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By Alison Smith, ATLIS editor 2008

In her ATLIS conference keynote address, Gráinne Ryder talked about two of the biggest issues facing Canadians: foreign aid and the environment. While the environment may at first glance seem the bigger of the two issues, as Ryder explains, in many cases, the two are actually inseparable.

This year's journal was originally to be focussed exclusively on the environment, as was this year's ATLIS conference. It became apparent in looking for papers, however, that a better approach would be to have an environmental emphasis and include papers that cover a wide range of topics such as post-colonialism, multinational corporations, and the Indian diaspora in film. There is no common theme to the papers, but as you will see, they go together quite nicely, especially when considered within the context of Ryder's keynote address.

In addition to the books that are reviewed by Dara MacDonald at the end of this year's journal, two books that also complement Ryder's topic are John Perkins's *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* and *An Imperfect Offering* by James Orbinski.

Perkins, like Ryder, discusses projects such as dams and energy generators. He takes a different approach from that of Ryder — Ryder notes that these projects are often bad for the environment and local communities whereas Perkins explains that contracts for such projects are often hugely beneficial to foreign companies and governments. In a sense they discuss the two different sides to the foreign aid coin — those receiving aid (Ryder) and those giving the aid (Perkins). While parts of Perkins' book does seem to have been sensationalized a bit (his use of terms such as "global empire" and "world domination" seem a bit too conspiracy-theory to me at times), he provides an important perspective on projects that are being encouraged by foreign developers (many American but many also Canadian) and funded by international corporations. It is important to read *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* with a grain of salt, but Parsons provides some important insights into how projects such as those described above benefit the governments that encourage them and the corporations that build them.

James Orbinski was president of doctors without borders when the organization won the Nobel Peace Prize. A Canadian doctor, Orbinski has worked in Afghanistan, Rwanda (both before and during the genocide), Kosovo, and Somalia. If for no other reason, his account of the situations in which he was working is immensely important for anyone interested in humanitarianism and especially for anyone with a passion for medicine. On top of that, Orbinski is hugely important to the study of Canadian foreign policy because of his argument that humanitarianism is by nature political. His account of history is tremendously personal and emotional, and his rhetoric is powerful and nothing short of a call to action.

While the environment is perhaps the single most important issue facing today's leaders, citizens, and governments, this year's journal has attempted to demonstrate that it must not be forgotten that there are many other issues — many of which are tied to the environment — that must also be studied and discussed.

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The Wrong Kind of Aid by Gráinne Ryder – policy director of Probe International and Editor of *Three Gorges Probe* Energy Probe Research Foundation

The following is the keynote address, given by Gráinne Ryder, at the fall 2008 ATLIS conference at Mount Allison University.

Though well intentioned, Canadian aid has backfired.

When I joined Probe International 20 years ago and began investigating how Canada's foreign aid affects the environment, I saw firsthand how "development" projects – particularly energy and water infrastructure projects – could really harm peoples' means of subsistence and their environments.

What I didn't realize initially was that this harm occurred almost everywhere: in west Africa at the Akosombo dam; at the Three Gorges dam in China; in the tropical rainforests of Indonesia and the Amazon from transmigration, logging, and cattle-ranching schemes; in the Congo road projects; and so on.

Through our contributions to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, United Nations (UN) agencies, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), we have financed environmental destruction.

So when you hear that aid is needed to save the global environment think again. The reality is that aid harms the environment by damming tropical rivers, by flooding agricultural lands, by clear-cutting forests, and by excavating mines.

Aid doesn't reduce poverty. It causes poverty by forcibly resettling people onto unfamiliar and unsuitable lands and by destroying the environments they know and depended on for their survival.

Development aid doesn't empower people. It disempowers them by financing dictators — like Zimbabwe's Mugabe — who can keep their armies ready and their personal bank accounts flush with the monies intended for the poor.

Yet we still hear pleas from rock stars like Bono to "make poverty history" by increasing aid, as if all aid is good. This notion is wrong and dangerous.

When we write cheques to the governments of Ethiopia or Pakistan or Haiti we allow those governments to be financially independent from their own people, we free them from having to tax their own citizens, to justify their expenditures, and to prove that funds are spent in the public interest.

With our aid, Third World rulers don't need to be accountable to their people for their performance. This not only undermines the efforts of the people to secure peace and democracy, it also creates the perfect environment for corruption and unchecked development.

The views of Dr. George Ayittey, a Ghanaian and Distinguished Economist at American University, are especially insightful. Here's what he recently told the Canadian Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade: "Naive Westerners think that the best way of helping the African people is by handing money over to their corrupt despots... The entire Western aid process has been corrupted and perverted. It is now a circus, riddled with failure, dependency, fraud, and trenchant dishonesty."

Faced with such harsh criticism, aid agencies are constantly reinventing themselves. The World Bank is now mobilizing billions of dollars for what is called "carbon finance" and a UN-brokered scheme called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This has developing countries now trying to pass off hydro megaprojects, industrial tree plantations, and even nuclear plants and coal-fired power stations, as projects qualifying for "carbon credits" that they can then sell on the global carbon market.

CDM hopefuls include big hydro dams in Africa on the Congo, and in Brazil on the Madeira River. Selling carbon credits has become a source of revenue for these projects that otherwise are not financially attractive.

The world's poor are likely to be the hardest hit by CDM projects as wind projects and hydro dams gobble up more land and as polluters learn how to game the system and acquire fake credits. If unchecked, this CDM business will lead to more monopolization of land and rivers by state controlled entities – and all for very dubious climate benefits. That is why citizens groups around the world are fighting CDM today, ironically, just as Western governments and donors are warming to it.

But let's return to the project scale of things for a moment. Why do bad projects keep getting built, knowing what we know after all these years? It can be boiled down to one simple but profound dynamic: when a dam builder (or a developer or polluter of any kind) does not have to pay for the costs imposed on other members of society, he or she will keep building.

This is because as one Chinese environmentalist put it, "the beneficiaries are not the sufferers, and the sufferers are not the beneficiaries." In other words, those who benefit are not the ones who pay the highest costs. The ones who pay the highest costs have no right to say "no." And so costs and risks get "externalized."

One of the clearest examples of "cost externalization" is China's Three Gorges dam, which started operating in 2003 and that took 10 years and \$25 billion (and counting) to build.

Because of China's state secrecy and ban on public criticism of the Three Gorges dam, we do not have perfect information about its costs — but we do know that its costs to Chinese society and economy are high and climbing.

Here is a glimpse:

- Of the more than one million people displaced by the Three Gorges dam, hundreds of thousands of farmers were moved uphill onto land that is too steep and barren for growing crops, and there's no alternative means of income.
- The Three Gorges reservoir has triggered landslides in more than 90 places and tsunami-like waves up to 50 metres high. Already, 70,000 people have had to be evacuated from at-risk areas.
- Rapid sediment buildup at the upper end of the Three Gorges reservoir will render the harbour at Chongqing – a city of 14 million – useless within 20 years.
- Water released from the dam is scouring flood control embankments faster than official predictions, putting downstream Wuhan, a city of 9 million people, at great risk. (Think New Orleans after its embankments failed but on a much much bigger scale.)

Critics inside China and elsewhere have predicted all these environmental problems and the attendant economic and social upheaval they cause since the 1980s. But because the proponents were not accountable to the people now living with these problems, the project went ahead.

What some of you may not know about Three Gorges is that Canadian aid helped make it happen.

The Three Gorges dam might not be operating today if not for CIDA's decision to finance the Canadian engineering consortium that recommended that China build the dam. Their favourable recommendation – which discounted the data warning of disaster – bolstered the Chinese government's decision to go ahead.

Not only did the Canadian consortium downplay every potential risk to people's lives and livelihoods, they concluded that no other investment options could provide the people of China with the navigation, flood control, and power benefits Three Gorges could.

How wrong they were. Here's the situation today after just a few years of operation:

- The dam has increased flood risk for millions of people, both upstream and downstream.

- The dam has created a navigation nightmare, a bottleneck for ships trying to reach Chongqing, with delays of up to several days before they can pass through the locks. Observers say more goods are now transported around the dam by road because it is faster and cheaper.
- The dam's power is neither cheap nor reliable. China would have been better off building smaller-scale power plants closer to where power is needed.

Had the Canadian consortium opted for prudence in their feasibility study instead of reassuring the Chinese government that the project was entirely feasible, millions of people living along the Yangtze might not be living with multiple threats of catastrophe from this project today.

Since analyzing how Three Gorges was justified and eventually financed, we have learned something we believe should be better understood by environmentalists. Projects that so harm the environment are not inevitable. They proceed only because a number of things are in place to make them happen.

First, governments give developers permission to destroy the environment, regardless of who is harmed. This permission usually includes immunity from environmental liabilities.

Then, in the case of dam builders, they are usually protected from competition. Nobody else is allowed to challenge the proposal in terms of promised benefits, price of output, and quality of service to customers.

Proponents are given subsidies to reduce financial risk to any private backers; this comes from government-backed institutions like the World Bank or China's Construction Bank.

Big dam developers are usually guaranteed returns from captive consumers. There is no market risk whatsoever because customers have to pay for the dam's output whether they want it or not.

And always you have agencies like UN Development Programme or the World Bank's Global Environment Facility ready to offset the developers' costs and risks. The UN Environment Program explained the use of subsidies in a report on the global water situation last year. It said: "[s]ubsidies of all types have been used in many countries to establish a 'topdown' energy supply system, favouring thermal and large hydropower generating plants of ever increasing capacity – a trend that now needs to be reversed."

So what can Canada do?

First, we need to stop throwing subsidies at projects we know are environmentally damaging and, more importantly, publicly unacceptable to local communities. More generally, we need to stop the delivery of aid to governments that do not respect citizens' rights.

To go back to what I said earlier, we have to accept that if aid doesn't reduce poverty or save the environment, then we should stop giving it.

I would like to read you what Gerry Barr, the President of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation told the Canadian Senate committee on foreign aid recently:

"The absence of international aid is certainly not the cause of poverty, and aid will not be its cure. Poverty is about decisions taken by those in power globally and within states about who counts and who does not. The cure to poverty is not aid but the emergence of those who are living in poverty ...as rights holders and as citizens demanding accountability from governments and reshaping their social circumstances."

The emergence of the poor as rights holders and citizens. This is our greatest hope.

Our greatest hope is in the emergence of people like China's Wu Lihong, who has complained loudly about industrial pollution destroying Lake Tai, China's third-largest freshwater lake (just outside Shanghai). For his efforts, he was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison last spring on trumped up racketeering charges.

Or people like Zhang Changjian, a rural doctor, who has sued a polluting factory with help from a new NGO called the Chinese Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims. For his efforts, the government revoked his license to practice medicine and now he cannot afford to pay his children's school fees.

These are just two people among thousands around the world who we call front line defenders of the environment. These community activists are the ones that we must cheer on and stand beside, not the global institutions and celebrity campaigners.

Remember that for every perceived global threat there are always local victims, people working to stop polluters and demanding cleaner water, cleaner air, or simply the security to own and defend their land and their communities without fear of reprisal, jail, or worse.

So this is our challenge. We must speak for those who cannot. We must lead by insisting that Canadian companies uphold the highest standards of conduct overseas and then hold them to that at every opportunity. We must demand that all citizens have the legal and political tools to participate in decisions affecting them and to defend their environment. And we need to ensure that people have the security to express themselves and assert their rights, and we need to help people hold their governments and ours accountable.

This is both vision and challenge for defending our global commons.

Thank-you.

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Painting the Roses Green: Consumer Resistance in the Era of Globalization by Rebecca McMillan — fourth year environmental studies

This February, the world's biggest producer of roses, the Indian company Karuturi Networks, — which grows flowers in India, Kenya, and Ethiopia — shipped about 18 million roses to Europe and other markets for Valentine's Day. In addition, local rose sales were up 25 per cent, despite claims by Muslim and Hindu hardliners that the western holiday is immoral and against local culture (Agence France Press, 2008): globalization at its finest. The international trade in cut flowers is loaded with these apparent contradictions and unlikely linkages, making it an interesting case study in the dynamics of global integration.

While flowers have been given as gifts since ancient times, the cut flower industry only began to bloom at the end of the last century. The production of decorative blossoms such as roses, carnations, and chrysanthemums for North American and European markets accelerated rapidly in the 1990s, with industry growth rates of around 10 per cent per year by the end of the decade (CBC News, 2007). Today, the global trade in cut flowers is estimated to be worth in the area of \$88.5 billion (Agence France Press, 2007), with roses accounting for three-quarters of total production (Howard, 1999). The principal reason for the explosion in flower consumption is the decrease in prices as producers have relocated to lower cost countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (CBC News, 2007).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the economies and societies of Latin America, Asia, and Africa underwent major changes.

Upon the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, many countries adopted structural adjustment programs aimed at reversing import-

substitution policies and curing them of their debt by generating foreign exchange. The policies combined short-term stabilization measures with broader reforms designed to reduce state economic intervention and increase national integration with global markets. The results of these programs were controversial. At the regional level, they tended to reduce inflation rates while increasing exports and foreign direct investment, but benefits to national economies largely failed to materialize. Urban unemployment levels increased in many areas, real minimum wages were lowered, and social service programs were cut or privatized. Select sectors did, however, experience increases in both output and employment during this time, especially labour-intensive manufacturing and nontraditional agricultural exports such as cut flowers. The expansion of the latter has been associated with the relocation of labour-intensive branches of European and North American agribusiness to countries that have a comparative advantage in terms of wage rates and growing seasons (Korovkin, 2003).

While the Netherlands, home of the industry's headquarters, remains the world's largest exporter of cut flowers, Colombia is now a close second. Roughly one in every two flowers sold in the United States is grown in the Colombian savannah surrounding Bogota (Global Pesticide Campaigner, 2002). Volcanic Andean soils combined with little seasonal variation make growing conditions in Colombia and Ecuador ideal. In its formative days, rapid growth in the floriculture industry in the Andean region was spurred by tariff incentives from the United States government under President Bush. As part of the United States' war on drugs, the Bush administration tried to promote alternative agricultural exports in the Andes in order to encourage the conversion of fields from coca to other crops. The result was the hugely popular 1988 *Andean Trade Preferences Act* which, among other things, eliminated tariffs on

Colombian and Ecuadorian flower imports. Cocaine production did not decrease and the result was a dramatic influx of roses and other flowers from the Andean region into the US at the expense of local producers (Howard, 1999). Today, other flower exporting countries include Costa Rica, Mexico, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Malaysia, India, and Thailand with the emerging Chinese industry expected to overtake these countries in the coming years (Early, 2007).

Unlike many nontraditional crops that are grown by individual farmers under contracts with agribusinesses, cut flower production in these countries is controlled directly by domestic or foreign companies and is organized around wage labour, most of which is done by young women. This is because growing flowers is highly capital-intensive with considerable up-front investment costs for greenhouses and chemicals. Developing new varieties also requires extensive industry knowledge (Korovkin, 2003). Smaller farmers lack necessary market linkages and larger farms are better able to meet the demands of major North American and British supermarket chains such as Walmart and Marks and Spencer (Hughes, 2001). Because flowers are highly perishable, production must take place in close proximity to airports so that the product can be quickly transported to international markets, first by freezer van and then by airplane. Trade in cut flowers follows a complex supply chain. Most flowers are sent from the producer or exporter to auction houses in the Netherlands where they are bid on by wholesalers (Bonaventura et al., 2000). Over 20 million flowers per day are sold at auction houses in the Dutch town of Aalsmeer where the industry has its headquarters (CBC News, 2007). Some flowers are purchased directly from the producers by European or North American wholesalers who supply the retailers that ultimately deliver the product to consumers. Low quality products and overripe flowers are not exported but are destined for local markets (Bonaventura et al., 2000).

In the mid-1990s the media and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) generated considerable public concern over cut flower production practices in developing countries by drawing people's attention to such issues as low wages, health and safety risks, environmental degradation, and child labour. These problems were juxtaposed with the luxury and frivolity of flowers and contrasted with the pure intentions of gift-giving. The outcry sent shockwaves through the industry and has forced it to be re-regulated according to ethical standards (Hughes, 2001). Hughes suggests that notions of "governmentality" can help shed light on this movement to more ethical production practices. He defines governmentality in terms of the changing ways we think about governing and the ways this collective thought is made practicable. Governmentality refers not to the distribution of power but to the regimes and organized practices it creates. In the case of cut flowers, two theories of government coexist. As made evident by the extensive trade of flowers globally, the industry is underpinned by neoliberal rationalities that favour competition and free markets. At the same time, however, ideas of business responsibility are emerging and are resulting in the incorporation of rules that are designed to guide the nature of private industry. Public awareness of ethical trading issues has prompted a shift from strictly economic thinking to a focus on the "triple bottom line" which considers the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of trade (Hughes, 2001). This paper will focus specifically on the environmental problems associated with the cut flower industry and then discuss how new ideas about environmental responsibility in business are translating into practice.

As previously mentioned, floriculture requires extensive inputs. Cut flowers can be grown in open fields but are preferably grown in greenhouses, which permit better microclimatic control. Flowers are highly susceptible to pests and diseases and are also extremely perishable (Bonaventura et al., 2000). Additionally, unlike fruits or vegetables, the quality of flowers is principally defined by their cosmetic value, so even small blemishes are not tolerated (Bergman, 2008). For these reasons, massive amounts of chemicals are applied both during cultivation and for post-harvest quality control. Chemicals applied during cultivation include fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, and fumigants – including the potent ozone depleter methyl bromide (Global Pesticide Campaigner, 2002). Post-harvest chemicals consist of nematocides and sterilants, foliar feeds, wetting agents, and acaricides (Bonaventura et al., 2000).

Statistics on chemical use in the global cut flower industry are difficult to obtain. While most

growers are required to register their chemicals, these records are elusive and in countries like Colombia, Ecuador, and Tanzania there is a substantial contraband in agricultural chemicals (Bonaventura et al., 2000; Bergman, 2008). It has been suggested that the application of chemicals during flower cultivation ranges from anywhere between 50 and 1000 times the amount used on vegetables (Bergman, 2008). Even if national regulations were being followed, the legal standards for pesticide use in many developing countries tend to be laxer than in North America and Europe. It is estimated, for example, that 20 per cent of pesticides used in the Colombian flower industry are either banned or severely restricted in the US and Europe (Bergman, 2008). This pesticide use is actually tacitly encouraged by Japanese and American trade regulations because these countries do not inspect for pesticides on imported flowers, as they are not edible. However, because they are considered an agricultural product they must be pest-free upon entry (Global Pesticide Campaigner, 2002). Pressure to fill increasing consumer demand for high quality products, especially during key festivals like Valentine's Day and Mother's Day, also contributes to the intensification of spraying (Hughes, 2001).

Perhaps the reason that this has up until now failed to generate the type of mainstream consumer concern associated with food products is that there is little evidence that the application of chemicals to flowers poses health risks to consumers. Instead, the workers and the natural environment that pay the price. Workers spend many hours at a time in confined spaces with the flowers and it is frequently only the sprayers who are provided with masks and respirators, not the graders and packers who also handle the flowers (Bonaventura et al., 2000). Worldwide, flower workers are complaining of headaches, dermatitis, irritated eyes (including cataracts), pain, and more serious conditions that result from exposure to carcinogens such as respiratory problems and neurological symptoms. Female workers exposed to chemicals have reported difficulty getting pregnant as well as miscarriages and birth defects. Studies conducted by the Canadian-based International Development Research Centre found that two-thirds of Ecuadorian flower workers showed signs of exposure to toxins (Bergman, 2008).

Flower cultivation requires large quantities of water that are usually delivered by drip irrigation systems or overhead sprinklers. If roses go without water for over 24 hours they sometimes need to be replanted, a process that is expensive and time-consuming (Bonaventura et al., 2000). For this reason, flower production usually takes place near bodies of water which can become easily contaminated by pesticide runoff, killing fish and harming other wildlife. In some places, chemicals and contaminated wastes are dumped directly into water sources (Bergman, 2008).

While the impacts of chemicals have garnered far and away the most concern from environmentalists, other negative ecological impacts have been highlighted. Flower cultivation requires large tracts of land that could be used for cultivating food crops. Foreign investors purchase most of the land for flower farms from indigenous farmers and in some cases, new land has to be cleared, destroying wildlife habitat (Bonaventura et al., 2000). In addition to land and water, flower cultivation and trade are energy intensive. When grown for export, flowers travel long distances by plane before reaching the consumer. Refrigeration requirements are impressive and in North America and parts of Europe where flowers are grown for local consumption, greenhouses need to be heated for at least part of the year (Howard, 1999).

This seems like a thorny situation, but producers are beginning to respond to increasing consumer pressure for more sustainable flowers. Like with coffee and produce, labelling has a key role to play in this transition. Both national and international standards systems that help the consumer identify which flowers are grown in environmentally friendly and ethical ways are being developed. These labels usually identify the flowers as either "organic" or "sustainable". Organic flowers are subject to the same criteria as organic foods. Organic certification focusses mainly on environmental practices and requires farming techniques that build rich, fertile soils and uses natural means to combat pests, prohibiting the use of synthetic pesticides.

Sustainable certification is broader than organic certification, encompassing ethical concerns as well as ecological ones. VeriFlora, established in 2004, is the largest "sustainable" label in North America

and includes standards for environmental responsibility, social responsibility, and quality control. VeriFlora's chemical restrictions are less stringent than those for organic certification, allowing the use of certain synthetic pesticides, but include rules about packaging, greenhouse gas emissions, and habitat mitigation that are absent in organic standards. Social responsibility standards include the prohibition of child labour and provisions for adequate wages, training, and medical care for workers. Lastly, quality control includes rules about product freshness and refrigeration. Thus far, VeriFlora has certified eight farms in California, three in Colombia, and eight in Ecuador (Bergman, 2008).

Similar to VeriFlora, The Milieu Project Sierteelt (MPS) is an international body based out of the Netherlands that attempts to maintain and promote the image of the floriculture sector and acts as a "one-window" certification body. Mainly certifying products for European markets, the MPS has several different certifications for environmental responsibility (MPS-A, B, and C), social responsibility (MPS-Socially Qualified), and quality control (MPS, 2008). In addition to these international bodies, some countries have their own nongovernmental national certification. In Kenya, the growers themselves, concerned about consumer criticism, took on the role of industry regulators with the establishment of the Kenya Flower Council, which certifies farms and conducts regular audits (Hughes, 2001).

Unlike with fruits and vegetables, sustainably grown flowers usually cost the same price as their competition. Therefore, the biggest impediment to more sustainable consumption is not a financial one; rather, it results from a lack of awareness on the part of consumers about the issues associated with flower production as well as confusion about the labels. With so many diverse certification bodies with widely varying standards, it is difficult to know which certification to trust (Bergman, 2008). Some national certification systems, such as the Kenya Flower Council's system, closely follow government regulations, which are generally much lower than those of North America and Europe (Hughes, 2001). Steps should therefore be taken to make standards more uniform. VeriFlora, for example, is attempting to have its criteria approved by the American National Standards Institute (Bergman, 2008). Furthermore, considerable improvements must be made in the vein of auditing processes to make farmers and certifying bodies more accountable (Hughes, 2001).

Though certification is far from perfect, this re-regulation of the flower industry is a prime example of how consumer resistance can translate into alternative regimes of governance in the absence of international and national laws. And as Amy Stewart, author of *Flower Power: the Good, the Bad, and the Beautiful in the Business of Flowers* states, "...certification is the future. Life on any kind of certified farm is better than it would be on a noncertified farm" (cited in Bergman, 2008: 52). In the coming years, it is likely that further strides will be made in painting the roses green. After all, while we may not all see eye-to-eye on the merits of Valentine's Day, I think we can all agree that our planet deserves a little more love.

Since the military regime assumed power in 1988, the Burmese government has continued to follow hardline policies on ethnic minorities, crushed all opposition parties, and prohibited free speech (Thurman, 2003: 443). The regime has taken control of virtually every aspect of Burmese society including education, the media, and public expression. To sever public access to information, the SPDC has enforced laws such as the Computer Science and Development Law, which authorizes a jail sentence of up to 12 years for anyone found in possession of an unauthorized modem or for mischievous behaviour (Mowatt, 2003: 133). Other alarming violations are the continued practice of forced conscription of child soldiers, forced labour, and the use of torture and degrading treatment of prisoners (Amnesty International, November 10, 2007). In November 2006, a video posted on the Internet showing the wedding of the daughter of General Than Shwe, leader of the junta, provided fresh evidence of the extreme greed of the Myanmar elite. The wedding was reportedly given fifty million dollars worth of wedding gifts including cars, jewelry, and houses (BBC

¹ The author has chosen to use the term Burma instead of the name Myanmar (official name changed in 1989) as the term "Myanmar" has been deemed to be no more inclusive of the ethnic groups of the country and acknowledges the legitimacy of the SPDC regime.

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Applying Global Governance to Foster Political Reform in Burma by Alex Goddard — fourth year honours international relations

The international community has received the recent peaceful protests in Burma¹ and the subsequent violent response from the Burmese military regime with a mixture of concern, disappointment, and outrage. More than a message to the military junta in power, the protests were a plea to the outside world from an oppressed population who realize that any true reform of the prevailing conditions in Burma will ultimately require the support of forces that lie beyond Burma's borders. This paper explores possibilities of implementing change in the political status quo of Burma from a global governance perspective focussing specifically on the efficacy of economic sanctions and economic organizations, the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the mission of UN envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari. However, before exploring these three matters in detail, a brief overview of modern Burmese history as well as an examination of the current conditions in Burma will aid in constructing an image of the political climate of the country and provide a description of the socio-economic reality of the Burmese citizenry.

Small-scale peaceful protests began in Yangon, the ex-capital and largest city in Burma, the week of August 20, 2007 in reaction to the doubling of the price of fuel (*The Globe and Mail*, August 24, 2007). On September 18, monks joined the protest, the first time ever that the Buddhist clergy had become involved in the opposition movement in Burma. By September 24 there were the largest protests in Burma in 20 years with reports of up 100,000 people and 20,000 monks in the streets of Yangon, as well as large-scale demonstrations in many other locations throughout the country (*The London Times*, September 24, 2007). However, beginning on September 26, the military regime in power — the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) — began to crack down on the protesters using brutality and massive arrests (*The Telegraph*, September 27, 2007). SPDC forces raided monasteries, fired live bullets as well as tear gas at protestors, and assaulted unarmed participants with batons. In the ensuing clampdown, at least 1,000 people are believed to have been arrested in Yangon alone (Amnesty International, October 1, 2007).

The recent protests are more than a reaction to an increase in fuel prices; they are a response to deplorable living conditions that have continued to be forced upon the population of Burma by a brutal and callous junta. Since the military regime assumed sovereignty over the country in 1962 under Ne Win, the Burmese government has continued to follow hardline policies on ethnic minorities, disallowed all opposition parties, and prohibited free speech (Thawngmung 2003: 445). Moreover, the government has taken control of virtually every aspect of Burmese society including education, the media, and public expression. To sever public access to information, the SPDC has enforced laws such as the *Computer Science and Development Law*, which authorizes a jail sentence of up to 15 years for anyone found in possession of an unauthorized modem or fax machine (Brooten, 2005: 135). Other alarming indications are the continued practice of forced conscription of child soldiers, forced labour, and the use of torture and degrading treatment of prisoners. (Amnesty International, November 10, 2007). In November 2006, a video posted on the Internet showing the wedding of the daughter of General Than Shwe, leader of the junta, provided fresh evidence of the extreme greed of the Burmese elite. The newly-weds were reportedly given fifty million dollars worth of wedding gifts including cars, jewelry, and houses (BBC

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News Online, November 2, 2006). In 2007, Transparency International ranked the SPDC as tied with the Somali government as the most corrupt government in the world (Transparency International, 2007).

There was little outside interest in Burma until 1988 when the country captured international attention with huge student-led protests, unforgiving military repression, and the emergence of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi as the leader of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) (Guan, 2007: 121). Remarkably, in the wake of the 1988 protests, the junta permitted democratic national elections to be scheduled for 1990. However when the time for elections arrived, Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest and forbidden from running for office (Brooten, 2005: 138). Yet despite such measures and tight restrictions on its campaigning the NLD won 392 of the 485 seats in the election, compared to only 10 seats won by the military regime. The junta, however, had no intention of surrendering its power and declared that it would not talk to the NLD, was not bound by any constitution, and would continue to rule under martial law (Silverstein 1996, 89). Since the disappointing 1990 elections there have been no significant concessions granted by the government and no successful reconciliation talks have taken place. Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest, having spent 12 of her last 18 years in confinement. Today, she is the only Nobel Peace Prize laureate who remains incarcerated (Aljazeera Online, November 11, 2007).

When confronted with a rogue state, governments and global governance bodies have a history of employing economic sanctions as a way of attempting to induce reform. In May of 2002, Aung San Suu Kyi reasserted, "I don't think we have found evidence that sanctions have harmed the Burmese people... Sanctions have a role to play because they are a strong political message. But also because they are an economic message" (Burma Campaign, August 23, 2004). Following Suu Kyi's requests the United States government passed the *Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act* in 2003, which bans the importation of all Burmese goods and prohibits the exporting of financial services, loans, and transfers to Burma, essentially cutting off all economic ties to the country (Rarick 2006: 61). The Canadian government took a similar stance on November 14, 2007, stating it would "impose the toughest sanctions in the world" on Burma, involving a ban on all exports and imports except humanitarian aid, a freeze on all assets of Burmese citizens connected to the junta, and a ban on investment in the country. However, the decision is largely a symbolic one as trade flows between Canada and Burma sank from \$46.8 million in 2002 to \$8.6 million in 2006 (*Reuters*, November 14, 2007).

The European Union (EU) has taken an alternative approach, opting to employ targeted sanctions focussed on industries where the regime benefits almost exclusively. On September 25, a policy statement by the EU called for a ban on exports, imports, and investment in Burmese logging, mining, minerals, and precious and semiprecious stone industries (EU Conclusions, October 15, 2007).

In April of 2005, Singapore's foreign minister reaffirmed that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) cannot interfere in the domestic affairs of Burma, stating that whatever steps the country takes it will be the Burmese themselves who bear the consequences (Emmerson, 2005: 177). However, ASEAN has recently moved away from its posture of "constructive engagement" (non-intervention). It has expressed its "revulsion" with the current situation in Burma and it called upon the military regime to expedite its process of democratization and the release of political detainees (Kinley and Wilson, 2007: 401). Beyond mere reprimands, there exists opportunity for ASEAN to play a role in fostering reconciliation in Burma not unlike the role ASEAN played in the reconciliation process that took place in Cambodia in the early 1980s.

To foster rapprochement between Cambodia's political parties, ASEAN proposed a comprehensive political settlement before the 34th UN General Assembly in 1979 and gained overwhelming support from UN members (Soon, 1982: 548). With enough encouragement, ASEAN may foment a similar initiative to address the crisis in Burma. Indeed, if any economic pressure is to be put on the SPDC it is essential that nations and organizations that are highly integrated in the Burmese economy, such as ASEAN, play a role.

Despite Suu Kyi's call for economic sanctions, critics have questioned this policy. When asked whether sanctions were an appropriate option Razali Ismail, UN envoy to Burma until 2006, responded "No, No, No... if you go to Myanmar you'll see sanctions hurt the wrong people." (Kinley and Wilson,

2007: 402). Probing the efficacy of economic sanctions, research by the Institute for International Economics concluded that in less than 20 per cent of cases do economic sanctions achieve their stated aims (Lukas and Griswold, 2003). Moreover, initiatives to stifle the economic base of the regime are particularly unattractive in the case of Burma due the fact that the country's neighbours have demonstrated strong reluctance to impose sanctions. Resource-hungry states in the region such as China, India, and Thailand have proven themselves eager to fill the void created by the sanctions enforced by other states (Steinberg, 2004). Furthermore, harsh economic sanctions may result in making the regime more desperate and being driven further away from the international community and the UN. Critics have argued that economic isolation has inadvertently strengthened Burmese-Chinese relations to a degree that is worrying (Guan, 2001: 478). In part it is hoped that economic sanctions will shame a regime into reform, however the SPDC inherently lacks most forms of legitimacy and is unlikely to be receptive to any efforts at damaging the regime's "face."

Initiatives of complete economic isolation that attempt to cut off all economic ties to the country may only succeed in deteriorating the quality of life of the average Burmese citizen, the very people such sanctions are intended to help (Major and McGann, 2005). However, bold economic gestures like the sanctions enacted by Canada and the United States may be helpful as an impetus for more important players — such as China — to consider reforming their relationship with the SPDC. In efforts to specifically cut away the regime's power base while minimizing the harm to the citizens of Burma, it appears a more effective approach is the use of targeted sanctions such as those adopted by the EU. By focussing specifically on industries where the government is the sole beneficiary — such as timber, precious metals, minerals, precious stones, and especially oil and natural gas — the repercussions incurred by the average citizen are somewhat decreased. As stated earlier, underlying any potentially successful employment of economic sanctions must be international cooperation and cohesive global governance that succeeds in getting all significant parties on board. As long as states, particularly Asian states such as China, refuse to put pressure on the regime and continue to do business with the junta, there will be a market for the SPDC, making it possible for the regime to maintain its economic foundation.

The crisis in Burma has repeatedly been brought before the UNSC, yet to date no binding resolution has been passed. In January of 2007 the UNSC failed to pass a resolution condemning the SPDC due to vetoes exercised by China and Russia, who claimed that the "matter was an internal affair of a sovereign state and did not pose a threat to international or regional peace and security." The most recent resolution would have called on the SPDC to cease military attacks and begin a substantive political dialogue leading towards a genuine democratic transition (UNSC Resolution 8939).

To comprehend the UNSC deadlock it is essential to examine the vested interests, both economic and political, of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In recent years, the Russian arms industry has enjoyed a lucrative business relationship with the SPDC. Russia exported 100 large caliber artillery systems to Burma in 2006, 10 combat aircraft in 2002, and four combat aircraft in 2001 (Amnesty International, November 10, 2007). China has also sold military supplies to the SPDC, and since 1988 has been the Burmese government's greatest military ally. The PRC has provided munitions at a "friendship" price; signed an agreement with Yangon to train Burma's air force and naval officers; and engaged in military cooperation, training, and the exchange of intelligence. To further complicate matters, China has regularly declined to report arms transfers to the UN (Thawngmung, 2003: 448). Aside from military transactions, in the wake of economic sanctions Chinese firms have eagerly moved in to fill the void, tapping into Burma's rich supply of natural resources. Currently more than 26 Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) are involved in more than 62 hydropower, oil and natural gas, and mining projects in Burma, from small dams to a dual oil and gas pipeline traversing Burma to Yunnan province in Southwest China (Earthrights International, September 2007).

Aside from Russia and China's economic ties to the SPDC, these two states are also reluctant to allow any UNSC resolution to be passed that would permit outside intervention in the domestic affairs of any sovereign state. Wary of the possible implications of international intervention into their own questionable domestic practices, China and Russia fear that setting such a precedent could come back to haunt them in the future. This hesitance on the part of Russia and China characterizes a recurrent paradox

of the UN Charter, whereby Article 1.3 calls for international cooperation in solving international problems of a humanitarian character, yet Article 2.7 holds that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" (UN Charter, 1945).

Some critics have called for the Security Council to pass a binding resolution that forces the SPDC to enter negotiations. Other critics such as Amnesty International have called on the UNSC to impose a comprehensive and mandatory arms embargo on Burma, and called on China and Russia to suspend all arms supplies to the SPDC (Amnesty International, November 10, 2007). Getting Russia and China onboard is a fundamental stepping-stone in ensuring a unified international approach and fluid UNSC functioning. In particular, due to its predominant relationship with the SPDC, any concrete steps forward must involve China's decision to support the UN and not the generals. Fortunately with the 2008 Olympics in Beijing looming on the horizon there are indications that the Chinese may become more co-operative. They have recently taken a tougher stand with North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe and may be persuaded to harden their position towards Burma (*The London Times*, September 29, 2007).

A third facet of global governance that has confronted the crisis in Burma is the recent mission of UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari, who visited Burma on two occasions from September 29 to October 2 and from November 3 to November 8. The principle goal of Gambari's visits has been to foster communication between the opposition parties and the SPDC. Gambari emphasized that dialogue is "the only way forward to address the country's ongoing crisis" (UN News Centre, November 13, 2007). Among the successes of this initiative was that for the first time since she was last put under house arrest in May 2003, Suu Kyi was allowed to pronounce herself publicly through a statement read by Gambari on November 8. Moreover, Suu Kyi was also permitted for the first time in four years to meet with other members of the NLD (UN News Centre, November 13, 2007). Other apparent triumphs of the Gambari visit included the lifting of curfews put in place during the demonstrations, the withdrawal of a visible military presence from the streets, and the release of over 2,700 people detained during the course of the protests (UN News Centre, November 13, 2007). In addition the SPDC has set up a constitutional drafting committee; has agreed to receive the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro; and has appointed deputy labour minister Aung Kyi to serve as the government's liaison with Suu Kyi (UN News Centre, November 13, 2007).

However, critics and residents have been divided over whether the results of Gambari's visits represent a step towards real change in Burma, or whether the concessions made by the junta are no more than a move by the military leaders to appease the international community and limit the damaging effects of economic sanctions. The fact that to date Than Shwe has refused to meet with Gambari or Suu Kyi is one strong indication that the junta is not serious about the UN mission or the reconciliation process. Moreover, the SPDC has yet to provide any assurance that it will lift restrictions on Suu Kyi (UN News Centre, November 13, 2007). Critics have also argued that the junta has made no substantive progress towards reversing the crackdown of the past two months and that it is essential that the Chinese, Indian, and Russian governments publicly back Gambari if the mission is to make any real progress on human rights in Burma (Human Rights Watch, November 2, 2007). Another discouraging indication is the SPDC's recent call for UN Resident Coordinator Charles Petrie to discontinue his work in Burma, accusing him of misrepresenting facts in his criticism of the country's deepening economic crisis. In response, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed "full confidence" in Petrie and his team and expressed his "disappointment" with the regime's decision (UN News Centre, November 16, 2007).

In regards to democratic reforms, the Burmese generals remember their loss in the 1990 free elections and as such are most likely very closed to the idea of another round of elections (Reynolds et al., 2001: 99). Therefore, the most appropriate remedy may not involve democratic elections and calls for a sweeping change of the status quo, highly likely to be shot down by the junta, but rather a more gradual process of reform to certain areas of Burmese politics and society. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that in some cases a process of "liberalization" is more suitable than a process of 'democratization.' Liberalization may entail "less censorship of the media... greater space for autonomous working class activities... the releasing of most political prisoners... and most important, the toleration of opposition"

(Linz and Stepan, 1996: 74). Democratization denotes much more profound changes, requiring "open contestation over the right to win control of the government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, the results which determine who governs" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 74).

Furthermore, it is essential that any reconciliation initiative integrate not only the SPDC and NLD, but also all significant ethnic groups in the country. While Burma has a large variety of ethnic groups, Bamar is the majority constituting approximately 65 per cent of the population and from which the current leadership is drawn. Burma has been afflicted by both horizontal and vertical conflict; not only do the people of Burma distrust the junta, but often the ethnic groups distrust each other as well. Democratic elections may eliminate the problem of the SPDC, but cannot in and of themselves nullify the multinational predicament (Reynolds et al., 2001: 101). Any approach to transform Burma from a weak to a strong state requires an understanding of the root cause of the internal, ethnic conflict in Burma and a suitable program catered to address these tensions (Guan, Ang Cheng, 2007: 133).

Appropriate global governance initiatives may succeed in bringing about positive reforms to the status quo in Burma. Some critics have deemed total economic sanctions unfavourable as they are likely to result in deteriorated living conditions of the citizens of Burma. If economic pressure is to be put on the junta, targeted economic sanctions may be efficacious but may also inadvertently drive the regime further away from the international community and into closer dependency on regional powers such as China. Underlying the successful application of any economic pressure is the necessity to get all significant players, particularly regional states, ASEAN, and China, onboard. So long as there are key economic actors that resist change the SPDC likely will maintain its economic base.

The UNSC has been deadlocked over the Burma issue due to vetoes executed by Russia and China, both of which have economic and political incentives to block intervention. Both states have enjoyed lucrative military deals with the SPDC and Chinese firms currently have significant investments in Burma's natural resource industries. Moreover, Russia and China are hesitant to pass binding resolutions that permit intervention into any state's sovereign affairs, wary that this precedent may be used in the future to merit intervention into their own domestic politics. Although no binding resolution has been passed to date, with the upcoming Olympics and with adequate pressure perhaps the PRC may be swayed to change its posture towards the SPDC and offer its support to the UN instead. The cooperation of China and Russia is a fundamental requisite for any UNSC progress on the Burma issue. Gambari's UN-sponsored mission to foster dialogue between the SPDC and opposition parties has been minimally successful. The SPDC has restored some conditions that existed prior to the clampdown in late September and has granted some minor concessions to the opposition. However, as Than Shwe has yet to meet with Gambari or Aug San Suu Kyi, the government has provided little indication that it is serious about reconciliation. Essential to a reform process is the integration of all significant groups. Moreover, to foment long-standing peaceful political reforms in Burma it is essential to appease not only the SPDC and NLD, but also to foster cooperation between all the significant ethnic groups in the country, which constitute over 30 per cent of Burma's population.

A process of liberalization may be more efficacious than a process of complete democratization; as such drastic changes have proven to be anathema to the junta and are unlikely to pass. Essentially, so long as the SPDC regime maintains power it appears that one of the most feasible avenues to pursue involves working towards smaller substantive goals, as opposed to a robust challenge to the regime's power. Such measures of gradual liberalization could include more open media access for Burmese citizens, the freeing of political prisoners, and most importantly, the toleration of political opposition. However, underlying all such initiatives is the necessary presence of legitimate outside observers in Burma, ideally from foreign institutions such as the UN. There must be access to indisputable evidence proving that measures agreed upon are actually being acted upon as promised by the Burmese government. A review of the history of Burma since independence demonstrates that if left to its own devices, it is likely that little substantial progress will take place. Any positive shifts in the status quo will ultimately require the help and continued support of foreign players.

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Belated Help? The United Nations' Transitional Authority in Cambodia's Ambiguous Contribution of Peace and Democracy by Christopher Durrant, third year honours international relations

Much could be made of the failure of the United Nations (UN) to mitigate any of the tragedies that occurred in Cambodia during the Cold War. The incursions of North Vietnamese troops into the country, the subsequent aerial bombings by the American military, the "killing fields" of the Khmer Rouge, and the Vietnamese invasion of the country all rank as events that violate the norms of international security — norms the UN ideally is supposed to protect. The failure however, may be fairly easily explained. Cambodia² was jostled between the competing interests of the Soviets, the Americans, and the Chinese, all holding veto powers on the UN Security Council (UNSC) with the Soviets providing support for the Vietnamese invasion, and China supporting the Khmer Rouge in the conflict because Vietnam was a Soviet ally, speaks to Cambodia's role as a playground for Cold War politics. This sad period when concerns of ideology were given more priority than the situation of Cambodian people came to an end with the Cold War. With Mikhail Gorbachev's new approach to Soviet foreign policy, the deadlock at the UN ended and 14 major peacebuilding missions were launched between 1989 and 1999 (Paris, 2004: 3). Among these were the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-1993 and its predecessor the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which served as a fact-finding mission from 1991 until the beginning of UNTAC.

In discussions of the UN peacekeeping record, UNTAC is frequently overshadowed by the disastrous peacemaking experiences of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) and United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda's (UNAMIR) inability to prevent genocide. It begs the question; have discussions of UN peacekeeping not focussed on UNTAC because it was a success? Or was it simply an unspectacular failure? To understand UNTAC's seeming absence in the popular peacekeeping discourse, it is critical to understand the mission's results. Key among the criteria to judge UNTAC is whether it was able to do more for the security of the Cambodian people than it was able to do during the Cold War. Considering the fact that a large portion of the mission was devoted to the organization of elections, it is not obvious how the mission related to security. The two come into relation because there was a belief that democracy could produce peace. "Peace-building missions in the 1990s reproduced Wilson's faith in the peace-building powers of liberalization" (Paris 2004: 7). It is with this in mind that we try to appraise UNTAC's contributions to both goals of security and democracy in Cambodia. Only after these issues have been settled can UNTAC's absence from the majority of the discourse on peacekeeping be addressed.

The structure of this examination is as follows. Sections I and II deal with the initial situation in Cambodia and UNTAC's mandate. Section III deals with UNTAC's successes and failure in the security issues of disarmament, refugee repatriation, and de-mining. Section IV covers UNTAC's role in supervising Cambodia's 1993 election, Section V consists of conclusions on UNTAC's interconnected legacies of peace and security legacy in Cambodia, and finally, section VI takes section V's conclusions and speculates on how they improve understanding UNTAC's minimal role in the peacekeeping discourse.

² I will be using the name Cambodia as the general name of the country for the purposes of this essay. Variations on the name such as Democratic Kampuchea will only be used when making reference to the particular regime.

I. The Paris Peace Process

Throughout the 1980s, various attempts had been made towards peace in Cambodia, through the efforts of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN); often, however, there was an inability to reach an agreement even between the anti-Vietnamese factions of the Khmer Rouge; Prince Norodom Sihanouk's royalist party, the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (is usually referred to by its French acronym FUNCINPEC); and former prime minister Son Sann's Khmer People's Liberation Front (Mayall, 1996: 31). The power balance in the country changed, however, when in April 1989, the Vietnamese government announced that it would begin to withdraw its troops from Cambodia. This was a decision based on Gorbachev's apparent lack of interest in supporting Soviet allies in regional conflicts and Vietnam's desire to present itself better on the international stage so as to further trade relations (Mayall, 1996: 31-2). This left the government of People's Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) still insisting on its legitimacy, while the three anti-Vietnamese parties looked to regain control.

To the international community, the three anti-Vietnamese parties looked more like "an incipient civil war than a government in waiting" (Mayall, 1996: 31). With the obvious power vacuum, Secretary-General of the UN, Perez de Cullar, convened an international conference in Paris, co-chaired by France and Indonesia, to work on a power-sharing arrangement in Cambodia. Beginning in 1989, the talks in Paris continued intermittently until October 23, 1991. The repeated breakdowns of the talks involved disagreements regarding the future of the Khmer Rouge (the PDK wanted a provision barring the return to power of the Khmer Rouge) (Mayall, 1996: 34) and the status of the then current-government of the PDK. Eventually, the Supreme National Council (SNC) was created, a body that was intended to embody Cambodian sovereignty, chaired by Norodom Sihanouk, and including members from all factions including the Khmer Rouge. The SNC assumed Cambodia's seat at the UN and was to be the body with which UNTAC was to communicate. On October 23, 1991, it was the SNC that signed the *Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict*.

II. The Peace Agreement and UNTAC's Mandate

In attendance at the Paris peace conferences were all five of the permanent members of the UNSC, which had officially encouraged the talks by resolution in 1990. The Security Council's support and attendance at the conference made it possible for the Paris peace agreement to presuppose a UN mission in Cambodia. UNTAC was already named in the agreement, and on October 16, the Security Council passed resolution 717 to establish the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) in anticipation of the forthcoming peace agreement. It is the Paris Peace Agreement, therefore, that lays down UNTAC's mandate.

The first Annex of the Agreement states, "UNTAC will exercise the powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement, including those relating... to elections" (Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, 1991). UNTAC seems to be generally remembered as a UN mission to ensure free-elections, however it seems that it was also responsible for all aspects of the peace agreement. This gave UNTAC a wide range of responsibilities. Section IV of the agreement stipulates a total withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Cambodia. The agreement's second annex makes clear that all military forces are to be cantoned under the supervision of UNTAC as part of a cease-fire. Part V implies that all Cambodian refugees are to be settled back in the country and Part III says that all Cambodians are to "enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, 1991). With all these responsibilities, plus the oversight of elections and various other tasks including training Cambodian volunteers in de-mining and complying with SNC advice (as stimulated in the first annex), UNTAC certainly had a full plate. In addition to all the duties set out by the Agreement, the Security Council resolution that authorized UNTAC did not just clarify the reason why the mission was being undertaken (to produce "a just and durable settlement to the Cambodian conflict") but it also added a condition to UNTAC's mission: the election and the mission had to be completed within 18 months (Resolution 745, 28 February 1992).

The large amount of duties assigned to UNTAC were matched with a large amount of resources. At its peak, the mission had 22,000 military and civilian personnel and cost 1.6 billion dollars (Chesterman, 2004: 73). In addition, it was not without power inside the country. The peace agreement signed by all members of the SNC agreed "that all administrative agencies, bodies, and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security, and information will be placed under the direct control of UNTAC" (Annex 1, Section B). As Michael Doyle writes "[n]ot since the colonial era and the post-colonial era World War Two Allied occupations of Germany and Japan had a foreign presence held so much formal administrative jurisdiction over the civilian function of an independent country" (Paris, 2004: 82).

III. Successes and Failures in UNTAC's Security Related Duties

In 1991, Cambodia had been through a 15-year period of "civil war and extraordinary levels of internal violence" (Greenhill, 2006: 28). It is not absurd, therefore, to suggest that when the Paris Peace Agreement was signed by all four groups possessing militaries, that they might have been sincere in their promise to submit their forces to cantonment, motivated by either the desire for peace or sheer exhaustion. It soon became apparent that neither was the case. In July 1992, only seven months after the start of UNTAC's mission, the Khmer Rouge was refusing to let UNTAC into their areas and they would not provide it with estimates of their troop numbers (Mayall, 1996: 42). The other factions also seemed hesitant, cantoning troops that were mainly teenagers with derelict weapons (Paris, 2004: 84). Despite the timetable goal of having 70 per cent of all armies cantoned by September 1992, only 55,000 troops in total were cantoned under UNTAC (Mayall, 1996: 43). Estimates of the total amount of military personnel belonging to all the factions ranges from 100,000 (at the lowest) to 200,000 which in either case, does not seem to indicate a fantastic success (Greenhill 2006: 29; Mayall, 1996:43). In the end, UNTAC abandoned its cantonment mission and released the few soldiers it had cantoned for agricultural leave.

UNTAC failed in this portion of its mandate, and there is little surprise why. The UN's role was to be a neutral overseer of a cantonment process agreed upon by all four parties in the Paris Peace Agreement. The UN was clear on the fact that UNTAC "could only solve problems through dialogue, persuasion, negotiation, and diplomacy" (Mayall, 1996: 37). Trying to enforce the cantonment process by force would have undoubtedly changed the character of the mission. In the approach UNTAC did take, it was at least able to maintain a degree of peace. UNTAC sustained a total of 82 fatalities during the mission (UN, 2003: untac.htm) and there was a decrease, but far from an end, to fighting between the factions.

In contrast to the containment process, UNTAC was highly successful in its efforts to repatriate refugees living in Thailand; of the 360,000 that had been identified in Thailand, 96 per cent had been repatriated and settled in Cambodia by 1993 (Mayhall, 1996: 42). The Khmer Rouge were helpful in this process, allowing UN officials into their base areas (Myhall, 1996: 41). While at first this cooperation may seem bizarre, it is well explained by the Khmer Rouge's ethnocentric point of view. The Khmer Rouge repeatedly demanded that UNTAC force all Vietnamese to leave the country, which included any ethnic Vietnamese who were Cambodian citizens (Greenhill, 2006: 31). A major source of the violence perpetrated during UNTAC's presence in the country was by the Khmer Rouge towards ethnic Vietnamese.

The pattern emerging is that UNTAC appeared to be successful when other actors involved wanted them to be. By all indications, the Vietnamese troops withdrew from the country according to plan; however, it may be that this had much more to do with the Vietnamese government's willingness than UNTAC's presence. UNTAC lacked tracking tactics and the ability to monitor movement across borders because of the dense Cambodian jungles, which led to an inability to monitor locations of Khmer Rouge or Vietnamese troops (Mayhall, 1996: 48).

Discouragingly, one of UNTAC's failures that cannot be blamed on anyone except its own organization is its failure to significantly de-mine the country. The estimate is that UNTAC's small de-mining team removed 15,000 of the country's eight to ten million mines during the mission (Mayhall,

1996: 48). While a complete de-mining of Cambodia in UNTAC's 18-month mandate would have been nearly impossible, it seems questionable why UNTAC brought such a small de-mining team to a country with such a large amount of mines. It was a failure on multiple levels, because it also undermined and impeded the work of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inside the country. It is quite telling of the UN's sluggishness to adapt to local factors that it was only in January 1992, a month before the commencement of UNTAC, that UNAMIC's mandate was expanded by the Security Council to include training in mine clearance (Mayall, 1996: 130).

IV. Free and Fair? UNTAC and the 1993 Cambodian Election

Though UNTAC's success in other areas of the mission appear to be shaky, it is for the running of election process, on schedule, that UNTAC is remembered best. This is the reason why inside the UN, the mission is remembered as a partial success (Chesterman, 2004: 224). Considering the record in Somalia and Rwanda, it might be easy to see why the UN would be able to take a favourable view towards the Cambodian mission based on the fact that nothing dramatic happened; yet in terms of the elections supervised, it was hardly a success.

The Paris Peace Agreement says several times, most notably in Part 2, Article 12, that the elections are to be "free and fair" (Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, 1991). This was not the case. One of the main reasons for this was UNTAC's inability to take administrative control from the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which was merely the electoral name of the party that had ruled the PDK. Despite having the unprecedented power over the administration of the country, as deemed necessary in the Paris Peace Agreement for holding a fair election, UNTAC was incapable of actually doing so. This was largely due to a lack of knowledge of the local culture and the Khmer language (Mayall, 1996: 44), and led to situations where UN officials had to rely on briefings on the activities of ministries as provided by the same ministries. For better or worse, this caused the Khmer Rouge to leave the election process, because they had thought that it was agreed UNTAC was going to dismantle government institutions, even ones related to facilitating daily life, if they were controlled by the CPP (Greenhill, 2006: 30).

As unreasonable as the Khmer Rouge demands may have appeared, it seems "the CPP continued to hold all positions of administrative power within Cambodia" and that they used any advantage they could derive from them in the election (Greenhill, 2006: 33). It should also be noted that the CPP did not stop at administrative meddling; they targeted the other parties and their supporters with violence. In the 10 weeks prior to the election, the CPP and the Khmer Rouge are thought to be the primary perpetrators of the acts of political violence, which totaled 176 deaths, 316 injuries and 67 abductions (Paris, 2004: 85). As repugnant as their actions were, the Khmer Rouge targeted mainly ethnic Vietnamese and were not trying to influence the outcomes of the election, where as the CPP "violat(ed) both the letter and the spirit of the Paris agreements...and murdered activists and voters for the other parties" (Greenhill, 2006: 34).

Despite these flaws in the process, during the planned time span of May 23 to May 27 in 1993, the elections took place in relative peace. Critics of UNTAC admit that the election themselves were conducted fairly (Greenhill, 2006: 34) and there was encouraging 89 per cent voter turnout. (Mayall, 2006: 55). The results were that FUNCINPEC (led by Prince Ranariddh, who had served as leader since Sihanouk had stepped down to play a more neutral role as the leader of the SNC) won an unexpected 45 per cent of the vote, with the CPP winning 38 per cent. Once it learned the unfavourable results, the CPP did what it could to undermine the election. The first incident involved the CPP supporting Prince Chakrapong (half-brother of Prince Ranariddh) in leading a secessionist attempt in the eastern part of the country. Though this attempt had little basis in any real social cleavage and had fizzled by mid-June, it provided exactly what the CPP wanted: pressure on UNTAC and FUNCINPEC to include it in government (Mayall, 1996: 56). Prince Sihanouk quickly constructed an agreement for an interim government where he would serve as head of state and both Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen (long time

leader of the CPP) would be co-prime ministers. Most notably he arranged this agreement without consulting his son, Prince Ranariddh.

Considering FUNCINPEC would have had more than 50 per cent of the seats in the assembly with a coalition with the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, the deal with Hun Sen was not obvious. It was never agreed that power sharing among major players would continue after the end of the transition period. The Paris Peace Agreements only set out specifications that the new Cambodian constitution would have to provide for the protection for human rights, the creation of a mode of government along the lines of a liberal democracy, and that it would have to be passed by a vote of two-thirds in favour. Nowhere did it specify anything about first and second prime ministers, or dividing ministerial posts between the two largest parties. There was much debate in the international community about whether this was a fair interpretation of the will of the Cambodian people or not (McCargo, 2005: 100). UNTAC allowed the assembly to be formed with the dual-prime minister system, and in September, after the passage of a new constitution, declared the mission finished.

V. Conclusion UNTAC's Legacy of Peace and Democracy in Cambodia

The question of whether UNTAC's presence in Cambodia had a lasting effect of improving peace and democracy in the country is a complicated one. The idea that democracy can lead to a reduction in violent conflict is an interesting one, but democracy in Cambodia is fraught with issues. Firstly, it has been suggested that UNTAC and the UN have done more harm than good in declaring the success of the 1993 Cambodian elections. "The successes of the 1993 election ... were more technical than substantive, for FUNCINPEC's victory led to no real transfer of power" (McCargo, 2005: 99). Cambodia has been described as "an electoral authoritarian regime with pseudo-democratic elements" (McCargo, 2005:106). John Sanderson, the head of the military division of UNTAC, has said that in holding elections in the manner introduced by UNTAC — elections that are technically correct but neither free nor fair — the ruling group in Cambodia has received "considerable undeserved support from the international community (and) its hand has...been strengthened" (1998).

There are some voices that support the notion that the cause of liberal democracy in Cambodia has been advanced by UNTAC. Simon Chesterman writes,

[i]f one takes the view Hun Sen...was always going to be the dominant political force in Cambodia, and that the purpose of the mission was to mollify the exercise of that power through introducing the language of human rights to Cambodian civil society, fostering the establishment of a relatively free press, and taking steps in the direction of a democratic basis for legitimate government, the mission was indeed a partial success (2004: 224).

Chesterman appears to be correct in his assertions. Freedom House reports that "many civil society groups operate in Cambodia, work[ing] on a broad spectrum of issues" including human rights (2007). However, it should be noted that in 2007, Cambodia received a six for political rights and a five for civil liberties (with seven being the lowest score in both categories) meaning it receives the "not free" designation (Freedom House, 2007). Undoubtedly, civil society is essential for democratic change; however, there is little signal that the Cambodian leadership is feeling the right kind of pressure. Many make the case that post-UNTAC, Cambodian politics did not experience any pathological change (Paris, 2004: 88). In some ways, things appear to be worse. Hun Sen remains the leader of the CPP, and until 2006, Prince Ranariddh was the head of FUNCINPEC. Both parties are described as being "post-ideological" in that they only strive for power and wealth, and FUNCINPEC has served as a uncritical coalition partner with the CPP (McCargo, 2005: 99). Sam Rainsy (head of the Sam Rainsy Party) is "the only significant opposition figure" and he faces harassment from the other parties" (McCargo, 2005: 99).

Despite the feebleness of Cambodia's democracy, some suggest that there is evidence to support the idea that holding the elections helped reduce violence. Though the Khmer Rouge continued violence after the elections (though oddly, not during), their "decision to abandon the democratic process resulted in a gradual unraveling of the organization, which eventually led to the KR's effective dissolution by

1997" (Greenhill, 2006: 31). However, the author who makes that claim also points out the Khmer Rouge "never politically recovered from domestic reaction to the abuses it perpetrated" and that it was "financially hobbled" because it was no longer receiving military or financial support from China or Thailand (Greenhill, 2006: 32-33).

If the Khmer Rouge had other factors in its demise, and the current political parties use violence and intimidation, has Cambodian democracy contributed to the security of the Cambodian people? The answer is, slightly. With the Khmer Rouge's increasing weakness and irrelevance, Cambodia post-UNTAC went from a country where "election-related violence could have easily escalated into renewed civil war" to a country where "the CPP is now indisputably hegemonic" (Paris, 2004: 86; McCargo, 2005: 106). As UNTAC failed in its mission to disarm the Cambodian factions, one can imagine that FUNCINPEC and other groups had the choice to continue fighting. However, with the CPP controlling the largest amount of forces (over 100,000 by the end of the UNTAC mission), taking the battle to the political arena must have seemed like the best choice for other parties (Greenhill, 2006: 35). And, with the CPP still firmly in control of the state administrative structure, elections are neither free nor fair. In the end, it is hardly surprising that FUNCINPEC is devoid of any real oppositional zeal. If the CPP did not have hegemonic control however, and if there was real political pluralism in the country, it may well have resulted in renewed civil war. Democracy's potential for peace building is hardly backed up by the Cambodian example, though perhaps this is because of fortunate circumstances, meaning this idea is not completely disproved either. At best, however, it seems the introduction of electoral structures in Cambodia has meant that violence is now constrained to the people who participate in these elections at a level beyond voting. In the end, there is little surprise as to why Cambodia has been cited as one of the reasons why the UN shifted from an emphasis on democracy in the early 1990s to good governance in the current decade (Chesterman, 2004: 225).

VI: Conclusions on UNTAC's Role in the Peacekeeping Discourse

UNTAC can be said to have had success in Cambodia, but not in any sort of ideal way. Sent to oversee a peace agreement when parties like the Khmer Rouge broke the terms of agreement, UNTAC took only diplomatic action. When UNTAC was unable to get the administrative control of the country away from the CPP, the former let the CPP continue to run the country. Taking a more aggressive stance in either case, even had they had the resources to do so, would have likely ended in a violent and protracted mission. In terms of its humanitarian role, the sluggishness of de-mining the country alone is a good indication that the mission did not fulfill its potential. In the end, UNTAC conducted itself in the classic peacekeeping style, fulfilling only the roles all parties in the conflict would allow it to fill. Having presided over a shift in Cambodian politics from civil war to a generally peaceful authoritarian regime is the UNTAC legacy — they did not make the relative peace, but rather facilitated it. If UNISOM II is an example of the disasters that can result from peacemaking, UNTAC is an example of the uninspiring positive results that a classical peacekeeping mission can yield. There is little wonder then, why UNTAC crops so little in the peacekeeping discourse despite being considered a flagship UN mission at the time. Its lack of major disasters and its superficial and coincidental successes make it an ineffective stick with which critics can beat the UN. Yet at the same time, the fact that UNTAC helped facilitate CPP's dominance in the country makes it a poor example for the champions of the idea that the UN can help bring democracy or even remain neutral in a conflict. The fact that UNTAC's mission does not easily lend itself to any broad opinions on peacekeeping operations should not discourage its study. UNTAC's experiences contain many lessons on the possibilities and limitations inherent in peacekeeping operations.

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Cinema and the Indian Diaspora: Tradition, Identity, and Conflict Through the Films of Gurinder Chada by Anne Herteis

— fourth year English and anthropology

The study of diaspora is becoming increasingly important as the world's populations are moving between countries as never before. The ease of travel and communication, combined with an increasingly global economy, have changed the nature of international movement including economic, educational, and forced migration. As one of the world's most populous countries, India also has one of the world's largest and most widely spread diasporas. Its British colonial history and years of indentured labour throughout the empire spread the Indian population across the world centuries ago. Today, these global Indian populations have become settled diaspora communities, which continue to draw immigrants from India to partake in different opportunities from those available in the homeland. One of the oldest and most well settled diaspora communities is the Indian population in Britain. This group has created a place for itself in British society and is now an important force in British culture.

While a fixture in British popular culture for decades already, Britain's Indian diaspora is beginning to assert its place in the mainstream entertainment by producing its own media. One of the most well known filmmakers of the Indian diaspora is Gurinder Chadha, whose two mainstream films *Bhaji on the Beach* (1993) and *Bend it like Beckham* (2002) gained international attention from not only the Indian community, but from audiences around the world. Her work, while fictionalized and light-hearted, is a valuable study of life as a woman in the Indian diaspora, the conflicts of hybrid identity, and the challenges of being a second or third generation member of Britain's Indian community. By critically reading Chadha's films through the viewpoint of diaspora theory and cultural studies, it is possible to understand not only the experiences of Indian women in Britain, but the methods and motivations behind diaspora pop-culture.

The notion of diaspora has changed considerably over recent years. Stemming from the Greek *speiro*, "to sow" and *dia*, "over," the term originally referred only to the Jewish and Greek populations forced from their traditional homelands (Sheffer, 2003: 9). The scope of the concept has grown, however, with the growth of international migration and enclaves of distinct national and ethnic groups in countries other than their homelands. The Indian diaspora in particular has a long and diverse history. Because of Britain's colonial presence in India, South Asians have been visiting the British Isles since 1720. In the late 19th century, Indians began coming to Britain to study British business practices or to receive formal education before returning to India. A few Indian sailors made their home in Britain in later years, but the group did not have any recognizable identity or presence in the country until after the Second World War and India's independence. In the 1950s and 1960s, large groups of Indian immigrants began travelling to Britain to seek employment and usually worked in low-paying industrial labour until South Asians from Africa fled to Britain and began successful entrepreneurial careers (Hinnels, 2000: 77-79).

Struggling against prejudice, racism, and often language barriers and economic hardship, the Indian diaspora in Britain has formed an integral and productive part of Britain's population. The Indian diaspora asserted its rights in Britain alongside other racial minorities and with a united "black identity," which was "directly influenced or modelled on forms of 'Black pride' and black hip-hop music" (Tariq Modood, 2001: 68). While racial activism still occurs within the Indian diaspora, it now asserts itself in different ways, for example through the media and popular culture such as that produced by Gurinder Chadha. While acting as a form of protest against British hegemony and prejudice, Gurinder Chadha's films are also an illustration of a number of different aspects of diaspora. They portray identity, generational conflict, the appropriate role of an Indian woman, and a heteronormative view of social

relations. By releasing films that not only satirize the diaspora group to which she belongs but also expose the racism faced by Indians in Britain, Chadha asserts the diaspora's agency over creating its own identity to both Indian and non-Indian audiences. By including these diverse themes in her films, Chadha not only criticises the British population for their racism, but also exposes the hypocrisies within the diaspora itself.

Hybridity and Media

One of the most important themes in the study of diaspora is identity. Identity as a citizen, identity within a family, national identity, ascribed identity, chosen identity, and fluid identity all must be negotiated. The films of Gurinder Chadha discuss the creation of hybrid identity more than any other of these aspects. Hybrid identity is created through "intensive exchanges between various social and cultural actors" (Sheffer, 2003: 169). These exchanges act in multiple ways, facilitating the creation of a hybrid identity with elements of Indian, British, and other qualities that influence an individual. The cultural exchanges can also work in the creation of multiple and culturally discrete identities that are all used in different scenarios. In this sense, identity is used and changed situationally; "the individual carries a portfolio of ethnic identities that are more or less salient in various situations" (Song, 2003: 17). Diasporic media illustrates this phenomenon in countless situations with portrayals of changes in language, dress, and manners when it is deemed most advantageous or acceptable. Georgiou (2006) explains this trend in linguistic terms, labelling it "code switching" (63).

It is primarily the second generation of Indian immigrants, those either born or educated in Britain, that have these ethnic options and engage in "code switching"; they are those who are responsible for the creation of its diasporic media and those who are trying to negotiate ethnic hybridity. Those belonging to this generation have a "greater array of ethnic options than their parents" (Song, 2003: 104), and it is notable in the films how much more cultural knowledge of Britain, their home-towns, and diasporic life these young British Indians have than their parents.

Media created by and for diaspora populations play a specific and important role in identity formation and preservation within diaspora groups. The specific national and cultural identities portrayed in diasporic media are depictions of "a holistic, essential quality of life." These media sources "repeatedly project particular perceptions and values that ascertain commonality and community" (Georgiou, 2006: 30). Diasporic media is, at its heart, essentializing. It takes what the authors, producers, and creators believe to be central tenets of the culture of the homeland and of the host country, and magnifies them as traditions to be fostered in a new nation; adopted for survival; or ridiculed as archaic customs that limit integration, modernization, and change. These media creations "can become powerful mouthpieces of the community they represent and they can create powerful images of self-representation for the group" (Georgiou, 2006: 13). Despite the prominence and power of such images, there is often disagreement across an entire diasporic group of how its identity should be represented.

Media is a commercial enterprise, and must therefore have enough appeal to reach a wide audience. Regardless of its social import, its role in community building, dissemination of information, creation of awareness, or provision of tools for identity formation, profit is the ultimate goal of any form of popular media. Popular culture of the diaspora faces even more of a challenge from these commercial motivations than media of the mainstream. Thus, the films of Gurinder Chadha are intended for a wide and culturally heterogeneous audience, not just members of the diaspora. The films face the challenge of trying to remain true to the themes of diaspora, identity, and feminism, while ensuring they have enough mass appeal to be widely received. Stuart Hall recognizes this problem of essentialism, mass appeal, and commercialism in a study on black media of the Caribbean diaspora: he argues that "[t]here is always a price of incorporation to be paid when the cutting edge of difference and transgression is blunted into spectacularization" (1996: 468). While it is possible to think of this "spectacularization" as simply selling out or pandering to mainstream popular culture, there is more at stake in the case of diasporic films such as Chadha's, which are viewed by the public as representing a population, as opposed to just telling a story.

A more critical viewpoint on this kind of diasporic media sees the creation of “stylish hybridity” – an intentional incorporation of essentialized, stereotyped minority characters and themes into mainstream media with little consideration of the realities of the minority populations presented (Giardina, 2003: 67). If this is in fact the case, diasporic film loses much of its objectivity and rebellion in an attempt at being incorporated into mainstream media; as Hall wrote, “by definition, black popular culture is a contradictory space” (1996: 470). The challenge is to maintain a media identity that is outside the mainstream of hegemonic cinema, but one that can still receive attention and reach its intended audience.

What makes the films of Gurinder Chadha so interesting in this respect is their similarity to mainstream popular culture. While the themes do deal with some issues that are almost exclusive to the Indian diaspora, the themes, plot, and characters are easily accessible to audiences of any culture and background. Instead of acting as an alternative to hegemonic western media, her films feature resistance and protest as internal. They show a revolt against traditional Indian diasporic culture in a popular format that has been widely released and received.

“This country has cost us our children”

Generational conflict is the most easily accessible theme in both *Bend it like Beckham* and *Bhaji on the Beach*. In her work on media of the South Asian Diaspora Pnina Werbner writes at length about the conflicts that can be created and publicized by diasporic media. She believes that most of what is considered the “new wave” of media of the Indian diaspora is focussed predominantly on generational conflict and an archaic cultural identity that is reproduced by a tradition-bound first generation of immigrants. According to Werbner, this new wave of literature, film, and popular media is “clearly and publicly aim[ed] to debunk sacred religious or South Asian traditionalist, sexually conservative, or ethnically chauvinistic values” (Werbner, 2004: 99).

While their shared Indian culture is mostly a uniting and positive force among the characters in these films, there are deep negative undertones that criticize blind adherence to tradition and a cultural past in a country most British Indians have never visited. Since 90 per cent of all of Britain’s ethnic minority residents under the age of 14 were born in Britain (Song, 2003: 104), they cannot be assumed to adhere to or understand the application of homeland practices. They are likely to know more about British, American, or French popular culture, laws, and social practices than those of India. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that most of the second generation of Indian immigrants attend the British school system with its emphasis on the “development of the autonomous critical individual – a concept that both in theory and practice challenges... their parents’ expectations” (Nielsen, 2000: 115).

The literature and films of the diaspora give truth to the common stereotype that British Indians are more traditional than anyone in India. As Georgiou concluded in her case study of the Armenian diaspora, “attitudes to the diasporic culture are often negative among youth” (Georgiou, 2006: 62). Yet “for the first generation, being part of a diasporic community is considered and experienced almost as natural” (Georgiou, 2006: 59). A similar idea is illustrated in *Bhaji on the Beach*. An exchange occurs among a number of the women about how to raise children with proper morals so they will not be corrupted by British values. Three women — Asha, a married woman born in India, Simi, the young group leader, and Rekha, a rich, stylish tourist from Mumbai — discuss how to raise Indian children in England:

Asha: “I’ve been teaching morals from back home.”

Rekha: “Home? What home? How long is it since you’ve been home? Look at you. Your Clothes, the way that you think!”

Simi: Auntie-ji, you try and teach them something, but you’ve got to learn to listen. Your daughters are doing their best.”

Rekha: Oh, come on. You’re all 20 years out of date.” (Chadha, 1993)

Asha does not perceive Rekha as an acceptable embodiment of Indian values, while Rekha, a woman still living in India, sees these women trying to nurture an Indian identity — one that has not existed for

decades in India — in Britain. The implication here is that it is inevitable for children of the original immigrants, who suffer from outdated and repressive demands, to only disappoint parents who are trying to recreate a lifestyle that is not only impossible in Britain, but that in reality does not exist anywhere.

Echoes of this frustration can be found in Chadha's later film *Bend it like Beckham*. Jess (Jesminder) Bhamra faces the brunt of her parents' displeasure by choosing to lead a life that to them is distinctly un-Indian. Jess's football playing and close friendship with Jules — unconventional, British, and white — are considered inappropriate for an Indian girl. They are perceived to lessen her parents' status in the community and degrade their skills at Indian parenting. When discussing Jess's behaviour with his future in-laws, Mr. Bhamra tries to excuse her behaviour: "you know how hard it is for our children over here, sometimes they misjudge and start behaving like the kids here" (Chadha, 2002). As a parent he has admitted the difficulties of preventing the Western influence from changing his daughter's values. Jess herself notices the conflict she has caused; she explains to Jules, "Anything I want is just not Indian enough for them!" (Chadha, 2002).

All three of these scenes and exchanges speak of the disconnect between generations, an inability of those of the first generation to understand the needs of their children, and the impossibility of living a completely Indian life outside of India. Chadha illustrates the ridiculousness of ignoring the influence of the culture with which one is surrounded. In her writing on the subject, Werbner posits exactly what Chadha has illustrated in her two films; this easily accessible diasporic pop-culture "has as its mission to persuade a younger generation of British South Asians to be less compliant and submissive to their parents" (Werbner, 2004: 903). These unconventional female characters in diasporic media are in fact meant to be instructional.

However, generational conflict is not exclusive to the diaspora community, nor is it necessarily caused by living in a country with different values. This important aspect of generational conflict is neglected entirely in *Bhaji on the Beach* and in most of the literature on the portrayal of women in diasporic media, but is given significant consideration in *Bend it like Beckham*. Jess's friend Jules Paxton and her mother consistently misunderstand each other over appropriate behaviour and what is expected of a young English woman. The conflict in the Paxton family almost directly parallels that in the Bhamras'; generational conflict is not unique to the diaspora. As the films portray, families of the Indian diaspora find it easier to blame the negative influence of the host country's culture than to recognize that conflict will naturally occur as children seek independent lives in a world different from that of their parents — different due to either a change in location and culture or simply the passage of time. It is not considered in either film that conflicts over values, lifestyle, and tradition undoubtedly take place among families in India, especially if India has changed as drastically in the past 20 years as Rekha suggests. This failure to recognize that conflict is an inevitable part of growing up and is not brought about by the challenges of cultural hybridity are again examples of idealizing the home country. These first generation immigrants have formed a "rosy picture of the country they have left" (van der Veer, 1995: 7) and forget about any conflicts or problems that undoubtedly existed.

"Indian girls aren't supposed to play football"

A continuous focus on appropriate gender roles is inherent in the generational conflict within the immigrant families portrayed in Chadha's films. These roles are made very obvious in *Bend it like Beckham* as it follows a number of gender-based conflicts both inside and outside the family. *Bhaji on the Beach* treats the subject differently, as the film tells the story of a group of women who interact mostly with each other. However, a number of general themes arise through both films.

Gender in *Bend it like Beckham* is tied to the discourse of honour and the deep fear the Bhamras feel about bringing shame upon their family; according to their future in-laws, "children are a map of their parents" (Chadha, 2002). Jess's football playing is considered a deeply shameful act for its sheer lack of femininity, which in its very nature it contravenes doctrines of modesty that a woman is supposed to embody. While Mrs. Bhamra occasionally mentions Jess's studies as a reason to quit football, her objections are usually based on gender roles and the notion that football and femininity cannot overlap.

The idea that football is not an appropriate pastime for an Indian woman is brought up in the film's first scene – a fantasy football game played by Jess and David Beckham. During Jess's daydream of playing a tournament-winning match for England, her mother evaluates her game. When her mother appears with the sports announcers, instead of praising Jess's excellent game she informs viewers that by "running around with all these men showing her legs to 70,000 people" (Chadha, 2002) Jess is bringing shame on the family. The football uniform and the skin it exposes are themselves enough reason to persuade her family that Jess should not be playing football. This same criticism is made multiple times later in the film. In an almost direct echo of this opening scene Mrs. Bhamra objects again to Jess's desire to play: "I don't want you running around half naked in front of men" (Chadha, 2002). As her mother sees the fact that football is played in shorts and in front of a mixed audience as a reason not to play, Jess tries her best to overcome the discomfort of showing so much skin in public. She asks her coach if she can play wearing track pants, she never joins the scrimmage team playing without shirts, and does her best to change privately in the change room full of girls.

Jess's reluctance to expose herself in these situations is not given much weight or discussion. It illustrates an important concept, however; Jess has not turned away from all of the fundamental aspects of Indian culture that her mother is attempting to instil in her. This adherence to ideals of modesty could in fact be something of which her mother could be proud; however, since football is considered in itself deeply unfeminine, Mrs. Bhamra cannot fathom anything positive about Jess playing, even though Jess acts in a way her parents would deem most suitably Indian.

There are two different ideas that may explain Jess's actions. The simplest may be that Jess has adopted a hybrid sense of identity; this element of Indian culture — her modesty — has become one way in which she represents herself. In this situation she is not using "code switching" as described by Georgiou (2006), or choosing her British identity from her "portfolio of identities" to use in front of her English soccer team, as Song (2003) would posit. Rather, she assumes traits of both cultures in daily life, whether intentionally or not. The second reason is that Jess appreciates this aspect of her Indian heritage. This explanation would be in line with Georgiou's conclusions about youth in diasporic communities who "grow to appreciate... [diasporic] culture as they age" (Georgiou 2006: 62).

Jess's modesty makes up one of the most interesting aspects of the theme of appropriate gender performance, and reaffirms the exchange in *Bhaji on the Beach* between Asha and Rekha; the assertion that Indian parents are so bound by tradition that they do not listen to their daughters. That Jess is the most conservative of all the second generation Indian women portrayed in the film escapes her parents' notice. Jess's football playing is an issue with which Mr. and Mrs. Bhamra assume they would never be faced in India. While Jess tries to use her conservatism and traditional views of the body to convince her mother to let her continue playing, it does not make up for all of the other norms Jess transgresses.

This plot device sets up an interesting contrast between Jess and her sister Pinky. Pinky and her friends all wear western and frequently revealing clothing, makeup, and spend time alone with men. While this behaviour is certainly not acceptable to Mrs. Bhamra, and contravenes many of the ideals she attempts to instil in her children throughout the film, they are suitably feminine and do not garner the same kind of anger and criticism as Jess receives. Their gender-appropriate actions, as opposed to Jess's lack of femininity, are seen as preferable to Jess's innocent yet culturally inappropriate interest in sports. Jess is portrayed as an outsider in the Indian community. While they are undeniably attempts to challenge her parents' enforcement of tradition, Pinky's parents interpret her transgressions as simply girls being girls. Jess, on the other hand, is not just a rebel, but a cultural anomaly. Her family cannot understand what motivation she could have to play sports; it does not conform to a gender normative worldview, and in their eyes will not get her a husband.

As well as these ideals of shame and modesty, *Bend it like Beckham* is full of what can be considered instructions on how the first generation of Indian immigrant parents wants their British-raised children to behave. It is made painstakingly clear to both the audience and Jess that the intended result of following these instructions is to become a good wife. Throughout the film Mrs. Bhamra speaks a litany of observations to Jess about her future as a wife. They range from the specific: "[w]hat family will want a daughter-in-law who can run around kicking football all day but can't make round chapattis?" (Chadha,

2002) to slightly more subtle hints: "I was married at your age. You don't even know how to cook daal" (Chadha, 2002). While it can be easily noted that cooking is considered a valuable skill for any young Indian woman, the deeper message in these quotations is that marriage is the ultimate goal in perfecting any feminine skill. Jess herself recognizes the inevitability of her eventual marriage and the ways it will change her life: "I wonder if I had an arranged marriage, would I get someone who'd let me play football?" (Chadha, 2002).

On the other hand, *Bhaji on the Beach* discusses life after marriage and the sacrifices women must make to fulfil the expectations of marriage – they have to give up the kind of life Jess leads in Chadha's later film. Sacrifice is the most commonly mentioned facet of marriage in *Bhaji on the Beach*. The first scene of this film is as telling of later themes as are Mrs. Bhamra's comments in the first scene of *Bend it like Beckham*. Again, the film begins with a daydream. Asha has a vision while walking through the back room of her shop in Birmingham. A larger-than-life statue of a god chants to her "honour, duty, sacrifice...know your place" (Chadha, 1993). She is immediately accosted by her husband and children with demands that she clearly does not want to fulfil. Asha — as it becomes obvious throughout the film — regrets the sacrifices she made for her marriage. In her encounter with Ambrose Waddington, a British gentleman and "ancient Blackpudlian," Asha fantasises about a life without the demands of her Indian husband and children, who insist she act as a traditional Indian wife. The trip to Blackpool and encounter with Ambrose Waddington, who treats her as someone "Proud, exotic, fascinating" (Chadha, 1993) is a markedly different experience from the traditional and patriarchal life she leads in Birmingham. This encounter causes Asha to retort to the god who taunted her at the beginning: "duty, honour, sacrifice! What about me? I was a good singer at college. I never had headaches. And I wasn't born selling bloody newspapers" (Chadha, 1993). It appears from this outburst that Asha did not ask for the life she is leading; she felt bound by honour and tradition to lead the life that was expected of her.

The other character who does not want the pressure of traditional Indian family life is the young mother, Ginder. She broke with tradition and angered everyone in the community, including her parents, in order to divorce her abusive husband. The older generation of "Aunties" who travel to Blackpool with the women's group cannot understand Ginder's decision: "That Ginder, I hear she ran off, left such a decent family. Took her son. And she even chose the husband! Poor thing, the mother-in-law" (Chadha, 1993). Ginder's plight is considered minimal; she was allowed one British compromise — she could choose her Indian husband. The Aunties assume it was Ginder's fault her marriage fell apart:

"I hear her husband used to beat her."

"These modern girls can't adapt. And those with jobs are the worst. Asha, you know her in-laws, is it true?"

"No. She must have done something" (Chadha, 1993).

Like the explanations of generational conflict, Britain and a lack of tradition are blamed for Ginder's misfortune and poor decisions. The fact that Ginder is modern, has a job, and chose her husband for herself are all poor predictors for the success of her marriage. Her husband's character is not questioned, as he came from "such a decent family."

The conflicts and demands faced by the women in the films are tied both to the ideal traditional female role that the characters believe is never challenged in India, and the clearly demarcated role women are to play in diaspora contexts. In diaspora communities, women are responsible for maintaining something recognizable, such as an Indian household, educating children in Indian cultural practices, and hopefully preventing children from assimilating too much into the host country's culture (Punathambekar, 2005: 159). Diaspora communities set up the home and household as a microcosm of Indian culture (Gopinath, 2003; Georgiou 2006). Within the households of diaspora communities "immigrant women are positioned by an immigrant male bourgeoisie as repositories of an essential 'Indianness'" (Gopinath, 2003: 264). They play the role of "agents and catalysers of cultural reproduction" (Bachu, 1995: 234). Due to women's representation of the values of a culture they not only have more restraints placed upon them, but are also watched far more closely for any transgressions against morals or tradition.

With these scenes Chadha is attempting to portray a reality felt by Indian wives both in Britain and in India. Yet it is easy to see that her goal is more than simply providing a description or inducing empathy in her audience. Chadha's films illustrate Werbner's (2004) theories on diasporic media as explained above – this media is instructional, transgressive, and anti-traditionalist. Werbner theorizes that this form of easily and widely accessible diasporic popular culture is directed to two different kinds of audiences within the diaspora. First, it is directed to people like the Aunties and a traditionalist, patriarchal community. These people are meant to see themselves satirised and to watch “the open public display of embarrassing, internally guarded ‘secret’ ethnic truths” that they are meant to feel is inappropriate for entertainment. However, if the film is correctly set up as criticism, this traditional group will hopefully recognise these “ethnic truths” as antiquated and ineffectual (Werbner, 2004: 902). The second group to whom this pop culture is directed is the young generation; in the characters of Jess and Ginder they are meant to see role models and a path to creating an independent life. As Georgiou explains, “in media cultures, audiences can... choose with whom and where they go” (Georgiou, 2006: 88). Chadha assumes, and hopes, that the young Indian women in her audience will choose to go with characters like Ginder and Jess.

Conclusion

The women's bus trip to Blackpool in *Bhaji on the Beach* begins with a speech by activist, advocate, tour guide, and friend, Simi: “It is not often that we women get away from the patriarchal demands made on us in our daily lives, struggling between the double yolk of racism and sexism that we bear. This is your day. Have a female fun time” (Chadha, 1993). Gurinder Chadha's films could easily be described as a “female fun time”; they are light-hearted, romantic, funny, and endearing. However, they expose a number of truths about the patriarchy, racism, and sexism faced by members of the Indian diaspora in Britain. It remains to be seen what kind of impact, if any, this new form of diasporic media will have on British popular culture, or whether it will influence those who face the same racism and sexism within their own cultures that Simi talks about. Regardless of their ultimate consequences, films like *Bend it like Beckham* and *Bhaji on the Beach* are a powerful tool for asserting both the presence of the Indian diaspora community in Britain and validating the changes the youth of this community are demanding in their homes. Gurinder Chadha's films, while perhaps not intended as an academic study, are surprisingly complimentary to diaspora theory and allow for a detailed analysis of the kinds of lives led by members of Britain's Indian diaspora.

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Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't; How the Chinese Communist Party Doomed its Authoritarian Regime by Developing China by Jean-Francois Arsenault — second year history

In June 1989, outside of Tiananmen Square on Chang'an Avenue, a lone, frustrated man defiantly stood in front of a Type 59 tank from the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The tank pilot tried to steer the tank around him, but the man simply adjusted himself to remain an obstacle. The tank tried again; again he blocked it. The man then climbed on top of the tank and spoke something to the occupants. He came down from the tank and a short while later he was rushed by a number of people dressed in civilian clothes and dragged away (Iyer, November 28, 2007). It was never known who the man was or what happened to him, but the images still have a resounding impact around the world, particularly in the West. The protest had been for freedoms. Instead, it became a bloody demonstration of the government's repressive regime.

As it continues its vertiginous economic growth, the world's eyes are fixed upon China. Increasingly gaining a reputation as a challenger to American hegemony, China is becoming both a role model and a source of fear for observers around the world. For developing countries, particularly for developing countries with leaders who are not particularly sold on the idea of potentially sharing their power through democracy, China's model of authoritarian, one-party, high-growth development can be very attractive. However, for democrats, the prospect of a successful authoritarian, one-party state is frightening and seems to repudiate their doctrine that links democracy and sustained prosperity.

But is this form of politically repressive but economically liberal type of system sustainable in the long run? How does economic growth affect the political system? This is what will be explored in this paper. I will do this by first setting out a framework for understanding relational dynamics between the state, society, and the economy. Once this has been explained, I will then recount the history of Taiwan's transition from authoritarianism to its current state as a free democracy. An analysis of how this happened will be provided using the state, society, economy model. This will be compared with China's contemporary situation; using what was extracted from Taiwan's democratic transition, I will explain how China might democratize.

Throughout this paper I will argue that by linking the Party's legitimacy to economic growth, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has intimately wed itself to the economy and is held responsible not only for its growth, but also for its fall. If the Chinese economy slows, the party's legitimacy will be eroded and discontent will brew. If this legitimacy sinks enough, civil unrest is likely to break out with the anger aimed directly at the CCP. To quell the unrest, a better long-term solution to regaining legitimacy is through democratization. If the Chinese economy keeps growing, Chinese society will be able to demand more civil liberties, which will then lead to an insistence on an alternative, more pluralistic political structure. With such wealth and access to democratic societies, either through media or by being able to visit these societies, Chinese citizens would wonder why they are not entitled to the same rights and freedoms as their counterparts in the developed world. This would make pressures for democratization great. In short, unless the CCP finds another source of legitimacy, no matter if the Chinese economy goes up or down, the CCP's authoritarian hold on China is doomed to decline and make way for a democratic China.

The Polity As Relations Between State, Society, and Economy

To facilitate the comparative analysis of China³ with Taiwan and understand the dynamics at work, I propose the polity be divided in three elements: state, society, and economy. Each element is representative of one aspect but it is interconnected to the others. The state here will be defined as per Max Weber's definition, "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 2007). This includes the administrative staff, the politicians, political institutions, court, the legal system, and anything else that directly manifests the will of the institution that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory. Society is defined as individuals and their relations within a given territory; the economy refers to its economic activity.

Each element of the polity interacts and relies on the others (see Figure 1.1). In the case of society and the state, society provides legitimacy for the state. The state requires this legitimacy to exist because it fundamentally exists for society and claims to have dominion over it. If it does not have this legitimacy, society will grow hostile to those claiming to be the state. Legitimacy itself is a debated concept, but for this model and the societies that will be analyzed, Otfried Hoffe's definition of legitimacy in a coercive order is the most relevant;

To put it in other terms, because the legitimation of coercive powers depends on the welfare of the affected parties, these powers can only be defended if they bring more advantages than disadvantages for *each* individual. The criterion is distributive justice. Something that is advantageous for everyone can be brought about by exchange; distributive advantage can consist in *mutual advantage*. Even if a coercive social order brings about coordination, efficiency, security and stability, and thereby the collective welfare, of a society, it lacks legitimacy if this is accomplished by disrespect for the interests of individuals or groups within the society (1995: 40).




Figure 1.1: Relation of the Polity's Elements

In accordance with this definition, as long as the state is seen as beneficial to the society, it will remain legitimate and not receive too much resistance. In return for the population's implicit support, the state uses domestic policy as well as economic policy to benefit society. If the state completely loses this legitimacy, the instruments of the state will turn against it. The state and the economy interact in a similarly mutual way, where the state dictates the economic framework and influences the economy through legislation aimed at regulating, giving competitive advantages, or by preventing certain economic activity. In return, through mechanisms like taxation, the economy provides the state the funds it needs to carry out its projects and finance the system to assure its control over the polity. Finally, the economy

³ For simplicity's sake, whenever I refer to China I am actually referring to Mainland China, I do not include Taiwan, regardless of the People's Republic of China's claims on the island. Likewise, when referring to Taiwan, I am referring to the polity administered by the Republic of China and nothing beyond.

provides society with employment and wealth while society provides the economy with labour. It is through this cycle that the polity maintains itself. Outside the polity, there are influences from other actors, such as foreign investors, international organizations, and foreign culture. These are the influences of the international community.

The Other China: Taiwan's Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy

The past year has been the darkest and bleakest in my life. I am confident that I shall receive the divine decree and can consummate my task. I have spent my past life in vain. I have suffered ignominy and defeat. However, I should not be worried, angry, nor should I be conceited. I have nothing to be ashamed of before God and man. How lucky I am to have the love of God. Danger and difficulty lie ahead. I must heighten my vigilance so that I can revive China and re-establish the republic (Fenby, 2004: 495-96).

It is with these defeated but optimistic thoughts that Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan, hoping to rebuild his forces to retake mainland China. At first, things looked bleak. The *Guomindang* — or state — was demoralized and top leaders were ruthless in dealing with the chaos that was caused by the massive influx of mainland immigrants — an influx not welcomed by the native Taiwanese (Walker, 1973: 361). The Taiwanese were forced to move or were evicted from the Japanese-abandoned homes that they had claimed, all of this to make place for the mainlanders (Walker, 1973: 361). Then, on February 28, 1947, triggered by a black-marketing incident, the Taiwanese attempted an uprising against the *Guomindang* forces, an uprising that was quelled with cruelty and violence (Walker, 1973: 361). Tensions became so heightened between native Taiwanese and mainlanders that the government ordered a blackout on discussions on mainlander-Taiwanese relations, something that only made the problem worse (Walker, 1973: 362). Despite all this, the *Guomindang* did have some assets. Richard L. Walker points to the determination of the *Guomindang* to “prove they *did* have a capability to move China into the modern world” (1973: 363), the small size of Taiwan, the Japanese created infrastructure that they inherited, the revitalization that having to start over can bring, and the Generalissimo himself who still had a loyal following (Walker, 1973: 364).

To put these things in action, in May 1949, the Nationalists declared martial law in Taiwan using a clause they had inserted in the Republic of China's (ROC) constitution in April 1948 to give the President of the ROC emergency powers (Leng and Lin, 1993: 805). What followed was nearly 30 years of stunning economic growth reminiscent of the People Republic of China's economic growth today. From 1952 to 1980, Taiwan's GDP growth was 9.21 per cent, the highest in the world at that time (Government Information Office in Taiwan, November 25, 2007). Industrial output grew from 16.7 per cent of the GDP in 1952 to 47.1 per cent of the GDP in 1986 (GIOT, 2007). GDP per capita also grew steadily (GIOT, 2007). In terms of social stability, no other uprisings were seen. This is not to say that everything was perfect in Taiwan; many liberties were repressed. The period is after all referred to as the “White Terror,” but economically the situation was very beneficial to the people.

Despite the strict martial law, however, the control of the Taiwanese political system was not as absolute as it is in the case of the CCP in Mainland China. For example, Thomas A. Metzger refers to the three embryonic marketplaces that helped in the development of democracy in Taiwan; the economic, ideological and political marketplaces, which had been created through incremental reforms (Chao and Myers, 2001: 24). These were created by Chiang Kai-shek when he “established local elections (an embryonic political marketplace), permitted Western ideas of liberal democracy to challenge the state's ideology based on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen (an embryonic intellectual marketplace), allowed a capitalist market economy to develop, and did not abolish religious and private associations unless they threatened party-state rule (Diamond and Myers, 2001: 13).”

In 1975, Chiang Kai-shek passed away. A year later, his main rival, Mao Zedong followed him to the grave. The leadership of the *Guomindang* was given to Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo. At first, the authoritarian style of his father continued. In an election in 1976, an independent candidate, Pai ya-tsan, viciously attacked Chiang Ching-kuo for his wealth, for having been unable to prevent Thailand and the Philippines to recognize Beijing, and for Chiang's daughter to be living in the United States

instead of Taiwan (McBeath, 1977: 18). Pai was arrested and charged with sedition, but instead of the death sentence he received lifetime imprisonment (McBeath, 1977: 19). He was released 13 years later once martial law had been lifted (Wei, 2007). Nevertheless, it was under Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership that Taiwan transitioned from a pseudo-democracy under martial law to a free democracy without martial law.

From 1977 onwards, more and more *dangwai* (non-party) were elected. Although they suffered some setbacks when many *dangwai* leaders were arrested December 10, 1979, causing defeats in the 1981 and 1985 elections (Diamond and Myers, 2001: 13), the opposition kept growing in strength. Finally, on the evening of September 28, 1986 in a meeting room of Taipei's Grand Hotel, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was illegally founded (Chou and Nathan, 1987: 277). This was a few months after Chiang Ching-kuo had announced the GMD's intention to reform the political system to democratize Taiwan (Diamond and Myers, 2001: 14). Instead of arresting the leaders of the DPP, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in July 1987 (Diamond and Myers, 2001: 14). In no time, free press and political parties flourished. When Chiang Ching-kuo died, his successor, Lee Teng-hui continued the political reforms (Leng and Lin, 1993: 806). In 1992, the constitution was reformed and in March 1996, the first national election for president and vice-president of Taiwan were held (Diamond and Myers, 2001: 14); Taiwan had become a democracy.

What made Taiwan a democracy?

Several factors contributed to the democratization of Taiwan. The embryonic marketplaces, particularly the local elections — however corrupt they were — identified by Matzger cannot be ignored. They provided the training for the opposition in how to effectively run and govern. More importantly, however, it taught the GMD that losing elections didn't mean the end for it (Diamond and Myers, 2001: 14). But we also cannot omit the role of economic growth in the democratization of Taiwan. In 1986, nearly every Taiwanese household had a television set (GIOT, 2007). Trips outside of Taiwan were becoming more frequent, causing Taiwanese nationals to come into increased contact with nations that had liberal democratic systems (GIOT, 2007). Wealth distribution at that time was even more equitable than in the Scandinavian countries (Chan and Clark, 1991: 561), and life expectancy and literacy rates improved significantly, putting them at a level that is comparable to the United States (Chan and Clark, 1991: 561). From 1952 to 1985, Taiwan went from having eight universities and colleges with a total enrollment of 10,037 to 105 postsecondary institutions with a total enrollment of 395,153 (Lu, 1985: 1085). All these factors combined to make Taiwanese society a middle class one. In fact, Thomas B. Gold describes Taiwanese society in the 1980s as made up 50 per cent by the middle class (Gold, 1997: 112).

Using the model defined at the beginning of this paper, we can explain the democratization of Taiwan as a dynamic of relations between state, society, and economy. In the early stages of the *Guomindang*'s rule, faced with an unwelcoming Taiwanese population, chaos from the massive influx of mainlanders, and a defeated legacy on the mainland, the *Guomindang* sought to establish its legitimacy as the ruler over the society. To do this, the *Guomindang* focussed on its economic policy. It was successful and its legitimacy was established as a result of all the wealth created from the economy. But as the Taiwanese got richer and richer, the economy became less of a force; the Taiwanese were no longer so desperate for wealth and employment. Their wealth also allowed them access to liberal democratic societies and afforded them the same socio-economic status. Surely some would have wondered why they were not entitled to the same political freedoms. Opposition became more and more prevalent. Faced with this growing opposition, pressured by the increasing internationalization of Taiwan, and by reformers inside the party, the *Guomindang* was forced to switch its focus to domestic policy. More specifically, it had to focus on democratic reform, to retain legitimacy, divorcing itself slowly from the state to make it a pluralistic system. The society accepted it and did not have to consider overthrowing the state.

China: The Other Taiwan?

As of late 2007, Chinese citizens appear to at least tacitly accept CCP rule. Why wouldn't they? In 2007, with China's GDP growing by 10.7 per cent (Feng, 2007), the lives of Chinese citizens have been improving rapidly. Infant mortality rates in 2005 were down to 23 per 1,000 for China (UNICEF, 2007), and in Beijing the rate is even lower — 4.6 per 1,000. By comparison, New York City has an infant mortality rate of 6.5 per 1,000 (Kristof, 2007). Life expectancy was 72 in 2005 (UNICEF, 2007). The total adult literacy rate in 2000-2004 was 91 per cent (UNICEF, 2007). China's middle class population is increasing at a great pace; in 2002, the Chinese government counted 50 million families as middle class, with household incomes 75,000 yuan and 310,000 yuan of assets on average (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, 2007). It predicts this figure will double in 2010 with 100 million families having annual income per household of 150,000 yuan and owning assets of 620,000 yuan (Embassy of the PRC in the US, 2007). In 2002, 13.5 per cent of Chinese citizens were considered middle class, demonstrating that a growing portion of Chinese citizens is enjoying a decent level of wealth (Embassy, 2007). This is more than enough to excite potential investors. But what the about democrats?

Comparing contemporary China to authoritarian Taiwan, we must first outline the relevant similarities and differences. Both polities were (and *is*, in the case of China) ruled by authoritarian, repressive single parties. The *Guomindang* and the CCP both owe their lineage to the Comintern and have Leninist ideologies (Chang, November 27, 2007). China and Taiwan share a language and a common Chinese heritage. However, there are major differences, such as China's immensity, both in geographical but especially in demographical scale and Taiwan's small island territory and modest population size. Taiwan also had what Metzger called an embryonic political market place through local elections since the very beginning of the Republic of China (even if these were corrupt and limited by martial law). In the People's Republic of China, the closest institutions to local elections are village elections, which have left observers particularly unimpressed (O'Brien and Li, 2001: 125). They do, however, give the chance for non-Party members to learn how to be a politician and teach Chinese citizens the dynamics of democracy firsthand. This is a form, albeit in its early stages, of a political marketplace (O'Brien and Li, 2001: 124). It is also not inconceivable that a certain faction within the CCP, or a group of purged Party members, would gather together to form an opposition party. For this to happen without them being immediately arrested, like the previous attempts to found parties in China, the CCP would have to be implicitly set on democratization.

Two ways this acquiescence can come about is by continued economic growth or by a sudden economic downturn after the current sustained period of economic growth⁴. In the scenario of continued economic growth, this would follow much like in Taiwan. China would grow into a middle class society. Already, since these are necessities for economic liberalization, more information is streaming into China and its citizens can travel abroad with minimal restrictions. Referring to the state, society, economy model at the beginning, the society, being increasingly wealthy, does not have to rely on the economy so greatly. This creates a legitimacy crisis (Hu, 2000: 138) that the government must correct. This correction is usually done through domestic policy, although it could find another source for legitimacy, such as a war that would require national mobilization. But seeing as how wars are usually bad for business, China would likely opt to please the population to make itself legitimate again. With frequent exposure to liberal

⁴ Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan come to the exact same conclusion in their paper, "The Meaning of China's Village Elections." They write, "If China's economy continued to grow, the new economic forces and groups will demand outlets to defend their interests. But the need to open legitimate political channels for these successful entrepreneurs will not be nearly as important as the challenge of responding to popular dissatisfaction if there is a downturn in the economy. Then, the government will need an escape valve for the people to release their frustrations. Fortunately, the best mechanism for dealing with both economic success and economic failure is the same: a free, competitive election. If such a mechanism does not exist when there is a downturn, however, the pressures for change might be so compelling that the only alternatives would be repression of violent revolution." Shaohua Hu also explains Chinese democratization in a very similar language.

democratic societies, Chinese citizens would wonder why they are not entitled to the same rights and freedoms, concepts very much present in Asian cultures. Amartya Sen points this out in response to critics of human rights and democracy on the basis of a perceived "Asian value" in opposition to a "Western value" (2000: 227-248), as their fellows in the developed world. This would likely be a widespread feeling despite the diversity of Chinese society, and could be articulated by reformers within the CCP. All these factors would combine to make it so that progressively, China would open up its political institutions and some form of pluralistic democracy would appear in which the CCP would still likely play a powerful role, but no longer the sole role.

In the case of a sudden economic downturn, it is historically evident that economic depression breeds discontent towards the institutions that govern. This would likely be the case with a CCP that has intimately linked itself to China's prosperity through its very explicit role in it. The CCP's legitimacy would quickly fall and it would be forced to find some way of restoring order. One of these ways would be repression, however after having a taste of more freedom this repression would anger the population even more, a dangerous prospect in a country raised on revolutionary tales. Discounting a remake of the 1989 protests in Tiananmen, to quell some of the protests the state would have to answer the demands of society to regain legitimacy. While these demands would be multiple and varied, with the regular exposure to liberal democratic societies, it is certain that a considerable number would push for democratization. Faced with the choice of democratizing or violently clamping down on a China now firmly connected to the international community, they would likely choose the former. That would be how a sudden economic downturn would lead to the establishment of democracy in China.

Huge challenges remain, however, for the CCP to be comfortable with pluralistic, free democracy in China. Unlike Taiwan, China has to worry about keeping its great diversity into a unified whole. Would democracy be more likely to encourage secessionist movements in Xinjiang? Would Tibet act to separate from China once a democracy would be established, or at least push for federalism? These questions and many more would have to be resolved or at least seriously considered by the CCP and advocates of democracy.

Conclusion

No one is able to predict the future with certainty because of the overwhelming number of factors that cannot possibly be considered. Only time will tell whether China will become a free, democratic society or not. However, even if the scale of China — with its population of 1.3 billion — and the cultural, socio-economic, and linguistic diversity makes it enormous and the differences with Taiwan are relevant, China is still subject to very similar fundamental dynamics that have affected it. Just like how in Taiwan stunning economic growth led to a democratization of wealth, which then led to a democratization of the political system, even though the *Guomindang* at least always claimed democracy as a goal, through its phenomenal economic growth, China has been set on a path of democratization. How long this will take is unknown and there are still many, many challenges ahead. It is also possible that other events could come in and upset the possibility of a democratic China. But barring those, whether economic growth continues or suddenly stalls, pressure from Chinese society on the Chinese state for democratization are more than likely to increase.

A democratic China would be a momentous occasion for the world. Already 1.1 billion people in India live in a democracy. If you add China to the population of democratic countries in the Americas, Europe, Africa, Oceania and Asia, a very considerable number of the world's population would be living in a democracy. If theories like the Democratic Peace Theory continue to be relevant, we can expect a future of increased peace, prosperity, and freedoms in the world. But pulling ourselves back to reality, the ball is in the court of Chinese citizens and CCP officials to tackle the multitude of challenges that will stand in the way of democracy. With time, we can expect that China's new wealth will afford them the luxury to want democracy. If they do not become wealthy however, for example if the economy hits a rough patch, discontent may grow to the point that democracy is offered to calm the population.

Either way, barring major new developments that would steer them away from democracy, the CCP will likely be cornered and pressed into democratizing China. So by linking themselves to economic

growth through their explicit role there within, they've may well have doomed their authoritarian hold on China.

Damned if you do, damned if you don't...

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An Unholy Union: Multinationals, The Government, and the Recourse Curse in Nigeria by Zoe Williams — third year honours international relations

Three years after gaining independence from Great Britain in October of 1960, Nigeria proclaimed itself a Federal Republic. From the outset, the Nigerian political theatre was dominated by political conflict underwritten by ethnic tensions,

“Like most of the boundaries drawn by the colonialist Europeans in the late 19th century, Nigeria's make little sense. They encompass a grab bag of 250 ethnic groups divided by language, culture and religion... Violence is a constant threat as the country's three major ethnic groups – the Yoruba of the southwest, the Hausa-Fulani of the north and the Ibo of the east – struggle for control. The smaller groups, such as those in the delta, scabble on the fringes for whatever crumbs they can get.” (Drohan, 2000; 89-162)

Following the contested results of the 1965 election, a coup was instigated by Igbo (Ibo) military officers from the south-east of the country. It was not until 1999 that allegedly free elections were held and former military ruler Olusegun Obasanjo was elected. Obasanjo has made noted improvements in terms of human rights and freedom of expression. However, his time in office has been plagued with continuous civil unrest and violence, particularly related to the oil industry in the southern states – an area already rife with secessionist ambitions stemming from ethnic and religious differences and past abuse at the hands of the northern dominated government. The elections in April 2007 were condemned by international observers and marred by accusations of corruption and violence. Clearly democracy has a tenuous hold in Nigeria, if it has one at all.

As Muno Ndulo, professor of Law at Cornell University, states, “...Africa's problems are myriad and complex...one particular issue that continues to bedevil African countries is how to establish democratic nation-states with institutions that promote economic development, consolidate political harmony and stability, and avoid conflicts through enfranchisement” (Ndulo, 2003; 315). The underlying problems in Africa, he argues, are poverty and a lack of both good governance and democratic institutions. A solution requires more than just a “Schumpeterian democracy,” one of relatively free elections. Instead, an environment that can foster democracy must be created because “the challenges cannot be met in conditions of poverty or scarce resources...” (Ndulo, 2003; 364), weak institutions, and conflict. Democracy, Ndulo argues, “...means the freedom of the people in their daily lives to determine their destinies... To a large extent, democracy is less of a formalistic system than an attitude” (Ndulo, 2003; 341). While Nigeria does have some semblance of free elections, it is arguable that a democratic attitude does not prevail. Contributing to this are many of the factors Ndulo addresses, including a legacy of colonialism that has exacerbated ethnic tensions, as well as leaving behind “... undemocratic governments and bureaucracies...” (Ndulo, 2003; 332).

Perhaps equally influential in Nigeria's recent history, however, is the existence of huge oil wealth, which raises the issue of another impediment to democracy – the resource curse. This concept suggests that the more natural resource wealth a country has, the less likely it is to experience economic growth and postulates that the problem of the resource curse is relevant to the study of democracy because it challenges the assumptions of modernization, which link economic growth to social and political development. Since the discovery of oil, Nigeria has become the largest exporter of oil in Africa and the fifth largest in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While a small minority of Nigerians have grown tremendously wealthy, the majority is increasingly impoverished and Nigeria remains a poor country with great income inequality (2007/08 Human Development Report). The

resource curse, in short, postulates that existence of bountiful natural resources in a country is at best a mixed blessing. Slower economic growth, increased civil unrest and conflict, and corruption are merely some of the observed effects of a resource-based economy. Michael Ross, an academic at the University of California in Los Angeles, who postulates that resources "curse" democracy. Most writing on the resource curse focusses on the effect of resource wealth on the government, without accounting for the ways in which natural resource multinational corporations (MNCs) operating within the country also contribute to, or exacerbate the problems attributed to the resource curse. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which the presence of oil undermines the building of democratic institutions in Nigeria, using the resource curse as a framework, but with a primary focus on the impact of multinational corporations. This paper finds that the broad predictions of the resource curse are born out in Nigeria, but, at least when applied to the building of democratic institutions, the behaviour of MNCs is inextricable from this outcome. While neither oil MNCs nor the government are directly preventing allegedly free elections in Nigeria, both, through their actions, contribute to an environment in which truly democratic institutions cannot be built.

The role of multinational corporations in situations where the resource curse is postulated is mentioned by a number of scholars. Nazih Richani's piece describes the war system in Columbia and the role natural resource MNCs play in exacerbating the conflict. He argues that, defying traditional economic logic, extractive multinationals actually benefit financially from operating in zones of conflict (Richani, 205; 114). Although his article addresses these issues in the Columbian context, it can serve as a useful reference point to find examples of MNCs acting in ways that produce a less than optimal situation.

Another author, Michael Watts also points to MNCs as worsening various conflicts in the states in which they operate, and Ross mentions problems involving MNCs and property rights. In states with weakly enforced property rights, MNCs are prone to hiring private security forces, often made up of gangs and rebel militias and "...the presence of resource firms may help these groups form (or enable pre-existing groups to expand) by giving them lucrative opportunities for extortion" (Ross, 2001; 321).

Arguably, the transition to civilian (non-military) rule has not led to significant positive developments in the social or political life in Nigeria. These problems also remain worse in the Niger Delta, as polling indicates. For example, in 2003 only 14 per cent of those who responded to a survey in the Niger Delta said they were satisfied with Nigerian democracy, compared to 35 per cent in the whole country who said they were satisfied (International Crisis Group, 2006). Other statistics further indicate that Nigeria has not progressed towards democracy past staging free elections. The World Bank has consistently ranked Nigeria among the worst countries in terms of rule of law, corruption, violence and political stability, regulatory quality and government effectiveness between 1996 and 2005 (World Bank Country Data Report, 1996-2005).

According to Watts, there exists in Nigeria, a "...repugnant culture of excessive venality and profiteering among the political class..." (Watts, 2004A ;201). Much of this corruption surrounds the oil industry. Nigeria's oil wealth is huge, but "in more than seven years of civil rule, functionaries at the local, state and federal levels have failed to deliver tangible economic benefits for impoverished residents" (International Crisis Group, 2006). Over the last 15 years of military dictatorships, approximately "...\$55 billion in oil revenues has been stolen..." (Oil for nothing, 1999) by the country's leaders. These problems are especially acute in the Niger Delta, where the promises of democracy have failed to materialize, and "...people continue to suffer the negative impacts of oil: violence; environmental degradation; and poverty" (Ibid). This inequitable distribution of oil wealth is caused by a "...radical fiscal centralism, in which revenues directly to Delta states have shrivelled" (Watts, 2004A; 203). In fact, currently the oil producing states receive only 13 per cent of oil revenues, despite the fact that the oil production from these states makes up almost the entirety of the income generated in the nation. The modern northern capital of Abuja indicates to some extent, what oil wealth can achieve in Nigeria. However, according to a 2006 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, the Delta states described the Niger Delta's human development situation as 'appalling' and states that the region was

unlikely to meet any of the Millennium Development Goal targets...by 2015 'or anytime soon after'" (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

The pervasive influence of oil has also led to what Watts calls a "crisis of national secular development." Nigeria is an extremely ethnically diverse state, but "...oil led development driven by an unremitting political logic of ethnic claims making, has fragmented and discredited the state and its forms of governance...[and] produced a set of conditions that have compromised and undermined the very tenets of the modern nation state" (Watts, 2004A; 204). The demands of ethnic groups have led to the creation of 36 locally governed areas (LGAs) in Nigeria. However, instead of increased local, equitable and democratic participation, these local governments have added just another level of corrupt officials to Nigeria's political arena (source?). Ethnic rivalries are a primary source of violence in Nigeria, and these LGAs were also meant to go some way towards ameliorating this, but by some accounts "...ethnic competition over resource allocation in the oil-producing areas has persisted or even intensified, as a result of the creation of new states and local government areas" (Frynas, 2001; 34). Furthermore, "...the government appears to have aggravated existing disputes and used ethnic factionalism as an excuse for repressive measures by the security forces on a number of occasions..." (Frynas, 2001; 35).

Civil unrest has not decreased with the advent of democratic elections. Militants frequently observe that the government is more willing to negotiate after an embarrassing crisis that has an international component (International Crisis Group, 2006). Criticism seems to be levelled both at the government and the oil companies operating in the Delta. While the government is ineffectual and corrupt, the majority of protests and attacks are aimed directly at the oil companies. The grievances of the people generally fall into three categories – environmental destruction, control of oil revenues, and compensation for land taken over by the companies. The protests come in a variety of forms. Some are peaceful, while others take the form of sabotaging pipelines and kidnapping oil workers. The Ijaw youth uprising in 1998 is representative of interactions between oil companies and protest groups. The youth had issued a declaration that all land and natural resources in Ijaw territory belonged to the Ijaw and demanded a withdrawal of military forces of "...occupation and repression" and further, that any oil company that employed the services of the Nigerian armed forces to protect its operations would be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw. Peaceful protests by the Ijaw were met with violence by armed forces, and protesters were killed (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Various communities in the area were attacked by soldiers; a Chevron owned helicopter fired on two villages, while Chevron owned boats carried soldiers into villages where they killed a village leader who was making an attempt to negotiate. In response to these accusations, Chevron "...said they had been told the alleged attack by armed forces was in fact a 'counter attack'" (Ibid). Incidences such as the Ogoni uprisings and the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, garner international attention and have been frequent in the years before and after the transition to civilian rule. It is arguable that Nigeria's federal system "...indirectly encourages violence in the Niger Delta by rewarding those who pose the greatest threats...with juicy oil contracts" (International Crisis Group, 2006).

The operations of the oil multinationals and the government in Nigeria exist in a very closely, and perhaps problematically reciprocal, relationship. Some of the world's biggest oil companies operate out of Nigeria, including Shell, Chevron, Agip and Elf, but all must work in conjunction with The Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC). There is a "...six per cent ownership by the government...The companies retain day-to-day operational control of the joint ventures, but the federal government is involved in key decision making..." (Frynas, 2001; 30). However, the relationship is far more extensive than this, and the interwoven interests of the government and the oil companies stretches into many areas of the Nigerian state. One of these is property law. In 1978, the Land Use Act redefined land ownership in Nigeria by declaring all land within a state the property of the state governor.

"While the Act applied to all landed property, it made explicit references to the oil industry. In particular... that the state governor could revoke a right of occupancy for 'overriding public interests', which included the 'requirement of the land for mining

purposes or oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith'. The Act thus empowered the governor to acquire any private or public land holdings for oil operations... (Ibid).

The result of this law is that the interests of Nigerian citizens are being subordinated to the interests of multinational corporations.

For some time, companies such as Shell and Chevron have on their web-sites maintained pages that document the companies' positive role in Nigerian communities to combat bad press. For example, Shell states that it's Nigerian operation is helping to build "...a major road in Bayelsa state..." and has "...spent a further \$32 million on community projects" (Nigeria Sustainability Report, 2005). However, the company information fails to mention that to operate, it "... requires roads for access to oil fields...Most of these roads lead to oil installations, bypassing the local villages...[and] the cost of development projects can be offset against tax, so the oil companies have an economic incentive to inflate the figures for social expenditure" (Frynas, 2001; 48). Furthermore, the projects undertaken by Shell have not been the successes that are claimed by the company (Ibid).

However, even more troubling, there also appears to be a collusion on the part of the Nigerian government and the oil companies to evade bad publicity. For example, during the Abacha administration "...a leaked memo reveals that a meeting took place between four senior Shell officials including and the Nigerian High Commissioner in London...and was also attended by representatives of the Nigerian army and police. According to the leaked minutes, the Nigerian High Commissioner 'called on Shell to put heads together with the Mission to effectively debunk all the false allegations peddled against Nigeria and Shell over Ogoni and Ken Saro-Wiwa.'" (Frynas, 2001; 45).

These PR strategies also meant that the government and the oil companies publicly disputed claims made by non-governmental organization and academics regarding oil operations in the Niger Delta (Ibid, 46). This demonstrates a commitment on the part of both the government and the oil companies, not to actually improve their practices in Nigeria, but to effectively hide the negative side of the oil industry and carry on with their business.

Finally, there is a very blurred line between the Nigerian armed forces and police, and the security forces employed by the oil companies. Companies like Shell and Chevron claim that their security measures operate within the bounds of law and respect human rights. Shell does mention that it employs private security forces in some areas, but only out of necessity, because in countries where "...the rule of law is weak, protecting employees and assets is not always as straightforward as relying on calling in the State's security forces...Where state security forces do not have sufficient resources a company may where legally permitted be able to choose to engage a private security firm to provide additional manpower and specialist skills" (Shell Sustainability Report, 2005).

Furthermore, there are reported incidences of oil companies supporting the Nigerian armed forces in the violent repression of civilian protests. The aforementioned Ijaw uprising is an example; another is the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Eight, by the state, after their organized protests against Shell. Both Shell and Chevron have also given money and equipment to the Nigerian armed forces. As mentioned above, Chevron boats and helicopters have been used against protesters by the Nigerian army, and "... a secret memorandum revealed that the oil companies provided the infamous Rivers State Internal Security Task Force with financial assistance" (Frynas, 2001; 50). In the same memo, a call was made to

"pressure on oil companies for prompt regular inputs as discussed.' The money was probably used for internal repression since the Task Force was mainly used in the Ogoni area to deal with anti-Shell protests. In the same memorandum, Major Okuntimo wrote:

'Shell operations are still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence.'" (Ibid).

There exists a "web of financial relationships linking oil companies with security forces, military groups and armed gangs..." (International Crisis Group, 2006). It appears that the oil companies are unofficially the primary employers, or at least financial backers, of the state police, and these forces serve the interests of the oil companies above those of Nigerian citizens. According to Frynas, the reliance on private security has worsened the violence in the Delta, as peaceful protests have been met with violence from oil company security forces (Frynas, 2001; 51). A Crisis Group report asserts that one explanation for the close relationship between the oil companies and the government is the existence of the joint venture projects with Nigeria's state owned oil company. "Furthermore...the oil companies have much closer ties with the Nigerian administration than with village communities. By implication, it has been more convenient, perhaps, for a manager to summon the police or the military than to engage in negotiations with the local people." (Frynas, 2001; 52).

Not only are the security forces of the oil companies repressive and contribute to the abuses of human rights in the Delta, oil companies knowingly interact with and employ members of militias. As a Nigeria-based official for Shell admitted, "...it is much less expensive to pay what the militants demand than to go in and repair damaged pipelines or flow stations.' In May 2006, Shell admitted that two companies owned by known militant leaders 'are on the list of approved contractors from the Shell Petroleum Development Company' to carry out pipeline surveillance and waste disposal" (International Crisis Group, 2006).

Nigeria has officially undergone a transition from military to democratic, civilian rule. However, as is indicated above, neither Nigerians themselves nor international monitoring organizations have much faith in Nigerian democracy or institutions. This paper argues that the presence of oil in Nigeria, and the institutions that have grown up around the oil industry, directly contribute to the lack of real democracy in Nigeria. To some extent, the three effects of oil that impede democracy outlined by Ross, are applicable to the Nigerian situation. The first of these is the Rentier effect – the phenomenon of states that derive most of their income from sources external to the state, in this case oil companies (Suburban Energy Management Project). Watts describes the Nigerian political system as solely utilized by individuals for personal gain. "Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake put it well: politics was a ferocious contest to gain access to state monies. The Nigerian public sector became, in this sense, a tool to manufacture a sort of political consent through an unstable and delicate web of pacts and alliances purchased by the distribution of rents..." (Watts, 2004B; 214). This system further exacerbated existing tensions and structures of domination in that "the intersection of centralized (state) oil monies and a highly segmented, and regionalized, class structure...produced a seemingly insatiable source of rents for the privileged, and corruption and fraud of Hobbesian proportions (Watts, 2004B; 215). Because of the centralized nature of the national oil industry, all oil revenues must go through Abuja, and are rarely controlled by local community leadership. Instead, they are pocketed by politicians, or used to buy allies and militias.

The series of military dictatorships has led to an army heavily involved in the political arena. As Ross describes, because the oil is located in an area dominated by an ethnic minority, this has led to the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts, with heavy involvement by the military.

The repression of civil society groups, often ethnically based, is also evident in Nigeria, as exemplified by the violent attacks on peaceful demonstrations demanding greater control of resources and payment for damaged property. Modernization also has a tenuous hold in Nigeria. While parts of the north are relatively well developed, as stated above, the south of Nigeria remains one of the poorest regions in the world, primarily because of the failure of the state to equitably distribute oil wealth. These three effects all pose a serious threat to the existence of truly democratic institutions.

Richani's description of the financing of the war-system in Columbia bears some similarities to what occurs in Nigeria. As demonstrated above, oil companies' operations both indirectly fuel ethnic tension and directly finance the operations of militias and armed gangs. In Nigeria, Watts states, "the presence, and activities, of oil companies constitute a challenge to customary forms of community

authority, inter-ethnic relations, and local state institutions, principally through property disputes...” (Watts, 2004A; 199). The MNCs also perpetrate violence against civilian protesters who demand only reparation for environmental damage and land lost. However, the presence of oil does not necessarily entail these conditions. MNCs could operate according to principles of corporate responsibility. As both Bennett and Muchlinksi discuss, MNCs are often extremely influential in the locations where they operate, sometimes more so than governments, and thus arguably have a responsibility to both ensure their own operations do not create problems and to participate in conflict resolution in problematic areas. The MNCs in Nigeria have, up to the present, done very little to operate according to these standards. Instead, they have, in conjunction with the Nigerian government, created an essentially predatory system in which the MNCs and politicians are the sole benefactors of the oil industry, and the citizens of Nigeria are left with a destroyed traditional economy and poor, conflict-prone communities.

It is this relationship between the government and the MNCs that poses perhaps the biggest threat to democratic institutions in Nigeria. The three examples above — of the land laws, the security forces, and the collusion over public relations — demonstrate the extent to which the state and MNCs collaborate for their mutual benefit in Nigeria. It is important to remember, however, that MNCs are businesses and that they exist to make a profit. Therefore, the extent to which they will behave altruistically, despite movements towards the attitudes embodied in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, is minimal. Oil companies in particular often operate in the most politically unstable regions and therefore take extreme measures to remain in operation. The MNCs in Nigeria did not create the ethnic tensions that are the root of so much conflict — these are instead, largely the result of colonialism and the decisions of subsequent Nigerian leaders. While it has been demonstrated that the operations of MNCs greatly exacerbate these pre-existing problems, ideally the government would act as a check on potentially destructive behaviour of MNCs, as well as establish a system of equitable distribution of power and oil revenues to various ethnic communities to minimize potential for conflict. In Nigeria, what is problematic is that the power of the MNCs is comparable to that of the government, and this is where the resource curse further contributes to an understanding of the situation. As the resource curse describes, because of the primacy of the oil industry, and the huge profits embodied therein, all other industry, from agriculture to manufacturing has been stunted in Nigeria. Thus, the oil industry has undue influence on the government, and the state is transformed into an apparatus whose primary purpose is the accumulation and distribution of oil rents and the repression of civilian organizations that might hinder the operations of the oil companies. When these are the primary functions of the state, and when it is dominated by the same profit-seeking attitudes as the MNCs themselves, there is little incentive to move towards establishing truly democratic institutions or attitudes.

It is precisely this democratic attitude, albeit embodied in a constitution, that Ndulo states is necessary for democracy to take a strong hold in African countries. This certainly applies to Nigeria. Good governance will further human rights and create a real democracy that includes the right to take part in government, to vote and be elected, and to equal access to public services (Ndulo, 2003; 334). However, real democracy cannot be created in situations of conflict, poverty and “...where ... the allocation of society’s resources favours and benefits the dominant faction” (Ndulo, 2003; 325). One solution that Ndulo calls for is the devolution of power to local governments. This would mean ceding to the demands of various ethnic minority groups for greater local control of oil revenues. It would involve lessening the power of the central government in Abuja and would require that the oil companies work to build better relationships with the communities in which they operate as opposed to corrupt officials in the capital. Ultimately what all this requires however, is a democratic attitude in place of the profit-seeking mentality that currently dominates the Nigerian political system.

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First as Masters, Always as Friends: The Colonial Legacy, Neocolonialism, and the Impact on African Development by

Cassandra Cotton — fourth year honours international relations

Nearly forty years after the majority of the continent's countries gained independence from their former colonial masters, and over one hundred years after the Congress of Berlin finalized the 'Scramble for Africa' by "carv[ing] up [Africa] into various European zones of influence" (Martin, 1982: 224), the continent still suffers the ill effects of its comparatively short-lived colonial era. The region's most recent development indicators are dismal: a 2006 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of \$598, with much regional variation within the continent and within individual countries (International Monetary Fund, 2007); a 6.1% HIV prevalence in 2005, amounting to nearly twenty eight million people (UNAIDS, 2006); an under-five mortality rate of 163 per 1000 in 2005 (World Bank, 2007) and a life expectancy of 47 years (World Bank, 2007). While some argue, perhaps rightly when one considers the corruption and lack of transparency common in African politics, that "Africa is partly responsible for its own misfortune," (Sarkozy, 2007) it cannot be denied that the past and current actions of the former colonial powers, particularly Britain and France, have had a powerful and long-lasting impact on the political, economic and social development of the continent. According to Iuean Griffiths (1995) "[t]he colonial experience is critical for Modern Africa because of its strong impact on the present ... [as] the imprint of the colonial inheritance is still very clear" (1995: 2) in the former African colonies. The intricate bond between the colonisers and the colonised has transitioned in recent decades from the colonial to the postcolonial; however, the relationship has continued to be characterized by imperial dominance even post-independence. The 'special relationship' between former African colonies and their colonisers in the years after

independence has allowed for the continuance of colonial rule – both direct and indirect – over the political, economic and social spheres of African life, resulting in an enduring neo-colonial bond. European neo-colonialism, coupled with the effects of the colonial legacy, is at the very least, partially accountable for the long-term development issues that the majority of former African colonies have encountered post-independence.

This paper will attempt to define and address the themes of neo-colonialism, dependency and interdependency, and the colonial legacy in relation to the African continent and will discuss key political, economic, and social aspects of the colonial inheritance using specific examples from the decades following independence. The paper will conclude with a brief analysis of the links between British and French neo-colonialism, the inherited African legacy, and current African development.

I. Thoughts on Neo-colonialism, Dependency Theory and the *Eurafrrique*

Colonialism in and of itself requires little explanation; however, neo-colonialism is a much more enigmatic and complex phenomenon, which necessitates defining in order to understand its implications and consequences. Simply put, the neo-colonial system is "a more subtle, indirect version of the old" (Young, 2001: 44) system of colonisation in place in Africa and elsewhere throughout the colonial period. The term was first introduced in 1961 at the All-African People's Conference (Young, 2001; Martin, 1985) and was further defined through the writings of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president after independence, on the continued involvement of Britain in the affairs of independent Ghana. Nkrumah, a leading proponent of Pan-African unity and socialism, insisted that decolonisation and independence were primarily symbolic on the part of colonial powers and that "political independence would mean little if it

were unaccompanied by economic independence from the former colonial masters" (Calvocoressi, 1986: 9). The process of granting independence allowed former colonists to claim a distance and separation from the affairs of their ex-colonies while still maintaining strong political and economic ties that provided distinct benefits to the European nations; in this way, "neo-colonialism [was and] is a continuation of traditional colonial rule by another means" (Young, 2001: 47). Neo-colonialism allows for the involvement of former colonial powers – in particular, the roles of Britain and France must be noted – in the economic and political decisions of former colonies through both direct and indirect means. This has, in part, led to continuing economic inequality and dependency, uneven and potentially exploitative trade relations, obvious social and political disparity, and systematic underdevelopment. Some argue the relationships and bonds between the European ex-colonists – now nearly all dominant world powers – and the former African colonies continues to border on exploitation similar to what was experienced during the colonial era (Chinweizu, 1987). It appears that "the crux of the [African] crisis [is] the unequal nature of the relationship between the West and Africa, an inequality which was created and is maintained by the West" (Chinweizu, 1987: 72). The consequences of neo-colonial practices and the remnants of colonisation together provide a long-term dependency of the so-called periphery of African ex-colonies on the core of dominant Northern former colonial powers, as well as a resilient colonial legacy that is "a product of historical forces and a direct result of the contact between the hitherto underdeveloped social formations [of African nations] and the forces of Western imperialism" (Udombana, 2000: 759). According to Young (2001) this dependent legacy is due almost entirely to the past and present actions of the former colonies, and he notes,

... the word "neo-colonialism" was a fitting term to describe the immediate set-up of the postcolonial epoch [as] although the formerly colonized territories gradually had their political sovereignty returned to them, they nevertheless remained subject to the effective control of the major world powers, which constituted the same group as the former imperial powers. Neocolonialism denotes a continuing economic hegemony that means the postcolonial state remains in a situation of dependence on its former masters and that the former masters continue to act in a colonialist manner towards formerly colonized states. (2001: 45)

Dependency theory, commonly espoused within discussions of "Third World" economic and politic matters, postulates on the existence of a developed core or metropole and a developing periphery or satellite, which is dependent economically on the core. Throughout the colonial period, the imperial powers cemented an uneven economic relationship built entirely on dependence of the colonies on the metropole European states for trading purposes; in the postcolonial period, "independent economic development in Africa remains a dream" (Griffiths, 1995: 179) due to the dominance of European powers in the world economic system and due to "the constraints of international politics and economics" (Zartman, 1976: 326). While dependency theory cannot explain every aspect of poor African development in the post-independence era, it is important to note the theory's usefulness in explaining the reliance of African ex-colonies on their former colonial masters, as the extensive historical economic ties provide a strong, and seemingly innate, basis for ongoing economic interdependence. The idea of 'complementarity' (Martin, 1985) alleges that the two continents are dependent upon one another in that "Europe requires Africa's raw materials and markets, while Africa needs the capital, technology, and know-how of Europe;" however, this interdependence primarily "serv[es] the interests of the metropole rather than those of the colony" (Martin, 1985: 222) and is thus another aspect of the neocolonialist system and "an ideological justification for the perpetuation of dependency in a changing international environment" (Martin, 1985: 233).

Out of these theories of interdependence and complementarity arose the French concept of the *Eurafrique*, which developed during the colonial era to describe a desired "kind of unity of continents with complementary economies, which under the leadership of 'the older of the two' was to develop as an independent factor in world politics" (Sicking, 2004: 212). Despite its conception in the late 1950s, the ideology continues to be advocated in the current era, promoted and referred to by French President

Nicolas Sarkozy recently as “this great common destiny that awaits Europe and Africa” (Sarkozy, 2007). The idea of a *Eurafrrique* is based on long-term cooperation and collaboration between African and European states whereby “the fate of Europe and Africa is seen as being naturally and inextricably linked at the political, economic, social, and cultural levels;” (Martin, 1982: 222) under the philosophy of the *Eurafrrique*, links between Africa and their colonial counterparts were seen as “indissoluble” (Martin, 1995: 2) and permanent. Thus, long-term interconnections and contractual commitments between the two continents, and in particular between France and both Francophone and non-Francophone African countries, are seen as natural continuations of historical economic and political partnerships, which first appeared in the colonial era as paternalistic leadership on the part of Europe and now as neo-colonialist policies “conveniently renamed *coopération*” (Martin, 1995: 4). Post-independence, policy makers in both Britain and France realised quickly that decolonisation did not necessarily need to mean a loss of overall power and of their long-term investment in a continent that had gained certain strategic importance in the bipolar world climate of the period. Particularly, in the case of France, the post-colonial period continues to be defined by the concept of a ‘special relationship’ (Golan, 1981) which “came into being during the last period of colonial rule and was aimed at allowing a certain continuity rather than a complete break with the colonial past” (Golan, 1981: 3). This ‘special relationship’ is still largely accepted by the French and promoted as being the best and most effective way to continue a relationship between the former colonies and France (Golan, 1981), although the “French approach has been condemned [by many Africans and Northerners alike] as essentially neo-colonial” (Griffiths, 1995: 74). The enduring strength and influence of the European powers in the political, economic and social spheres of Africa is considered largely to stem from the subtle and indirect means the former colonists use to engage the continent in the international system. Such influence ranges from the provision of development assistance, often in the form of tied aid, to the creation of Euro-African trade agreements, many of which provide few benefits to the average African. These neo-colonial forms of control and influence “represent imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage” (Nkrumah, 1965).

II. The Colonial Legacy: What has Africa Inherited?

Much work has been published on the impact of colonialism on Africa (Boahen, 1987; Chinweizu, 1987; Griffiths, 1995; Nkrumah, 1965; Rodney, 1973), although the nature of the impact is often in question. While some argue that there were indeed exploitative and oppressive practices in place within the colonial system, others argue there were positive “credits” of development to the “balance sheet of colonialism” (Boahen, 1987: 95). Others strongly maintain that there were no positive impacts resulting from the colonial era. In the words of Walter Rodney, author of *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, “[c]olonialism had only one hand — it was a one-armed bandit,” and a system under which “the only thing[s] that developed were dependency and underdevelopment” (Rodney, 1973). Regardless of its positive or negative nature, the importance of the colonial experience on African development cannot realistically be denied, and the endurance of the colonial legacy and inheritance are key to understanding the current situation in the majority of African former colonies. At this juncture, it is useful to define what, precisely, is meant by the term “colonial legacy.” Similar to the phenomenon of neo-colonialism, the colonial legacy embodies the remnants of the colonial system: institutions (both political and economic); infrastructure; boundaries and borders resulting from partition, and social and cultural practices, including but not limited to language and religion. Such aspects of colonialism were often carried over into the workings of the post-colonial, independent states of Africa for domestic convenience at time of decolonisation and continued to be used due to international pressure and influence under the neo-colonial system (Griffiths, 1995). The effects of the colonial legacy – and the legacy itself – varies greatly, dependent on both geography (as some regions fared better than others in the colonial period due to natural resources and strategic locations) and on the form of colonialism in place from 1884 until decolonisation. Differences in the colonial approach may be important when considering the impact of colonialism as it is often argued “the British espoused a philosophy of indirect rule, working through indigenous rulers and preserving traditional institutions. Conversely, the French adhered to a philosophy

of direct rule, abolishing indigenous institutions and imposing French beliefs and practices outright" (Firmin-Sellers, 2000: 254).

A. The Implications of Partition: "Unnatural" Borders

One of the most important, yet also one of the most basic, aspects of the colonial legacy is certainly the partition of the continent during the "Scramble for Africa," which culminated in the Congress of Berlin in 1884-1885. It is "perhaps the most basically problematical part of the colonial inheritance" (Griffiths, 1995: 98). Prior to the dissection of the continent into European-controlled zones, a number of distinct areas based on ethnicity, language and shared ancestral history existed; many such areas were divided and separated during partition with little thought on the part of the European powers. This process of "balkanization" (Griffiths, 1995; Martin, 1995), under which "small component political units" (Griffiths, 1995: 167) emerged first as colonies and later as independent states, provided long-term disruption to development, and made both colonial and neo-colonial systems of dependence far easier to impose. Colonial borders were drawn with little regard to traditional boundaries, often dividing and separating ethno-linguistic groupings and favouring those groups most amenable to European interests, which often furthered interethnic conflict and caused a number of issues in regards to traditional land and resource use. The arbitrary nature of the partition has been duly noted by a number of scholars on Africa: H. L. Wesseling (1996) notes that Europeans organized partition looking at maps, with little knowledge of the regions discussed, and that "[t]hese maps did not ... reflect reality but helped to create it ... draw[ing] much criticism. Thus it is often said that it has rendered the borders of Africa 'unnatural'" (Wesseling, 1996: 364); Griffiths, too, notes that "the partition of Africa was by Europeans for Europeans" (Griffiths, 1995: 45). Essentially, "Africa became Europe's geo-political chess-board" (Griffiths, 1995: 38). Few other aspects of the colonial era have held over so firmly in the post-colonial period; not only have the vast majority of independent African states adopted the colonially-determined borders despite long-term criticism of their ineffectuality as appropriate and logical boundaries, but the implications of such borders are numerous and delve into the political, economic and socio-cultural spheres. "The colonially-imposed partition is a political straight-jacket for modern Africa. It divides, constrains development, encourages neo-colonialism and helps perpetuate Africa's economic and political weakness in global affairs" (Griffiths, 1995: 3). Furthermore, it "created fundamental problems in Africa that are still present and are likely to be there for many years to come," (Griffiths, 1995: 44) and the international recognition of the existing borders is such that "opportunities for change in the post-independence era have largely been ignored" (Griffiths, 1995: 84). The European-drawn borders of the colonies have created long-term problems for governance in a number of African countries, as states lack cohesion and unity and face issues involving "disputed borders and incorporated religious and ethnic conflicts" (Calvocoressi, 1986: 15). Griffiths summarizes the various reasons behind the extreme impact of partition, noting,

The partition of Africa by the European powers to create colonies which subsequently became independent sovereign states caused all manner of problems for those successor states. Some are land-locked, others are of an off shape, many have ambiguous boundaries, most have badly located capital cities. Some are too small to be economically or politically viable, others are too large, particularly in the sense that they encompass disparate groups of people. As states they lack cohesion and unity." (1995: 123)

Independent Africa appears on the modern map much as the boundaries were drawn in 1884, despite a number of factors that interfere with cohesive statehood in the present. Many states suffer a variety of conditions rendering them politically and economically unviable on their own as distinct political units; thus, neo-colonial practices are suggested as a means of integrating these small countries into the international system.

B. The Political and Economic Inheritance: Systems of *Coopération*

Politically speaking, former African colonies inherited the political systems and institutions of their colonists, often with few changes made. The French administered a direct, centralized system of rule within their colonies, while the British ruled more indirectly, often seeking out traditional or customary leaders to rule through (Golan, 1981; Firmin-Sellers, 2000). The adoption of the former colonial systems of rule has led to complex political ties to the ex-colonist countries, and particularly in the case of the French, it is noted that "regardless of their political regimes - military or civilian, 'progressive' or 'moderate' - the Francophone states of Africa all maintain a particularly close association with their former metropolis: Paris" (Golan, 1981: 3). Many African colonies inherited the bureaucratic institutions of the former colonists, including a two-tiered system of civil servants and customary rulers, under which power was passed on to a small African elite promoting a patronage system that would remain in use long after decolonisation. According to David Potter (2002),

The post-colonial state was thus two-tiered (like its predecessor) bureaucratic and political institutions in the top-tier, 'customary' patrimonial authorities in the lower tier. The anti-democratic character of post-independence politics in many African countries can be traced at least in part to the colonial legacy of authoritarianism. (2002: 286)

The long-term use of authoritarian political systems in African colonies encouraged the development of neopatrimonialist systems after independence, which combined traditional patrimonial rule and "rational-legal political institutions" such as "bureaucracies, courts and executives accountable to legislatures" (Potter, 2002: 286). Neopatrimonialism – a system whereby one person holds supreme power and "dominates the state apparatus" (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997: 62 quoted by Potter, 2002: 286) – has become a standard feature in African politics and figures heavily in the political relations between African states and their former colonial masters. The prominence of neopatrimonial leaders has done little to encourage development and political and economic stability in present-day Africa; in fact, the extensive employment of patronage and clientelism has done little but to facilitate the neo-colonial practices of the former colonial powers.

The economic legacy of colonialism, too, has heavily influenced the economic and commercial decisions made by African leaders in the decades following independence, largely due to the continued involvement of former colonial powers in the economic affairs of the ex-colonies. The main economic agreement signed prior to independence granted preferential status to France's colonies under the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community. Following decolonisation, the tenets of the Treaty were adopted under the first Yaoundé Convention (1964-1969) with few changes, and were later transferred into the second Yaoundé Convention (1969-1975), which thirteen of the former French colonies and the three former Belgian colonies were party to (Martin, 1982). The first and second Lomé Conventions (1975-1980 and 1980-85, respectively) were touted as being less neo-colonial and more conducive to African unity; however, the Conventions meant "the transition from the colonial to the neo-colonial pact is realised smoothly while the essence of the unequal exchange remains unaffected" (Martin, 1982: 230). The agreements promoted exploitative trading practices and allowed for continued underdevelopment of African economies, which appeared as mere "appendages of the Western economy" (Chinweizu, 1987: 286). Trade agreements between European and African countries emphasised the subservient role of African economies in the world economic system and encouraged continuing production of cash monocrops whose commodity prices were, and still are, often kept artificially low (Martin, 1995). Colonisation put an end to the majority of inter-African trade (Boahen, 1987) and little changed in this regard post-independence; the former metropolises remained the primary trading partner of nearly all African states (Griffiths, 1995). Along with close trading relationships and "[an] overdependence on aid" (Nyukuli, 1999: 624), the former colonists continued to tie the colony currency to that of the mother country, and much of the colonies' earnings were held in European banks, rarely withdrawn – even post-independence – for development of investment purposes (Boahen, 1987). A prime example of postcolonial monetary policy is the *Zone Franc*, under which the French pegged colonial currency against the worth of the *franc*, which "meant that these territories followed France's inflationary and deflationary movements" (Sicking, 2004: 210). The neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs

(SAPs) promoted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank throughout the 1980s, while too complex to discuss in-depth in this paper, also added immense economic and political pressure on the developing world as a whole and Africa in particular and caused a host of problems in and of themselves, adding to the effects of neo-colonial economic practices (Nyukuli, 1999).

III. Colonialism and Neo-colonialism: Impacts on and Possibilities for African Development

The legacies of the colonial period are deeply engrained in the present political, economic and social spheres of African life; they have erased and recreated aspects of African history (Chinweizu, 1987). It is argued "the immediate causes of African misery must be put in the context of basic structural defects, both economic and political, deriving from the comparatively recent and short-lived colonial period when almost the whole of Africa was divided between European powers. This context is by no means the sole cause of Africa's present plight, but the colonial inheritance is crucially important and not easily disowned" (Griffiths, 1995: 1-2). While it would be an exaggeration to lay blame on the events of the colonial period for all of the current issues facing modern Africa, the remnants of colonialism, as well as the neo-colonial practices of European powers, are responsible, directly or indirectly, for the underdevelopment of the continent. In order to continue to move forward with development efforts, the history of colonialism must be addressed, as "contemporary Africa is beset with problems which cannot be solved without adequate attention first being paid to the surviving legacies of [the] past" (Chinweizu, 1987: 227). The continent is faced with numerous internal conflicts (frequently over ethnicity, ownership of resources and the issues surrounding national boundaries) such as those experienced in much of sub-Saharan Africa; famines and droughts; the unethical exploitation of natural resources including diamonds and gold, which are mined primarily by and for the North; immense loads of debt, and high prevalence of poverty and disease. Underlying these conditions is the economic and political subservience and instability assumed to be an inheritance of both the colonial and neo-colonial periods (Griffiths, 1995; Martin, 1995). While a number of factors have improved over the past decade – GDP per capita has increased (IMF, 2007); more democratic and fair elections have been held in several countries such as Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Liberia, and public spending on education and health has increased – the continent "remains marginalized in the economic development process and global political scene" (Nyikuli, 1999: 623) and development efforts continue to stagnate.

Faced with what often appear to be insurmountable obstacles to political, economic and social development, African scholars and others have continued to note the importance of "African countries... bear[ing] the responsibility of shaping their own destiny" (Nyikuli, 1999: 636). The endorsement of African unity in the forms of a common market organizing both inter-African and international trade policy, integrated infrastructure including roadways and communications, and integrated financial resources such as a common African currency are often promoted as the most logical means of shaking off the effects of the colonial legacy and the more recent influence of neo-colonialism. After more than one hundred years of colonialism and neo-colonialism, suggestions for African development are following in the lead of the pan-Africanists of the 1950s, who believed "that the immediate and complete political and economic integration of the whole of Africa is the only road out of the neo-colonial predicament in which the continent at present finds itself" (Martin, 1982: 236).

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Paul Collier: Rescuing the bottom billion

Collier, Paul. 2007. *The Bottom Billion*:

Book reviews are by Dara MacDonald, fourth year honours international relations

Collier's *The Bottom Billion* begins with an intriguing and provocative premise that guides subsequent analysis: the development community and the international public as a whole have been focussing on the wrong group of poor societies. More specifically, he argues that it is the "bottom billion" (those billion people who live in the most extremely poor countries, most of which are in Africa and Central Asia) about whom the international community should be concerned. Collier argues that these societies living in "fourteenth century conditions" are suffering from one of four traps: the conflict trap; the natural resource trap; the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbours; or the trap of bad governance in a small country (3). At first, these particular features seem somewhat random, but the statistical analysis that follows, much of which Collier has done himself or with colleagues, indeed corroborates his assertions that these are very important characteristics for extreme poverty.

Collier further argues that these countries are often trapped in these situations for decades, and that lifting them beyond the periodic limbo of extremely slow growth is a task that requires several key changes to the international development framework. Perhaps predictably, Collier toes the party line when he suggests that the real issue is the bottom billion's lack of growth and that therefore the real task is to get those countries fair access to world markets at the right time. He asserts, "the failure of the growth process in these societies simply has to be our core concern, and curing it the core challenge of development" (11).

Overall, Collier's argument is innovative, persuasive, and well-researched. His ability to build complex models linking economic to social and political characteristics of these bottom billion societies is a valuable and inventive Paul Collier's contribution to the literature on why development has gone wrong in so many places. Any attempt to quantify the effects of civil war, natural resource endowments, regional placement, and bad governance on a society's economic growth and development is courageous, given the difficulty of such an endeavour.

In attempting this task, Collier brings many original components to our concept of underdevelopment, all of which appear to be supported strongly by data. His discussion of failing states is one such example; although the concept of a state whose government (and thus law and order) has collapsed is not novel in the political science literature, Collier's use of the idea to explain why economies collapse correspondingly is quite interesting.

Additionally, Collier diagnoses some serious problems within the development bureaucracy itself; views that he readily admits may be ill received. Like William Easterly, he believes that the international aid devices are not properly structured and that they should be more flexible to context and transferable to other countries. According to Collier, they must be more agile and willing to accept risk when disbursing money (as risky situations are those with the biggest payoff when properly executed). He also suggests, again similar to Easterly, that the professional structure of these institutions inadvertently positions aid more like a business endeavour than a collective support instrument. Career success in aid institutions is based on the disbursement of money, and no one wants their career trajectory to be predicated on measurable success in utterly intractable development situations. Brave statements for him to make, and entirely necessary if the international system is to use its money effectively.

Collier's statements about the need for the West to take responsibility in situations of humanitarian need and collectively intervene militarily might also be controversial; however, it is clear that, through his analysis, Collier has come to understand the pervasive need for holistic efforts to avoid letting any more societies slip into the bottom billion (or fail to escape should the chance

presents itself). The book's firm advocacy for just but free trade between the bottom billion and the developed world also falls along these lines; his concern for the headless heart of the international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the public that oppose free trade, which he believes to be an important component of growth and thus the lift out of extreme poverty, is measured yet convincing (156). The lament that many NGOs and most of the public do not understand trade policy does seem to ring true in many cases.

His diagnosis of the issues is well thought out, however it is the proposal of solutions that is most heartening. His suggestions are firmly focussed on the practical, advocating ideas such as the independent service authorities, the promulgation of international charters establishing policy procedure to be used in multiple countries, the re-thinking of international trade to allow market access for the goods of the bottom billion, and the re-structuring of the aid paradigm. There is also a pervasive thread of collective responsibility, which he lays out most poignantly in the book's conclusion. He appeals directly to the reader — a powerful while unexpected tactic. Openly telling readers that just because their work may not be concerned with development does not mean they are off the hook, Collier reminds individuals: "you are a citizen, and citizenship comes with responsibilities . . . It is the responsibility of all citizens to prevent us from sleepwalking into another avoidable catastrophe that our children would have to face" (176).

William Easterly: Economic growth in comparative perspective

Easterly, William. 2006. *The Elusive Quest for Economic Growth*.

An outspoken and somewhat unorthodox contributor to the literature on economic growth and development, William Easterly does an exceptional job of detailing economists' pursuit of the cause of economic growth in *The Elusive Quest for Growth*. In addition to offering a meticulously researched summary of the attempts made thus far, he manages to offer some innovative insight into what a growth-conducive economy would look like, all while using a rhetorical style that is unassuming, direct, and witty.

The logic flows seamlessly, with appropriate modesty, and with exceptional use of analogical examples and extensive data. Easterly may be labeled a pessimist, but his own rhetoric suggests that he is more pragmatic than anything else. Far from not caring about the poor or not supporting initiatives for the betterment of their situation, Easterly is foremost a critic of the fact that money, time, and energy have been wasted on the inefficient means by which the international community has all been trying to reach that end.

Easterly positions his book as a chronicle of the adventures of economists in attempting to explain why growth happens and, therefore, what a country can do to make its economy grow. His admission throughout of the faults of his own discipline, and indeed the faults in his own work, is particularly admirable. On their elusive quest, he suggests that economists have been searching for various panaceas that will serve as magic bullets to growth in all contexts. Somewhat provocatively, he then suggests that most of these proposed solutions to the problem of why developing economies do not grow are sorely misguided. The refrain that people respond to incentives is constant, and it is obvious that Easterly believes his field has not taken this fully into account at any point.

It is difficult to believe on instinct that all development economists to date have been this far-off base, but Easterly's logic and extensive analysis of various data sets does lead a reader to have faith in his argument. He resolutely attacks the pillars of modern development thinking: the financing gap (and its solution, foreign aid); technological change; investment in human capital; population control; and debt forgiveness. But the attack is well-planned and well-executed — after reading his book, it is easy to see why all of these efforts have indeed been fairly misguided (and in some situations sorely so), and, more importantly for Easterly, why they have created perverse incentives for growth. One of his most recurrent points is that societies that are primed for growth (or are on a path to growth) are those that see value in investing in the future. A simple concept, to be sure, but one that he fleshes out excellently by showing how the reverse is true; economically stagnant societies are those that are not investing in the future (evidenced by how their economies, fiscal policy, and governance systems are structured).

It is on the point of governance that Easterly reaches some of his most insightful conclusions. Overall, he suggests that the international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank for example) need to wake up to the economic inefficiency of their programming and the inadequacy of their monitoring systems. At the very least, this is one issue on which Easterly and Jeffrey Sachs agree. Easterly advocates for a complete overhaul of the approach, noting that, "the motto of the IMF, World Bank, and the recipient governments sometimes seems to have been 'millions to resolve a crisis, not a dollar to prevent one'" (115). On the recipient side, he takes aim at inefficient and often criminal governments of the developing economies.

His further points on the corruption present in the governments of many developing countries are well placed and make the reader wonder why few others have vocalized this particular brand of inefficiency so openly. Easterly makes a very important note in saying that economists who are studying growth and development must essentially consider the role of politics, as governments

are the primary agents of decision-making in most collective policy that will foster (or circumvent) growth.

Easterly's insights on the role of social polarization are also quite novel. Putting the machinations of government officials on behalf of ethnic interest groups in economic terms is a valuable and rare contribution to the thinking on these issues. It is more common to hear about the role of inequality and wealthy elites in perverting policy, which Easterly does address at some length, but rare to discuss social polarization as a concept in the terms of development economics. His further discussion of initiatives on the part of governments to avoid undue influence of one ethnic or class interest group (central bank independence, an independent budget-setting authority) also seems quite novel.

Overall, Easterly's work is highly insightful and critical. The reader soon develops a strong sense of respect for his ability to cut through the rhetoric and promises of development programming throughout the decades and critically evaluate its success with respect to its primary aim. The intermezzos and other short examples of the real-life component behind his data sets and evaluation of economic models serve to ground his work with a sense of purpose and responsibility. It is also admirable that he rarely resorts to the high-minded rhetoric of many writers in the field, instead choosing to invoke the emotional element judiciously. The choice to begin and end the book with the same real-life example was an apt way of demonstrating his concern for the discovery of responsible solutions to the vast issues of extreme poverty and economic development. As he writes, "nothing would be sadder than to give up the quest altogether" (291).

Benjamin Friedman: Economic growth in 'moral' perspective

Friedman, Benjamin. 2006. *The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth*. Vintage: . 592 pages.

Ben Friedman's work, *The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth* is an important addition to the contemporary literature on the validity of economic growth goals in both industrialized and industrializing economic contexts. As a whole, the book is extremely well-researched, argumentatively thorough, and quite convincing. Friedman's fundamental premise seems to make common sense: economic growth raises individual and collective living standards, which in turn provides a society with resources to make itself prosperous and build strong institutions. However, his larger thesis is more novel: the process of economic growth (and the accompanying increase in living standards) is crucial to the maintenance of a democratic, transparent, and tolerant society congruent with Enlightenment-era moral values.

The idea that it is not only a high standard of living but also the existence of a *rising* standard of living that promotes such moral values is particularly innovative. The pursuit of economic growth has often been vilified by anti-globalization activists and other groups hostile to neo-conservative thought; however, Friedman's meticulous research about and evidentiary support for the necessity of growth shows that its pursuit is not actually a method of consolidating wealth in the hands of the wealthy, but rather a smart policy aim when pursued conscientiously. He ably identifies the fundamental reason why economic growth is a viable policy goal — it will bring positive social consequences in addition to money to buy goods and services (such as the aforementioned higher standard of living).

It is partly Friedman's writing style that makes his thesis so convincing. His detailed discussion of the interaction between economic climate and political history in the Western democracies is instructive, and that his admission of the occasional situation that does not corroborate his argument actually serves to strengthen the reader's faith in its worth. Overall, both the argument and the book itself become more interesting as Friedman applies his ideas to the developing world. Again, the analysis in those chapters is thorough and considerate. Friedman is open in admitting the presence of economic, social, political, and cultural diversity in the developing world, and this tendency again makes his work believable. He sets out with admittedly broad questions, and then proceeds to answer them as best as possible with clear-cut, rigorous analysis and statistical evidence.

Friedman is also understanding and inclusive of the social forces at work in economic development processes. His recognition that modernization creates political alienation and conflict is reminiscent of Samuel Huntington (*The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order* and *The Soldier and the State*), but seems more evolved. The point that economic growth creates the kind of interpersonal trust necessitated by any kind of democracy suggests that he is working with a more nuanced interpretation of events than Huntington; Friedman's assertion that growth creates trust in the idea that one's situation will improve and therefore also creates a greater tolerance for the inequality of early economic development is indeed compelling. His recognition of the fact that citizens must perceive that everyone has an equal chance at being successful is also important; in fact, it may be used to explain why phenomena such as backlash against wealthy ethnic minorities occur fairly regularly in developing economies.

Although the basic argument is most appropriate in the context of Western democracies, Friedman's ideas do seem to hold true throughout most of the chapters about developing countries. His use of Freedom House data regarding civil liberties and political freedoms is helpful in understanding what exactly is meant by moral consequences outside of the examples given in specific context (such as legislation in Western democracies). Further, the idea of vicious and virtuous circles helps the reader to understand how economic growth and healthy democracy are

mutually reinforcing in the best situation, and, by contrast, how economic stagnation and repressive politics are mutually reinforcing in the worst situation. His conclusions about education and other methods of human capital formation are crucial to the reader's understanding of how such circles work — democracies promote greater access to education, an educated workforce generally promotes growth, and growth in turn promotes democracy.

It is also fitting that Friedman proceeds to address the issue of resource allocation; the environmental problem is immediately evident once one has agreed that the pursuit of continual economic growth is a valid aim. It may be surprising to many environmentalists that Friedman — an economist — asserts that today's industrial economies became the way that they are today because of large-scale habitat destruction and that climate change is a crucially important public policy issue.

One of his most sensible and relevant points on this issue relates to the cost of mitigation: if environmentalists want to protect the Amazon, their countries must be prepared to help the Brazilians pay for it. This is a simple point, but it is very relevant to attempts at international environmental cooperation. As well, Friedman's discussion of the nature of sustainable development clarifies the character of an often-confused field. He even goes as far as to extend the idea of sustainable development beyond its environmental roots, asserting that "bequeathing future generations a better state of life than our own — including not just their material standard of living but also the physical environment in which they live and the societal institutions under which they go about their daily lives — is central to what sustainable development means" (394).

Friedman's conclusions regarding the use of the natural environment can readily be universalized to symbolize his larger recommendation for policy makers. They can be summarized as this: Market forces will do part of the job in both protecting the resource base and encouraging growth, but there is also a crucial role for public policy that creates the condition for environmental protection and economic growth. Public policy can fill the gap between what people *should* do and what they *will* do when faced with existing (largely market) incentive structures. Overall, Friedman's argument that the promotion of economic growth is essential to the development of a democratic, open society to which most of us aspire is extremely sound; as is often the case with this kind of literature, it is a discussion of the specific character of public policy capable of achieving this goal that is somewhat missing from the argumentative equation.

Jeffrey Sachs: An Achievable End to Poverty?

Sachs, Jeffrey. 2006. *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. Penguin: New York

As an economist who has become something of a social justice celebrity in recent years, Jeffrey Sachs plays his cards predictably in *The End of Poverty*, a piece that proposes an ambitious and resolutely political stance on the need and means to end global extreme poverty. Although the discussion of his basic point is rather lengthy, the crux of it is this: a program of concerted global investment in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their principles, combined with rigorous plans to monitor and evaluate the returns on that investment, has the power to end extreme poverty by 2025. In principled form, Sachs' argument is convincing, seems morally appropriate, and shows mutual benefit for all the world's citizens; the rhetoric is impeccable, and the call to action motivational. Critics of Sachs' work will, however, have some questions about the reality of his ideals. Will the world collectively have the ability or willingness to operationalize Sachs' prescriptions (as he would like them to be called, having completed his differential diagnosis)? Moreover, some economists criticize the very credibility of Sachs' ideas on a macroeconomic level, critique to which he does not speak in the book.

Occasionally, Sachs' writing style and rhetoric leaves something to be desired. Although it is indeed inspirational in nature, it is also at times simplistic and mildly self-congratulatory. Moreover, a well-informed reader will see much of his stated truths as self-evident, and his periodic tendency to summarize himself in point form can seem trite.

However, over the length of the book, Sachs' style ceases to grate so much on a cynical reader and gives way to a more rigorous and believable analysis. Regardless of its simplicity, Sachs' description of the global problem of poverty is accurate and considerate; for an uninitiated reader, one could not ask for much better. The reasoning behind his unwavering support for the MDGs is obvious given his professional ties to the United Nations, and his analysis of their integrity and chance for success suffered from some lack of critical assessment as a result. Aside from this, the book lays out a series of concrete, mostly measurable policy prescriptions, which is more than you can say for several similar texts.

Apart from those truths that hold to be self-evident and whose mention may be unnecessary, Sachs hits on several important, if not unknown, realizations. It is especially important that these points be made publicly in a book with as wide a reach as *The End of Poverty*. Although his treatment of various aspects of the development equation is complete, the particular aspect of economic development that Sachs mentions quite often is the issue of geography and natural capital. He often notes that geographical barriers or resource differentials are key markers of differential development experience among countries. It is geographical distress, particularly that associated with poor agricultural climate or land endowment and transport isolation, that he cites regularly as the most fundamental reason why economic growth has not occurred in various locations.

By Sachs' description, it is rural Africa that has suffered the most from underdevelopment, and it is mainly the region's isolation from infrastructure and trade nodes that has perpetuated this state. More simply, "geography has conspired with economics to give Africa a particularly weak hand" (208). According to him, the rising tide of economic growth cannot lift all boats, as it doesn't reach "the mountaintops of the Andes or the interior of Asia and Africa. Market forces, as powerful as they are, have identifiable limitations, including those posed by adverse geography" (326). Perhaps such insight is expected in this case, given that Sachs was trained as a geographer.

Overall, Sachs' general principles and even most of his policy suggestions are well-stated and relatively feasible. The main question is whether or not they are actually possible given the international political climate and the international community's capacity for coordination. In the description of his proposed MDGs common aid plan, he states plainly that many diverse

It is evident that Sachs himself harbours serious discontent with respect to many international development institutions, particularly the IMF. It is with some derision that he remarks how “the main IMF prescription has been budgetary belt-tightening for patients much too poor to own belts” and that the IMF has a tendency to “study problems to death while an economy collapses” (77). He also takes repeated aim at his own government, accusing it of being insufficiently thorough, making promises it does not keep, and ignoring the extremely deprived worldwide — all claims that many others might corroborate. In the end, however idealistic its prescriptions may be, *The End of Poverty* is an honest and courageous stab at many of the world’s most pressing issues.

Lucky Stars

I find my faith in the brilliant stars.

-The "Religious Views" of a friend on her Facebook profile
(To be included in program)

Scene 1

In a cozy living room with a coffee table downstage slightly right but angled towards centre with a chair on upstage edge facing the audience in which DREAMER, a typical-looking 20-year-old, is sitting. There's a smoothie in a tall glass with a spoon in it on the table in front of him and another across from him.

Stage lights irregularly but gradually turn on and off, reaching higher peaks, illuminating a larger area, and staying on longer with time. As the lights come on, DREAMER starts moving as if in conversation, at first moving his mouth without speaking and then letting out fragments of sentences.

DREAMER: ...and then...

...was thinking...

...picked it up off the...

...well, you know...

...actually understand exactly what...

(Finally, after 30 seconds of on and off, the lights come on and stay on.)

DREAMER: Oh man! I had the weirdest dream last night! You gotta hear this.

So first off, it was is in this completely different world. Well maybe not completely different — actually there was just one really big difference: there were no lights! Or sun or fire or anything to light things up except for stars. But not stars in the sky, although there were those too: people had collected stars out of the sky with these giant machines and everyone had to hold them up on streets, acting, essentially, like lampposts. But you didn't have to stand there all day; a couple people took turns working the same spot. It was like a job, and when people walked by your area, they would give you a couple o' their stars — for your service, you know?

So anyways, I'm sitting in this cozy, warm living room. But it's a little eerie 'cause the only light's shining in through the window, right? And there's an old man with shimmering white hair and some white stubble on his face sitting in front of me in a big armchair. And in that slow calm voice old people have, he says to me: "Now I'm starting to fade — like my stars. But before I go, let me tell you a story; not about me, not about my lucky stars, this is the story of my family: my son and my grandson." And there was no stopping him after that; he just went on with his story and as he was telling it, I could just picture everything perfectly.

"The day David was born was one of the greatest days of my life. It was as if all my life I had been preparing, training just for that: to pass on some of my stars — the stars I had worked so hard to amass my entire life — and to teach my son everything about how to protect and to build up one's collection. Of course, I can't claim to have been the perfect parent, but at his birth, I gave my son even more stars than my father had given me and I did my very best to impart to him all the good habits and the understanding I thought he would ever need.

"As these things go, after he had learned all there was to learn at home and at school, and had begun accumulating stars of his own, the time came for him to become a father. He married a nice girl from a good family whom he had known for two years, Debbie, and less than a year after their marriage, they had a son, Eddie. Twenty years after bringing a child of our own into the world, my wife Chandni and I were the proudest grandparents there could be. We were filled with such joy to see the stars we had passed on to David moving on to yet another generation. We could wish for nothing more and thought we had made it to the end, problem-free. Who could have guessed that this magical cycle would soon be broken?"

Ah! Jeez! I wish I could tell it more like he told it to me, with all the crazy little details! You just gotta imagine this like, glowing old man, so wrapped up in what he's saying, like he was reliving every moment as he told it, so unbelievably happy all through the first part and then just... so old and tired-looking with that last sentence. And it just seemed to get worse as he went on. It was like he went from being this jolly, old, Santa kind of figure to a guy that should be dead, but was somehow being kept alive, just to tell me his story.

(Blackout)

Scene 2

(After a short blackout, with the set unchanged, DREAMER continues)

DREAMER: It all started with Debbie's father's Alzheimer's. As always, it wasn't bad at first; he had to learn to carry a notebook with him, to write things down, to discover through small talk things people expected him to remember, and so on. It was not easy by any means, but he could cope. With time though, his situation gradually deteriorated and he started to lose his patience. He became angry and took out his anger on the only person around: his poor wife Nancy. When their children found out, of course they were devastated. Debbie took it especially badly. And who could blame her? For the months leading up to and following her parents' divorce, she stayed home all day and David took care of her as best he could when he was not out shining — earning stars to replace both his and Debbie's that had already begun to fade.

In the midst of all this, however, neither Debbie nor David was left with very much time or energy for Eddie. As for him, he could not fully understand the situation and simply wanted to escape the tension and sadness of the household and have a little fun like all the other boys his age. That's how it started, but at fifteen, a couple of his peers quickly recognized him as vulnerable and coaxed him into accompanying them to find some solace at a star spinner's. Like everyone who gazes at a spinning star, he was instantly mesmerized and stared for hours, paying dozens of stars for this wretched "service." But it was exactly what he wanted: something to keep him out of the house and to help him forget about the problems that awaited him there.

Eddie was never a bad kid — he was a boy and he liked to have his fun, but he never made any serious trouble. He went to school and learned how to hold stars properly, and although his teachers sometimes complained that he was rather excitable, they all liked him and knew he was a good boy. Still, there is only so much one can control and *anyone* can fall into the hands of the star spinners.

He did well at first — better than most. He did so well, in fact, that no one noticed a thing until it was too late. As you know, police cannot arrest people simply for going to the spinners; they can only arrest someone for committing one of the Four Crimes against Society: spinning; stealing another's stars; walking in one's light without paying; or attempting to navigate the city on the fringe of the dark areas without directly entering the lit spots. The Fourth Crime was originally established based on the assumption that it indicates one does not have enough stars to pay shiners and thus, is likely also committing the Second and Third Crimes. Naturally, some people simply enjoy a stroll in the darkness from time to time and others live on the outskirts because they were brought up there: it's their home. Even with the Second Crime, who can honestly claim never to have skirted behind someone, through their light, when they weren't looking? Tell me who? As for the First Crime, spinning, I could tell you stories you would never believe about the corruption that surrounds it! But you don't care about all this, do you? Nobody does.

Eddie never committed any Crime until he was a junior in college. Throughout high school, he would say he was playing at a friend's house after school but would go shine in a small neighbourhood not too far away but where no one would recognize him; he would ask his parents for a couple of extra stars to run around the city with his friends but would save them for the spinners. In fact, as we later found out, he rarely went about in the city, except for school, shining, and to see the spinners, and he always took the shortest route. Moreover, he truly made the best of the opportunity Chandni and I gave him to attend college; he studied diligently and quickly learned to clean and polish his stars, that they might light up a larger area and earn him more in return.

We could not pay for all of Eddie's the college expenses though, and even with his new skill and part-time shining, Eddie just could not make ends meet with so many of his stars going to the spinners; he started walking the fringes, but only when he really had to. Oh, he was careful! I don't think he ever would have been caught, if it weren't for Woozie, as they called her. She was an older girl he had met at a spinner's one night. He says they were never more than acquaintances, and that's probably why she named him."

(Blackout)

Scene 3

(After a short blackout, with the set unchanged, DREAMER continues)

DREAMER: "Yes, she named him alright. She knew the system well enough to realize that it was the only way she could avoid being locked up herself. Of course, Eddie could have done the same thing: all he needed to do was give a couple of other names and he could make a deal. But he didn't know the system, you see? Like so many other naïve people out there, he thought he would be best off just telling the honest truth — no one could convince him otherwise. He thought that would somehow be enough to earn him a reasonable sentence. But how mistaken he was! When it was all said and done, they gave him 27 years. Twenty-seven years! After they caught him walking along the fringes early one morning, they needed no more evidence save Woozie's testimony to convict him of two counts of the theft and five counts of fringe-walking.

In jail, Eddie quickly lost his... naïveté. He received the brutal awakening with which all new inmates are greeted but that no one likes to think about. The first thing they did was take away all save three

of his stars — and stars fade quickly in jail, so there are far too few to go around. Can you imagine life without one star?"

Obviously I could, but not the way he meant it, of course. He went on:

"A man without a star is a desperate man indeed. He will do anything to be able to hold one (I'm sort of attached to this "and", but if you really want to omit it, go ahead) and once he's got one, he will do whatever it takes to get his hands on another before the first one fades away. Since jails are entirely lit by state-employed shiners, however, there is no chance at getting a star legally; one must steal or spin, and spinners in jail can tell right away - from the look in your eyes - if you're hooked. On his first day, an exceptionally friendly inmate offered to spin a star for Eddie free of charge. In a time of such disillusionment, there was no way Eddie could resist; however, as the spinner knew would happen, Eddie came back within a few days, but that time it was not free. When it came time to pay, Eddie offered two of his final three stars but argued that he needed his last one just a little longer to earn a few more. He was even ready to fight to keep that last one — Eddie, who had never been in a fight in his entire life! That's when he realized he was not the only one seeing the spinner, and that everyone else was eager to do anything that might win them a couple of minutes of staring...

After three days in the infirmary, feeling worse than before since he had spent those three days without a star, Eddie was ready to learn how things worked. He started body building — learned to fight; he tattooed his body; and eventually, he did what he had to do to gain acceptance to a gang. None of us recognized him anymore — we all tried, but simply could not understand him at the time. We couldn't appreciate that as a gang member, he was entitled to a certain number of hours every week holding one of the gang's stars. There were risks, but when all one has is a life in jail, the benefits outweigh them by far.

So he gambled, he fought, he stole — and as he moved up in ranks, he had to do less of it. Over the course of his twenty-seven years though, he was caught many times and paid dearly for it. The first few times, his fingers were stomped: first his little finger, then his ring finger, his middle finger, his thumb, and finally his index. The whole left hand, and then the right. But, as in most cases, the guards didn't quite achieve the deterrence effect that was intended and they had to move to hammering and eventually the removal of the little and ring fingers on his left hand. Fingers are believed to be the last thing inmates care about, but as we see far too often, not even those are worth anything to hopeless inmates constantly reminded of their worthlessness, and they are surely not worth more than the chance to hold a star for a short while. The great irony few people perceive in all this is that with injured or missing fingers, it becomes virtually impossible to hold a star tightly enough to shine. Spinning, however, becomes unbelievably easy since it requires a looser grip."

(Blackout)

Scene 4

(After a short blackout, with the set unchanged, DREAMER continues)

DREAMER: "In any case, after what still seems like an eternity, Eddie returned home, to a much different home, albeit, but he was free. An enormous gap had inevitably grown between him and his parents, but they all did their best. Seven years earlier, Chandni and I had bought the house next to Debbie and David's and we helped in any way we could. Still, Eddie had lost sight of life outside of jail while he was there and had not been thinking of the long-term consequences of his actions there on his life as a free man. With his fingers so damaged, he was useless: he could not shine at all and thus he had to rely on stars from his parents and from Chandni and I to get by. We had saved enough that it was no burden on us — especially with only one son and one grandson — but Eddie, he couldn't stand it. Every time we would give him some stars or pay for him, such a look of shame and embarrassment swept over his face. Here he was, a grown man, unable to survive by his own means, with nothing left to give to society. The looks given to him by neighbours and shiners were no consolation either: even though he always kept his hands in his pockets, they knew why he could not pay. What he didn't realize was that we had suffered much of the same hostility throughout his time in jail. We had, after all, brought up a criminal.

Although we had helped Eddie keep away from the spinners, the shame was so much that it pushed him back into fringe-walking. If there's one thing one learns in jail, it's crime, especially spinning and robbery, since one can practise those skills. But inmates always exchange best practises, as it were, on the other two Crimes as well. Thus, Eddie had become somewhat of expert and was sure that without anyone to snitch on him that he would be safe. And again, to a hopeless man, a little risk simply does not provide much deterrence."

Now by this point, the old guy's startin' to lose it a bit. But he was like 100 years old and practically crying. I didn't know what else to do but just to let him keep going.

"The only thing Eddie had overlooked was that the condemning looks people gave him were not just looks: they were manifestations of true suspicion, spite, hatred. Everyone knew Eddie had gone to jail, and they did not want to hear anything more. It was as if his release was a direct, premeditated attack on them, and they needed to protect themselves. It was the neighbours' innocuous-looking six-year-old son who saw Eddie on the fringes. He didn't grasp much of the situation, but he knew enough to conclude that his parents would be very proud of him for sharing this observation with them. It wasn't just his parents; when Eddie was sent back to jail, the young boy was heralded as a little hero by the whole city — even after Eddie took his life, his first day back..."

(Blackout)

Scene 5

(After a short blackout, with the set unchanged, DREAMER continues)

DREAMER: "If Debbie's parents' divorce was like losing part of her past, Eddie's death was like losing the entire future, all of our futures. We grieved, we wept, we wailed, we mourned. A few unexpected friends offered their support, but for the most part, we only had each other. We seriously considered leaving the country altogether; at the very least, we had to leave the neighbourhood to escape the indifference people threw at us like daggers. In end we opted to stay within the limits of the city; it was the only home any of us knew.

Perhaps because she had suffered the most throughout her life, Debbie was the first to truly recover. A couple of years after his death, she decided there was still reason to keep going. Blowing us all away with her new-found strength and determination, she worked tirelessly to convert part of our new house into a centre where people released from jail could come to learn how to re-integrate into a society that had long since abandoned them. She read every book there was on the topic, met with experts from all over, and pulled David along the way.

Having learned from an experience no one should ever have to suffer through, she knew that a few stars to get back on their feet were the least of her clients' needs. She was not going to let them join the slews of desperate people who had lost all their stars and been beguiled into working on the star-collecting machines in the hope of rebuilding their collection either. Of course that route is nothing more than an endless and hazardous dead-end: one breaks one's back and stiffens one's hands working endless hours on huge machines only to receive such a small enough fraction of the captured stars to get them through another day and keep them coming back.

No, Debbie taught them how to shine again, to shine with damaged or missing fingers. She even taught the fingerless to clasp stars with their palms! In fact, if you peek out the window here, you'll see an older woman holding up a star at the corner of the street. She was one of the first people they helped and if you look very closely, you can see her fingerless left hand."

So I got up, went over to the window and just caught a glimpse of this old lady holding up the brightest, sparkling ball of light you can ever imagine. But then, even though I tried to fight it, I slowly *(house lights gradually come on and reach their max at the end of the sentence)* started to wake up to the sun shining right in my face through a crack in the curtain.

END

(House lights stay on and stage lights quickly go off and back on for the bow)

Author's Note – by Nicholas Dubé

The statistics on incarceration in the USA are staggering. That country incarcerates more people (2.3 million as of early 2008) at a higher rate (over one in every 100 adults) than any other country in the world (Pew Centre on the States, *One in 100: Behind Bars in America*). Neither the significantly more populous People's Republic of China with 1.5 million inmates (Pew Centre) nor the 36 largest European countries with 1.8 million inmates (various years) (Pew Centre) come anywhere near rivalling the staggering number of persons behind bars in the USA.

While studying at The American University in Washington, DC in 2007-2008 with the support of the Killam Fellowships Program, I had the opportunity to take a course on this phenomenon with an innovative and inspiring professor, Dr. Robert Johnson. As a final project for this class, *Lucky Stars* attempts to provide a creative analysis of the effects of a justice system focused on punishment rather than rehabilitation, while including some particulars of the US American system. The themes of guilt and forgiveness were no doubt also influenced by my concurrent studies in German.

"Forgiveness does not change the past but it does enlarge the future."
-Paul Boese

