors have attempted to fill the gap left by the government's absence and provide for citizens, including traditional clan structures, de facto state administrations, private security companies, sharia courts, and international intervention, but these have proven insufficient. The strengths and weaknesses of each will be explained in turn.

Clans are not a new governance actor in Somalia, as they have been important social organizers in Somalia since pre-colonization. However, citizens have increased their reliance on clan ties for security since the state

⁷ Bakonyi and Stuvøy, "Violence and Social Order," 368; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 76.

⁸ Matt Bryden, "New Hope for Somalia? The Building Block Approach," *Review of African Political Economy* 26 (1999): 139, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056249908704367>; Ioan Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), xi; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 94.

⁹ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 34.

¹⁰ Jeffrey Clark, "Debate in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1992): 110, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045500>.

¹¹ Clark, "Debate in Somalia," 112; Höhne, "Political Identity," 397.

¹² Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 81.

¹³ Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia*, 7; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 81.

collapse.¹⁴ Because of the greater divisions caused by the civil war, the country is now effectively partitioned along the lines of clan territory and each group serves as a “survival unit” for its members.¹⁵ Clans act as their citizens’ connection to what exists of an economy, provide social support, and often have their own militias as well, meaning an all-around approach to security for their citizens. There are still many shortcomings, however, even apart from the basic lack of resources, which prevent this actor from lessening the citizens’ need for a central government.¹⁶ Clans and sub-clans provide relative stability for their members in that they guarantee a clan elder and familial group looking out for their wellbeing, but organizing in this manner is an ineffective system for ensuring the security of the Somali population as a whole.

The instability of the clan system was first evident in the colonial era when struggles for power between colonial powers and local leaders, as well as among Somali leaders themselves, were prevalent.¹⁷ Today, the instability still exists as clans come into contact with each other while looking to assert their control, define their territory, and claim resources in order to provide protection to their members in the lawless state.¹⁸ These actions inevitably create competition with the other clans looking to accomplish the same goals. The conflict that can arise as a result is exemplified in the civil war after the collapse of the Barre administration: two clans had worked together to oust Barre but turned on each other in order to

try to assure their own security and obtain the national leadership role themselves, causing a statewide war in the process.¹⁹ This can happen in smaller circumstances as well: when one group encroaches on another’s territory or poses a threat to another through relative power gain, this causes the other clan group to feel endangered, and any response to the situation perpetuates the cycle further.²⁰ Representing an example of the larger insecurity dilemma the state faces, each clan attempting to assure its own security causes the insecurity of members of both groups by exposing them to conflict, even if not a statewide war. Because they work against rather than with each other, the clan system as it currently functions cannot serve as an effective replacement for a central government.

Certain clan groups have become more effective security providers to their members: the de facto states of Somaliland and Puntland in northern Somalia are perhaps the most institutionalized and legitimate governance actors in the country. Somaliland was established in 1991 immediately following the state collapse by members of the Issaq clan long desiring autonomy and self-reliance due to shortcomings under Barre administration.²¹ Puntland was founded in 1998 at a congress of Harti and Daarood clan representatives who saw themselves as a cornerstone of a future federal Somalia.²² These clans have far outpaced the rest of the country in security, economic recovery, and administrative development.²³ Both regions have defined their particular territory and embarked on state-building projects, including the establishment of state-like bureaucracies, legal systems, and

¹⁴ Bakonyi and Stuvøy, “Violence and Social Order,” 366; Patrick Gilkes, “Somalia: Conflicts Within and Against the Military Regime,” *Review of African Political Economy* 44 (1989): 53, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4005835>.

¹⁵ Bakonyi and Stuvøy, “Violence and Social Order,” 373; Clark, “Debacle in Somalia,” 112.

¹⁶ Bakonyi and Stuvøy, “Violence and Social Order,” 366; Bryden, “New Hope for Somalia?,” 136.

¹⁷ Höhne, “Political Identity,” 399.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 399.

¹⁹ Clark, “Debacle in Somalia,” 115; Menkhaus, “Governance without Government,” 81.

²⁰ Stig Hansen, “Private Security and Local Politics in Somalia,” *Review of African Political Economy* 35 (2008): 589, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056240802569268>.

²¹ Bryden, “New Hope for Somalia?,” 137.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, 136; Höhne, “Political Identity,” 397.

security apparatuses.²⁴ Supported by a functional though modest state structure and budget, Somaliland especially represents a successful experiment in ad-hoc governance. In most of this region, citizens are relatively safe, and economic recovery has been impressive due to investment by diaspora, outside business investment, and the attraction of migrant labourers made possible by the region's relative stability.²⁵ Puntland is less developed thus far, but has also established a relatively stable bureaucracy and has effectively engaged with private security companies to secure the rich fishing waters they claim as part of their territory.²⁶ Though the international community has not recognized either region as a sovereign country, both enjoy the support of their governed citizens and the legitimacy crucial to ensuring stability as a result, and are now successfully providing services and security to citizens.²⁷ Despite their success, the de facto states have their own challenges in being the security solution for Somalia.

Both Somaliland and Puntland still suffer from administrative incapacities, which they are attempting to rectify through the use of private security companies (PSCs). Puntland has further challenges: their administration is chronically short of money,²⁸ meaning that it has not seen quite the same level of development.

This region is also the site of lucrative but illegal activity like human trafficking, arms smuggling, and piracy,²⁹ suggesting some further weakness in its legal and security capacity, or reflecting

the area's need for capital. The significance and possible interconnectedness of these last concerns is further demonstrated by the fact that the fragile peace between the three strongest clans in Puntland is only maintained through a balance of power in the administrative body, and by distributing financial support to key locals in each clan.³⁰ However, these issues are relatively minor and can be overcome through further institutional development.

The greater security weakness of the two administrations is that they have not actually overcome the problems other clans face in terms of competition and insecurity, they are just fortunate to be more isolated from other groups and therefore encounter less problems. Relative to the rest of Somalia, both Somaliland and Puntland have been very effective in providing for their individual populations. However, neither has adopted a cooperation strategy to limit the insecurity caused by competition and therefore still subject their populations to security threats. There remains ongoing conflict between the two administrations over water and other territory,³¹ which causes the same societal insecurity that other clans encounter more frequently. This demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the further development of clans into "sovereign" groups as a wider solution to Somalia's problems on its own; it is only

possible in the absence of competition, which will not happen in the rest of the country without an active championship of this goal by all groups. As a result, because they still have their own weaknesses and have not effectively solved the underlying Somali insecurity dilemma, de facto state administrations do not represent a sufficient replacement to a central governing

"WHILE PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES DO WORK TO FILL IN GAPS LEFT BY OTHER GOVERNANCE ACTORS IN THE ABSENCE OF A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, THEIR SUCCESS IN SOMALIA IS FAR TOO CONTINGENT ON LOCAL POLITICS TO BE CONSIDERED SUSTAINABLE."

²⁴ Hansen, "Private Security," 585.

²⁵ Bryden, "New Hope for Somalia?" 136; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 91.

²⁶ Hansen, "Private Security," 585.

²⁷ Bryden, "New Hope for Somalia?," 140.

²⁸ Höhne, "Political Identity," 410.

²⁹ Hansen, "Private Security," 587.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 595.

body in the country – they are merely more formally-structured clans that still contribute to the insecurity of other populations and their own.

In contrast to the overarching security provision attempted by the *de facto* states emerging in the North or the clan system of organization, some other actors present in Somalia try to fill in particular gaps in security provision. Private security companies (PSCs), for example, have been employed by the TFG and the bureaucracies of Somaliland and Puntland primarily to enhance coast guard services and train local coast guard personnel to prevent piracy, illegal fishing, and illegal dumping.³² The external companies are thus contracted in order to compensate for a state's inadequate capabilities in some area of security provision.³³ These have seen varying levels of success in each of the three regions of Somalia. In Puntland, the use of PSCs initially led to a reduction in the frequency of incidents of piracy, created an effective British-trained Somali coast guard, and helped the state successfully defend itself against a foreign company when a territorial claim was questioned in a case on illegal fishing.³⁴ However, the company bringing about this success withdrew from the region due to the eruption of conflict, and subsequent companies were too closely involved with Puntland politics to function effectively, either disagreeing with government forces or with the larger population of Puntland depending on the administration.³⁵ The TFG was only approached by illegitimate companies looking to exploit whatever opportunities they could in the weak state, and never actually saw a contract come through to completion.³⁶ Somaliland has signed a contract with Norwegian Nordic Crisis Management for a

project to improve the security of their main port, Berbera, funded entirely by development aid.³⁷ The company is far more legitimate than those operating in other parts of the country, but does not acknowledge the contentiousness of certain waters between Somaliland and Puntland, resulting again in their engagement in local issues.³⁸

The weakness with PSCs is, then, their unreliability. While they do work to fill in gaps left by other governance actors in the absence of a central government, their success in Somalia is far too contingent on local politics to be considered sustainable. In each of the three regions, the weak state has hindered the group's security function in some way and led to the company's involvement in politics rather than solely focusing on providing security. This dependence on a good fit with the current administration and the clan comprisal of the region is especially difficult given the fluidity of both in Somalia.³⁹ PSCs could work to exacerbate problems of instability or rivalry in a region if they are in a corrupt relationship with the state, operate solely in search of profit, or lack the real expertise and experience to complete the work they have been hired to do.⁴⁰ The potentially detrimental multiplier effects that could be experienced as a result of the functioning of PSCs and the many contingencies on the efficacy of their performance demonstrate the difficulty in considering them effective providers of security in Somalia.

The sharia courts that have been established in Somali communities are another example of an actor that has arisen post-state collapse to serve a particular purpose in the security realm. Because of the support and legitimacy they enjoy from their communities, municipal and neighbourhood level initiatives like these courts

³² *Ibid.*, 585.

³³ *Ibid.*, 586.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 587.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 588.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 592.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 594.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 595.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 586.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 596.

have been most effective in producing day-to-day governance in Somalia.⁴¹ The first generation of sharia courts were created in the mid-1990s to serve specific sub-clans and provide a local legal authority.⁴² The courts are administered by coalitions of local clan elders, businesspeople, intellectuals, and clergy, and carry out judicial and law enforcement functions through the interpretation of sharia law as necessary in their respective communities.⁴³ This guarantees at least the possibility of recourse for illegal behaviour and, in that way, provides peace of mind and security for citizens.⁴⁴

There are, again, shortcomings with this makeshift security actor. While the variety of different community members participating is what lends the courts their support, it can also lead to internal tension and structural weakness.⁴⁵ This fragility means that, much like everything else in Somalia, they can become susceptible to outside actors and that their efficacy is ultimately dependent on the interaction with those in power in the region. The courts function well in areas where the local warlord's power is waning or another municipal actor is supporting security or development efforts, but in places where the warlord is powerful, the courts are relatively useless in controlling their actions.⁴⁶ Powerful businesspeople and Islamic movements throughout the country have also converted the courts into militias. They also provided firearms and funding to the militias, increasing their law and order capacity and, in turn, decreasing the power of warlords in some circumstances.⁴⁷ Militarization, however, turns these courts into another contributor to the insecurity dilemma of

Somalia, as their operations can directly threaten another's wellbeing.⁴⁸ The new form of sharia courts, then, cannot effectively take the place of a central government either, as they increasingly cause insecurity to other groups in the state.

The final prominent way that security provision has been attempted in Somalia since the state's collapse is through international intervention, including peacekeeping operations and nation-building assistance. In the immediate years after collapse, both US- and UN-led operations were launched in attempts to provide humanitarian aid, assist with reconciliation, demobilize and disarm clan militias, and revive the government.⁴⁹ Positively, the missions led to an inadvertent stimulation of the local economy through increased employment and contract opportunities, and ensured relief supplies reached civilians in spite of the civil war.⁵⁰ The UN also brokered a ceasefire between warlords Aideed and Mahdi, but this did not hold and violence escalated as a result.⁵¹ The UN's failure exacerbated the tensions in the state and led to previously neutral clan groups engaging in the conflict.⁵² The country plunged into crisis and though external involvement continued in some capacity until 1995, the missions withdrew at that time with the country still in a state of war and chaos.⁵³ It is believed that inadequate multilateral measures contributed to the very circumstances of anarchy and violence they were supposed to address.⁵⁴ This demonstrates

⁴⁸ Hansen, "Private Security," 592.

⁴⁹ Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World* (Latham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 200; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 81.

⁵⁰ Clark, "Debacle in Somalia," 109; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 82.

⁵¹ Bryden, "New Hope for Somalia?," 134; Clark, "Debacle in Somalia," 115.

⁵² Clark, "Debacle in Somalia," 115.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 109; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 81.

⁵⁴ Clark, "Debacle in Somalia," 109; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 81.

⁴¹ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 88; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 85.

⁴² Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 85.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁴⁴ Bakonyi and Stuvøy, "Violence and Social Order," 368.

⁴⁵ Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 86.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 88.

the inefficacy of these missions in providing security in Somalia.

Recent international efforts have attempted a different approach than intervening in conflict zones, instead focusing on establishing a new Somali central government. Since 1991, more than a dozen national peace conferences have been launched to try and revive the state, but none have succeeded in becoming a locally-claimed federal government.⁵⁵ The TFG is the most recent attempt, which was created during the Kenyan-led 2002-2005 peace process in Nairobi.⁵⁶ In 2004, the president was elected and a 275-person government was established.⁵⁷ The TFG is internationally recognized as Somalia's sovereign authority, but is in control of less territory than either Somaliland or Puntland and is also very dependent on Ethiopian support to function.⁵⁸ The constant turmoil within the government since its creation also makes its success uncertain.⁵⁹ This is likely the result of the power-sharing attempts inherent to the structure, as the government is comprised of members of each of the largest clans but clan ties are proving stronger than the commitment to national unity. A central government is necessary for the effective functioning of the Somali state in the future, but unless the TFG can actually gain the support of the country's entire population, it will not work, and will be yet another ineffective security provider to citizens.

Having discussed the key strategies for security provision in Somalia since the state's collapse, it has been demonstrated that all are insufficient. None of the structures currently in existence

address the concerns of nor adequately protect the whole of the population, leaving them insufficient on their own to replace a central government. Further, these structures have not overlapped in order to accommodate individual weaknesses and form a cohesive structure of governance; rather, their existence has caused greater instability by acting as a challenge to the other makeshift structures. Therefore, the existence of these actors *causes* insecurity rather than eliminating it as they were created to do. This represents just one level of the insecurity dilemma plaguing the collapsed Somali state and demonstrates the incompetence of makeshift actors in replacing a central government. Even more problematic, however, is purposeful hindrance by these actors of any attempts to create the central government clearly needed by the Somali state.

"SHOULD A LEGITIMATE
MOVEMENT OR
STRUCTURE ARISE
THAT COULD BE A
POTENTIAL SOURCE
OF STABILITY AND
SECURITY, THE CLANS
WOULD CONTINUE
THEIR EFFORTS FOR
DOMINANCE AND
ATTEMPT TO
UNDERMINE EVEN A
POTENTIALLY
EFFECTIVE ACTOR."

The need for a central government in Somalia is evident, not only because current actors have shortcomings, but also because there are things only a central government can provide for citizens, including national security and social programs financed by a broader tax base.⁶⁰ However,

after twenty-five years, one still has not emerged. The only real attempts have been propped up by the international community, and are not legitimate because they do not enjoy the support of the larger population. It is true that these externally-driven central governments

⁵⁵ Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 74.

⁵⁶ James Fergusson, *The World's Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2013), 83; Hansen, "Private Security," 590.

⁵⁷ Hansen, "Private Security," 591; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 74.

⁵⁸ Hansen, "Private Security," 591.

⁵⁹ Fergusson, *The World's Most Dangerous Place*, 98; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 74.

⁶⁰ Bryden, "New Hope for Somalia?," 139; Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, xi; Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 94.

have their own weaknesses, being created relatively arbitrarily by people far removed from the Somali context based on what they view as best. However, the concern is not necessarily that the makeshift actors do not support *these* central governments, but that they seem to intentionally undermine any larger attempts at state governance. Many clans wish to be the dominant group, and they continue to compete against others for that role despite it meaning insecurity for their citizens and alliance creation being potentially more effective. These clans also coopt other security providers as it best suits their needs, as can be seen with both the PSCs and the sharia courts. This pattern of behaviour suggests that, should a legitimate movement or structure arise that could be a potential source of stability and security, the clans would continue their efforts for dominance and attempt to undermine even a potentially effective actor. Once again, even though a clan or other actor wants to protect its population, it acts in ways that undercut this goal. Adding yet another element to Somalia's complex insecurity dilemma, clans likely carry out this action not just to further their own drive for power, but also because they think it protects their citizens by shielding them from another repressive government like that of Siad Barre.

In this element of the Somali insecurity dilemma, the lack of a central government and desire for power cannot be blamed; rather the cause is how the state functioned while under its last leader. Barre ran a neo-patrimonial state in which he integrated clan structure into the modern state apparatus.⁶¹ He had begun his rule by incorporating members of all major clan-families into the state administration, but a decrease in resources in the late 1970s resulted in the successive exclusion of certain groups from state and economic benefits.⁶² Much evidence suggests that by the mid-1980s the state had already failed: there was government

repression, heightened clan cleavages and animosity, rampant corruption, low production on state farms and factories, the civil service and social programs were falling apart, and the security sector was the only partial exception.⁶³ The dysfunction experienced under the last "government" of Somalia causes many to question whether another such body is necessary and to almost fear the existence of one. They then challenge other potential authorities, afraid that they will act as Barre's administration did. This further exacerbates the previously mentioned problems, and provides yet another dynamic to the Somali insecurity dilemma. It is also, however, another point that suggests why makeshift actors are not effective security providers: the logic of clan leaders and citizens is understandable, but it does not change the fact that Barre's administration was not actually an effective central government, nor the fact that local actors working to prevent one from coming into power are causing insecurity for their populations.

After more than twenty-five years of its existence, the Somali insecurity dilemma now seems relatively impossible to overcome. The only actors working to provide security to citizens have not only proven insufficient replacements to a central government, but they continuously exacerbate the insecurity of the country, both intentionally and unintentionally. This insecurity fosters chaos throughout all of society and makes it difficult for progress to be seen, as development will first require stability. The only real solution to the problems - an effective central government that works to provide for each member of the population equally and, in turn, bring the stability needed for growth - cannot arise without cooperation, which does not exist at any level in Somalia. The lack of trust in both other clans and in state administrations will prove a difficult obstacle to overcome but is one necessary for a successful

⁶¹ Bakonyi and Stuvøy, "Violence and Social Order," 364.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Menkhaus, "Governance without Government," 80.

future for the state.⁶⁴ Unless the country can build trust and patch together their makeshift governance system to create an effective and appropriate central body with the resources and legitimacy to end this long conflict and move the country forward, the currently insufficient system of governance, and the insecurity dilemma and stagnancy that come with it, will continue to be the Somali reality.

⁶⁴ Bryden, "New Hope for Somalia?," 136.