The Intension of Human Rights
Abstract
This essay argues that conceptions of human rights that can be modeled by a mere extension fail. If human rights are claims grounded in the fact that the agent belongs to the human species then when claims become meaningless due to conflict, for example with democratic values, one is entitled (by modus tollens) to assert that any agent who cannot make a claim is not human. This illustrates the need to consider rejecting the liberal conception of human rights as unreasonable. Furthermore, these types of arguments demonstrate that there is a problem with our current conceptions of human rights and our deeper intuitions that give rise to human rights in the first place. I argue in this essay that by positing intension in human rights, that this satisfies the apparent non-linearity of human co-existence, productivity and history. I will then offer a theory of intension in human rights grounded in a (Neo) Marxist account and a conception that all human rights are negative rights and that all democratic rights are positive rights.
On argumente dans cet essai que les conceptions des droits humains formees seulement a partir d'extension echouent. Si les droits humains sont des reclamations fondees sur le fait que I'agent appartient a I'espece humaine et que ces reclamations deviennent sans significations durant un conflit, lorsqu’il s'agit par exemple de comprendre des valeurs democratiques, on peut done (par modus tollens) affirmer que quelconque agent ne faisant pas de reclamations n'est pas humain. Ceci oblige de considerer le rejet de la conception liberate des droits humains comme etant irraisonnable. J’argumente dans cet essai qu'en prenant comme vrai I'intension des droits humains, on aboutit a une explication pour I'apparente non-linearite de la co-existence, la production et I'histoire humaine. Je propose ensuite une theorie d'intension des droits humains fondee sur un compte neo-marxiste et une conception que tout droit humain est un droit negatifet que tout droit democratique est un droit positif.
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