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Breakthroughs: Innovative Solutions for
Communal Challenges

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AN INTRODUCTION

BENJAMIN DUNFIELD

The Atlantic International Studies (ATLIS) Journal is Canada's first and only peer-reviewed, academic journal strictly for undergraduate students. Published at Mount Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick, the journal is in its seventh year and is garnering increasing attention. It is nationally archived and copies are held in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Military Affairs in New York.

The purpose of the journal is to allow undergraduate students in the Atlantic Canada region to showcase their research, whether it is for a class, an independent study, or a thesis project. The journal is interdisciplinary and aims to include papers from students in any year of their undergraduate degree.

Our executive this year decided that instead of focusing specifically on the issues discussed in our classes, we wanted to explore solutions to these issues. We were fortunate to host Jeff and Debbie Moore of Just Us! Coffee Roastery through the generosity of the Pottle Family, whose Pottle Fund helps finance the conference each year.

In this issue of the journal you will find a variety of topics dealing with post-Cold War politics, linguistics and alternative healthcare systems to name a few. As the journal editor this year, I am very pleased with the caliber of articles that have been selected by the peer-reviewers and myself.

There have been a few changes to the journal this year. As an executive, we decided to shorten the length of the journal, while imposing stricter guidelines on material submitted. This has allowed us to focus the scope of the journal, while maintaining the standard of excellence expected of ATLIS. We also changed the peer-review process in the hopes to provide students with the opportunity not only to be involved in the review process but to also evaluate the work of their peers.

The conference and journal are run by students for students. If you enjoy the journal and are interested, there are several ways to get involved with ATLIS in future years. You can attend our conference, submit to the journal, volunteer to peer-review articles, or become a staff member and actively plan and prepare our activities throughout the year. ATLIS was created in the winter of 2003 at Mount Allison with the purpose of fostering informed undergraduate participation in international issues through scholarship, social and political involvement. ATLIS is committed to finding innovative ways to engage students with the world around them. ATLIS actively seeks partnerships with other organizations and clubs, other universities, faculties and experts in diverse fields of international studies.

For more information visit: atlismta.org

The Centre for International Studies (CIS) is a joint student-faculty run organization designed to engage Mount Allison students, faculties, and the wider community across disciplines in critical learning, dialogue, and innovative, collaborative action on pressing global issues. It does so through hosting conferences and speakers, compiling databases of resources and internship opportunities, and supporting the creation of Working Groups on areas of interest to students.

For more information visit: cismta.ca

EUROPEAN LANGUAGES AND THE MODERN AFRICAN STATE

CHRISTOPHER BALCOM

The politics of language in post-colonial Africa are both enormously complex and divisive. The colonial legacy left behind states with no grounding in ethnic and linguistic distribution, and as such many countries have continued with the use of the formerly colonial languages, particularly in administration and education. Since the end of the colonial era, a vibrant debate has arisen on the role of imperial languages in modern Africa. Many anti-imperialist critics argue that the continued reliance on European languages is an ongoing form of linguistic and cultural imperialism. Others maintain that European languages are not only a necessity, but can be legitimately appropriated to express the African experience. This paper will examine the theoretical debate regarding European languages and the African experience, and some of the obstacles to Africanizing national language policy. While European languages are undoubtedly on the continent to stay, there is potential and strong rationale for African languages to assume a greater role in national language policy

Between 2,000 and 2,500 languages are spoken on the African continent. This represents 30% of the world's languages, and thus, on average, every African country is home to between 35 and 40 indigenous languages.¹ Many scholars have argued that Africa is a linguistically unique continent due not only to the plurilingualism of African states, but also because of the high degree of multilingualism amongst the population. Linguistic divisions are generally but not exclusively along ethnic lines. Africa is also notable in the degree to which societies rely upon foreign languages. In demonstrating the linguistic dynamism of Africa Batibo uses a hypothetical example in which "a Tshivenda speaker in South Africa may speak Tshivenda to his parents but use IsiZulu to address his workmates, and then receive orders from his employer in Afrikaans. But he may use English in a bank or when talking to educated strangers, and finally use Fanagalo in a pub with colleagues."² The internal patterns of language use in African states are complex, and differing languages serve different needs and situations. Despite these difficulties, Batibo and others have

identified a recurring language hierarchy in African states.³ In this hierarchy, ex-colonial languages are considered the most prestigious, but are generally associated with the elite and have few native speakers. These ex-colonial languages continue to dominate government and education. Next in the hierarchy are dominant indigenous languages. These are African languages that have some regional importance, and often serve as *linguae francae* among different ethnic populations. Depending on government policy, dominant indigenous languages are used in some limited public capacities, such as local levels of government or in primary education. There is often some level of media, such as television and radio programming available in these languages, as is the case with Hausa in Western Africa. Dominant indigenous languages have some demographic weight and prestige either within a specific area, throughout an entire country, or across national borders. Generally they have some history as a trading language and are attractive to be learned as a second or third language. The third category, minority languages, are generally confined to a particular ethnic

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group with limited demographic potential and have only a marginal public role.⁴

As African countries gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, African administrations tended to marginalize indigenous languages and continue using colonial languages in government. (Important exceptions to note include Tanza-

nia, Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Arabic-speaking Northern African states.) There are several different explanations as to why the ex-colonial languages continue to enjoy such a privileged status in Africa. Most significantly, European languages are often referred to as "neutral" languages, because they are not associated with any particular ethnic group. In attempting to juggle ethnic and linguistic divisions and build coherent national identities, many governments opted for European languages to manage these differences. Chinua Achebe points out that even the vehemently anti-

¹ Batibo, Herman M. *Language Decline and Death in Africa*. (Cleveland: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 2006.) 1.

² Batibo. 1.

³ Batibo. 18.

⁴ Batibo. 24.

imperial Marxist states maintained the use of European languages despite their colonial roots. He quotes a former minister from Burkina Faso who said “sixty different ethnic groups in the country could not mean sixty different nationalities.”⁵ Many attempts to render African languages the official language, such as Hausa in Nigeria, or Luganda in Uganda, have failed due to protests from other ethnic groups who feared domination by another cultural group.

However, language “neutrality” is not the only reason the colonial languages still enjoy such importance. Many relatively linguistically homogenous states, such as Rwanda and Burundi, and states with well-established and widely spoken African *linguae*

francae, such as Senegal and Namibia, still have European languages in “official” positions. After independence, rather than adapting their own *linguae francae*, it was much easier to continue using languages that were already widely used in the realms of technology, higher education, law and diplomacy. Within Africa,

and among many speakers of African languages, there remains a lasting association between European languages and modernity or prestige. For many Africans, ex-colonial languages are vehicles of social advancement, and in contrast African languages are often considered backwards and primitive. Western institutions such as the World Bank, who have strongly resisted attempts to provide education in national languages, frequently reinforce this perception.⁶ In Francophone Africa, France has been particularly assertive in ensuring linguistic allegiance to France through La Francophonie. Many African languages lack accepted orthographies and have not been adapted to academic or scientific literature. As such, they are perceived by many to be difficult to adapt into existing political and social institutions. In many cases, European languages are simply more convenient to maintain in official positions.

⁵ Achebe, Chinua. “Politics and Politicians of Language in African Literature.” *The Education of a British-Protected Child*. (New York: Anchor Books, 2009.) 106.

⁶ Alidou, Hassana. “Language policies in Francophone Africa.” *Black Linguistics*. (London: Routledge, 2003.) 106.

“to speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization.”

It would be grossly misleading to discuss language as simply a means of communication. Language also embodies a world-view and perspective unique to a particular culture and it is a means of preserving and communicating knowledge. As Frantz Fanon asserted in his seminal work, *Black Skins, White Masks*, “to speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization.”⁷ African languages are unique carriers of African knowledges, cultures and experiences. When considering language in the post-colonial context, it is imperative to examine the social and psychological effects of relegating native African languages to a position beneath the European tongues.

The prominent Kenyan novelist, playwright and intellectual, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, has been a vocal advocate for the use of African languages. After publishing several successful plays and novels in English, he dramatically rejected English for Swahili and his mother tongue, Gikukuyu. Over the years he has written extensively on the politics of language in Africa, and identifies the continued use of ex-colonial languages as a form of cultural imperialism.⁸ As opposed to simple political or practical convenience, wa Thiong’o relates the ongoing supremacy of European languages to the backgrounds of the African elites who took power at independence. He maintains they were and are products of their European educations and cultural experience. This is a fact that many analysts have seized upon, and many have noted the degree to which the school systems of many African countries, particularly in the Francophone world, mirror colonial practices.⁹ This is representative of an ongoing class struggle, in which elites are familiar with European languages, while the masses continue in the use of African languages.

Wa Thiong’o’s analysis details how language imperialism served to accomplish the economic aims of colonialism through controlling people’s means of self-definition in relation to others and systematically devaluing local cultures. He effectively demonstrates how “the domination of a people’s language by the languages of the colonizing nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colonized.”¹⁰ For wa Thiong’o, the division

⁷ Fanon, Frantz. *Black Skin, White Masks*. Trans. Charles Lam Markmann. (New York: Grove Press, 1967.) 18.

⁸ Wa Thiong’o, Ngugi. *Decolonising the Mind*. (London: James Currey, 1986.) 16.

⁹ Alidou. 108.

¹⁰ Wa Thiong’o. 16.

of Africa into Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries is a dangerous absurdity, which has no grounding in the realities of African societies. Due to the continuing reliance on European tools of expression and self-definition, Africa remains trapped in a culturally subservient role that is incompatible with national development. Other analysts, such as Alamin Mazrui, have taken a less linguistically deterministic approach, and maintain that more harmful than speaking a European language are the negative stereotypes internalized from a Eurocentric worldview.¹¹ Nonetheless, Mazrui is a strong advocate for the scientification of African languages, and places great importance on shattering the paradigm that associates modernity and progress with European languages. To modernize African orthographies, adapt them to scientific and technological purposes, and increase their value in higher

“The dependency on European languages is often seen as part of a broader ‘intellectual dependency’ within Africa.”

education could have profound effects for Africa. This would not only help affirm the equality and worth of African languages, but has great democratizing potential, as it would empower large segments of the population familiar with African languages yet unfamiliar with European ex-colonial languages.

The dependency on European languages is often seen as part of a broader “intellectual dependency” within Africa. It is this intellectual dependency that led Wa Thiong’o to denounce the African university as one of the greatest impediments to African self-identification and the development of the African novel.¹² As Mazrui points out, “a university-trained surgeon who does not speak a European language is a sociolinguistic impossibility.”¹³ This is particularly troubling when compared to other post-colonial states where physicists, economists and others are able to function in their own national languages. Another particularly interesting point Mazrui raises, is that few or no countries have succeeded in economic development in a foreign language. Despite the ideology of the World Bank and IMF, capitalism is most successful in countries where the language of the marketplace and the language of the classroom are the same.¹⁴

¹¹ Roy-Campbell, Zaline M. “Promoting African Languages in Educational Institutions.” *Black Linguistics*. London: Routledge, 2003. 86.

¹² Wa Thiong’o. 69.

¹³ Mazrui, Alamin. *English in Africa After the Cold War*. (Clevedon, Multilingual Matters, Ltd.) 58.

¹⁴ Mazrui. 122.

As the Asian countries have done, it is perhaps important for African countries to indigenize modernization as opposed to attempting imitations of Europe. Furthermore, how representative or accessible can a state be if only a minority of the population speaks the official language?

In opposition to the hardline wa Thiong’o takes with regard to linguistic imperialism, many other African revolutionaries and intellectuals have defended their use of European languages. Despite the censure wa Thiong’o reserves for African intellectuals and writers who work in European languages, Achebe distinguishes between wa Thiong’o’s perspective and his own by explaining that when it comes to indigenous and European languages in African literature “Ngugi *now* believes it is *either/or*, I have always thought it was *both*.”¹⁵ Achebe goes on to explain that he writes in English not because of its role as a global language, but because it is so central to Nigerian life. Nigeria, Africa’s most populous state, is also one of its most linguistically diverse and politically tense. Achebe points out that English is now a central feature of the Nigerian experience, and writing in the language enables him to bridge the linguistic gap among his fellow Nigerians. Ken Saro-Wiwa, a prominent Nigerian activist against the neo-colonial state, who was executed in 1995 said, “...I remain a convinced practitioner and consumer of African literature in English. I am content that this language has made me a better African in the sense that it enables me to know more about [fellow Africans from] Somalia, Kenya, Malawi and South Africa than I would have otherwise known.”¹⁶ These quotations illustrate the degree to which the English and other European languages have been appropriated to express the African experience.

English has a long history as a pan-African language. Not only did English serve as a means of communication amongst and within former European colonies, it also facilitated communication with the African diaspora. In particular, African-Americans assumed central places in the leadership of Pan-Africanist thought. Implicit in the words of Saro-Wiwa and others, is that the very idea of Pan-Africanism arises from a colonial, and particularly English, context. In Lusophone and Francophone Africa as well, many scholars have examined how Colonial languages were often adapted to express a more revolutionary vocabulary, taking the former Imperial language and using it as an ideological tool.¹⁷ As example of this

¹⁵ Achebe. 97.

¹⁶ Saro-Wiwa, 1992, from Mazrui, Alamin M. 69.

¹⁷ Mazrui. 73.

process, Frantz Fanon in particular wrote extensively on how the liberation of Algeria facilitated a taking back of the French language from its colonial past and appropriating it to the struggle for independence.¹⁸ While the appropriation of European languages may have been an important ideological tool during the independence era, the time has come to re-evaluate their official position. Assimilation and urbanization have already had huge transformative effects in African countries. Particularly in urban environments, it is simply impractical to deliver education in the native tongues of each child. Reversing assimilation and segregating pupils on the basis of mother tongue is also neither practical nor desirable. While it is of course important to protect endangered languages, some degree of language loss is inevitable. The question is then of course, which language is most appropriate for use in the educational context. Aside from the children of the elite, who largely attend inaccessible private schools, the masses of pupils and even many teachers have inadequate familiarity with European languages. Some studies have demonstrated that students are less likely to participate in class because they are unfamiliar with the language of instruction.¹⁹ Furthermore, due to standardized examinations, they are only tested in European languages, which Alidou and others have demonstrated are an inaccurate and unfair means of assessing pupil's ability in a variety of subjects.²⁰ Alongside the political issues at play, there are clearly some basic questions of educational quality. Promoting the that are already understood by both teacher and pupil makes sense as a means of ensuring educational equality. While it may be desirable to acquire a European language down the road, it should not be at the expense of literacy and grounding in a more familiar tongue.

The dialogue surrounding language in Africa can often be misleading. Particularly when discussing endangered languages, there is a tendency to talk about European languages as "killer" languages that are demographically wiping out African tongues. Interestingly, many scholars predict that endangered indigenous languages do not face the greatest threat from European languages, but from nationally and regionally dominant *linguae francae*.²¹ While recording and protecting these endangered languages is very important to their preservation, it is preferable to have them displaced by widely accepted African *linguae francae* as opposed to

ex-colonial European languages. One of the most dramatic examples of this trend is Senegal, where the official language, French, is only spoken by about 15 percent of the population, as opposed to Wolof, the lingua franca, which is spoken and understood by nearly 90 percent of the country.²² Several similar cases, such as Botswana, Madagascar and Zimbabwe can be found across the continent. Countries with well-established, dominant African languages often afford token respect to one or two languages as "national" as opposed to "official" languages.²³ For the sake of accessibility and self-determination, it is essential that higher education and administration take more important steps to recognize languages that already have much larger demographic bases than the local colonial language.

A paradigm shift is required in how African languages are valued, both on the continent and abroad. There remains a pervasive mentality that African languages are linguistically inferior to their European counterparts, and should be subordinate in the realm of public policy. While there have been significant structural causes for the underdevelopment of African languages, their development is not only possible but also valuable. They often remain in marginal roles because political decision-makers lack the necessary political will needed to enrich them, not because of any innate inferiority on the part of the languages or their speakers.²⁴ Tanzania and its institutionalization of Swahili in the post-colonial context has been a very important case in this discourse. The Tanzanian case has demonstrated the potential efficacy of adopting African lingua francae to fill national roles. The Tanzanian state has invested considerable resources in expanding the lexical base of the language, refuting the notion that African languages lack the necessary linguistic sophistication for application to higher education and government.²⁵

It is also of great importance to acknowledge Africa's linguistic diversity as a blessing, not a curse. The sheer diversity of African languages has immense value in the cultural and linguistic wealth they hold. As opposed to barriers to national development, they ought to be vehicles for such development, with great encouragement to invest time in translation and development of these diverse language groups. Some academics have even proposed grouping African languages with high levels of mutual intelligibility together, and creating languages with standardized

¹⁸ Mazrui. 74.

¹⁹ Alidou. 104.

²⁰ Alidou. 104.

²¹ McLaughlin, Fiona. "The Ascent of Wolof as an Urban Vernacular and National Lingua Franca in Senegal." *Globalization and Language Vitality*. (London: Continuum, 2008.) 142.

²² McLaughlin. 145.

²³ Batibo. 20.

²⁴ Roy-Campbell. 86.

²⁵ Roy-Campbell. 90.

orthographies out of their shared characteristics.²⁶ These proposals could add demographic weight to these already widely spoken languages, and facilitate their use in government and education. Not all indigenous languages need to be afforded equal public roles. In fact, such a scheme would be impossible, but it is imperative that countries continue to abandon unilingual official language policies, and afford greater public roles to African languages.

CHANGING TRADITIONS: REDUCING THE PREVALENCE OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION IN AFRICA

ELISE DOLINSKY

Female genital mutilation (FGM), (also referred to as Female Circumcision or Female Genital Cutting) has become a major concern in Africa, and is starting to attract significant international attention. Unfortunately, until very recently, there has been a considerable lack of research and productive action against FGM, and because of this, there is little consensus on how the problem should be dealt with. I propose that local groups, particularly those led by women, are most effective in slowing the practice of FGM in Africa, and the best method by which they can do this is through education. For this argument, I will first provide an overview of FGM and its prevalence, and then discuss some of the dominant issues and problems faced by groups who work to end the practice. I will examine why international organizations and African governments have been less successful than local groups, especially local women's groups. Finally, I will suggest that a four-pronged educational approach is the best way for these groups to maximize their influence and hopefully eventually eradicate FGM across the continent.

FGM has been, and continues to be, a significant problem for women in Africa, with recent analysis determining that approximately 3 million African girls and women are cut every year.¹ Between 100 and 140 million girls and women have undergone some form of FGM, including 26 million who have undergone infibulations, the most radical and damaging form of the practice.² Sub-Saharan African countries, along with Egypt and Sudan, tend to have the highest prevalence (the percentage of women aged fifteen to forty-nine who have undergone some form of FGM) of FGM; however, there is significant variation from country to country, and even between regions within countries, and this can make it difficult to get accurate data on FGM.³

As this paper demonstrates, the politics surrounding language in the African context are incredibly complex. This paper does not seek to argue that European languages have no place on the continent: even the first President of Tanzania and passionate advocate of the Swahili language, Julius Nyerere, acknowledged, "English is the Swahili of the world."²⁷ However, a more balanced vision of the public role of African languages is required. Where indigenous *linguae francae* are prominent, they should be institutionalized and accorded their rightful place in the administration of the nation. In many cases, there is already real demographic weight behind this possibility. Higher education and state administration ought to promote African languages, and co-operate with linguists when necessary to adapt them to their modern roles. The development and promotion of indigenous languages in Africa could not only reinvigorate the national identity of these states, but also provide greater opportunities to those who speak African languages. There is no reason why African languages cannot assume more cosmopolitan and modern roles. The time has come to appropriately address the imperial legacy of language on the African continent.

"However, a more balanced vision of the public role of African languages is required. Where indigenous *linguae francae* are prominent, they should be institutionalized and accorded their rightful place in the administration of the nation."

²⁶ Roy-Campbell. 95.

²⁷ Batibo. 20.

¹ Alexia Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation" *UNICEF*, last modified 2005. assets.unicef.ch/downloads/FGM_English-nov05.pdf, 3.

² Judith Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation," *World Health Organization. Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 82.2 (2004), 153-154.

³ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 3.

The practice of FGM is extremely harmful to the women subjected to it. It violates the physical integrity of women, and has been directly linked to a plethora of serious physical and psychological issues, and in many cases even results in the death of the girls involved.⁴ FGM is considered a violation of basic human rights, particularly because girls are almost exclusively subjected to the practice before the age of sixteen, making it an issue pertaining to the rights of children.⁵ In the majority of cases, girls have little to no say in whether they undergo the procedure or not, and there are significant societal and cultural barriers that prevent girls from being able to seek help to protect themselves from this practice.⁶

The practice of FGM is important to African politics, as it plays a role in the freedom and empowerment of African women. Despite their contribution to the post-colonial independence movements, African women still struggle to gain political autonomy. As a practice that restricts a women's control over her sexuality and reproductive functions, FGM seems to play a role in reinforcing patriarchal societal rule.⁷ The practice of FGM works to repress women, hurting their ability to pursue political freedom. FGM is the "manifestation of deep-rooted gender inequality that assigns [women] an inferior position in society."⁸ As one African woman says: "We can't talk about women's liberation if we don't respect their physical integrity."⁹

Since the start of the colonial period, there have been a growing number of attempts to ban and reduce FGM, both by international and local governments and organizations.¹⁰ However, because of the unique factors associated with the practice that have prevented attempts to end FGM, it is still widely practiced in twenty-eight African

countries, where it is a persistent social norm.¹¹ FGM is a deeply entrenched social convention that persists despite attempts to get rid of it. Groups and individuals looking to lower the prevalence of FGM continually face the challenge of not even knowing how to approach the issue.

There are a variety of reasons why parents would want to ensure their daughters undergo FGM, and most of these parents feel justified in continuing the practice for the good of their daughters and the community. Often, due to lack of education and information on the topic, families are unaware of the harm caused by FGM, or even believe it is healthy for their daughters to undergo the practice.¹² A common belief is that FGM makes a girl "clean" and/or more physically beautiful. This belief is generally held not only by the men, but by the women and girls undergoing the practice as well.¹³

However, lack of knowledge of the negative consequences of FGM is not the only reason for the continuation of the practice. Even when parents are aware of the dangers of FGM, they will continue to practice it on their daughters due to societal and community pressures and norms.¹⁴ In many communities, FGM is a necessary part of properly raising a girl, and integral to protecting her honour, which in turn dictates the status of the entire family.¹⁵ For example, Maninka women living in Guinea believe they have three primary duties to their daughters: to educate them, to cut them, and to find them a husband, and failing to do any of these properly would be to fail in their role as mothers.¹⁶ Families and girls who do not conform to the practice are stigmatized from the community, and bring shame upon their families.¹⁷ Furthermore, girls who are not cut are considered unclean, less able to satisfy a man, and are unable to prove their virginity, providing them with

⁴ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," VII.

⁵ John C. Caldwell, I. O. Orubuloye, and Pat Caldwell, "Female Genital Mutilation: Conditions of Decline," *Population Research and Policy Review* 19.3 (2000): 237.

⁶ Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation," 153.

⁷ Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation," 153.

⁸ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 1.

⁹ Marion Mayer-Hohdahl. *Female Circumcision: Human Rites*. (Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities & Sciences, 1998), Digital.

¹⁰ Caldwell, Orubuloye and Caldwell, "Female Genital Mutilation: Conditions of Decline," 200.

¹¹ Leye, Els, et al, "An Analysis of the Implementation of Laws with Regard to Female Genital Mutilation in Europe," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 47.1 (2007): 2.¹² Soraya Mire, *Fire eyes: a film*, (New York: New York Filmmakers Library, 1995), Digital.

¹³ Mire, *Fire eyes: a film*.

¹⁴ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 35.

¹⁵ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 11.

¹⁶ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 11.

¹⁷ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 34-36.

little chance to find a good husband and live a happy life.¹⁸

International groups and African governments have been prevented from effectively making any real change with respect to FGM. Both groups are often reluctant to get involved in the issue, and when they do they face significant barriers and problems regardless of the level of good governance present in these groups. African governments are often weary of FGM because it is a very controversial issue, and one that has been practiced for a very long time and has ties to religion and specific cultural norms.¹⁹ FGM is often considered a private matter, and one that should not be intruded upon by the state. Furthermore, African states generally have little capacity to deal with issues such as FGM. There is significant competition for funding and attention between interests and issues, and FGM is often pushed to the side. This could also be partially attributed to the lack of women in positions of power in African governments to fight for anti-FGM projects, as FGM is considered a 'women's issue' that is not necessary or fitting for men to discuss.

Though they may have more financial and structural capacity to deal with the issue, international groups face their own challenges when dealing with FGM. Organizations are often forced to take a very hands-off approach to FGM projects, as they do not want to appear as though they are attacking traditional African culture and tradition. It is very important for these groups to approach the issue in a sensitive manner, so that it does not seem as though foreigners are imposing their will and practices on local communities. In fact, many international organizations choose to work through local groups to help reduce FGM. By providing financial aid and educational tools to local groups, they are able to have an effect by empowering rather than imposing.²⁰ Yet this can create problems for the local organizations they are trying to help, as locals see these local groups as simply an extension of Western influence.

The primary tool of African governments and international organizations has been introducing legislation that bans FGM within their jurisdiction. National legislation that prohibits FGM has been very successful at accelerating change; however, this only works when societal change is

already underway and citizens are well informed about the issue.²¹ Often, FGM legislation is not properly composed, and even when constructive legislation is put in place, it is rare that it is properly enforced, and will even cause more problems by forcing women to practice FGM in unsafe manners.²² For example, in Gambia, though the practice is prohibited by the government, 80% of the female population undergoes some form of FGM.²³ Pushing FGM underground can be very dangerous for girls in African communities, as they will be less likely to receive adequate medical treatment during the procedure, and if any complications arise, they might be pressured not to go to hospitals or local clinic for help out of fear of punishment.²⁴ Legislation banning FGM is also linked to the decreasing of the average age at which a girl is subjected to FGM in a country, as it is easier to hide the cutting of younger girls; this makes the practice even more dangerous and further infringes upon the rights of children.²⁵ Commitment at all levels of government is necessary for legislation banning FGM to be successful, with legislation complemented by advocacy, awareness efforts, and effective enforcement of the legislation.²⁶ These support mechanism must be dissuasive rather than punitive in order to cause any behavior change, and require considerable coordination between different political actors.²⁷ Furthermore, legislation can be difficult to implement across borders, as even if a state is exceptionally good at enforcing anti-FGM legislation, parents can still take their daughters across borders to other countries to have the procedure done, and this is hard to regulate without extensive coordinated action between countries or infringing on individual rights to cross borders.²⁸

An alternative to legislation banning FGM that nations such as Egypt, Guinea and Mali have attempted is the medicalization of FGM, where parents are encouraged to have their daughters cut in hospitals, where the risk of medical

²² Caldwell, Orubuloye and Caldwell, "Female Genital Mutilation: Conditions of Decline."

²³ Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation."

²⁴ Leye, Els, et al, "An Analysis of the Implementation of Laws with Regard to Female Genital Mutilation in Europe."

²⁵ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation, 7.

²⁶ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation, 14.

²⁷ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 29.

²⁸ Leye, Els, et al, "An Analysis of the Implementation of Laws with Regard to Female Genital Mutilation in Europe," 15.

¹⁸ E. Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 20 (2006): 128.¹⁹ Mayer-Hohdahl, *Female Circumcision: Human Rites*.

²⁰ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 29.

²¹ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 29.

complications is significantly reduced.²⁹ While this change may address some of the health issues associated with FGM, it does not change the underlying gender inequality caused by FGM. In some areas, this idea is taken even further and 'fake' FGM ceremonies are held. Here, parents trick their community, and often even their daughter, into thinking that they cut their daughters. Again, while this removes the health complications of FGM, it still fails to address the psychological or societal issues associated with the practice.³⁰

Local NGOs have proven to be much better suited to fight FGM than African governments or international NGOs, as they can draw upon collective action. With collective action, the decision to abandon FGM comes from within the community and results in a shared shift in perceptions.³¹ This type of change avoids the problem of having a few girls suffer for the future of others. When only some families refuse to practice FGM, their daughters are excluded from the community, but local groups help empower entire communities to change.³² While it is social pressure that lets FGM continue to be practiced, social pressure can also be used to help communities abandon the practice.³³ Old social norms like FGM are self-reinforcing and hard to change, but once a new social norm is established, it too becomes self-reinforcing and there will be little risk of a community reverting to the practice of FGM.³⁴ Social customs and values change over time from within, and do not necessarily require outsiders to enforce changes if citizens are actively engaged in debating their cultural norms and values.³⁵

The most successful anti-FGM projects help guide communities to see the problem and formulate their own solutions, so that they do not feel forced to change or criticized for their behavior.³⁶ In a study of FGM in Mali, a country

with a prevalence rate of 95%, it was found that a grassroots approach to the problem was seeing a lot of success.³⁷ Despite mounting international and local pressure, the government of Mali had been reluctant to prohibit FGM by law. Local groups developed a community-focused campaign against FGM, and were eventually able to solicit the support of the government, which helped empower the grassroots movement and implemented their training programs for teachers and nurses to raise awareness for FGM.³⁸ Because FGM is a community-based practice, ending it must also be a community initiative.³⁹ Outsiders do not have the same relationships and connections with community members that are necessary to change local social norms, while local groups allow for change from within. As previously mentioned, the prevalence and type of FGM practiced varies from community to community, and this makes it difficult for a nation-wide initiative to have much success.⁴⁰ While it is important that states still look into the prospect of nation-wide legislation and projects, this will not be very effective if used alone. Local groups have the experience of living within a community that is necessary to understand the specific local norms, and they can use this to formulate their strategy and action.

One particular advantage of local action is that once a local group has successfully influenced the behavior and norms of their community or region, they can engage that community in helping neighboring communities in the fight against FGM.⁴¹ This way, groups are empowering individuals and families to push for more change themselves, instead of having to start over from scratch in each new community.⁴² Examples of these successful grassroots movements can be found especially in Kenya, Uganda and Egypt.⁴³

²⁹ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 7.

³⁰ E. Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 20 (2006): 130.

³¹ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," VII.

³² Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 13.

³³ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 12.

³⁴ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 35.

³⁵ Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 126.

³⁶ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 36.

³⁷ Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation."

³⁸ Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation."

³⁹ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 14.

⁴⁰ L. Morison, C. Scherf, G. Ekpo, K. Paine, B. West, R. Coleman, and G. Walraven, "The long-term reproductive health consequences of female genital cutting in rural Gambia: a community-based survey," *Tropical Medicine & International Health* 6 (2001): 366.

⁴¹ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 14.

⁴² Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 23.

⁴³ Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation."

⁴⁴ Morison, Scherf, Ekpo, Paine, West, Coleman, and Walraven, "The long-term reproductive health consequences of female genital cutting in rural Gambia: a community-based survey," 644.

Local action has also been successful when governments endorse FGM. In 1997 the Gambian government issued a ban on national radio and television from broadcasting anti-FGM material, and it was only through grassroots movements that active campaigning against FGM could occur.⁴⁴ Though the ban has since been lifted, it is still primarily local Gambian groups who work to end FGM. Local women's groups are generally the most successful in reducing the prevalence of FGM. FGM is often considered a 'women's issue' and in many regions it is the women, not their husbands or fathers, who keep the practice of FGM alive.⁴⁵ Mothers firmly believe that they are helping their daughters by subjecting them to FGM, as to them it is the only way to ensure their daughter's virginity remains intact until marriage (and in African countries that practice FGM, virginity is considered a necessary prerequisite for marriage). Without a good marriage, many Africans view a women's life as wasted and pitiable, and while it is often acknowledged that FGM is a difficult and painful procedure, it is considered "just one of the challenges of being a woman".⁴⁶

It is important for women to empower themselves in the fight against FGM, because it is their oppression that is being reinforced by FGM. There has been a significant improvement in the prevalence of FGM over the past twenty years, and women's movements should receive a lot of the credit for leading the attack on FGM.⁴⁷ Women's groups have demonstrated that women need to stand together if they hope to change the prevalence of FGM, and according to Gruenbaum, "women are in the best position to continue or modify their practices."⁴⁸ There are many examples of women's groups successfully changing the public opinion on FGM, such as the Tanzanian Media Women Association, a group that is very good at using the media to attract attention to their cause.⁴⁹ Another example is a collection of women's groups in Senegal, where women are teaching other women about the human rights and health issues associated with FGM, and they are doing a very good job of changing the collective stance towards the issue.⁵⁰

⁴⁵Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation."

⁴⁶Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 116.

⁴⁷Caldwell, "Female Genital Mutilation: Conditions of Decline."

⁴⁸Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 133.

⁴⁹Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 31.

⁵⁰Mandelbaum-Schmid, "Mali Takes Grass Roots Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation."

A strong example of local women's groups bringing about change to the practice of FGM is the Amazonian Initiative Movement (AIM) in Sierra Leone. The group was founded by Rugiatu Turay, a local woman with personal experience with FGM who wanted to prevent other girls from having to undergo the practice.⁵¹ Though the group has faced considerable barriers and challenges in their fight against FGM, even receiving death threats for their work, they have managed to instigate change in their region, primarily thanks to their determination to end FGM.⁵² Without Turay's personal experience with FGM, she would not have worked as hard to stop the practice or inspired so many other girls. The group now receives international recognition and gets funding from foreign NGOs to help continue their work.⁵³ However, like many other local groups working with foreign NGOs, this can cause considerable difficulties, as these groups are often accused of being swayed by Western influence and not properly representing the African people. It is difficult for local groups to balance the pressure they receive from foreign groups who want to help them, with the pressure they receive from local opposition. There are many cases in which foreign aid has helped their cause (by providing resources and credibility) and cases where it has hindered it (by stimulating local opposition to foreign intervention).

While women's groups are integral to lowering the prevalence of FGM, it is also important for these groups to work with men. It is important that men do not feel threatened by the rise in power of women's organization, or fear that the change might come at their own expense. Men typically hold most positions of power in African states, and it would be easy for them to repress women's groups if they thought it was necessary. Many studies on FGM have found that men are simply not very well informed on the negative consequences of FGM for women and for themselves. For example, men from Kubur Abdal Hameed in Sudan have started to call for the end of FGM in all forms, thanks to information they gained at a workshop for men.⁵⁴ These workshops received very positive responses from the men who attended them, many of whom said they had no idea that there were so many complications associated with FGM and felt almost "duped" by the prac-

⁵¹Liliane Bitong, "Fighting Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone," *World Health Organization. Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 83.11 (2005).

⁵²Bitong, "Fighting Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone."

⁵³Bitong, "Fighting Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone."

⁵⁴Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 132.

tice.⁵⁵ In many areas, rights related to sexuality belong to husbands and fathers, so it is necessary that they understand FGM and its consequences.⁵⁶ The education of men is also an important factor to consider, as recent studies have found that the level of education of a husband is directly proportional to his opinion on FGM and domestic violence. In a study by Simister,⁵⁷ higher levels of education were linked to higher disapproval of FGM and domestic violence and less frequent violence against wives.

I propose that education is the best method available for local groups to undertake if they wish to have the largest impact on FGM prevalence possible. Preferably local women's groups, with the support of local men and external groups, would implement this method. This method is not only appealing in its effectiveness; it also allows local groups to integrate the support of governments and especially international groups into their projects without compromising the integrity of their organization, minimizing the backlash they would receive from local communities. In education-focused anti-FGM projects, international groups and African governments often support the self-directed projects of local groups by providing them with access to educational material and funds for training, and this technique has seen a lot of success in numerous states across the continent.⁵⁸

There are four different components to an education-based approach to FGM; the first is improving the education of African girls in general. Studies have found that the more educated a mother is, the less likely it is that her daughter will undergo FGM.^{59/60} Globally, FGM prevalence is higher among illiterate parents, and many activists firmly believe that education is more important than government legislation when it comes to fighting FGM.⁶¹ According to Rugiatu Turay, "Educating people is empow-

ering them. It is only through their minds that you can change the attitude of people."⁶² Fortunately, as levels of female education are currently increasing in Africa, fewer and fewer girls are being subjected to FGM. Not only does education help teach young women about the dangers of FGM and allow them to think critically about it, but it also provides them with jobs and therefore economic independence, and this allows them to distance themselves from the social pressures of their communities and the wills of their (potential) husbands and parents.⁶³ Recent studies in Kenya have shown that there has been a pronounced decline in FGM over the past twenty years. This is credited to the increase in education for women, which has provided more women with jobs and therefore more economic independence for women, leading to less community and patriarchic control over women in the area.⁶⁴

However, education of girls alone is not enough to end FGM, and there is a downside to educating girls when it comes to FGM. Many parents believe that with more and more girls attending schools and universities outside their communities, there is a greater need to subject them to FGM, as they will be exposed to more intimidating situations and cannot be protected by their community at all times.⁶⁵

A second component of the educational approach to reducing the prevalence of FGM is informal, community-based education focused specifically on FGM and the health and human rights issues associated with it. Workshops that advocate for human rights in a non-coercive and non-judgmental manner are often touted as the best way to change social opinion on FGM.⁶⁶ Parents who advocate for FGM are often doing so because they believe it is in the best interest of their children, and teaching them about the human rights violations associated with FGM is very good at changing perceptions.⁶⁷ It is important that these sorts of workshops allow for community discussion and debate, so that members of the community can collectively come

⁵⁵ Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 135.

⁵⁶ Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 135.

⁵⁷ John Gordon Simister, "Domestic Violence and Female Genital Mutilation in Kenya: Effects of Ethnicity and Education," *The Journal of Family Violence*, 25 (2010).

⁵⁸ Beatrice Spadacini, and Pamela Nichols, "Campaigning against FGM in Ethiopia using popular education," *Gender & Development* 6.2 (1998).

⁵⁹ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 6.

⁶⁰ Caldwell, Orubuloye and Caldwell, "Female Genital Mutilation: Conditions of Decline," 234.

⁶¹ A. O. Igwegbe, and Ifeoma Egbuonu, "The prevalence and practice of female genital mutilation in Nnewi, Nigeria: the impact of female education," *Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology* 20.5 (2000).

⁶² Bitong, "Fighting Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone."

⁶³ Igwegbe, and Egbuonu, "The prevalence and practice of female genital mutilation in Nnewi, Nigeria: the impact of female education."

⁶⁴ Caldwell, Orubuloye and Caldwell, "Female Genital Mutilation: Conditions of Decline," 242.

⁶⁵ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 11.

⁶⁶ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation."

⁶⁷ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 13.

to understand the damage done by FGM not only to the health of girls, but to the bodily integrity of women.⁶⁸ An example of the human rights approach to FGM is the African NGO RAINBO, which works to empower women and girls by providing the necessary educational resources and forums to members of local communities so they can learn about human rights and discuss how these rights exist in their communities.⁶⁹ Tostan's Community Empowerment Program is a very similar anti-FGM NGO, which provides participatory, informal education programs in Senegal to educate participants on human rights.⁷⁰ The organization has been very successful in its mission, and has reached over 1,500 communities in eleven regions of Senegal.⁷¹ According to Lewnes, approaches to ending FGM that are "based on the principles of human rights have demonstrated the greatest potential for promoting the abandonment of FGM."⁷² However, it is important to note that many Africans hold the perception that Western culture is behind the rights argument, and are weary of it because they see it as an attack on their culture and religion.⁷³

A third educational approach is important in the eradication of FGM: the education around religion and religious leaders. While FGM is not officially prescribed by any religion, and is found in neither the Koran nor the Bible, there is a common perception that it is a religious requirement, particularly in Muslim communities.⁷⁴ This perception has persisted primarily due to the lack of education and low literacy rates in many communities, as this means that individuals do not have the opportunity to study religious texts on their own and must rely on past interpretations. Education is a key component of clearing up this myth. In Sudan, for example, Sudanese Muslims who practice FGM believe it is a necessary part of following Islam, and teaching people that this is a myth has been

an important component of the fight against FGM.⁷⁵ It is very important that religious leaders be educated about the negative consequences of FGM for women, as they are very influential individuals in communities. In many communities, international human rights are only socially accepted if they agree with the local interpretation of Islam, and because of this, religious teachers need to play a very significant role in the anti-FGM movement.⁷⁶ An example of success in this area has happened in Upper Egypt, where NGOs (with the support of UNICEF and CED-PA) are working with religious leaders to lead discussion groups and visit families to raise awareness about FGM.⁷⁷

A final educational component of ending FGM is the education of midwives and traditional medical practitioners of FGM. Like religious leaders, these individuals typically hold a lot of power and influence in their community, and it is important for them to understand the negative consequences of FGM, so that they can at least understand the opposition to it, if not condone and refuse to practice it themselves. Especially when it comes to government-funded workers, it is important for traditional medical practitioners to understand the laws surrounding FGM, so that there is no room for error or misinterpretation of the law.⁷⁸ However, it is important to approach these individuals in a non-accusatory manner, so that they are able to keep an open mind about FGM and not feel attacked. Midwives and traditional medical practitioners often earn their livelihood off of performing FGM rituals, so it is also important for local groups to start programs in order to educate them so that they can pursue other careers if necessary.⁷⁹ In Sudan, for example, several NGOs have collaborated with the Sudan Ministry of Health to provide programs that train midwives and promote awareness about FGM through workshops.⁸⁰

While it is still a significant problem for girls across the continent, there is much potential for the eradication of FGM in Africa. Currently, local women's groups who focus on ending FGM through education have the best

⁶⁸ Morison, Scherf, Ekpo, Paine, West, Coleman, and Walraven, "The long-term reproductive health consequences of female genital cutting in rural Gambia: a community-based survey," 651-652.

⁶⁹ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 20.

⁷⁰ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 23.

⁷¹ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 23.

⁷² Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 35.

⁷³ Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 113.

⁷⁴ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 11.

⁷⁵ Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 122.

⁷⁶ Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 134.

⁷⁷ Lewnes, "Changing a Harmful social convention: Female Genital Mutilation," 25.

⁷⁸ Leye, Els, et al, "An Analysis of the Implementation of Laws with Regard to Female Genital Mutilation in Europe," 25.

⁷⁹ Bitong, "Fighting Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone."

⁸⁰ Gruenbaum, "Sexuality Issues in the Movement to Abolish Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," 129-130.

chance of success. However, these groups still face significant obstacles, and the lack of research in this area is troubling. It is important that researchers continue to investigate and analyze the work of anti-FGM groups, particularly in the area of education, to ensure this negative practice can be brought to an end as soon as possible.

CHARTING THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD BANK: THE ON-GOING NEED FOR MEANINGFUL REFORM

GREGORY L. SHARP

Conceived in the aftermath of World War II, and the Great Depression, the Bretton Woods institutions were very much products of their epoch. Since their inception, they have been constantly redefined in an effort to remain relevant. In order to chart this convoluted evolution, it is important to have a grounding in the fundamentals of the World Bank, the context from which it arose, and a grasp of its sister institutions. With this understanding it is then possible to examine the evolution of the World Bank chronologically – beginning with its inception in the post-World War II period to its quick shift in focus to the aid of Third World countries. With loans and capital becoming more accessible, these countries quickly became hugely indebted. This in turn resulted in the rise of structural adjustment programs by the World Bank as it tried to confront this problem. These adjustment programs proved extremely controversial and eventually prompted reforms in the organization's purpose and operations. Nevertheless, if the World Bank wants to effectively tackle the global problems of poverty and underdevelopment, it must be reimaged yet again.

UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD BANK

The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, more commonly known as the World Bank) were all designed to facilitate economic cooperation, promote a return to profitable growth and rectify the failures of the capital market.¹ More specifically, the GATT was to prevent protectionist trade barriers from being implemented; the IMF was to provide liquidity as well as over-

see the dollar-gold standard; and the World Bank was to engage in the reconstruction of war-damaged Europe.² These goals, although economically motivated, also had political dimensions. These institutions, by creating wealth and raising the standard of living, were designed to prevent a return to economic malaise and stifle the rise of political extremism.³ Moreover, as it became clear that the U.S.S.R. was unwilling to relinquish its control of Eastern Europe, these institutions became an indirect means to counter the spread of communism.

These organizations have developed to such an extent that today they bear little similarity to the institutions created in New Hampshire in 1944. This reflects the simple truth that contemporary financial markets are a far cry from those of the post-war period.⁴ For example, the World Bank has developed into a group of five affiliated multilateral institutions. Together they engage in an array of economic development activities and form the World Bank Group.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) are the two main institutions which form the World Bank. The IBRD lends at below market rates to governments of middle-income countries, as well as those who are lower-income, yet deemed credit-worthy. Similarly, the IDA deals strictly with the poorest countries and provides them with interest-free loans. This division helps better serve the different needs of countries of varying wealth.⁵

The internal structure of the World Bank is also important to note. The bank collects funds for its operations by two methods: one is to solicit contributions from wealthier member governments, and the other is to raise money in financial markets by "selling AAA-rated bonds and other debt securities to pension funds, insurance companies, corporations, other banks, and individuals around the globe."⁶ Unlike other international institutions, the World Bank can exert a certain independence in terms of its objectives, ambitions, and per-

² Joseph E. Stiglitz, "The World Bank at the Millennium," *The Economic Journal* 459 (1999): 579.

³ Jonathan Masters, *The World Bank Group* (New York, NY: The Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).

⁴ Jessica Einhorn, "Reforming the World Bank: Creative Destruction," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (2006): 20.

⁵ Paul McLure, *A Guide to the World Bank* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003).

⁶ McLure, *A Guide to the World Bank*, 43.

¹ Christopher Gilbert et al., "Positioning the World Bank," *The Economic Journal* 459 (1999): 600.

sonality due to its capacity to raise funds independently.⁷

This independence; however, is limited by the control that the five largest donor countries exert over the World Bank. The World Bank comprises a Board of Governors, a Board of Executives and a President. Although all countries are represented on the Board of Governors, the real power lies with the Executive Board and the President. These are largely under the control of the largest donors: the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK.⁸

The influence of dominant Western powers on the Bank is an external factor that has guided its evolution. Other external factors include global policy shifts, dramatic shifts in capital markets and new views of development. In terms of internal sources of change, the puissant role of the president is influential in deciding the direction of the organization. Various combinations of these factors have shaped the way in which the World Bank has evolved throughout its brief history.

Since its inception, the World Bank has been forced to adapt its purpose and operations many times in order to remain relevant. The radical transformation of financial markets, the rapid growth of world population, the collapse of communism, and the effects of globalization have all presented challenges to which this institution has had to adapt.⁹ This evolution can be broken down into five approximate periods: the post-war period (1944-1951), the shift in focus to the third world (1951-1968), the rise of third world debt (1968-1980), the implementation of structural adjustments (1980-1989) and, finally, the adaptation to criticism (1989-Present).

POST-WAR PERIOD (1944-1951)

The World Bank's initial primary purpose was to facilitate European reconstruction. Throughout this period, it predominantly focussed on economic growth, rapid (re) industrialization and the development of infrastructure. In particular, it was defined by fiscal conservatism, careful screening, and a focus on financing dollar imports.¹⁰

⁷ Edward E. Mason & Robert E. Asher, *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973).

⁸ McLure, *A Guide to the World Bank*, 8.

⁹ Moisés Naím, *World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994).

¹⁰ Ibrahim Shihata et al., "Evolving Strategies and Policies of Development," *The World Bank in a Changing World* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 41.

These elements are all evident in the very first loan issued to France in 1947. Crédit National, a French public corporation, applied for funding of \$500 million, yet they only received \$250 million. It must also be noted that, prior to the loan being approved,¹¹ a missive was sent from the U.S. State Department to the French government asking it to remove communist elements of its cabinet. Within hours of these elements being removed, the loan was approved. Furthermore, the World Bank closely monitored the use of funds and ensured that the French government would balance its budget.¹²

An initial uncertainty regarding the scale and scope of these operations contributed to this conservatism. Perhaps more importantly, the World Bank only had \$727 million in gold or U.S. dollars (out of initial paid-in capital of \$1.6 billion). Most countries applying for loans required goods and supplies that could only be obtained in the U.S. market and consequently required gold or U.S. currency.¹³

In an effort to expand its assets, World Bank president John Jay McCloy made it a focus of his administration to convince American investors that Bank securities were worth purchasing. Shortly after the New York stock exchange opened on July 15th 1947, the Bank's first bonds appeared. These bonds were quickly bought up and began selling at a premium. Nevertheless, this success came with limitations as the Bank now had to appease risk averse American investors – further entrenching fiscally conservative values. This potential for dependence on Wall Street inevitably drew much criticism from the international community.¹⁴

With an increase in capital, further loans were approved for the Netherlands (\$195 million out of an application for \$535 million), Denmark (\$40 million), and Luxembourg (\$12 million). These were not for specific projects but instead for financing U.S. dollar imports that would restore the industrial capacity of these nations and rebuild their infrastructure. These first four loans were significant to McCloy, who saw the Bank as a lifeline to a "sinking Europe" until the implementation of the Marshall Plan.¹⁵

This was a difficult period for Europe, as its access to the Lend-Lease program had been discontinued with the end

¹¹ Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

¹² Mason & Asher, *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, 52.

¹³ Mason & Asher, *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, 52.

¹⁴ Mason & Asher, *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, 54.

¹⁵ Mason & Asher, *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, 53.

of the war. Furthermore, they were threatened by the potential halt of food, fuel and raw material imports. Despite the perceived conservatism that permeated the early World Bank, it was later revealed that these loans were made largely on faith – no one knew if they would actually be repaid or not.¹⁶ It was partially for this reason that McCloy was an ardent supporter of the Marshall Plan – even going as far as to testify before U.S. congress – despite knowing that this “measure would put the Bank out of business in one of the two principal fields in which it was set up to operate.”¹⁷

The European Recovery Program, more commonly known under the sobriquet of the Marshall Plan, was implemented in April 1948 and was followed by the Mutual Security Plan in 1951. Their mandates were to rebuild Europe and make it profitable again – essentially the same as the World Bank.¹⁸ This marked a turning point for the organization, in which the focus shifted from Europe to the ‘third world.’^{19/20}

SHIFT IN FOCUS TO THE THIRD WORLD (1951-1968)

The period immediately following World War II saw the emergence of a whole new class of countries – the Third World. Over three dozen new countries were formed during the decolonization of Africa and Asia,²¹ most of which promptly became members of the World Bank. Whereas previously the Bank had predominately dealt with industrialized countries recuperating after the devastation of war, these fledgling states experienced a host of different challenges. They not only required the creation of infrastructure, but also programs that specifically targeted poverty alleviation. This marked the first time that poverty reduction became a stated goal of the World Bank.²² While the Bank previously lent to European countries,

despite uncertainty regarding their ability to repay these loans, this was largely due to their substantial economic impact. Moreover, these nations were already well versed in advanced infrastructure systems and thus it was simply a matter of reconstructing them. Perhaps most importantly, it was vital for the U.S. to get European markets up and running again so that they could purchase American goods. The domestic markets of these emerging countries were not attractive enough to warrant the special treatment that was granted to many European countries.²³

So, unlike the loans previously offered to European states, the World Bank was unwilling to make loans on faith in this uncharted territory. This was a new domain in which they were cautiously feeling out their first steps. This risk averse perspective resulted in projects only being funded if they would enable a borrower country to repay its loans (for example, the construction of ports, highways, trade hubs or power plants).²⁴

The first development loan, of \$16 million, was granted to Chile; however, unlike previous loans that were granted with a wide mandate for purchasing dollar goods, it came with the specific stipulation that \$13.5 million was to be allocated to the construction of a hydroelectric power plant and \$2.5million to the production of agricultural machinery. In keeping with previous loans, the Bank carefully monitored how this money was spent by the Chilean government.²⁵

Throughout the remainder of the 50s and into the 60s, the bank slowly realigned itself to fulfill this developmental purpose. While European nations began to pay off their loans during this period, with the first two being repaid by Finland and Yugoslavia in 1951, the Bank began to approve more loans to the Third World. These ranged from Jamaica, to Ethiopia, to Brazil, and were granted by the IDA and IBRD (as well as other members of the World Bank Group).²⁶

THE RISE OF THIRD WORLD DEBT (1968-1980)

This era of the Bank’s history was marked by an increase in programs that were meant to address the foundational causes of poverty, instead of the grand infrastructure projects that characterized the post-war period. These

¹⁶ “Archives - Pages from World Bank History: Richard Demuth,” *The World Bank Group*, accessed November 4, 2012, <http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extaboutus/extarchives/>.

¹⁷ Mason & Asher, *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, 53.

¹⁸ Nicolaus Mills, *Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America’s Coming of Age as a Superpower* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 195.

¹⁹ Shihata et al., “Evolving Strategies and Policies of Development,” 41.

²⁰ Naím, *World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture*.

²¹ “1945-1952: Decolonization of Asia and Africa,” *Office of the Historian*, accessed November 5, 2012, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/AsiaandAfrica>.

²² Shihata et al., “Evolving Strategies and Policies of Development,” 42.

²³ Shihata et al., “Evolving Strategies and Policies of Development,” 44.

²⁴ Naím, *World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture*.

²⁵ Mason & Asher, *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, 53.

²⁶ McLure, *A Guide to the World Bank*, 152.

initiatives included rural development strategies, the promotion of small scale industry, agricultural reform, and an emphasis on the direct provision of health, education and food – essentially a consolidation of its earlier aim of poverty alleviation.²⁷ These new programs were accompanied by a decentralization of Bank activities and the establishment of Resident Missions.²⁸

Many loans were approved for an increased diversity of projects under this rejuvenated mandate. These ranged from pollution control and education reform, to commercial ventures. The enlarged scope and scale of World Bank operations allowed for an increased number of loan approvals. During this period a vast number of loans were approved to countries including The Gambia, Yemen, Mexico, Korea, China and Brazil *inter alia*.^{29/30} As loans became easier to obtain, developing countries were encouraged to borrow heavily, in order to fuel economic growth and address issues related to poverty. Consequently, the indebtedness of Third World countries skyrocketed to unprecedented levels.^{31/32}

Many of these changes in policy and operations were the result of the resourcefulness of the President, Robert McNamara, who exerted the power granted by his position to realign the organization's goals. These changes were further compounded by the Nixon shock in 1971 and the 1973-75 economic malaise prompted by the oil crisis and stock market crash.³³ Combined, these factors radically altered the nature of the World Bank.

By the early 1970s inflation in the United States was accelerating - due largely to the Vietnam War - and the country began to run a serious trade deficit. The sheer amount of dollars that had been pumped out into the world through the Marshall Plan, other aid measures, and the expansion of the American military abroad, meant that the U.S. treasury saw its gold coverage drop dangerously low. This was called

the Triffin dilemma.³⁴ This led to the Nixon Shock, in which the United States unilaterally abandoned the dollar-gold standard and the par value system – essentially eliminating the *raison d'être* of the Bretton Woods institutions.³⁵

This unforeseen return to floating exchange rates, in addition to the 1973-75 recession, forced the World Bank to face the stark reality of the era. Stagflation, as well as a rise in unemployment and interest rates, resulted in tenuous relations between the Bank and the U.S. Federal Reserve. This made it more difficult to raise additional funds. These events “clearly necessitated a change in the functioning and perhaps in the very role” of the World Bank.³⁶

“These events were not isolated points but instead were anchored within a larger societal shift.”

These events were not isolated points but instead were anchored within a larger societal shift. The post war period had been, until this point, largely oriented around the ideas of the economist John Maynard Keynes (who was instrumental in creating the Bretton Woods institutions). Keynesianism favoured government intervention in markets

and considered it a means by which the fluctuating nature of capitalism could be stabilized. These values were inherent within the Bretton Woods institutions upon their creation. However, the Nixon Shock and the following recession ushered in a new era of economic thinking. Contrary to Keynesianism, neoliberal economic policies favoured a minimization of government intervention, promoted privatisation and advocated for market determination.³⁷

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS (1980-1989)

These new economic models – now known as the Washington consensus – found ardent supporters in the World Bank, the IMF and the U.S. Treasury. These ideals were highly influential, as they were not only supported by a

²⁷ Shihata et al., “Evolving Strategies and Policies of Development,” 43.

²⁸ “Archives - World Bank Historical Chronology: 1970-1979,” *The World Bank Group*, accessed November 6, 2012, <http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extaboutus/extarchives/>.

²⁹ “Archives - World Bank Historical Chronology: 1970-1979,” *The World Bank Group*, accessed November 6, 2012, <http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extaboutus/extarchives/>.

³⁰ McLure, *A Guide to the World Bank*, 152.

³¹ Eric Toussaint, *Your Money or Your Life: The Tyranny of Global Finance* (London: Pluto Press, 1999).

³² Jane Harrigan, *Aid and Power* (London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 1995).

³³ Jack Rasmus, *Epic Recession* (London: Pluto Press, 2010).

³⁴ Robert O'Brien & Marc Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 223.

³⁵ Roger Lowenstein, “The Nixon Shock,” *Bloomberg BusinessWeek*, April 4, 2011.

³⁶ Stiglitz, “The World Bank at the Millennium,” 581.

³⁷ O'Brien & Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics*, 383.

host of international organizations, but also strongly supported by the conservative regimes of Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in the United States. Although state-led development had been the dominant model up until this point, this was quickly eclipsed by the notion that a free market was integral to development and growth.³⁸ Once again the Bank's operations adapted to accommodate this new purpose. The focus on basic needs and social programs was abandoned in favour of an emphasis on structural adjustments programs (SAPs).^{39/40} Essentially, these loans were provided by the World Bank to Third World countries on the condition that they implement reforms to lessen government intervention in the economy. The conditions generally entailed "fiscal discipline, liberalizing trade, freeing exchange rates and interest rates, privatizing state industries, deregulation, tax reform to broaden the tax base, redirecting public expenditure to increase economic returns and redistribute income, and securing property rights."⁴¹

The first such loan was granted to Turkey in 1980 for \$200 million.⁴² This initial loan was followed by many others as the 1981-82 recession sent already indebted developing countries to the brink of default.⁴³ In 1985, 12 of the world's most indebted countries had SAPs; by 1990, the number of SAPs issued around the world had risen to 187.⁴⁴ It was believed that these policies would stabilize the economic situation in these countries and allow them to repay their other debts.

Despite the prevalence of these loans, they were extremely controversial. Advocates pointed to success stories, such as that of South Korea, where the World Bank provided huge amounts of funding and the economy grew

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quickly during the 1970s-80s.⁴⁵ However, contemporary critics claim that the few countries that met with success did so because they did not submit to the unbridled will of the free market, and instead took a highly state-centric approach. Furthermore, they point to the steady outflow of wealth from Third World countries to bankers in the global North. They also cite the many crises that resulted from the implementation of SAPs in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South-East Asia. They argue that the huge sums of money being diverted to service debts had an extremely negative and disproportional impact on the health, education and nutrition of the world's poorest countries.⁴⁶

These critiques were not limited to the economic realm, however. Instead, advocacy groups, non-governmental organizations and even international organizations critiqued the implementation of SAPs over gender, environmental and human rights issues. It

was recognized even as early as 1988 that these programs were devastating to the poor, an idea that was encapsulated by a United Nations report concluding that “the most vulnerable population groups, in particular women, youth, the disabled and the aged, [had] been severely and adversely affected.”⁴⁷ It was largely a response to these critiques that informed the World Bank's next period of adaptation.

RESPONDING TO CRITICISM (1989-PRESENT)

The deluge of criticism that began in the 1980s reached a critical threshold in the 1990s. Commentators on the right claimed that it was a bad hangover from an interventionist era, whereas those on the left labelled it as a new form of imperialism.⁴⁸ This torrent of bad press, combined with the collapse of the U.S.S.R., another change in presidency, and an increase in private capital, informed the next step in the evolution of the World Bank.

³⁸ O'Brien & Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics*, 383.

³⁹ O'Brien & Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics*, 383.

⁴⁰ Antje Vetterlein, “Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction, and the Role of Social Policies: The Evolution of the World Bank's Social Development Approach,” *Global Governance* 13.4 (2007): 515.

⁴¹ O'Brien & Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics*, 384.

⁴² McLure, *A Guide to the World Bank*, 153.

⁴³ Toussaint, *Your Money or Your Life: The Tyranny of Global Finance*.

⁴⁴ John Gershman, “The Free Trade Connection,” in *50 Years is Enough: the Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund* ed. Kevin Danaher (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1994), 25.

⁴⁵ Jonathan Masters, *The World Bank Group*.

⁴⁶ Kevin Danaher, “Introduction,” in *50 Years is Enough: the Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund* ed. Kevin Danaher (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1994), 2.

⁴⁷ Kevin Danaher, “Introduction,” in *50 Years is Enough: the Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund* ed. Kevin Danaher (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1994), 3.

⁴⁸ Gilbert et al., “Positioning the World Bank,” 599.

The fall of the Berlin wall ushered in a new era for both the world and the World Bank. The mission of aiding war torn states, “which was ignored during the Cold War, [came] back with a vengeance.”⁴⁹ The multitude of newly independent states soon bolstered the ranks of the World Bank Group, as they sought assistance in their transitions from command economies to capitalist economies.

Unlike the emphasis on macroeconomic growth that existed under adjustment lending, this allowed the Bank to gradually shift toward a new goal of sustainable development, coupled with the underlying emphasis on poverty alleviation. However, this transition did not occur immediately. Instead World Bank officials simultaneously defended SAPs while trying to alter them so as to address the aforementioned problems. They currently still exist, albeit in a radically different form, and are designed to complement the World Bank’s new emphasis on sustainable poverty alleviation.⁵⁰

A change of presidency in 1995 consolidated these changes. James Wolfensohn made it very clear that his priorities were constructing institutions in host countries, improving governance, enhancing the agency of the poor, strengthening the rule of law, and eradicating corruption. It was Wolfensohn who wanted the Bank to have “a human face” and who dreamed of a world without poverty.⁵¹

It was through his initiative that the World Bank adopted a two-pronged approach. On one hand, they would focus on supporting economic prosperity in borrowing countries through a variety of programs and policies. An example of this would be the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative which made 39 countries around the world eligible for special assistance. On the other hand, they would invest directly in people through human resource development. This manifested itself in the form of increased lending to local non-governmental organizations and charities.⁵² It was hoped that through these programs, the organization would experience a restored sense of mission, more confidence from recipients, as well as donors, and a rejuvenation in its lending operations.⁵³

⁴⁹ Einhorn, “Reforming the World Bank: Creative Destruction,” 18.

⁵⁰ O’Brien & Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics*, 332-34.

⁵¹ Einhorn, “Reforming the World Bank: Creative Destruction,” 17.

⁵² Shihata et al., “Evolving Strategies and Policies of Development,” 43.

⁵³ Jonathan Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters, “Reinventing the World Bank,” *Reinventing the World Bank* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 16.

Furthermore, globalization gave rise to “integrated capital markets, in which private flows to developing countries have become more important than public ones.”⁵⁴ Consequently, the Bank had to face some bleak statistics. The IBRD’s lending declined throughout this period from \$13 billion in the 1990s, to approximately \$10 billion in 2004-2005. Private capital flows over comparable time periods amounted to over \$300 billion a year and the trend is generally of increasing investment (although the 2008 financial crisis is proving resistant to recovery), despite the volatility of private capital. Perhaps, as many have suggested, lending to middle-income countries is no longer necessary and the IBRD is a dying institution.⁵⁵

“The old adage
*Tempora mutantur,
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Calls for dissolution of the organization put further pressure on the World Bank to reform. In 1998 they officially redefined the organization as a ‘Knowledge Bank’ – essentially the world leader in development research and policy. This was possible, as the organization had grown into the “largest centre for development economics” and often attracted the best minds in the field.⁵⁶ Part of this initiative was to set global standards and norms (for example, environmental regulations on investments or ethical investing). Equally important was identification of uneven application of private capital and investment in projects and programmes that were deemed too risky or infeasible by private sector organizations.⁵⁷ Despite these many reforms, and an acceptance of past faults, the World Bank is still fervently criticized. This prompts the question: is the World Bank worth keeping?

REIMAGINING THE WORLD BANK

The old adage *Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis* – time changes and we change with it – is true of the World Bank. The World Bank currently faces a challenging situation. The dwindling relevance of public flows of

⁵⁴ Claude Freud, “La Banque Mondiale n’a Plus d’Argent, mais elle a des Idées,” *Cahiers d’Études Africaines* 157.40 (2000): 137 (my translation).

⁵⁵ Einhorn, “Reforming the World Bank: Creative Destruction,” 20.

⁵⁶ Shihata et al., “Evolving Strategies and Policies” 44.

⁵⁷ Gilbert et al., “Positioning the World Bank,” 613.

capital, the “epic recession” of 2008,⁵⁸ and a deep rooted mistrust of the organization are among some of the problems faced. For the World Bank to remain relevant, it must first accept that its past reforms have been inadequate. Then, and only then, will it be able to reimagine itself.

While many critiques of the World Bank are outdated and do not actually reflect the contemporary operations of the organization, others are valid and reflect a genuine need for change. Of particular concern is the artificial disjuncture between the economic and social realms implicit within World Bank policy. This is largely due to uncritical faith in neoliberal economic ideals, which emphasize adjustments on a national level. Although macro-economic health is important, wealth does not necessarily trickle down – it must also be encouraged from below.⁵⁹

It is this blind adherence to free trade and neoliberal values that is one of the Bank’s greatest weaknesses. Many of the world’s dominant economies went through mercantilist or protectionist periods in their development – France, Germany, Japan and the U.S. in particular – so why should developing countries skip straight to the extreme of unrestricted markets? It is for this reason that the IMF and the World Bank are often accused of being tools of imperialism. Consequently, it is paramount that there is a recognition that there is more than one valid economic model, and that developing countries often lack the capacity to adequately handle the rigours of free trade.⁶⁰ The Bank cannot hope to achieve these changes unless it manages to effectively translate purpose into operation. Their goals are just ones: workers’ rights, women’s health, non-discrimination, local self-reliance, creation of infrastructure, education and poverty reduction amongst others. However, these good intentions need to actually be put into effect. For example, funds are often blatantly misused for political purposes (a problem also faced by the IMF)⁶¹ or simply stolen by corrupt officials in recipient countries. To prevent this, the organization needs more transparency. This could be achieved through a reform of the internal structure that facilitates accountability, and the creation of a mechanism that circumnavigates institutional inertia.⁶²

⁵⁸ Rasmus, *Epic Recession*.

⁵⁹ Pincus & Winters, “Reinventing the World Bank,” 15.

⁶⁰ Freud, “La Banque Mondiale n’a Plus d’Argent, mais elle a des Idées,” 137-38.

⁶¹ Alex Dreher et al., “Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes in the United Nations Security Council,” *European Economic Review* 53 (2009): 742-757.

Moreover, an approach of international standardization and normalization – although at times desirable – is not the best solution to every situation. Instead the Bank needs to operate under the assumption that each problem is unique to its context.⁶³ To borrow a term coined by the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, the World Bank needs to “globalize” its operations to best address the local problem.⁶⁴ It is at this confluence of international expertise and local experience where innovation and solutions occur.

The World Bank should seek to specialize in knowledge, development and international-local cooperation. Lending to middle income countries is no longer relevant due to the aforementioned private capital flows; as a result, the Bank should restrict its loans to the poorest nations with little access to capital. A transfer of knowledge and expertise should be coupled with these measures, not top down structural adjustments.

“It is important to preserve this institution, partly because it has the potential to be transformed into a puissant tool to combat poverty, but also because such an organization might never be created today due to the dichotomous political climate.”

It is important to preserve this institution, partly because it has the potential to be transformed into a puissant tool to combat poverty, but also because such an organization might never be created today due to the dichotomous political climate. Finally, the purpose of the World Bank – poverty alleviation – is a noble one; it is simply a matter of making the implementation an accurate reflection of the intent.

⁶² Kevin Danaher, “What to Do?,” in *50 Years is Enough: the Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund* ed. Kevin Danaher (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1994), 187.

⁶³ Pincus & Winters, “Reinventing the World Bank,” 17.

⁶⁴ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

EVOLUTIONARY AND ACQUIESCENT ULAMA:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ULAMA IN SAUDI ARABIA AND PRE- REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

ERIC FREEMAN

In Saudi Arabia between the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s and in Iran between the mid-1950s to the late-1970s, the respective dynastic monarchies both embarked on policies designed to diminish the power and influence of the *ulama* - the religious elite.^{1/2} In both countries, the *ulama* have traditionally been important political actors, able to exert considerable influence throughout society. In Iran, these policies culminated in the 1979 revolution, while in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi *ulama* have not, to date, mounted any significant opposition to the regime. This paper will elucidate why the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia have continued to support the Saudi regime, while the Iranian *ulama* revolted against the Pahlavi regime. I argue that there have been two principal causes for the contrasting responses of the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia and the *ulama* in Iran. First, there are organizational and doctrinal differences between the *ulama* in the two countries, and these differences endowed the *ulama* in Iran more independence from the regime, as well as more power, than their counterparts in Saudi Arabia. Second, unlike Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, the Saudi royal family has incorporated the *ulama* within the regime. Consequently, although the power of the Saudi *ulama* has diminished, the Saudi royal family has not isolated and antagonized the *ulama* to any significant extent.

This paper is divided into two sections. The first section will highlight several structural differences between the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia and in Iran. This section will establish how these structural differences endowed the Iranian *ulama* with greater independence and power, enhancing their ability to revolt. The second section will highlight how the Saudi regime has been more prudent in its management of the *ulama*. This section will demonstrate that by incorporat-

ing the *ulama* within the regime, the Saudis have secured continued religious legitimization and have not alienated or antagonized the *ulama* to any significant extent.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES: POWER AND INDEPENDENCE

In both Iran and Saudi Arabia, the *ulama* have historically played a significant role in providing political elites with religious legitimization.^{3/4} However, the relationship between the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi royal family is unique and is significantly different from that which has existed in Iran between the Iranian *ulama* and the Shah. The origins of the Saudi state are rooted in a religious and political alliance from 1744, between Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Saud.⁵ Indeed, the current Saudi state is the third manifestation of the Wahhabi state, emerging in 1902 and consolidated in 1932, in which Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud invoked the alliance between the Al Saud and the al-Shaykh family - the descendants of al-Wahhab - in order to legitimize his rule.⁶ The unique religious-political alliance that exists within Saudi Arabia is important because the Saudi "*ulama* have, since the alliance in the eighteenth century, remained intimately tied to... the Saudi state."⁷ Conversely, the *ulama* in Iran have functioned as an independent social institution, and have lived through multiple regimes - such as the Safavid dynasty, the Qajar dynasty, and Pahlavi dynasty.⁸

The *ulama* in Saudi Arabia have also been much more financially dependent on the Saudi state than the *ulama* in Iran have been on the Iranian state. This is partially a result of the fact that the Saudi *ulama* are Sunni, while the Iranian *ulama* are Shi'a. Sunni *ulama* have traditionally been much

¹ Joseph A. Kechinchian, "The Role of the Ulama in the politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, no. 1 (February 1986): 60,

² Shahough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 132

³ Alexander Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 1 (February 1985): 39.

⁴ Willem M. Floor, "The Revolutionary Character of the Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality?" In *Religion and Politics in Iran*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 74

⁵ Kechinchian, "The Role of the Ulama," 53

⁶ Ayman Al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*. (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1985), 43

⁷ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 154

⁸ Nikki Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran" *Studia Islamica* no. 29 (1969), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595086>.

more financially dependent on the political elite.⁹ Indeed, *ulama* in Saudi Arabia are salaried employees of the state.¹⁰ The financial dependence of the *ulama* on the state is actually rooted in a Wahhabbi doctrine, which stipulates that the political elite is responsible for collection of *zakat* – a mandatory religious tax.¹¹ Furthermore, Wahhabism prohibits the *ulama* “from receiving gifts and donations or surviving on *awqaf* (religious endowments) revenues.”¹² Ultimately, because the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia are so dependent on the royal family, they are more beholden to them, and this reduces their ability to protest or rebel against the regime.

Conversely, the Iranian *ulama* were financially independent of the Pahlavi regime. The financial independence of the Iranian *ulama* from the Pahlavi regime has its roots in both historic practice, which dates back to the Safavid dynasty, as well as Shi’a religious doctrine, which assures the *ulama* administration over religiously mandated taxes.¹³ Mandatory religious taxes – such as the *zakat* and *khums* – have historically been administered and collected directly by the *ulama*, and this practice has continued throughout both the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties.¹⁴ By collecting the religious taxes independently of the state, the Iranian *ulama* have been able to maintain a level of independence from the state. This financial independence has enabled the Iranian *ulama* to oppose the ruling elite on multiple occasions, such as in the Tobacco Concession (1891-1892) as well as in the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911).¹⁵ Both of these instances of *ulama* opposition against the ruling elite resulted in political victories for the *ulama*. Ultimately, the *ulama*-led oppositional movements underscore the way in which the financial independence of the Iranian *ulama* has enabled them, more so than their Saudi counterparts, to oppose the political elite.

Finally, there are doctrinal and structural differences between the *ulama* in Iran and the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia, which endow leaders of the Iranian *ulama* with more pow-

er and influence than their counterparts in Saudi Arabia. Doctrinally, it is important to note the emphasis placed on ritual within Shi’a Islam. In the Usuli branch of Shi’a Islam, which is the dominant religious affiliation in Iran, people are divided into either laypeople or experts, and laypeople are required to emulate the leaders.¹⁶ Furthermore, in the mid-nineteenth century, a religious position emerged in Shi’a Islam, called the *marja al-taqlid*. A *marja al-taqlid* is a pre-eminent religious authority, of which there could be one or multiple in existence, who ultimately served as the “source of emulation.”¹⁷ The centrality of ritual and sources of emulation in Shi’a Islam is a significant factor that enables the Iranian *ulama* to rebel. Akhavi notes that “the informal network of assistants, religious students, bazaar merchants and common believers that these individuals [sources of emulation] came to supervise provided a social base of support.”¹⁸ As well, ritual and sources of emulation create a clear hierarchy with the Shi’a clergy, and it is a hierarchy that is once again independent of the political elite.¹⁹ This is important because it enabled prominent religious leaders, such as Ayatollah Khomeini, to mobilize their followers.²⁰ As well, it is important to note that the Shi’a position of *marja al-taqlid* provided the foundation for Khomeini’s *valayat i-faqih*, which ultimately gave the *ulama* in Iran justification to hold political power.²¹ Although *valayat i-faqih* did not particularly empower the Iranian *ulama* before the revolution, it did establish a viable clergy-based alternative to the Shah. In this sense, it did provide more incentive to rebel and is thus noteworthy.

In Saudi Arabia, the *ulama* do not achieve the same degree of influence and power that their counterparts do in Iran. Indeed, there is no position within Sunni Islam which is analogous to the power and influence of the *marja al-taqlid* in Shi’a Islam.²² Furthermore, as will be elaborated upon in the next section, the high-ranking religious establishment

⁹ Fuad I. Khuri, “The Ulama: A Comparative Study of Sunni and Shi’a Religious Officials,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, no. 3 (July 1987): 308.

¹⁰ Ayman Al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*. (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1985), 48.

¹¹ Al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, 30.

¹² Al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, 48.

¹³ Keddie, “The Roots of the Ulama’s Power,” 48

¹⁴ Glenn E. Perry, “The Islamic World: Egypt and Iran,” in *Politics and Religion in the Modern World*, ed. George Moyser, (New York: Routledge, 1991), 116.

¹⁵ Mohammad H. Faghfoory, “The Ulama-Sate Relations in Iran 1941” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 4 (November 1987): 413.

¹⁶ Juan R. Cole, “Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on Emulating the Supreme Exemplar” In *Religion and Politics in Iran*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 33.

¹⁷ W.G. Millward, “Political dimensions of the Marja’iate in Ithna’Ashari Shi’ism: Recent Developments.” (paper presented at the annual meeting of The Middle East Studies Association, Phoenix, Arizona, November 19-22, 1994), 7.

¹⁸ Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, 12.

¹⁹ Millward, “Political dimensions of the Marja’iate,” 4-5.

²⁰ Behrooz Moazami, “The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution, 1963-1979” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29, no.1 (2009): 48.

²¹ Millward, “Political dimensions of the Marja’iate,” 14.

²² Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam*, 144.

is government appointed, and this is a significant source of their political power and social status.²³ However, this is not to say that the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia do not have influence and power. The Saudi *ulama* do serve as intermediaries between the royal family and different groups within the Saudi state.²⁴ Through their control of the mosques, the Saudi *ulama* are able to reach and influence the population at large, and this remains an important element of their power.²⁵ Nevertheless, although the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia are able to influence the public and do have power, they have not had the same level of influence or independence that the high-ranking Shi'a clergy in Iran have possessed.

Ultimately, there are several structural and doctrinal differences between the *ulama* in Iran and the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia. These differences are significant because they endowed the *ulama* in Iran with substantially more independence from the political elites and with more power and social influence. The additional independence and power that the Iranian *ulama* possessed were important factors that helped to facilitate their rebellion against the Shah. Conversely, the Saudi *ulama* have not had the same degree of independence from the royal family nor have they had the same social base of support that the Iranian *ulama* have possessed. Consequently, they have not had the same ability to instigate a revolt against the political elite.

MANAGING THE ULAMA: INCORPORATION INTO THE REGIME

In both Saudi Arabia and in Iran, the *ulama* have witnessed the implementation of policies that have defied their religious beliefs, as well as policies that were designed to diminish their power. In Saudi Arabia, the royal family has embarked on numerous policies that have angered many of the *ulama*, such as the introduction of the television in 1963.²⁶ As well, the Saudi royal family has embarked on numerous policies designed to diminish the power of the *ulama*, such as the establishment of a Ministry of Justice, which the *ulama* viewed as a threat to their religious prerogatives.²⁷ Similarly, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi embarked on modernization policies that both incensed the Iranian *ulama* and threatened their power and traditional

roles.²⁸ However, although both the Saudi royal family and the Shah embarked on measures that angered the *ulama* and were designed to diminish their influence and power, the Saudis have succeeded in doing this in a manner that has not provoked widespread dissent or revolution. A significant reason for this success is that although the *ulama* in Saudi Arabia historically had stronger ties to the Saudi royal family than the *ulama* in Iran had to the pre-revolutionary Iranian state, the Saudi royal family has also taken steps to further incorporate the *ulama* into the regime. There have been two significant consequences of this difference. First, by incorporating the *ulama* into the state, the Saudi royal family has been able to secure continued religious legitimization. Second, by giving the *ulama* a stake in the regime, the Saudis have succeeded in diminishing the *ulama*'s power without antagonizing them.

First, the Saudi royal family has incorporated the *ulama* into the regime by bureaucratizing the high-ranking religious officials into state-appointed positions. In 1953, the government established the state-appointed Institute for the Issue of Religio-Legal Opinion and in 1971 it established the state-appointed Council of Senior *ulama*, who pronounce religious and legal judgments.²⁹ Moreover, as of 1993, the head of the Council of Senior Ulama held the position of Grand Mufti, who constitutes the top-ranking member in the religious establishment.³⁰ On the other hand, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi did not try to incorporate the *ulama* into the regime, but rather attempted to assert his own religious leadership.³¹ Indeed, throughout the modernizing Pahlavi dynasty, even more so than in preceding dynasties, there was a clear segregation between the state and the religious elite.³² The bureaucratization of the *ulama* within the state has been a significant factor in helping to ensure that the Saudi regime continues to receive religious legitimization for their rule as well as religious legitimization for their modernization policies. The creation of the Senior Council of *ulama*, in particular, established a permanent institution of elite religious officials who could subsequently be used to provide religious legitimization for the Saudi royal family as well as their modernization policies.³³ The Saudi regime has been able to use the Senior Council of *ulama* in order to delegitimize and assuage religious opposi-

²³ Aharon Layish, "'Ulama' and Politics in Saudi Arabia" In *Islam and the Politics in the Middle East*, ed. Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, (Sydney: Croom Held Lmt, 1984), 31.

²⁴ Layish, "'Ulama' and Politics in Saudi Arabia," 50

²⁵ Layish, "'Ulama' and Politics in Saudi Arabia," 40

²⁶ Kechinchian, "The Role of the Ulama," 57

²⁷ Kechinchian, "The Role of the Ulama," 60

²⁸ Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, 132

²⁹ Layish, "'Ulama' and Politics in Saudi Arabia," 30

³⁰ Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam*, 153

³¹ Perry, "The Islamic World," 107

³² Mansoor Moaddel, "The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran" *Theory and Society* 15, no. 4 (July 1986): 533.

³³ Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite," 39

tion. In 1979, the Council of Senior *ulama* issued a fatwa (legal ruling) denouncing the seizure of the Grand Mosque by religious rebels.³⁴ During the Gulf War in 1990, the Council supported the King's decision to allow the deployment of foreign troops within Saudi Arabia.³⁵ Finally, in 1991, a group of *ulama* sent a petition, called the Memorandum of Advice, to the regime, which called for the regime to enhance the authority of the *ulama*.³⁶ With pressure from the regime, the Council of Senior *ulama* strongly denounced the Memorandum of Advice. However, seven of the seventeen members on the Council abstained, claiming ill health, and were subsequently dismissed from the Council by the King. This demonstrates the institutional subordination of the Saudi *ulama* to the Saudi royal family.³⁷ Ultimately, the bureaucratization of *ulama* within the Saudi regime is important because it has "routinized the use of religion and the religious establishment as a source of legitimization."³⁸ By contrast, the failure of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to incorporate the *ulama* within the regime mitigated his ability to receive religious legitimization. The Shah attempted to obtain religious legitimization, independent from the *ulama*, by asserting his own religious leadership; however, as argued by Perry, he failed to secure religious legitimization, and often "the religious scholars that he tried to undermine were perceived much more as the true spokesmen for the faith than was the Shah."³⁹

By incorporating the *ulama* into the regime, the Saudi royal family has also largely avoided alienating and antagonizing the *ulama*. Although the *ulama* have experienced a decline in their power since the 1950s, they have not mounted any serious resistance to the Saudi monarchy.⁴⁰ One significant reason for this is that, by incorporating the *ulama* into the regime, the Saudi royal family has succeeded in providing the *ulama* with channels to affect the policies of the regime, especially policies that are religiously important. Layish notes that the Saudi "royal house, aware of the importance of the *ulama*, does its utmost to institutionalize them, to integrate them into the ruling elite and give them due honour in matters of protocol so that they feel full partners in responsibility for policy and political deci-

sions."⁴¹ By giving the *ulama* a stake within the regime, the Saudi royal family has managed to avoid provoking them. Bligh notes that the *ulama* meet weekly with the Saudi royal family and that they maintain significant control over certain issues – such as education and justice – that are viewed as religiously important.⁴² Indeed, since 1960, the *ulama* have been represented in every government Cabinet. Moreover, members of the *ulama*, and specifically the members of the al-Shaykh family, have occupied the religiously important ministerial positions – such as Minister of Education and Minister of Justice.⁴³ As well, the *ulama* control the Council for Exhortation to Good and Interdiction of Evil, otherwise known as the religious police, and this allows them to influence public behaviour.⁴⁴

In Iran, the Shah did not try to incorporate the *ulama* within the state, nor to give them any influence over policy. Rather, the Shah embarked on numerous policies designed to eliminate their power as well as their traditional religious roles within Iranian society. In the early 1970s, the Shah announced the creation of the Religious Corps, which would be comprised of young university students rather than graduates of the *ulama*-run madrassas, as well as the creation of a Department of Religious Propaganda in the Endowments Organization.⁴⁵ The functions of these two organizations paralleled the functions of *ulama*, and as such represented an attempt to segregate the *ulama* from the regime while simultaneously eliminating their power and traditional roles.⁴⁶ As well, in 1976, the Shah changed the Iranian calendar to match the Zoroastrian calendar, which led many in the *ulama* to fear that the Shah might revitalize the Zoroastrian religion and declare Iran to be a Zoroastrian state.⁴⁷ It is important to note that not only was the Shah threatening the power of the *ulama*, but the modernization policies of the White Revolution also threatened many of the *ulama*'s traditional allies, such as the bazaar – the merchants of the bazaar. In the White Revolution, the Shah introduced land reform and endorsed the destruction of the physical bazaar markets, and these actions angered the bazaar and, as argued by Moaddel, this "provided favorable conditions for the

³⁴ Kechinchian, "The Role of the Ulama," 60–63

³⁵ Tim Niblock, *Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 89.

³⁶ Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 171.

³⁷ Herb, *All in the Family*, 173.

³⁸ Al-Yassini, *Religion and State*, 67.

³⁹ Perry, "The Islamic World," 107.

⁴⁰ Al-Yassini, *Religion and State*, 59.

⁴¹ Layish, "'Ulama' and Politics in Saudi Arabia," 56.

⁴² Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite," 42–43.

⁴³ Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite," 42–43.

⁴⁴ Layish, "'Ulama' and Politics in Saudi Arabia," 35.

⁴⁵ Perry, "The Islamic World," 125.

⁴⁶ Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, 140.

⁴⁷ William O. Beeman, "Images of the Great Satan: Representations of the United States in the Iranian Revolution" in *Religion and Politics in Iran*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 210.

growth in *ulama* power in their opposition to the state.”⁴⁸

Finally, not only did the Shah fail to incorporate the *ulama* into the regime, but he also employed state violence as a means to repress them. This violent strategy to repress the *ulama* is significant because it consolidated the *ulama* in opposition to the regime.⁴⁹ Before the revolution the majority of the Shi’a clergy were dormant, and it was only a radical minority, led by Khomeini, that were overtly opposing the regime. However, as noted by Perry, the Shah used secret police to infiltrate the *ulama*, he placed shrines under military control, and he imprisoned, expelled, and executed leading oppositional *ulama*; this excessive use of violence caused the “quiescent, conservative *ulama* such as Ayatollah Shari’atmadari to call for an end to the [S]hah’s dictatorship and to recognize Ayatollah Khomeini as the representative of the popular will.”⁵⁰ Ultimately, the Saudi royal family attempted to integrate and subordinate the *ulama* to the regime, while the Shah attempted to exclude the *ulama* and to eliminate their power.

In conclusion, although both the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the Saudi royal family have attempted to diminish the power of the religious elite within their respective countries, the Saudis have enjoyed much greater success in this respect. The cause of this has been twofold. First, the *ulama* in the two countries differ in several significant ways. These differences ultimately endowed the Iranian *ulama* with more power and influence, therefore enhancing their ability to revolt. Second, unlike the Shah, whose attempt to undermine the influence of the *ulama* culminated in a revolution, the Saudi royal family has successfully employed a “carrot-and-stick policy” regarding the *ulama*: they have rewarded them with influence and control over areas of religious importance – such as the ministries of education and justice – while simultaneously eliminating the influence of members of the *ulama* who dissented from the regime, such as those *ulama* who abstained from the condemnation of the Memorandum of Advice. Overall, although there are many parallels between the strategies of the Shah and the Saudi royal family as well as similarities between the *ulama* in the two countries, the *ulama* in both Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the strategies employed by the two regimes, have many significant differences. Understanding these differences is critical to understanding why the *ulama* revolted in Iran but not in Saudi Arabia.

CUBAN MEDICAL INTERNATIONALISM: BUILDING SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND ALTERNATIVE HEALTH SYSTEMS

CAROLINE WHIDDEN

Since the Revolution, Cuba has devoted much of its energy and resources to developmental assistance in countries that have had similar historical struggles, with health care at the forefront of such efforts. Cuba’s international medical aid efforts since the 1960s have involved various dimensions, the most prominent of which are Havana’s Comprehensive Healthcare Delivery Program (CHDP) agreements, in-country medical training programs, bringing foreign patients to Cuba for free surgery and other medical procedures, awarding scholarship to foreign students for full-time medical education, and extending short-term disaster relief. As a result, the Cuban Revolution has succeeded in establishing its position as a major player in international medical diplomacy and its contributions to improving global health are truly commendable. While neo-liberalism frames development in terms of economic growth, Cuba has recognized that the health of a country, particularly of its most vulnerable populations, plays a very fundamental role in development, and has framed domestic and foreign policy accordingly.

The emergence of leftist governments in Latin America and the strengthening of Cuba’s regional identity coincide with increasing recognition of the need for an alternative development model. Cuba has demonstrated a shift away from aid and towards solidarity and the potential for strong South-South cooperation in achieving developmental aims, providing the framework for a promising alternative to the predominant North-South flow of assistance. The argument presented in this paper is two-fold. First, given that the leading causes of death and illness in the global South continue to be preventable diseases caused by a lack of access to basic primary care and poor health promotion, the Cuban model is undoubtedly more suitable to addressing the global public health crisis than the West’s model of health based on hospital medicine and high technology. Secondly, although it is important to build capacity and exchange knowledge within and between nation states rather than maintaining dependency on aid, the most valuable lesson to be drawn from the Cuban experience of medical internationalism is for countries to

⁴⁸ Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” 541.

⁴⁹ Millward, “Political dimensions of the Marja’iate,” 9.

⁵⁰ Perry, “The Islamic World,” 125.

ultimately develop sustainable healthcare systems of their own by adopting the Cuban emphasis on community-based primary care. While the Cuban solidarity programs and medical brigades can contribute to the betterment of the people of a particular marginalized community, development at the national level requires strong political determination for good health from the host country.

This paper will analyze and evaluate Cuban medical internationalism and its role in promoting international development specifically in terms of its CHDP arrangements with other countries in the global South and its medical education program for foreign students – the Escuela Latinoamericana de Medicina (ELAM) – being the key institution in this endeavor. These policies will be evaluated in terms of their underlying motivations, their contribution to development at the national and community level, and the challenges they face in achieving developmental aims.

It is important to begin by noting that “[a]lthough Havana’s aid efforts have been and continue to be not only ambitious but indeed breathtaking in scope, there has been very little in terms of serious scholarly or policy analysis studies of the subject.”¹ There are only two main works that extensively and broadly discuss Cuban medical internationalism, one published in 1993 by Julie Feinsilver² and the other more recent publication by Krik & Erisman³ from 2009. Both were heavily relied upon for the following analysis. The only source that regularly publishes news and research articles pertaining to Cuba’s international as well as domestic medical policies is MEDICC, a nonprofit NGO founded in 1997. In regard to US media sources, Cuba’s international medical policies have been portrayed almost exclusively in military terms.

Before Cuba was able to engage in medical outreach it first had to achieve considerable success in developing its own health resources and attain health indicators of an international standard worthy of emulation.

Cuba’s ability to conduct medical diplomacy is a logical outcome of having developed a healthcare system capable of accumulating symbolic capital by garnering international accolades for

its outcomes, processes, infrastructure, human resources, and equality of access. Without this domestic medical success, any gesture of providing medical aid to other countries would be neither credible nor much appreciated.⁴

Since it began its policies of medical internationalism, Cuba has demonstrated the ability to send a quarter of its medical staff away on international missions without seriously compromising the delivery and quality of health care in Cuba. Not only is the patient-to-doctor ratio remarkable, but Cuba also has a rather equitable distribution of medical personnel and resources. Although Cuba continues to face poverty-related challenges, including health problems, it has substantially narrowed the gap between its health indicators of infant mortality and life expectancy and those of the US and other developed nations. It has done so by reinforcing its commitment to primary care as key to improving health status. By 1999, a neighbourhood-based family doctor-and-nurse program was in place across the country and covering 98.3 per cent of Cuba’s 11 million people.⁵ The program embedded health services deeper into communities with the aim of more effective health promotion and disease prevention.

Cuba’s first significant international medical outreach occurred in 1960 when Havana dispatched medical teams to Chile to provide humanitarian assistance following the major earthquake disaster. Although Cuba continued to engage in ad hoc disaster relief operations, more comprehensive and long-term projects based on formal arrangements soon became the focus of the Revolution’s medical aid programs. The first of such initiatives occurred in 1963 when Havana and the newly independent government of Algeria entered into an arrangement to send the Revolution’s first international medical brigade composed of 58 doctors and other health workers. This large and unconditional assistance has been attributed to the revolutionary government’s ability to identify fully with Algeria as a poor nation fighting to emerge from and overcome the legacies of colonialism. Since then, Cuba has concluded agreements with approximately 100 other governments, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America, with Cuban medical aid involving a grand total of more than 100,000 health professionals.⁶ “The impressive scope and energy of Havana’s efforts can be illustrated by the fact

¹ Michael H. Erisman and John M. Kirk, *Cuban Medical Internationalism: origins, evolution, and goals* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 21.

² Julie M. Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses: Cuban health politics at home and abroad*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).

³ Erisman and Kirk, *Cuban Medical Internationalism*, 2009.

⁴ Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses*, 91.

⁵ “Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba (MEDICC),” accessed March 1, 2012, <http://www.medicc.org/ns/index.php>.

that the number of Cuban medical aid personnel working overseas in 2009 (38,000, of which 17,000 were doctors) exceeded those deployed by the World Health Organization and indeed the G-8 nations of the industrialized world.⁷

There is no doubt that Cuba's policy of medical internationalism has brought significant diplomatic benefits for the Revolution and has helped to develop its foreign policy in terms of enhancing its international stature and potential soft power. Feinsilver claims that medical diplomacy has allowed Cuba to accumulate considerable 'symbolic capital' in terms of goodwill, prestige, influence, credit, and power as a result of the initial investment of material capital as well as the time and effort given to these projects.⁸ This symbolic capital can eventually be converted into material capital, which in Cuba's case means both bilateral and multilateral aid, trade, credit and investment.⁹ Particularly in the face of strict US trade embargos that followed the sudden demise of the support it received from the former Soviet Union, medical diplomacy has been key to seeking international solidarity for the Revolution.

Shortly following Cuba's unique response to Hurricane Mitch, for example, both Honduras and Guatemala shifted toward normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba, and bilateral relations have since expanded with both countries. In 2003, Cuba made a major commitment to Venezuela, a country with one of the greatest income inequalities in South America. The agreement falls under the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) accords, a body to foster South-South bilateral agreements based on each country's resources. In the case of Cuba and Venezuela, the arrangement is often simplified in the media to 'oil-for-doctors'.¹⁰ While it is difficult to attribute this normalization of relations between Cuba and various countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America in recent years solely to Cuban medical diplomacy, there is no doubt that it has indeed been the principle factor in this development.

⁶ Erisman and Kirk, *Cuban Medical Internationalism*, 2009.

⁷ Erisman and Kirk, *Cuban Medical Internationalism*, 3.

⁸ Julie M. Feinsilver, "Cuban Medical Diplomacy: When the Left has got it Right," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs* (2006).

⁹ Julie M. Feinsilver, "Cuba's Health Politics: At home and abroad," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs* (2010).

¹⁰ Greg Morsback, "Venezuela basks in oil 'bonanza'" *BBC News* February 17, 2006, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/>.

The Cuban Foreign Ministry summarizes the CHDP programs as a cooperative arrangement based on the delivery of health specialists and technicians, generally family doctors, for a two-year term at most.¹¹

These medical brigades work in rural areas or in urban barrios lacking in government or private medical services, so as to not interfere with local physicians. These government-to-government agreements usually entail a commitment from the host country to provide the Cuban medical brigades with lodging, food, domestic transportation, and a modest monthly stipend of usually 100 to 150 dollars. However, according to Kirk & Erisman, Cuba can and often does waive some or all of these provisions, especially the stipends, in the cases where they are difficult for the host country to provide.¹² At the other end of the agreement, the Cuban Health Ministry is responsible for ensuring that

the medical professionals receive their regular salaries, round-trip transportation, and other logistical support.

One critically lauded case of Cuban internationalism is their comprehensive programs in The Gambia, a country that, with strong political leadership in the health care sector and the cooperation provided by Cuba, has been able to improve access to healthcare services and build a valuable malaria treatment and prevention program. One of the poorest countries on the Human Development Index, The Gambia has long suffered from the incomprehensible doctor-to-patient ratio of 1 for every 50,000 people until 1998 when, upon the arrival of Cuban healthcare workers to deliver services and offer training, the ratio decreased to 1 physician for every 21,000 people.¹³ By 2004, four years after Cuba established the University of The Gambia Medical School, the ratio became 1 physician for every 9,174 people.¹⁴

¹¹ Michael, H. Erisman, "Cuba's Overseas Medical Aid Programs And Soft Power Politics," *Annual Conference of the Society of Latin American Studies at the University of Liverpool*, 2008.

¹² Erisman and Kirk, *Cuban Medical Internationalism*, 2009.

¹³ John M. Kirk and Robert Huish, "Cuban Medical Internationalism in Africa: The threat of a dangerous example," *The Latin Americanist* (2009): 132.

¹⁴ John M. Kirk and Robert Huish, "Cuban Medical Internationalism in Africa: The threat of a dangerous example," *The Latin Americanist* (2009): 132.

Yet the political motivation from President Yahya Jammeh after he was elected in the mid-1990s, not only to make health a top priority but also to address health needs from a local perspective, has been critical to these improvements in The Gambia. In 1998, the president proposed a medical institution dedicated to training physicians with a commitment to treating vulnerable populations within The Gambia. Cuban and Gambian professors developed a six-year curriculum focusing on meeting local needs such as integrated medicine, community-based consultations, and disaster preparedness.¹⁵ The partnership allowed Gambian professionals to provide local context to the broad knowledge of disease prevention of the Cuban experts.

The case of malaria in The Gambia is an example of how a particular disease can be targeted as part of a broader public health initiative based on political will of governments partnered with Cuba's role in training people on the ground in preventative care. Donated medicines from international organizations and civil society groups also assisted the initiative. In an interview with MEDICC, WHO Resident Representative Dr. Nestor Shivute argues that the Cuban-supported program's success relies on four main strategies: vector control, access to early diagnosis and treatment, prevention through public education and involvement, and research,¹⁶ all of which are relatively basic, cost-effective methods to disease eradication.

One particular challenge that can arise from this type of medical interventionism is that agreements made between Havana and national governing bodies of recipient countries may not take into consideration the particular dynamics and health structures at the community level. The extent to which Cuban health workers become integrated into a community and interact with local health workers, for example traditional healers or midwives, is difficult to predict and document, as it would depend on the specific local context. Another significant feature of Cuba's medical internationalism, the training of foreign medical students in Cuba to return to their home countries to practice primary health care, could potentially avoid this particular challenge.

The Escuela Latinoamericana de Medicina (ELAM) is a medical school that exclusively receives thousands of foreign medical students from marginalized communities, charges no tuition, and "asks only for a moral commit-

ment that they will serve in vulnerable communities when they graduate."¹⁷ In this sense, ELAM is an example of how a medical school's institutional ethics plays a role in preparing physicians to bring their skills to the vulnerable, valuing community service above personal fortune.

ELAM was formed in 1998 following the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch that killed over 30,000 and displaced hundreds of thousands across Central America. The already pressing need for health-care services and support in rural areas of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua escalated into a full-scale disaster. Many countries responded with immediate aid; however, it was Cuba that suggested the creation of an institution that would empower would-be graduates to eventually strengthen the local healthcare workforce of affected communities. This move was significant in that it demonstrated Cuba's commitment to capacity-building as part of its foreign policy of medical outreach.¹⁸ The school later welcomed students affected by poverty and marginalization from 29 different countries, including the United States. Currently, over 10,000 scholarship students from across the global South are studying in Cuban medical schools.

The recruitment process of ELAM students varies from country to country and continues to evolve. Generally the process starts with the help of third-party solidarity organizations that pre-select applicants from humble backgrounds usually from rural areas.¹⁹ The idea is that these students will have a clear understanding of the challenges facing their fellow citizens, and as a result, are very much inclined to remain and contribute to the health of their country. This is a more effective alternative to 'forced-retention' or 'contractual service' requirements for medical graduates in some developing countries since it is based on personal choice as well as positive reinforcement and encouragement. ELAM allows the pre-medical qualifications to vary and also assesses student motivation. Although this allows for flexibility in the selection process, the absence of transparency makes the process susceptible to influences and errors in judgment. Applications are then processed through the Cuban embassy in that country.²⁰

¹⁷ Robert Huish, "How Cuba's Latin American School of Medicine challenges the ethics of physical migration," *Social Science & Medicine* 69 (2009): 301.

¹⁸ John M. Kirk and Robert Huish, "Cuban Medical Internationalism and the Development of the Latin American School of Medicine," *Latin American Perspectives* 34 (2007): 77-92.

¹⁹ Huish, "How Cuba's Latin American School of Medicine challenges the ethics of physician migration," 302.

¹⁵ Kirk and Huish, "Cuban Medical Internationalism in Africa," 133.

¹⁶ Gail A. Reed, "Dusk to Dawn: Fighting malaria in Gambia," *International Cooperation Report MEDICC Review* 7 (2005).

The school's curriculum reflects Cuba's domestic health policies, focusing on community health promotion, preventative care, and identifying and perhaps intervening on the social, cultural, economic and environmental determinants of health rather than just core clinical practice.²¹ Training in traditional and natural medicinal practices is also part of the core curriculum. The education is meant to prepare health professionals to have the confidence and skills necessary to work in resource-poor environments where health care services are most needed, and to understand health challenges in relation to issues of social justice and inequality. ELAM's curriculum and overall mandate promotes "community-oriented primary care as a counter-hegemonic action against neoliberal healthcare structures."²²

The culture of medical schools in the South – which is modeled off that in the North – encourages responsive clinical practice over community-oriented care based on principles of disease prevention and health promotion, building a skill set that is more attuned to the market demand of developed countries and therefore contributing to the brain-drain. In South Africa for instance, between one-third and one-half of all medical graduates migrate to the global North.²³ The Cuban model discourages the notion that migration to Westernized countries is a measure of medical success and encourages a sense of moral duty to serve the most vulnerable. Radically altering the nature of medical education in the global South will likely encourage some medical graduates to remain in their home country where the need for medical care may be greatest. However, this cannot be seen as a panacea for addressing the brain-drain phenomenon. The migration pipeline to the global North is influenced by a multitude of factors, and is fundamentally founded in the enormous issue of income disparity between rich and poor countries.

The leading causes of death in the global South continue to be preventable diseases like pneumonia, diarrhea, and tuberculosis that are caused by a lack of access to basic primary care, infrastructure, and poor health promotion. The Cuban model trains family physicians that can cater to these primary needs, rather than training specialists and tertiary care providers likely to migrate to the North where

these qualifications are best financially rewarded. As such, Cuban medical internationalism, where strategies of disease prevention and health promotion are just as important as clinical competency, is much more effective in addressing the global public health crisis than the West's model of health based on hospital medicine and high technology.

The major limitations of Cuba's health system are due to the state of the economy in terms of shortage of money and inadequate access to physical inputs, medicines, and basic supplies, which is very much affected by the US embargo. "As a result, the Cubans have become very adept over the years at doing more with less"²⁴ and "other means of improving health, such as improved sewerage, potable water supply and housing are even more costly than training and deploying doctors."²⁵

It is difficult to assess the sustainability and stability of these partnerships given that the extent to which Cuba's medical internationalism is a result of self-motivated interests and a tool of soft power in the international political economy, rather than a "genuine humanitarianism and an ideological commitment to the less fortunate,"²⁶ remains unclear and contested. With Cuba's growing popularity within Latin America, especially with the rise of leftist governments and the recent establishment of ALBA, it is possible we may see a progression away from international medical diplomacy if the former motivation is predominant in shaping Havana's foreign policy. It is therefore critical that recipient countries do not depend upon the never-ending altruism of Cuba's medical outreach, but take advantage of the partnership and adopt domestic policies based on the Cuban model of disease prevention and emphasis on community-based primary care in order to establish medical self-sufficiency.

More critical analyses of Cuban medical internationalism are needed, with more specific case studies and local-level research into the effectiveness of these programs in terms of community-level as well as national development. Cuba's international medical outreach seems to make sense, and seems to be working. However, it is important to think critically about the motives, stability, and potential consequences of any type of international assistance, even if it presents itself as an exciting alternative to the frustrating predominance of North-to-South development and disease eradication strategies.

²⁰ Huish, "How Cuba's Latin American School of Medicine challenges the ethics of physician migration," 302.

²¹ Ken Flegel, "A Cuban Revolution in Medical Education," *Social Science & Medicine* 69 (2009): 305-06.

²² Robert Huish, "Going where no doctor has gone before," *Journal of the Royal Institute of Public Health* 122 (2008): 553.

²³ Kirk and Huish, "Cuban Medical Internationalism in Africa," 130.

²⁴ Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses*, 1993.

²⁵ Feinsilver, "Cuba's Health Politics," 2010.

²⁶ Erisman and Krik, *Cuban Medical Internationalism*, 183.

FEATURED ARTICLE:

ALL QUIET ON THE
COLD WAR FRONT:
MOLDOVA'S FUTURE BETWEEN
RHETORIC EU AND
REALPOLITIK RUSSIA
GEORGIA SIBOLD & EVAN REVAK

I. INTRODUCTION

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova emerged as an independent state free from the red sphere of the USSR. The sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union left Moldova in disarray, with rapidly declining birth and fertility rates, in addition to unsettled political and economic conditions, the country was quickly becoming unsustainable as a nation. Tensions continued to increase as the state was torn between an enthusiastic Russian-speaking minority and resolute Moldova-Romanian majority. Conflict ensued in 1992 as a separatist war erupted between the official Republic of Moldova and a "self-proclaimed" Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR), in which some 1,000 lives were claimed and Moldova was left in ruins. Although a ceasefire between the two states was signed shortly after the outbreak of violence, Moldova was left with a frozen conflict on its territory and a dramatic loss in major resources as Transnistria controlled 90% of the nation's energy and one third of its industrial output in the early 1990s.¹ Currently the conflict is at a standstill as Moldova is torn between maintaining current relations with Russia, which involve both Moldova and

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Transnistria being heavily reliant on Russia economically, politically, and culturally, or alternatively seeking further integration into the European Union despite the organizations apparent lack of interest in the conflict. Russia presents itself as the leading supporter of Transnistria, using their involvement with the region to advocate for negotiations with Moldova regarding the reintegration of Transnistria on the basis that Russia is included as the key mediator in the agreement and entrusted as the sole international representative of the region. At the same time, Moldova has turned to western powers and the European Union to assist in resolving the internal conflict and to assist in decreasing the degree of influence Russia possesses over the region.² Unfortunately the EU has failed

to adequately respond to this interest and demonstrate the initiative to help Moldova deal with this situation. As a result of this, the conflict has remained at a standstill. Russia continues to pressure Moldova to conform to their wishes, while Moldova welcomed the EU intention to develop its relation with neighboring countries and was disappointed as the new EU Neighborhood Policy did not consider a European perspective on Moldova.³

II. MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA

Russia viewed the newly separatist region of Transnistria as "a zone of special strategic interest" due to the multitude of Russian residents and influence the area granted Russian leaders over the Moldovan Republic.⁴ In addition, Transnistria was the site of a massive Soviet era arsenal of military equipment at Kobasna, which the Russians insisted on providing their own guards to protect. This resulted in the 1992 Moscow Agreement that specified that Russian troops were to remain stationed in Transnistria as part of this protection

¹Evan Revak would like to thank his family (Pam, Tim and Haley) for the continued support and motivation and would like to give a formal recognition to Dr. Wayne Hunt for allowing to pursue our research on this topic

² Georgia Sibold wants to thank her family (Kathy and Neil Camarta and Steve Sibold) for the love and drive they have given to her as well as would like to formally recognition to Dr. Wayne Hunt for providing the opportunity to explore this particular topic

³ Elena Korosteleva. "Moldova's European Choice: Between Two Stools?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 62:8, (2010): Pg. 1267-1268.

² Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra. "Transnistria: A Bottom-Up Solution," *European Council on Foreign Relations*, (2012): 4.

³ Buscaneanu, Sergiu. "Moldova and EU in the European Neighborhood Policy Context: Implementation of the EU-Moldovan Action Plan." Cont. Igor Botan, Anna Popa, and Valeriu Prohnitchi. Chisinau: *ADEPT Association*. (2008): 12.

⁴ Elena Korosteleva, "Moldova's European Choice", 1268.

operation.⁵ The demise of the USSR left Moldova heavily dependent on Russia, with 80% of their exports being sent there.⁶ With the separatist movement, Russian support has shifted to focus on Transnistria, supplying 80% of their budget and allowing the region to collect a gas debt of nearly 3.8 billion dollars without pressuring them for any form of compensation. As Moldova continues to make moves towards joining the European Union, Russia is becoming increasingly desperate to maintain their influence over the region by continuing their support for Transnistria in hopes of reopening negotiations for the reintegration of the region into Moldova, with the condition that Russia remains the sole international representative of the area.⁷

RUSSIAN SUPPORT TO TRANSNISTRIA

Russia has maintained its connection to Moldova by supplying a plethora of support to the separatist region of Transnistria, “from military, economic, and nationalist to electoral and political [Russia supplies everything] to fully exert and extend its influence over the [region]” and in turn, over Moldova.⁸ Economically, Russia has a stronghold over the region by supplying not only industry, but also natural gas. Since the separatist movement began in 1991, Russia has been involved in providing large amounts of gas to the region. However, since 2007-2008 Transnistria has stopped repaying for Russian gas, leading to gas debts amounting to nearly 3.8 billion for which the Russian authorities are looking to Moldova for compensation.⁹ Of the Russian gas delivered to Moldova Gaz, half is redistributed to Tiraspoltrungaz, which handles distribution in Transnistria. In the Transnistrian region gas is sold below market price to residential and industrial consumers – this generates huge losses for Tiraspoltrungaz and Moldova Gaz. Because Transnistria is considered a separatist region within Moldova, and since the distribution channels through Moldova Gaz, Russian authorities claim the gas debt of the region to be Moldova’s responsibility.¹⁰ Furthermore, Transnistria is the site of numerous major Soviet-era industrial assets such as the MMZ steel plant, Rybnitsa cement plant

in the north, and the Cuciurgan cement plant in the south, all of which are at least partially controlled by Russia.¹¹

These sites have provided industry in the region and have aided in creating income and securing job opportunities for citizens. By developing economic relations with Transnistria, Russia has succeeded in creating a dependent relationship where Russia plays such a dominant role in the economic well being of the Transnistrian region that if they were to cut off support, the area would be incapable of sustaining itself. It is through this economic dependency that Russia hopes to extend its influence to Moldova. If a reintegration agreement were to be reached between Moldova and Transnistria, Russia would be strongly involved in the negotiation process and gain greater influence over Moldova via their dominating stance over Transnistria.¹² In addition to demonstrating a stronghold over the Transnistrian economy, Russia is also highly involved in Moldovan exports and imports and uses this position to further pressure the nation’s leaders to consider reintegration programs with the separatist region and to refrain from reaching agreements with western powers.

In the past, Russia has used economic means to negotiate its political leverage. This was seen in the sudden reduction in the supply of gas, oil, and electricity supplied to Moldova in the winter of 2005-2006 after the nation failed to reach an agreement on the Kozak Memorandum, which proposed the creation of a federalized state, in addition to calling for a Russian military presence in the state for at least 20 more years.¹³ Furthermore, in 2006-2007 Russia introduced sanction driven policies against Moldova including banning the import of some agricultural products and wine and placing embargos on the nation’s main items of export, wine, vegetables, and heavy metals. These tactics were used in order to discipline Moldova for its “increasingly defined leaning towards the West,” and to further emphasize the nation’s economic dependence on Russia.¹⁴ By continuing to serve as a leading supplier to both Transnistria and Moldova, Russia hopes to maintain and extend its influence over the region if a reintegration agreement were to be met. Serving as the main industrial and economic supplier to Transnistria has created a relationship where the separatist region is entirely dependent on Russia to sustain its economy. This power would allow Russia to exert in-

⁵ Matthew Rojansky, “Prospects for Unfreezing Moldova’s Frozen Conflict in Transnistria,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2011): 1-2.

⁶ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1268.

⁷ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 3-4.

⁸ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1279.

⁹ Andrey Devyatkov and Marcin Kosienkowski, “Testing Pluralism: Transnistria in the Light of 2011 Presidential Elections,” *Working Paper*, (2012): Pg. 7.

¹⁰ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 5.

¹¹ Matthew Rojansky, “Prospects for Unfreezing”, 3.

¹² Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 4.

¹³ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1278.

¹⁴ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1279.

fluence and preference within any negotiations between Transnistria and Moldova and demonstrates that “Transnistria’s greatest value to Russia is in providing a source of leverage within Moldova.”¹⁵ Furthermore Russia’s involvement in Moldova’s exports and imports provides them with a means of threatening the nation to refrain from reaching further agreements with western powers, in addition to pressuring them to consider negotiations with Transnistria.

CURRENT RUSSIA-TRANSNISTRIAN RELATIONS

Following the signing of the ceasefire between Moldova and Transnistria in 1992, Russia has been heavily involved in the politics of both Transnistria and Moldova. From the beginning, Russia was involved in the proposal of several documents that negotiated the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova, such as the 1997 Memorandum on the “Normalization” of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, and the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, both of which were rejected.¹⁶ Within Transnistria, the Soviet Union and now Russia has played a large roll in determining the organization of the region’s political structure, resulting in a strong “neo-Soviet” collective identity within the breakaway region.¹⁷ From this, Transnistria developed a “basically Soviet style government,” known mostly for its long-standing authoritarian leader, Igor Smirnov of the Respublica party, who led the state from the time of the fall of the USSR until the most recent elections in December 2011. Smirnov was known to hold a strong relationship with Russian leadership, working closely with the Kremlin in his governing of the state, and being often referred to as a Soviet-style leader.¹⁸ Having this close relationship over the Transnistrian political system via the president allowed Russia to further increase their involvement in the organization of the state. Russia was able to advertise their involvement through Smirnov and his party, displaying posters of Smirnov with Putin modeling the logo “our strength is our unity with Russia,” throughout Transnistria.¹⁹ However, prior to the presidential elections in December of 2011, the citizens of Transnistria began to express interest in political change, specifically the need for new leadership in the form of a politician associated with true renewal. This pressure from

the public led Russia to shift their support from longtime ally Smirnov to Anatoliy Kaminskiy of the *Obnovleniye* (Renewal) political party.²⁰ Russia publically declared Smirnov a “monument, which should be honored and respected,” but added that he should no longer be in power.²¹ Despite aggressive involvement by the Russians in the internal politics of Transnistria by backing Kaminskiy and his party, in addition to campaigning with posters of him as well as Putin stamped with “supported by Russia,” Kaminskiy was defeated by Yevgeniy Shevchuk.²² Shevchuk focused on the idea of Transnistria’s revival and provided harsh criticism of Smirnov and the whole political establishment, accusing it of incompetence and bribery.²³ Although relations between Shevchuk and Russia are not as closely bonded as those of the previous leader, Russia continues to exert a prominent influence over the region as Shevchuk recognizes that Transnistrian is dependent on Russia both politically and economically. Therefore, although Transnistria has made the move to elect a leader who is more dedicated to the revival of Transnistria as a more independent nation, this goal cannot be fully realized due to the nations inability to adequately sustain itself without Russian assistance.²⁴

RUSSIA, TRANSNISTRIA AND MOLDOVA

Russia continues to push for the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova with an agreement that would see the “...recognition of Russia as the only country which possesses political and coercive authority in the region,” with the creation of a common state formed on a federative basis.²⁵ However, with the election of new leadership in Transnistria, agreements have been reached between the separatist region and Moldova, which have, much to their dismay, left Russia behind. This was demonstrated at the most recent round of ‘5+2’ talks held this past April in Vienna, which focused on whether Moldova and Transnistria could be considered equal parties. During these discussions Russia and Transnistria argued together for the recognition of equality, while Moldova stated that “there could be no parity between a recognized state and a secessionist entity.” However, during a break in discussions while the Russian representative, Gergey Gubarev, was absent from

¹⁵ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 5.

¹⁶ Elena Korostelva. 1277-1278.

¹⁷ Rebecca A. Chamberlain-Creanga. *U.S. Embassy Policy Specialist Program (EPS) Research Report*. (2007): Pg. 2.

¹⁸ Nico Popesco and Leonid Litra. Pg. 2.

¹⁹ Matthew Rojansky, “Prospects for Unfreezing”, 4.

²⁰ Rebecca A. Chamberlain-Creanga. *U.S. Embassy Policy*, 1.

²¹ Andrey Devyatkov and Marcin Kosienkowski. “Testing Pluralism”, 13.

²² Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 6.

²³ Andrey Devyatkov and Marcin Kosienkowski. “Testing Pluralism”, 16.

²⁴ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 6.

²⁵ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 4.

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the room, the Moldovan and Transnistrian representatives reached an agreement on a compromise that recognized the “equality of all participants in the negotiating process.” This implied that the Moldova capital of Chisinau would recognize its equality with Tiraspol and that all participants in the ‘5+2’ meeting would be considered equal in the negotiations. Those involved included Russia, Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as mediators, and the European Union and United States as observers. Upon his return to the discussion room, Gubarev was shocked to hear of the agreements reached between Transnistria and Moldova without Russian approval. Through the discussion Russia was hoping to achieve equality between Transnistria and Moldova that would see further integration of Russian influence into the nation without increasing western involvement.²⁶

Russia’s historical political influence over Moldova and Transnistria has allowed it to play an integral role and obtain a coercive position within the region. Possessing this political influence over Transnistria allowed Russia to intertwine itself in the negotiations between the region and Moldova, insisting that its continued involvement be a precondition to every agreement.²⁷ Following the 2011 elections and coming to power of Yevgeniy Shevchuk, a new leader dedicated to the revival of Transnistria who won despite having no Russian support for his campaign, the region has made some strides to independently hold negotiations with Moldova and decrease Russian influence in the area. Because Smirnov had been the main obstacle for any substantial dialogue between Tiraspol and Chisinau, the election of Shevchuk has opened the doors to increased negotiations in the future.²⁸ Unfortunately Russia is not prepared to lose their stronghold over the region and continues to emphasize their economic and political importance to both Transnistria and Moldova, making it increasingly difficult for both districts to act without considering the impact on Russia.²⁹

“Unfortunately Russia is not prepared to lose their stronghold over the region and continues to emphasize their economic and political importance to both Transnistria and Moldova, making it increasingly difficult for both districts to act without considering the impact on Russia.”

As the European Union continues to pressure Moldova into joining their organization and adhering to their international laws, Russia maintains that Moldova should steer clear of western influences and instead focus on mending the conflict between Transnistria and accept membership into the Eurasian Union.³⁰ Although Chisinau is seemingly determined to move further towards closer integration with the EU, Russia continues to pressure them that

the EU is a failing organization and that the reintegration of Transnistria can be easily accomplished if Moldova were to accept Russian language, culture, and political support into their nation because these are the factors that Transnistrian citizens fear they are losing by being a part of Moldova. A majority of the conflict stems from fear that Moldova is looking to form connections with Romania. The Russian-speaking citizens of Transnistria dislike Romanian nationalism and still refer to Romania as the villain and Russia as the hero in a historical narrative dating back to World War I when Bucharest was allied with Nazi Germany.³¹ Therefore, in addition to demonstrating both economic and political influence over the regions of Moldova and Transnistria, Russia is also heavily involved in the cultural aspects of the separatist movement. Transnistria is home to a large majority of Russian citizens, with over 150,000 Russian passports issued in the region, and has a strong cultural connection to the former Soviet nation.³² Because reconciliation between the two areas involves the acceptance of Russian culture into the Moldovan sphere, Russia can use this aspect to further ensure that their interests and preferences are represented in any agreements made between the two regions and any other external participants.³³

RUSSIA-MOLDOVA CONCLUSIONS

As Moldova develops as a nation and continues to explore its options for becoming involved in the international com-

²⁶ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 5.

²⁷ Rebecca A. Chamberlain-Creanga. *U.S. Embassy Policy*, 2.

²⁸ Andrey Devyatkov and Marcin Kosienkowski. “Testing Pluralism”, 14.

²⁹ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 4.

³⁰ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 9.

³¹ Matthew Rojansky, “Prospects for Unfreezing”, 2.

³² Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 3.

³³ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 4.

munity, it is going to be strongly impacted by the economic, political, and cultural pressures asserted through the nations unresolved conflict with Transnistria supported by Russia. To Russia, Moldova is an important nation over which to maintain influence because of its past position within the Soviet sphere and the Russian belief that it provides a “foothold” in that region of Europe, projecting

“Therefore, any plans for Moldova to integrate with western powers are greatly impacted by the degree of influence exerted by the Russian government over both Moldova and Transnistrian in terms of the economic and political support they provide to each, in addition to the Russian connection in the cultural disputes between the two regions.”

an image of strategic depth against possible threats from the west.³⁴ Through the separatist movement in Transnistria, Russia has found a way to aggressively maintain its influence over Moldova by working through Transnistria to support the reintegration of the region into the main nation through negotiations and agreements that see that Russia is granted maximum power over the state and serves as the sole international representative of the area. By doing this, Russia hopes to not only maintain their sphere of influence over Moldova, but also to ensure that the leaders of the nation are not tempted by western powers and organizations looking to integrate Moldova and Transnistria into their community. By developing itself as the key economic supplier to both Moldova and Trans-

nistria, Russia has created a system where any negotiations between the two regions or any other external participants regarding trade agreements would require the involvement of Russia. As a result, both areas are so dependent on the economic support provided by Russia that they would need to channel any possible changes through them in order for them to progress. Possessing this level of influence over the Moldovan and Transnistrian economy makes it very difficult for either region to even consider agreements with western powers because they are so heavily monitored by the Russians, and any agreement without Russian participation would be automatically disapproved. Furthermore,

Russia has always played a key role in the organization of the Transnistrian government by working closely with the former president, Igor Smirnov, to ensure that Russian involvement in the region was maximized and encouraged throughout the system. Although the newly elected leader does not have this same connection with the Russian Kremlin, Russia is still heavily involved in Transnistrian governmental processes because of the state's dependence on them for support, in addition to Russia's persistence in attempting to organize political negotiations between Transnistria and Moldova. Finally, Russia continues to exert influence over the regions through the multitude of Russian citizens that reside in the separatist region and the cultural issues relating to the integration of Russian language and lifestyle into Moldova as a condition of resolving the conflict between the two states.³⁵ Therefore, any plans for Moldova to integrate with western powers are greatly impacted by the degree of influence exerted by the Russian government over both Moldova and Transnistrian in terms of the economic and political support they provide to each, in addition to the Russian connection in the cultural disputes between the two regions.

III. MOLDOVA AND THE EU RELATIONS

The European Union (EU) has expressed openly “a fundamental change in its approach towards Moldova, which was about to become a direct [neighbour] after the European Union's eastward enlargement” soon after the fall of the Soviet Union.³⁶ Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) originating in early 2002, the EU made “proposals to mitigate the exclusion of the imminent enlargements for Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus”.³⁷ However, despite the mandated intent of the ENP, “EU relations with Moldova clearly lack a sufficient institutional framework or a basis of mutual trust and commitment”.³⁸ Whether the EU's tepid response to Eastern European inclusion vis-à-vis the ENP's implementation and viability in Moldova, the larger “conundrum that evolves is [...]: how can the EU take advantage – if at all – of enlargement-tested ‘conditionality’ and, for that matter, expect compliance from neighbouring countries without relying

³⁵ Nicu Popesco and Leonid Litra, “Transnistria”, 4.

³⁶ Giselle Bosse. “The EU's Relations with Moldova: Governance, Partnership or Ignorance?”. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62:8, 2010, 1291.

³⁷ Sergiu Buscaneanu, et al., *Moldova and EU in the European Neighbourhood Policy Context: Implementation of the EU-Moldovan Action Plan*, Chisinau: ADEPT Association, 2008, 7.

³⁸ Giselle Bosse “The EU's Relations”, 1307.

³⁴ Matthew Rojanksy, “Prospects for Unfreezing”, 3.

on the 'golden carrot' of membership"?³⁹ In essence, the EU has externally taken a passive, rhetoric-based stance in terms of integration of Moldova into "the EU's fundamental values and objectives [and...] [the] enormous gains [...] in terms of increased stability, security and well being".⁴⁰ Through this EU pacifism, Moldova remains in political and economic stasis with ever-looming questions over a resolution to political tensions, economic unviability, incohesive civil society and the 'frozen-conflict' of Transnistria under a European-led vanguard.

THE EU AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Since its inception and implementation, the ENP has functioned as the EU's primary integrative operation in relation to neighbouring states of 'interest'. Its primary function and mandate states:

In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, the EU would offer to its neighbours a range of opportunities such as: closer economic cooperation [...]; a stake in the EU's Internal Market; preferential trading relations; liberalisation of the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital; cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats; great EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management; greater efforts to promote human rights; integration into transport, energy and telecommunication networks; new sources of finance; etc.⁴¹

Under this framework outlined by the EU, it requests "compliance of candidate countries with a set of economic and political criteria, the [...] Copenhagen Criteria."⁴² However the application of the ENP meant "the partners in Eastern Europe had very little or no role in defining the very terms of the proposed partnership, its

content and mechanisms."⁴³ Rather, states under the purview of the ENP were subject to the terms and conditions set forth by the European Commission. Fortunately, the EU became aware (not entirely) of the incompleteness and asymmetry formulated within the ENP and rectified these defects through further legislation. The amelioration of EU-Moldova relations came from the application of the New Enhanced (Neighbourhood) Policy (NEP), Generalized System of Preferences (GSP+), and the Moldova Action Plan (MAP). In fact, even the nomenclature had changed and "became clear in the categorisation of neighbours such as Ukraine and Moldova, not as 'Western Independent States' (WIS), but increasingly as 'Eastern ENP' – and thus clearly European countries."⁴⁴ Yet, these rhetorical alterations and institutional reconfigurations did not resolve the fundamental issues plaguing the EU-Moldova ENP implementation: "[these mechanisms] were too 'thick' on Moldova's commitments and too 'thin' on EU responsibilities."⁴⁵ Although the "ENP has been underdeveloped conceptually [as...] a Commission-driven policy,"⁴⁶ "the EU delimits itself and refuses to assume any responsibility on ENP implementation, even though the document was negotiated and adopted by both [...] the EU and Moldova."⁴⁷ Ultimately, despite the EU's insistence on a shared, equally negotiated partnership, the ENP remains a unilateral 'bestowment' from the EU to Moldova where Moldova must meet the criteria placed by the EU rather than mutually agreed political convergence.

THE EU AND THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT

In addition, the EU "does not have [...] a strategic framework into which to integrate its substantial and scattered actions on Moldova and Transnistria" creating further political distance from the hope of EU-Moldovan cohesion.⁴⁸ Openly, the EU has "declared that it 'shared' responsibility with Moldova in settling the Transnistria conflict" as part of the initiatives set forth by the ENP.⁴⁹ In association with Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), "[supporting...] mediation efforts aimed at establishing a viable and democratic Moldovan state" has been at the crux of EU-Moldova's doctrine of political

³⁹ Stefan Gänzle, "EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Analysis", *Europe-Asia Studies* 61:10, 2010, 1716.

⁴⁰ Nicu Popescu, The EU in Moldova: Settling conflict in the neighbourhood, Occasional Paper 60, 2010, 9.

⁴¹ Sergiu Buscaneanu, et al., *Moldova and EU*, 8.

⁴² Stefan Gänzle, "EU Governance", 1716.

⁴³ Giselle Bosse. "The EU's Relations", 1297-1298.

⁴⁴ Stefan Gänzle, "EU Governance", 1725.

⁴⁵ Nicu Popescu, *The EU in Moldova*, 38.

⁴⁶ Nicu Popescu, *The EU in Moldova*, 10.

⁴⁷ Anna Lungu, "Peaceful Conflict", 22.

⁴⁸ Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra, "Transnistria", 1.

⁴⁹ Giselle Bosse. "The EU's Relations", 1302.

collaboration.⁵⁰ Further, the EU Border and Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was set up 30 November 2005 with the explicit intention “to make a sustainable contribution to the development of border-management procedures that meet European Union standards [...] which in turn enhances regional security and supports economic development.”⁵¹ EUBAM reflects the commitments of a multilateral measure “to combat the smuggling in Transnistria section of the Moldova-Ukraine border” on behalf of the EU as well as participating states and organizations: Moldova, Ukraine and OSCE.⁵²

Even though there many institutions in place that outwardly express an interest of the EU to be an important player within Transnistria discourse, the reality remains that the EU has continued policies of indifference and impartiality. Besides playing a participatory role within ‘5+2 framework’ negotiations, the EU has taken a considerably passive and complacent role in seeking a settled resolution on the subject of Transnistria. On the whole, “the EU [has] not [used] all its influence [...] to relieve the Transnistrian settlement negotiation process because of prevalence of other important issues on the agenda.”⁵³ Thus the Transnistrian conflict is relegated to irrelevance and nonchalance within the context of the EU’s overarching goal of cooperation in a greater community of Europe. For the EU, “its success in transferring its rules and norms to Moldova” – Europeanization – remain at the forefront of the ENP ideology rather than engaging in relatively inconsequential power politics between itself and Russia.⁵⁴ Thus, it becomes more and more transparent that “the ‘theory’ and political rhetoric in ENP documents [...] has little bearing on the actual day-to-day practice of the EU’s engagement with Moldova.”⁵⁵ As a consequence, Moldova arrives at a political and economic impasse in terms of adhering to the EU’s ENP terms while receiving little relief from the EU itself to ameliorate the Transnistrian question.

THE EU AND MOLDOVAN POLITICS

Under the EU-Moldova Action Plan (MAP), the primary objective is to:

further [strengthen] the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law; ensuring the democratic conduct of parliamentary elections [...] in Moldova in accordance with European standards.⁵⁶

These parameters make a clear indication that the political and institutional framework must be altered in order to advance towards a possibly deeper integration. The Moldovan political environment has been changed post-2009 with the defeat of the Communist Party (Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova) and the ushering in of the Alliance for European Integration (Alianța pentru Integrare Europeană) (AEI), a party committed and “engaged in a dynamic rapprochement with the EU.”⁵⁷ Because of this particular electoral outcome, Moldova has taken the necessary democratic steps – albeit spasmodic and protested – to fall closer within the EU fold of member states. The new politics undertaken by the AEI have yielded benefits and evidence of a commitment to EU integration: “Moldova has launched talks on an Association Agreement, entry into a [Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area] (DCFTA), and the establishment of a visa-free regime with the EU.”⁵⁸ Yet, “the EU has kept a rather low profile in the political conflict between the pro-European opposition and the Communist Party” thus demonstrating to the Moldovan government as well as to political actors that political apathy is the EU’s *modus operandi*.⁵⁹ Furthering the EU-Moldovan conundrum is the major question of Transnistrian politics that play a large role in the possibility of political integrations within the EU. While Moldova has progressed towards a democratic electoral system, Transnistria remains encumbered by a quagmire within a system where “Transnistrian leadership [chooses] to severely restrict political competition in order to consolidate its hold on power” – an

⁵⁰ European External Action Service, “EU-Moldova Relations”, accessed 16 Oct. 2012, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/moldova/pdf/internal_political_economic_en.pdf.

⁵¹ EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, “Background”, accessed Oct. 13, 2012, <http://www.eubam.org/en/about/overview>.

⁵² Sergiu Buscaneanu, et al., *Moldova and EU*, 76.

⁵³ Sergiu Buscaneanu, et al., *Moldova and EU*, 54.

⁵⁴ Giselle Bosse. “The EU’s Relations”, 1306.

⁵⁵ Giselle Bosse. “The EU’s Relations”, 1306.

⁵⁶ European Union. “EU/Moldova Action Plan.” EUROPA.eu. N.p., 1 May 2004. Web. 15 Oct. 2012. <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> . 4.

⁵⁷ Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra, *Transnistria*, 7.

⁵⁸ Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra, *Transnistria*, 8.

⁵⁹ Giselle Bosse. “The EU’s Relations”, 1306.

ideology more aligned with the (former Soviet) Russia.⁶⁰ Thus, Moldova finds itself in a conflicting position: “if Moldova attempts to integrate with the West, it would most likely lose Transnistria [...] in addition, Moldova would be disconnected from the Russian Market.”⁶¹ It is a domestic issue that gets no political consolation from the EU, thus forcing Moldova to consider the possibility that: “if state functionality and EU integration cannot be reconciled with reintegration [of Transnistria], then reintegration is considered to be the less important.”⁶² And although the domestic political climate of Moldova and Transnistria has progressed more democratically in terms of political agents – in Moldova with Prime Minister Vlad Filat (AEI); and in Transnistria with President Yevgeny Shevchuk (Renewal) – both must foster “in-depth administrative reform involving greater transparency, a simplification of administrative procedures and a fight to counter corruption” under the active participation and continuing inspection by the EU.⁶³

THE EU AND MOLDOVAN ECONOMICS

The opportunity for convergence of economic legislation, the opening of economies to each other, and the continued reduction of trade barriers which will stimulate investment and growth; [as well as...] increased financial support.⁶⁴

Unfortunately, “[Moldova’s] per capita real GDP is the lowest in Europe and [consequently, it] is classified as low-income by the World Bank”, thus making economic integration a major component of a EU-Moldovan cooperation.⁶⁵ For this reason, the EU does provide economic mechanisms as well as immediate financial support to the Moldovan state. In fact, “Moldova has been one of the leading ENPI [European Neighbourhood Policy Instruments]

recipients, receiving a per capita spending of €48.”⁶⁶ Additionally, the Moldovan state has grossed large financial aid from the EU and subsidiary bodies via indirect programs and payments: EUBAM direct payment of €400,000, plus €730,000 for developing Boarder Guard; Food Security Programme payment of €10 million; Eastern Partnership (EaP) payments to increase by another €2.1 billion by 2020.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Moldova has signed onto several EU economic agreements and agencies in order to increase economic integration such as: Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP), Generalised System of Preferences (GSP+), Instrument of Technical Cooperation and Information Exchange of the European Commission (TAIEX), cooperation with the European Investment Bank, and others.⁶⁸ But despite the EU’s reliance on a ‘hand-out’ diplomatic approach, “these generous financial provisions [...] do not automatically translate into Moldova’s unequivocal commitment to the European course.”⁶⁹ Thus, these financial ‘hand-outs’ by the EU do not completely address the underlying economic reforms that are necessary for complete integration. In fact, a major concern arises from the energy market due to Transnistria’s transit status in relation to Moldova. In essence, “Gazprom [a major Russian energy company] ‘sells’ gas to enterprises in Transnistria which pay reduced fees for the gas to Tiraspol, which in turn simply allocated that money to the ‘state’ budget. The resulting debt, worth over \$2 billion, is sent Chişinău, consistent with Russia’s official position that Transnistria is a part of Moldova.”⁷⁰ This transnational subsidized energy market makes it difficult for the Moldovan state to alleviate and ameliorate economic conditions within the terms of the EU partnership parameters thus forcing Moldova to acquiesce towards “prioritisation of Russia over the ‘moral’ commitment to Europe.”⁷¹ Perhaps the fault of weak economic institutions within Moldova, the fundamental problem

“In this way, the EU is hoping that “supporting pluralism will mean supporting capacity building for NGOs in the region.”

⁶⁰ Oleh Protsyk, “Representation and Democracy in Eurasia’s Unrecognized States: The Case of Transnistria”, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 25:3, 2009, 277.

⁶¹ Inna Lungu, “Peaceful Conflict”, 20.

⁶² Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra, *Transnistria*, 4.

⁶³ Florent Parmentier, “Moldova, a Major European Success for the Eastern Partnership”, *Fondation Robert Shuman, European Issue* 128, 2010, 4.

⁶⁴ European Union. “EU/Moldova Action Plan.” EUROPA.eu. N.p., 1 May 2004. Web. 15 Oct. 2012. <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> . 3-4.

⁶⁵ European External Action Service, “EU-Moldova Relations”, accessed 16 Oct. 2012, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/moldova/pdf/internal_political_economic_en.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1276.

⁶⁷ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1276.

⁶⁸ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1275.

⁶⁹ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1277.

⁷⁰ Matthew Rojansky, “Prospects for Unfreezing”, 3.

⁷¹ Elena Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice”, 1283.

lies within the EU's economic approach towards Moldova, which lacks any "offering of more tangible incentives [that] it cannot give or promise."⁷² Inherently, "it [requires] more clarity and commitment from the EU in order to convert Moldova's current [economic] alignment into a resolute [economic] commitment" rather than continuing a 'money pouring' policy without any form of institutional reform or economic consultation a capite ad calcem by providing easier mechanisms for Moldova to integrate into the EU and detach from Transnistria's energy debts.⁷³

THE EU AND MOLDOVAN CIVIL SOCIETY

The ENP explicates and MAP reifies that the EU is committed to "[ensuring] respect for the freedom of association and [fostering] the development of civil society [through...] [enhancing] dialogue and co-operation."⁷⁴ Under this framework of the ENP, the MAP and the supplementary EaP, "dialogue with civil society has noticeably improved and measure have been taken to increase access to information and transparency of the public decision-making process."⁷⁵ The EU has been instrumental in supporting "the Moldova branch of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) [which both] could play a positive role" in quelling political tension and building civil society cohesion.⁷⁶ In this way, the EU is hoping that "supporting pluralism will mean supporting capacity building for NGOs in the region."⁷⁷ However, in relation to its capacity and capability to engage in problems of civil society, "the EU's involvement with [Moldovan] civil society [has been...] rather limited."⁷⁸ *Grosso modo*, "besides endemic problems related to human rights, freedom of the media, anti-corruption fight, independence of the judiciary and business climate, a serious gap of the political dialogue between Moldova and [the] EU has encouraged the reticence of the later towards Chişinău's demands."⁷⁹ For the EU, its primary strategy should not be to institute civil society organizations within Moldova; rather, it should "act as a watch dog and [...] monitor the implementation

of the reform."⁸⁰ To the credit of the EU, the European Parliament has a limited role in formulating and applying EU foreign policies, but, in contrast its resolutions for Moldovan civil society have had a great role to raise the awareness of member states of the necessity of more EU involvement in ENP application and a more general, solid commitment.⁸¹ But unfortunately, despite the constant rhetoric and political 'lip-service', the EU – and more generally the West – "has lost some of their interest [and...] a large portion of [financial assistance... goes] towards institutional and legal reform" than direct investment aid to Moldovan-lead NGOs and civil society organizations.⁸² On the side of Moldova, "Moldovan NGOs do not feel involved in any form of decision making with the EU in any form of partnership" leading to increasing feelings of alienation and estrangement to an institution doctrinally invested in a 'Neighbourhood' cooperation.⁸³ Additionally, the EU could take a firmer stance in reuniting Transnistrian and Moldovan civil society "by downplaying ethnicity [and focusing...] on theft and asset stripping by political leaders [which will...] reframe the discourse of conflict and may lead to a more productive dialogue for resolution."⁸⁴ With a perpetuation of apathy and unresponsiveness on part of the EU, Moldova will ultimately continue to languish within in terms of repairing and rebuilding a functioning civil society that is reflective of ENP's and MAP's objectives.

THE EU AND MOLDOVA CONCLUSION

The ENP and subsequent mechanisms (e.g. EaP, MAP, etc.) promised a continuous engagement of Europe within the affairs and integration of Moldova within the EU supranational entity. Through the implementation of these institutional instruments, the EU allowed for the possibility of a progressive and incremental transition of Moldova from an Independent State of the West (ISW) into a possible EU Candidate. However, a large disparity has arisen between rhetorically promulgated policies and effectively enforced policies, and the EU has erred on the side of 'rhetoric politics' rather than realpolitik. In the perspective of Moldova, the EU's exercised policy of ignoring Moldova is certainly not a step towards the mutual trust

⁷² Elena Korosteleva, "Moldova's European Choice", 1284.

⁷³ Elena Korosteleva, "Moldova's European Choice", 1287.

⁷⁴ European Union. "EU/Moldova Action Plan", 9.

⁷⁵ Victor Chirila, "New Opportunities for Moldova", Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011. 115.

⁷⁶ Rebecca A. Chamberlain-Creangă, *Identity*, 5.

⁷⁷ Nicu Popescu, *The EU in Moldova*, 39.

⁷⁸ Dura, George, *The EU and Moldova's*, 13.

⁷⁹ Nicu Popescu, *The EU in Moldova*, 39.

⁸⁰ Klas Markensten and Igor Grozu, Review of civil society organization in Moldova: Final Report. SIDA : Stockholm (2011). 13.

⁸¹ Nicu Popescu, *The EU in Moldova*, 53.

⁸² Jos Boonstra, *Moldova, Transnistria and European Democracy Policies*, FIRDE, Madrid, 2007, 3.

⁸³ Giselle Bosse, "The EU's Relations with Moldova", 1307.

⁸⁴ Jeffrey Own, "Neopatrimonialism", 7.

and 'shared responsibility' that it has espoused.⁸⁵ Independent sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for institutional apathy on the part of the EU; instead, it must be remain actively seized of the matter and actively participatory. In the end, "the EU [...] takes its 'soft power' appeal for granted, as reforms that the EU demands from its neighbours are hard, laborious and in the short term, socially alienating."⁸⁶ In order to improve Moldovan-European relations as well as to arrive at the result stipulated by the ENP and MAP, the EU must involve itself more in the transformation of the political environment, the reformation of economic institutions, the enhancement of civil society and the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.

IV.MOLDOVA CONCLUSIONS

Moldova is ultimately placed in a precarious position after the fall of the Soviet Union and its declared independence on 27 August 1991. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists as a tangible international entity, remnants still exist within the power politics exerted by the Russian government; conversely, Europe has evolved into the ideological institution of the European Union which looks to increase its influence abroad. Thus, "Moldova find itself 'courted' by two 'rivals' [and] as a result, Moldova is playing a confusing double game."⁸⁷ However, the dynamics of the superpower relationships are considerably different: Russia chooses to act upon 'domination' policies of realpolitik, while Europe chooses to rely upon 'soft power' and 'moral' policies of persuasion. Ultimately, "as a small and weak state, Moldova is adopting the identity and ideology of its most powerful neighbours", but since Russia is preoccupied by Transnistria and the EU remains apathetic to the region, Moldova is at a prospective impasse. In the end, the future of Moldova's integration either into the Russian sphere or into the EU system depends entirely on whether either side decides to play a more active role; because as of right now, Moldova will continue to stay within its political and economic quagmire until interest by either side concedes to increased involvement to find an answer to its current stasis.

85 Giselle Bosse. "The EU's Relations", 1307.

86 Elena Korosteleva, "Moldova's European Choice", 1280.

87 Anna Lungu, "Peaceful Conflict", 20.

