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In the Case of Intervention

Editorial

The metaphor of the international community existing in a “global village” is an excellent one. It is a term wholeheartedly embraced by many humanitarian organizations, diplomats and media members alike. It provides a creative nuance to people’s tendency to identify international actors as plot-carrying characters on a global stage, having the effect of deflating, localizing and civilizing a world that could otherwise be described as expanding, fracturing and aggravated.

While it would be capricious to extend the metaphor too far, to see the world as a global village may provide some insight into the topic ATLIS addressed this year: intervention.

In so many circumstances—including on an international scale—to intervene is meant to be an act of charity, concern and, ultimately, good will to bring some semblance of order into what is perceived to be a chaotic situation. The foundations of international law were established on Grotian ideals that forceful interventions were only acceptable if the intervening actor’s clear and immediate intention was to reestablish order and peace where it was broken.

In fact, one of the oldest, most developed and arguably most important use of international law has been addressing the question of when, why and how intervention is acceptable and indeed necessary. The path of international enforcement and compliance theory in law is without doubt one of the most pertinent, essential and—I argue—most promising avenues for international actors to establish greater order and accountability in a world suffering too much from despotism and injustice.

There are still many arguments and questions facing the ‘international law regime’—as are expected at any level of law. Indeed neo-realists and factions of other theoretical frameworks don’t see the merits or efficacy of such a system at all. And this is where, I suppose, the idea of a global village may help.

Regardless of one’s theoretical basis or political camp, there is no denying this is a world where intervention by a wide assortment of actors towards one another, under innumerable pressures and motivations, occur. Terms of what is acceptable, achievable, legal, and what lies in the gray area, are defined by policies, treaties, resolutions, informal agreements and contracts that can all act as case sources for international lawyers to argue the ‘legality’ of each intervening act.

By the same methods of adopting what is deemed ‘legitimate’ by society, do jurists of any village create laws to provide order. Insert into that village a community of such complexity and diversity that it may only exist on a global scale, and intervention merely becomes one more method of interaction between villagers that is undertaken to sustain a communally beneficial status quo.

The position of international law may then be argued to be the yardstick by which intervention between actors is regarded as either in the interest of maintaining and establishing order, or not. By this account intervention may be regarded just as the likes of Grotius, Kelsen as well as the United Nations Charter espoused; an act only accepted “to preserve international peace” in this global village.

This journal volume has been compiled to display and address some of the many actors, methodologies and circumstances that make up this increasingly momentous global phenomenon of intervention. The question this editorial wishes to ask is whether the examples of intervening action discussed here uphold legal standards or, if one is not sold on the place of international law, whether the kind of interaction seen in these examples is the kind we’re willing to accept in a civil township, of which we are all members. The arguments and issues published in this journal are not inert intellectual exercises, but concrete facets of our world that we must engage with. After all, as we know is the reality of any village, everything can become everyone’s business.

Sasha Van Katwyk
Journal Editor, 2008/09

Lessons from the Horn: Why did the UN fail in Somalia?

Eric Blake

The conflict in Somalia stands at an important place in the history of the UN. The end of the Cold War gave the organization the potential for a far greater role in world affairs. However, at this favourable moment the world delivered one of the great peacekeeping failures in history. There are many reasons for the failure of the Somali operation, but there are also lessons that can prove useful in helping future operations be more successful. Applying these lessons will not completely solve the peace enforcement dilemma. What should be taken from this essay is that there were mistakes in Somalia that should not be repeated and if they are not, they provide peace enforcement missions with a greater chance of doing good rather than harm. This paper will demonstrate that while the reality on the ground may have doomed the UN in Somalia before it ever arrived, there are still important lessons to be learned from the experience.

It can be argued that the UN failure in Somalia was assured before any UN personnel began their work. The situation in Somalia was arguably so far beyond repair that the UN could not realistically have been expected to have mustered the kind of forces to create peace in the power vacuum that existed.¹

This is argument is quite convincing. It is crucial to understand just how far the situation in Somalia had deteriorated by the time the UN authorised a mission. By January 1991 Somalia's longtime but now powerless dictator, Siad Barre, was removed from power by clan factions.² In the aftermath of Barre's removal, the clan alliance dissolved and civil war broke out between two factions; the United Somali Congress and the Somali National Alliance. By 1992, 50,000 had died from the violence while

another 300,000 had starved to death³. Somalia had always had food problems, but the conflict put half of the country's 9 million people at risk of starvation. Food became a weapon; with the factions using it as a way of exerting control.⁴

Under circumstances such as these the political realities of the UN system makes it seem unlikely that the UN could have had mission success as it came to be defined by the end of the intervention. If their goal was to solely implement a humanitarian relief mission than perhaps the intervention could have been successful, but as will be demonstrated later, the mandate quickly grew in scope, with negative consequences.⁵

While success in Somalia may have been impossible, that does not mean that the UN is without blame. The UN made errors, some preventable, while others appeared to be a result of the UN structure. Overreliance on the US or slow action by the Security Council are problems that face many peacekeeping/enforcement missions. The main problems that beset any peace enforcement mission, however, are a lack of resource-money, troops, and political backing.⁶

Even if the structure behind the mission is flawed however, recent history shows us that peace enforcement missions will still be attempted (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kosovo), even if the resources are not always there for the job to be done with a reasonable expectation of success. Thus, since peace enforcement missions will almost certainly continue, we must learn how to do them as well as possible under imperfect circumstances.

A further reason why Somalia may have been lost before the intervention began is the issue of conflict stalemate raised by Eva Bertram. Bertram argues that intervening in a conflict before the belligerents have exhausted their will to continue the fight

¹ Dwight D. Murphy. "The post-Cold War American interventions into Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo." *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*. 25.4 (2000): 489-510.

² Norrie Macqueen. *United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. Toronto: Longman, 2002. 202.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Dwight D. Murphy. "The post-Cold War American interventions into Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo."

⁶ Page Fortna. "Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia" Book Review in *Political Science Quarterly*. 117.1 (2002): 163-4.

militarily is a recipe for failure.⁷ She provides the examples of Angola and Western Sahara that were doomed because one of the belligerents did not have the necessary incentive to come to the negotiating table. In the case of Angola the UNITA rebels lost the election and had no incentive to lay down their arms.⁸ In the Western Sahara the Moroccan government had no international pressure to force them to relinquish the territory.⁹ In Somalia, the UN entered the country on humanitarian grounds, but they erred when they attempted a peace enforcement mission without any true agreement to enforce.¹⁰ The only treaty that the mandate was based on was agreements the two faction leaders made in Addis Ababa, but even in this case they were not strictly related to the UN mandate.¹¹ Complicating the matter, the two sides showed no real signs of wanting to end the conflict and seriously go to the negotiating table. This put the UN mission in the impossible position of trying to impose peace on participants that were still intent on fighting.¹²

This attempt to enforce a weak peace agreement is related to another problem with the UN role in Somalia: the lack of clearly defined political goals. Since the military goals were much better defined than the political, the military side was used to direct the political goals.¹³ To illustrate that point consider the way the UN handled disarmament. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's insistence on disarmament either by choice or by military force and his belief that this would lead to better conditions, illustrates the UN's faith in the military to accomplish its goals in that theatre.¹⁴

"A further failure of the Somali mission was the false belief that when faced with a significant number of heavily armed western forces, militias would surrender and submit to UN demands."

Perhaps the largest failure was the missed opportunities for preventative diplomacy. The idea of preventative diplomacy is to prevent a conflict from escalating to the point where a peacekeeping/peace-enforcement mission becomes necessary.¹⁵ After the fall of Siad Barre's government in January 1991, a year passed before the UN intervened.¹⁶ In the beginning however, intervention only consisted of the assignment of various UN officials to the conflict and the creation of an impossible to enforce arms embargo. UNOSOM was not dispatched until a year and a half had passed since Barre's fall.¹⁷ It was not until a full two years after the last government of Somalia collapsed that the UN authorised an intervention under chapter VII.¹⁸ The delay was so long that the Secretary General's special representative, Mohammed Sahnoun, resigned in protest over a lack of UN support and the unacceptable wait for action.¹⁹ His resignation was a setback since he commanded the respect of the Somali clans and was well versed in Somali culture.²⁰ While long waiting periods are common for UN missions²¹, it is nonetheless a significant disadvantage.

One of the major problems with the Somali mission was the overall force composition. Dr. Ali Mazuri argued that the intervening force in Somali should have consisted of troops from other African Nations.²² If that was not possible then it should have been the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) who made the troop commitments. Next to the OIC, the League of Arab States would have been the next viable option, and if all three of those were not possible than a truly

⁷ Eva Bertram. "Reinventing Governments: The Promises and Perils of UN Peacebuilding." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 39.3 (1995): 387-418. 405.

⁸ Eva Bertram. "Reinventing Governments: The Promises and Perils of UN Peacebuilding." 412.

⁹ Ibid. 411.

¹⁰ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001.) 68.

¹¹ Ibid. 74.

¹² Adam M. Hussein. *Durable Peace: Challenge for Peacebuilding in Africa*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.) 270.

¹³ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. 74.

¹⁴ Ibid. 74.

¹⁵ Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. Mingst. "The Search for Peace and Security." *International Organizations*. Boulder CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2004. 277-253. 290.

¹⁶ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. 270.

¹⁷ Ibid. 54-5.

¹⁸ Ibid. 57.

¹⁹ Ibid. 53.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ The waiting period for Somalia was comparable Bosnia.

²² Adam M. Hussein. *Durable Peace: Challenge for Peacebuilding in Africa*. 253-4.

multinational force comprised of specially selected countries would have been the best to intervene in Somalia.²³

While Mazuri's suggestions may have been correct, assembling such a force would have been a difficult task. It has become a reality of the UN that if it wishes to undertake major operations, the US must play a major role.²⁴

When significant forces were eventually deployed in Somalia under the United Task Force (UNITAF), which took over for the ineffective UNOSOM, it did not resemble any of the force compositions suggested above. It was a force of 37,000 troops with contributions from many developed countries, as well as a major contribution from the United States.²⁵ This overdependence on the US turned out to be a major problem for the Somali operation in the end. Also, the force that intervened in Somalia was not ideal since it lacked significant representation from neighbouring nations. Peacekeepers are better received from a geographically closer nation since they are not viewed as occupiers. This problem was especially evident with Western peacekeepers, which can pose a conflict of interest, especially if they have a colonial history with the country.²⁶

Since the Americans composed such a large portion of the UNITAF Contingent (and since US forces almost never serve under foreign command²⁷), UNITAF was to be a US commanded mission with the UN stamp of approval.²⁸ As a result of this overdependence the UN was forced into a series of compromises and arguments with US leadership

over the Somali mission.²⁹ For example, when the UNITAF mission was established there was disagreement between the US leadership and Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali over the importance of disarmament in the UN mandate.³⁰ The UN wished for disarmament and a cease-fire while the US wanted disarmament to be a secondary objective (as a result of force limitations). In the end, the position of the US was the one that was adopted because, according to Boulden, "the bottom line was that the United States, not the secretary-general, was in charge of the operation"³¹

A further failure of the Somali mission was the false belief that when faced with a significant number of heavily armed western forces, militias would surrender and submit to UN demands.³² History has shown this view to be incorrect in Somalia and as well in other African conflicts. This underestimation of the will of the Somali rebel militias led to the lack of will to engage in direct disarmament, which was instrumental in the overall failure of the Somali operation.³³

In the UNOSOM II command structure, there was major separation of some US forces from the rest of the operation.³⁴ For example in UNOSOM II there were 4,000 American troops under the UNOSOM II umbrella, however there were an additional 17,000 troops who were under direct US command, titled the "United States Joint Task Force in Somalia".³⁵ Besides creating a major split in the mission command structure, this set the precedent for other contingents to take orders from their domestic governments, rather than the UN.³⁶ This occurred when the Italian contingents began direct negotiations with Aidid's forces under orders from Rome, in discordance with UN wishes³⁷.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*.

²⁵ Adam M. Hussein. *Durable Peace: Challenge for Peacebuilding in Africa*.

²⁶ For example, Italy contributed forces to the Somali missions despite their position as a former colonial occupier. Their presence would cause problems for the operation.

Norrie Macqueen. *United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*.

²⁷ Although a small contingent of a few thousand soldiers did serve under UNOSOM II, but they were in a more logistical and support role.

United Nations "Somalia – UNOSOM II Background"

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2backgr2.html

²⁸ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. 57-8.

²⁹ Ibid. 73.

³⁰ Ibid. 67.

³¹ Ibid. 68.

³² Norrie Macqueen. *United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. 208.

³³ Ibid. 209.

³⁴ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. 78.

³⁵ Norrie Macqueen. *United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. 213.

³⁶ Ibid. 213.

³⁷ To make matters worse (according to Boutros-Boutros Ghali) it appears that the Italians were talking with Aidid in order to gain further influence over Post-Conflict Somalia.

To further illustrate the problems that permeated the UNITAF and UNOSOM II command structures, we may examine the Olympia Hotel Raid. As a result of the split in command, when the US special forces decided to assault the Olympia Hotel in an attempt to gain information on the location of General Aidid, they did not notify the rest of the UNOSOM II forces of the operation. When the mission began to deteriorate it took a long period of time to mobilize UNOSOM II soldiers, and when they arrived they were not prepared for the level of fighting that they faced.³⁸ The result of this ultimately disastrous mission was the eventual withdrawal of US forces from Somalia (Macqueen 216). In the longer run the Olympia Hotel raid led to the creation of the Dover Criterion, which meant that any humanitarian operation that would lead to the death of 20 (roughly the amount killed in the raid) or more US soldiers was politically infeasible. This criterion was disastrous for future conflicts of the 1990s such as Rwanda or Haiti (Dyer).

A further failure of the UN in Somalia was its eventual loss of impartiality over the course of the conflict. After the June 5 attack, in which 26 Pakistani soldiers were killed in SNA raids involving Pakistani arms inspectors and aid distributors, the UN lost any pretence of evenhandedness (Macqueen 213). After these attacks the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 837 which called for "all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks...including those responsible for publically inciting such attacks... including to secure the investigation of their actions and the arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;" (Resolution 837). Later, on June 17th Admiral Howe publically named Aidid responsible and proceeded to issue an arrest warrant (Boulden 68).

The events described above essentially made Aidid and the SNA enemies of the UN in Somalia, effectively turning UNOSOM II into one of the belligerents in the conflict (especially in the eyes of

Aidid and the SNA). UNOSOM II³⁹ essentially engaged in war against the SNA, hindering any efforts for the UN to play a credible role in the political process.⁴⁰ This conflict was beyond the ideal scope of peace enforcement, "the moment a peacekeeping force starts killing people, it becomes part of the conflict it is supposed to be controlling, and is therefore a part of the problem".⁴¹

Not only was the loss of impartiality damaging for the reasons listed above, but it also represented a golden opportunity lost. After the attacks, 11 of Somalia's most important clan leaders condemned the attacks against UNOSOM II. Instead of using this political sympathy to their advantage, the UN pressed on with the military offensive in the hopes of capturing General Aidid.⁴² This loss of impartiality was an important mistake for the UN. While it is hard to maintain impartiality in humanitarian conflicts where some belligerents

deserve much more blame than others, setting a single focus upon one group or one person can have very negative consequences for a mission overall.

This lesson was on display in Bosnia

where the UN (in particular the US) focused on the humanitarian aspects of the conflict to stay impartial and avoid being drawn into the conflict.⁴³

"This mandate expansion and troop reduction significantly hampered the UN's ability to successfully accomplish its objectives."

A further problem faced by the UN intervention in Somalia was mandate creep (referring to the UNITAF and UNOSOM II mission, not UNOSOM I). The UN mandate for intervention in Somalia originally called for a humanitarian relief

³⁹ In particular the US contingent, ex: the Olympia Hotel raid Ibid. 70.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 75.

⁴¹ Jonathon Moore. "Deciding Humanitarian Intervention." *Social Research*. 74.1 (2007): 169-202.

⁴² Norrie Macqueen. *United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. 214.

⁴³ Although it is arguable that they strayed too far in that direction in Bosnia.

Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. 216-7

Ibid. 214-5

³⁸ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. 71

mission, according to President Bush "a 'strictly humanitarian' mission, limited in both scope and duration."⁴⁴ When UNITAF was replaced by UNOSOM II its mandate was broadened to include nation building, with initiatives for disarmament and reconciliation. The US ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright called for "the restoration of an entire country."⁴⁵ The mandate was broadened even further with the implementation of the arrest mandate, which along with the arrest of General Aidid, required the UN to fight his SNA militia.⁴⁶ Despite these new responsibilities, there were no new major troop commitments made to UNOSOM II. In fact, total UN troop levels from UNITAF to UNOSOM II actually declined (38,000 under UNITAF, declining to 28,000 under UNOSOM II⁴⁷) significantly despite a large increase in responsibilities. This mandate expansion and troop reduction significantly hampered the UN's ability to successfully accomplish its objectives.

In the end what should the UN have learned from this experience? Firstly it should have learned that while the US military is extremely valuable for its logistics, air and sea power, the fact that the US government is very casualty adverse when it comes to these types of missions' means that it has limited effectiveness. Countries that are geographically close to the affected state should be used more readily if they are available. In such a situation the US could then provide logistical support if needed. The UN should also have learned the benefits of a clearly defined mandate. The fact that the overall goals of the mission changed so much over the course of the UN involvement was detrimental to the mission. The UN experience in Somalia also lends more credence to Bertram's 'ground truth' argument. The fact that the UN was trying to impose peace upon people who did not want it made for an almost impossible mission. A very important lesson the UN should have learned is the importance of maintaining some semblance of impartiality in a

conflict. The UN should also never again assume that poorly trained militias will collapse in the presence of trained armies; this fatal miscalculation undermined the effort from the beginning. The final lesson for the UN to learn is the benefits of a unified command structure. By having the US outside UN jurisdiction it allowed them to undertake the Olympia Hotel raid without any backup. That was the deathblow to the Somali operation.

In the aftermath of Somalia we have learned that the fundamentals of the UN will generally prevent UN peace enforcement missions from reaching the success they intend. That is not to say they are total failures, as thousands were saved from famine by the UN effort in Somalia. While the fundamentals may be wrong, missions will still be attempted. If the UN learns its lessons in impartiality, command structure, mandate clarity and force composition than it will help future enforcement missions be more successful, although they may never be perfect.

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⁴⁴ Dwight D. Murphy. "The post-Cold War American interventions into Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo."

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. 75.

⁴⁷ Admittedly there were another 17,000 US troops in addition to the UNOSOM II force, but they were outside UN control (Macqueen 213).

Somaliland: An "Oasis of Peace" to Somalia's Chaos

Charlotte Gleave Riemann & Sam Gregg-Wallace

The Greater Horn region of sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most volatile conflict zones in the world. As of 2008, Somalia in particular "claims the unenviable distinction of being the state most at risk of failure."¹ Unbeknownst and unrecognised by most of the world, however, is that in northern Somalia there exists a breakaway republic known as Somaliland which, since 1991, has worked to establish itself as an independent, moderate Muslim democracy. The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the government of Canada recognise Somaliland's sovereignty, first by taking an active role in facilitating Somaliland's current voter registration campaign, then by establishing a consulate within the country, and finally by calling on the international community to officially recognise Somaliland's independence as well.

The Somali people were colonized by three separate powers: France colonized present-day Djibouti, the north of Somalia was colonized by Britain, and south Somalia was Italian territory. After India's independence in 1947 the strategic importance of Somaliland dissipated, and Britain's attitude towards its protectorate became one primarily of neglect. As economic progress and development stagnated, cries within Somaliland for self government and union with the neighbouring Italian protectorate grew. Britain was happy to relinquish the financial burden of the colony and granted Somaliland independence on June 26th, 1960.² Multilaterally acknowledged independence, recognised by both the United Nations and Canada,³ lasted five days before Somaliland

voluntarily united with the former Italian-administered UN trust territory of Somalia to create the present-day Republic of Somalia.

Somaliland's enthusiasm for the union quickly waned. In their haste to reap the benefits of a united Somalia, leaders on both sides had given little thought as to the technicalities of amalgamation. As colonies, they had "two different judicial systems; different currencies; different organization... for the army, the police and the civil service; different taxation and customs; different governmental institutions...; different educational systems."⁴ They brought with them four different legal traditions: Italian law, British common law, Islamic *shari'a*, and traditional Somali law. A North-South divide was immediately apparent. Unification and democratization efforts were additionally undermined by the geographic distance between north and south which not only hampered political representation and communication, but also significantly reduced projected industrial and economic gains. Finally, Somalia fell prey to the all

"There have been no fewer than 14 UN sponsored peace and reconciliation attempts, and the UN peace-keeping mission to Somalia is the most expensive UN peacekeeping mission to date."

too common cause of political tension in postcolonial African states: the implementation of Western-style administrations and the appropriation of Western class systems and competitive values. In Somalia this resulted in increasingly competitive clan-based political parties, who

saw political power as a means of controlling state resources and establishing themselves firmly in the upper class. Less than a decade after the union, General Mohamed Siad Barre overthrew the "highly dysfunctional" government of Somalia in the military coup of 1969.⁵ So began the autocratic military rule and human rights violations that have characterized Somalia since independence.

Siad Barre, a member of the Daarood clan of southern Somalia, staffed his military regime through nepotism, obliterating the interests and

¹ The Failed State Index, *Foreign Policy* 167 (2008): 66.

² Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland* (London: Impressio, 2008), 32.

³ Paulo Contini, "Integration of Legal Systems in the Somali Republic," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 16 (1967): 1088.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1088.

⁵ Seth Kaplan, "The Remarkable Story of Somaliland," *Journal of Democracy* 19 no. 3 (July 2008): 146.

opinions of other clans. With respect to Somaliland's quest for sovereignty it is essential to know that in the 1980s Siad Barre instigated a military campaign against northern civilians, killing 50 000, and displacing over 500 000 people. Opposing clan-based guerrilla armies, including the northern Somali National Movement (SNM), overthrew Siad Barre in 1991 but the anticipated return to peace never arrived. Instead, guerrillas from the south "reneged on an earlier agreement and unilaterally named a southerner president,"⁶ ruling the country, de facto, through coercion and intimidation, increasing inter- and intra-clan conflict throughout Somalia. It was at this point, when the country was in the most volatile state to date, that the leaders of Somaliland declared their independence from the union with Somalia and it is from this point on that we see the respective futures of Somalia and Somaliland branching out in two very polarized ways.

Somalia has experienced ongoing conflict since 1991. There have been no fewer than 14 UN sponsored peace and reconciliation attempts, and the UN peace-keeping mission to Somalia is the most expensive UN peacekeeping mission to date.⁷ In 2005 an UN-sponsored Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was set up in the town of Baidoa, while a council of 11 militia-backed Islamic Courts came into power in Mogadishu. The Islamic Courts, who promote radical Salafism and are suspected of having ties with Jihadist movements, won the support of the people by providing stability and security not offered by the TFG or the warlords. They hold far more power than the TFG and have announced their goal of creating a Somali state that would include Somaliland and regions of Ethiopia. In 2006 Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia and temporarily dispelled the Islamic Courts but the intervention "which Washington backed and supplemented with its own air strikes, has sown the

seeds for an Islamist and clan-based insurgency in the future."⁸

In comparison, Somaliland's recent history has been one of increasingly successful democratic developments. In 1996 regional elders, business elites, and clan leaders numbering 500 attended a *shirbeeled* (clan conference) that saw power peacefully handed from the transitional government of the SNM to a civilian administration. Unlike many poor states that are "held back by administrative and political systems built separately from the societies that they are meant to serve," Somaliland, having never been subject to foreign advice or interference, has an administrative structure formed solely on traditional and contemporary Somali values. This means that instead of Western-imposed systems whose top-down implementation often leads to methods of governance that are "illegitimate, ripe for exploitation, and a major hindrance to democratization and development,"⁹ Somaliland's political system stresses Somali notions of governance through consultation and consent, thus attaining more internal and external legitimacy.¹⁰ This mix of modern and traditional needs and values is addressed by having a governmental structure that is comprised of a president and a House of Representatives that are both directly elected by the people and a *Gaurti* or Upper House of Elders whose members are appointed by clan leaders.

Somaliland today operates on an annual budget of 25 million dollars.¹¹ Its largest source of income, other than money sent by the diasporic community, is livestock. The new government structure and new government policies have repeatedly gained the respect and support of the population. Of note is the constitutional referendum called by Somaliland president Mohamed Ibrahim Egal in May of 2001; 1.18 million people voted and the new constitution

⁶ Peter J. Schraeder, "Why the United States Should Recognise Somaliland's Independence," Centre for Strategic and International Studies: Africa Policy Forum, <http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=19>.

⁷ Jahzbahy, Iqba. "African Union & Somaliland: Time to affirm 'Africa's best-kept secret'?" *Sub-Saharan Informer* (March 17, 2006): 8.

⁸ John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, "Blowing the Horn," in *World Politics 2008/2009*, ed. Helen E. Purkitt (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 123.

⁹ Seth Kaplan, "The Remarkable Story of Somaliland," 144.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 144.

¹¹ International Republican Institute: Somaliland, "Parliamentary Election Assessment Report," International Republican Institute, <http://www.iri.org/africa/somaliland/pdfs/Somaliland2005ParliamentaryElections.pdf>, 12.

supporting sovereignty acquired a 97% approval rate.¹² Furthermore, Somaliland held peaceful parliamentary elections in 2005 to elect a president and members to the House of Representatives. According to the more than 70 international observers, the election was “the freest and most transparent democratic exercises ever staged in the Horn of Africa.”¹³ These international observers recommended that the government create a standard form of identification and a national voter registration system to further ensure the legitimacy of their elections.¹⁴ The government has taken up this daunting task, but needs outside help if it is to have a system ready in time for the already postponed federal parliamentary and presidential elections now set for March 2009.

WHAT SOMALIA ASKS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

During an informal visit to Canada in May 2008, Somaliland MP Nasir Hagi Ali spoke before the Canadian Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. He asked that Canada establish an office in Somaliland to regulate and improve the flow of Somalilanders traveling between Canada and Somaliland, and that Canada be supportive in granting visiting visas for official Somaliland politicians who desire to travel in order to promote their nation’s existence and needs.¹⁵

More generally, Somaliland asks of the international community to be recognised as a sovereign state. They understand that the isolation they have experienced was central to their development in both positive and negative ways. For instance, the fact that they cannot receive bilateral technical assistance from other countries; and that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the African

Development Bank, and bilateral development agencies cannot offer it loans and financial aid has meant that they have total ownership over every step of their path to stabilization. The time has come, however, when the disadvantages outnumber the advantages.

Banks and insurance companies will not establish branches within the country; the cost of living is higher because local firms cannot directly import goods without local banks to issue letters of credit; international investors (and the jobs that they would create) stay away because insurance and other investment protections are lacking. Many diasporic professionals—whose return would help to invigorate Somaliland’s legal, accounting, health, and educational systems—are reluctant to come home for fear of Somaliland’s uncertain legal status.

Finally, the threat of continued unrest, factional fighting, or an increase in terrorist activities in the south will continue to hamper Somaliland’s development as long as its future is held hostage to events in Somalia.

WHAT INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS HAVE DONE THUS FAR

When François Lonseny Fall, the UN Special Representative to Somalia, was asked to comment about the status of Somaliland in 2006, he said that Somaliland was part of his mandate, that it had declared its independence, but that recognition of said independence was “up to all United Nations Member States.”¹⁶ This statement came after years of the UN refusing to acknowledge Somaliland’s secessionist claims, let alone offer it a place as a member state. Commenting on the quest for peace in Somalia, Kofi Annan reported to the General Assembly in 2000 that “‘Somaliland’, in particular, remain[ed] firmly outside the peace process.”¹⁷ So it is that the UN has seen Somaliland’s struggle for independence at best as an inconvenience, at worst as a sabotage to the Somali peace and reunification

¹² International Republican Institute: Somaliland, “Parliamentary Election Assessment Report”: 6.

¹³ Seth Kaplan, “The Remarkable Story of Somaliland,”: 150.

¹⁴ International Republican Institute: Somaliland, “Parliamentary Election Assessment Report,”: 6.

¹⁵ Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2nd Session, 39th Parliament (March 12, 2008),

<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/CommitteeBusiness/SearchBrowseEvidence.aspx?arpi=s&arpiit=Somaliland&arpidf=2007%2f10%2f16&arpidt=2008%2f09%2f07&arpid=False&arpace=True&arpicl=&ps=Parl39Ses2&arpiisb=Publication&arpiirpp=10&arpiis=False&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2&arpicpd=3356438#Para989812>.

¹⁶ Department of Public Information, “Press Conference by Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2006/060619_Fall.doc.htm.

¹⁷ Annual Report, “Chapter I – Achieving Peace and Security,” Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, http://www.un.org/documents/sg/report00/c_h1.htm.

efforts.

As for the role of the African Union (AU), a fact-finding mission report on Somaliland that they released in 2005 stated, "the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case."¹⁸ Unfortunately for Somaliland, the "special method" has not yet involved a formal recognition of sovereignty or their much sought-after admittance into the Union.

Canada, for its part, toes the blurry UN line, recognizing Somaliland's autonomy, but not its sovereignty.¹⁹

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

The political events that have come to pass in the breakaway territory of Somaliland following the fall of Siad Barre's regime have been, arguably, the most democratic in the region. In addition, the organized

"The threat of continued unrest, factional fighting, or an increase in terrorist activities in the south will continue to hamper Somaliland's development as long as its future is held hostage to events in Somalia"

political climate has created an air of stability, opened the free market, and created "an oasis of peace."²⁰ Why then has the international community refused to acknowledge the territory as sovereign?

There is fear within the UN and AU that if Somaliland's secessionist goals are fulfilled, the situation will "open a

Pandora's Box" of separatist claims among African nations.²¹ What seems to have been forgotten is that Somaliland is a former colony that seeks a return to its colonial borders rather than an ethnic minority seeking new ownership over previously united land. Also overlooked is the fact that many African countries have entered into unions and later left them behind: Egypt - Syria (1958-61), Mali - Senegal (1960), Senegal - Gambia (1982-89), Rwanda - Burundi (1962).²² Precedence has been set, and Somaliland has the additional advantage of having existed for ten years now as a functioning democracy despite its geographical and theoretical ties to Somalia. Even the AU has said that "Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of 'opening a Pandora's box.'"²³

Another concern among the international community has been the possibility that secession will intensify conflict between the Islamic Courts and the TFG. But time has shown that "Somalia will remain in crisis regardless of what is done with respect to Somaliland recognition."²⁴

While the global players deliberate over the appropriate course of action, inside Somalia what little control the TFG has is waning and support for the Islamic Courts continues to grow in regions outside the capital. If no changes are made to the way in which foreign aid and diplomatic intervention is deployed in Somalia, we will see the power of the Courts spread and begin to impede on the stable north: Somaliland. Radical Islamic ideals could polarize the populace of the region and lead to increased insecurity, human rights injustices, and an indefinite loss of productive capacity.

On a more positive note, examples of renewed faith in Somaliland are abundant. Since 1991, 700,000 of the 1.2 million Somalis who fled the Barre conflict in Somalia have returned to Somaliland,²⁵ and in 2005 landlocked Ethiopia signed a trade agreement

¹⁸ Jahzbahy, Iqba. "African Union & Somaliland: Time to affirm 'Africa's best-kept secret?': 8.

¹⁹ Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets, "Country Fact Sheet: Somalia," Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/ndp/ref/index_e.htm?docid=379&cid=0&sec=CH01&version=printable&disclaimer=sh.

²⁰ Ali Farhiya Ahmed, "Somaliland Elusive Independence," *New African* 447 (January, 2006): 34.

²¹ "Dilemma of the Horn: The West Pushes for Somaliland Recognition," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 34, no. 2 (2006): 7.

²² Jahzbahy, Iqba. "African Union & Somaliland: Time to affirm 'Africa's best-kept secret?': 8.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Peter J. Schraeder, "Why the United States Should Recognise Somaliland's Independence".

²⁵ Ali Farhiya Ahmed, "Somaliland Elusive Independence," 35.

with Somaliland to conduct marine trade through the port of Berbera and travel hence to the border town of Togwajaale.²⁶ These developments offer a valid sense of hope for the region, but they will come to an end if the political stability the government of Somaliland provides ceases to exist.

UN, AU, and Canadian policy will continue unimpeded without significant pressure from independent sovereign states. Furthermore, Somaliland will not attain recognition from the UN or the AU unless a member state initiates the process of acknowledgement.

POLICY OPTIONS

Canada's current foreign policy regarding Somalia asserts full support for the UN-backed Transitional Federal Charter, signed in 2004, and subsequently the Transitional Federal Government of Mogadishu. Canada has demonstrated this support, by the directive of the UN, by providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is responsible for distributing the capital, and contributed \$16 million to multilateral organizations operating in Somalia from 2006-2007.²⁷ By promoting the actions of the TFG, Canada has in effect rejected Somaliland's claims to independence.

In continuing to support the TFG, Canada can choose to maintain its current role as a passive contributor of foreign aid, or to take an active role in calling for a new mandate of peace and reconciliation to be drafted within the UN framework. This new mandate, the fifteenth formal attempt at reconciliation, could reflect John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen's recommendations for a comprehensive multilateral diplomatic strategy centered on resolution and effective governance.²⁸

The strategy requires a three-part directive focusing on resolving conflicts, keeping the peace, and implementing multilateral penalties. Conflict between the TFG, the Islamic Courts, and warring clan factions remains to be resolved. The UN could broker a deal with participation from the African Union to negotiate the realization of a coalition government. Following negotiations, peace-keeping forces would be deployed in Somalia, through UN direction, to guarantee a smooth transition to new governance. The UN, rather than the AU, would assume leadership due to the inability of the AU to mobilize enough troops to successfully accomplish objectives. That said, the AU would have a significant role to play through garnering military support.

Following the successful implementation of a coalition government, the international community, organized through the UN, might then impose strict penalties on Somalia for any return to violence or anti-democratic practices. These penalties would come in the form of embargoes, sanctions, and prosecution of individuals by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

A multilateral peace agreement, UN leadership in peacekeeping, and punitive measures is a plausible policy alternative should the Canadian government decide to continue its policy of Somalian reconciliation.

Alternatively, Canadian foreign policy could be rewritten to reflect support for Somaliland's claims to independence, through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation and aid. Initially, Canada could simply recognise Somaliland's sovereignty as one sovereign nation to another. It could subsequently send people to support the administration of the internationally recommended voter registration process that Somaliland has undertaken in preparation for their parliamentary and presidential election in March 2009, and work towards establishing a consulate in Somaliland. Finally, Canada could use its position as a member state of the United Nations to pressure other member states into recognizing Somaliland's sovereignty.

²⁶ "Dilemma of the Horn: The West Pushes for Somaliland Recognition," 7.

²⁷ Canadian International Development Agency, "Somalia," Canadian International Development Agency, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/somalia>.

²⁸ John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, "Blowing the Horn," 127.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Somaliland's biggest problems are inexperience and the international community's refusal to acknowledge their existence as a sovereign state. Canada can and should take an active role in ameliorating both of these problems by following the recommendations outlined in the latter of the two policy options.

Canada's ability to act is undeniable. It has a respected voice in the United Nations that could be used to bring Somaliland's story to the world stage, it has the experience needed to be an advisor on electoral processes, and given the millions of dollars CIDA contributes to Somali aid, it is clear that it could have the financial ability to set up a consulate.

What remains to be contested is whether Canada should change its foreign policy. A shift from passive donor to proactive supporter would not only benefit Somaliland, but would benefit Canadian interests and the interests of counterterrorism efforts around the world.

The benefits to Canada are apparent. Canada's military strength is limited, and yet Canada wishes to present itself as the world's peacekeeper. This is evident in Canada's push for the development of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and in Canada's 2005 International Policy Statement, which reads:

"With our focus in the area of governance, we have the capacity to strengthen the ability of poor performing countries to use aid more effectively. We will, therefore, provide targeted bilateral support directly aimed at improving governance in a limited number of strategically significant poor-performing countries."²⁹

Canada's involvement in Somaliland could be entirely civilian, thereby avoiding the debate over R2P's potential neo-militarism. The suggested actions are also decisively not top-down aid, but rather an implementation of exactly what Somaliland has requested. On a domestic front,

recognition of Somaliland's existence would also recognise the history of Somalilanders living in Canada.

Finally, let us consider the benefits to Canadian-US relations and to counterterrorism as a whole. Somaliland is a stable, moderate Muslim democracy in a region characterized by faith-based conflict. By not recognizing Somaliland's accomplishments in stabilization and democratization, and instead repeatedly trying to instate western-style transitional governments and reunification, the UN and its member states are providing fuel for the Islamic Fundamentalist argument that the West is anti-Muslim; that the West will recognise no authority or solutions except those they put in place themselves. To date, Somaliland has remained relatively unscathed by Islamic extremist acts of violence, but that trend is turning. As recently as October 28th of this year, two UN staff members in Somaliland were killed when a suicide bomber blew up a car outside a UN office.³⁰

Recognizing Somaliland's independence would be an effective, high-impact, low cost form of foreign aid that more than fulfils Canada's desire to be a peace-keeping nation. It satisfies the ideological tenets of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, provides exactly what the nation in need asked for, and avoids accusations of neo-colonialism or neo-militarism. And lastly, support for Somaliland is support for counterterrorism initiatives around the world. The question now is not *should* Canada, but rather, *when* will Canada acknowledge the incredible success story that is Somaliland.

²⁹ Canadian International Development Agency, "Canada's International Policy Statement 2005," Canadian International Development Agency, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ips>.

³⁰ Office of the Spokesperson of the Secretary-General, "Somalia / Two UN Staff Members Die," United Nations, (October 31st, 2008), <<http://appablog.wordpress.com/2008/10/31/somalia-two-un-staff-members-die/>>

The Challenge of Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity: PCIA Methodologies and the Organizational Culture of NGOs

Jennifer Causton

BACKGROUND: THE NEED FOR CONFLICT SENSIVITY

The prevalence and persistence of conflict in some of the world's poorest areas have both frustrated development efforts and inspired a desire to better understand the relationship between security and development. What materialized in the aftermath of the Cold War was not the expected peace dividend, but rather an explosion of violent conflicts, which reached its peak in 1995.¹ Although the world had experienced extraordinarily destructive wars before, these new conflicts "swept away decades of expert gospel,"² and their increased visibility on the global stage in the midst of the growing awareness of the interdependence between global economic and security concerns, made them the topic of intense interest and debate.³ As the line between combatants and civilians during intrastate conflicts became less easily defined so too did the lines between security and development. Development actors increasingly found themselves working in volatile environments and with the removal of the Cold War "geopolitical straightjacket"⁴ were confronted with new opportunities for interventions to address issues, such as security and governance, which were once deemed to be the sole responsibility of sovereign states.

Indeed numerous documents, including the 1992 United Nations *An Agenda for Peace* laid the

framework for a more holistic approach to peace and security. Former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali identified the need for continued peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, but also introduced the term peacebuilding which was defined as "actions to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."⁵ In 1997 the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee's *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* codified the long dormant first line of the UN Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."⁶ It deemed conflict prevention a key development goal, and laid out the "rationale and conceptual framework for linking development and security."⁷ While some have argued that these new roles are a natural progression of the development enterprise, others such as Mark Duffield, have conceived of them as a radical break in both development thinking and practice.⁸ However, regardless of the perspective one takes, it is evident that the institutional fragility, social trauma, and political uncertainty of these situations have challenged both the wisdom of carrying on with 'development as usual' as well as the ability of development actors to do so.

The aid effectiveness debates of the 1990's shone a light on the negative impact of some humanitarian aid, but they also illuminated the development enterprise and its failings.

What became more apparent was that inadequate or inappropriate projects that were not reflective of the context in which they operated, were more likely to aggravate the existing structural, or root dimensions of tension, often exacerbating or at times causing conflict. No assistance programme is ever neutral, given that even the presence of development workers in a certain area can change power dynamics, so even seemingly benign projects, such

¹ International Peace Academy. (June 2005). *Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Conflict Contexts: Policy Brief*. New York: International Peace Academy, 2.

² Stedman, S.J. (1991). Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A conceptual framework. In F.M. Deng & I.W. Zartman (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. 367-399. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 367.

³ Tschirgi, N. (December 2003). *Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the window of opportunity closing?* New York: International Peace Academy, 2.

⁴ De Waal, A. (1997). *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster of Relief Industry in Africa*. London: Oxford University Press, 133.

⁵ Barakat, S. (2005). Chapter 1: Post-War Reconstruction and Developing: Coming of Age. In S. Barakat (Ed.), *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*. 8-32. London: I.B. Tauris, 27.

⁶ Charter of the United Nations. (1945). <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

⁷ Tschirgi. *Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development*, 4.

⁸ Duffield, M. (2001). *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.

as the development of educational systems, have the potential to contribute to existing factionalism by emphasizing ethnic or religious boundaries or by inadvertently privileging one language over another.⁹ The example that is perhaps most often cited, of development gone wrong, is that of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in which both development and relief agencies acted with only "limited understanding of the structures of Rwandese society [and] took very little account of the views of the beneficiaries in the design and implementation of programmes."¹⁰ A lack of understanding and appreciation for the structural causes of the conflict and dynamics of the society in this situation, resulted in programmes that overlooked those who were most vulnerable in the population, and so development efforts ended up reinforcing the authority of a privileged few.

However, the idea that development can contribute positively towards peace has been codified in numerous United Nations and international documents and reports, confirming that education systems do not have to reinforce factionalism and schools can provide an alternative to combatants and offer space for discussion and dialogue. It has become clear, though, that this new perspective will require that development organizations fill the existing gaps in theory and practice regarding both the nature of conflict as well as the ramifications of their involvement. The World Bank, for instance, has reassessed its role in 'post-conflict reconstruction,' while "a number of international and local NGOs [have] collaborated through the Local Capacities for Peace Project, also known as the Do No Harm Project (DNH) to learn more about how assistance that is give in conflict settings interacts with the conflicts."¹¹ So, while realization of the two-way relationship between conflict and development has come at the price of devastating

destruction and missed opportunities, it has also inspired a desire to minimize negative impacts and positively contribute towards peace by developing programmes and activities through a conflict sensitive lens.

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY DEFINED

Conflict sensitivity, much like gender sensitivity, was never intended to be just a checklist of appropriate activities, but rather, "an entire ethos as to how organizations could strategize, plan, implement and evaluate their work."¹² In order to be effective it must therefore, be mainstreamed throughout all policies and projects, so that development actors establish an intimate knowledge of the environment in which they are operating, are clearly aware of the potential effects of their actions and have a realistic understanding of the ability of the organization to act on that knowledge. Conflict sensitivity, according to the FEWER et al. *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding – A Resource Pack* is the capacity of an organization to:

- Understand the context in which you operate
- Understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and
- Act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts¹³

Adopting such an approach has the potential to make development projects not only more realistic in their goals and appropriate in their interventions, but also capable of making a contribution towards ameliorating violent conflict and building peace. Nevertheless, the decision to mainstream conflict sensitivity is a "strategic choice"¹⁴ that the majority of organizations have not voted in favour of. Despite the growing awareness of the two way relationship between conflict and development and

⁹ The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), Saferworld, International Alert, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), Africa Peace Forum (APFO) and the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA). (2004). *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding – A Resource Pack*. London, Chapter 4, Annex 1, 12.

¹⁰ Ibid., Chapter 1, 4.

¹¹ Collaborative Learning Project & Collaborative for Development Action Inc. (2004). *The Do No Harm Framework: The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict*. Massachusetts: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 1.

¹² Barbolet, A., Goldwyn, R., Groenewald, H., & Sherriff, A. (2005). The utility and dilemmas of conflict sensitivity. In D. Bloomfield, M. Fischer, & B. Schmelzle (Eds.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 5.

¹³ The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) et al. *A Resource Pack*, Chapter 1, 1.

¹⁴ Lange, M. (2004). *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice: The case of international NGOs*. London: International Alert, 5.

the proclaimed 'culture of prevention,' few organizations are either rigorously analyzing conflict or effectively altering their programmes to reflect a sensitivity to conflict. The literature clearly implies that the most prevalent reason why conflict sensitivity has not been adopted is the lack of clear methodologies that would facilitate the mainstreaming of this perspective. Perhaps inspired by Kenneth Bush's claim that without such methodologies, development interventions can only really "list, assert, or guess at the positive or negative impacts of [their] actions,"¹⁵ much of the literature, going one step further, has focused on developing a single, universal methodology to translate theory into practice.

ASSUMPTION 1:

PCIA AS A UNIVERSAL METHODOLOGY

Underlying the search for a universal methodology, is the assumption that it is possible for one methodology to serve the interests of both the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding communities, as well as donors and civil society. As a result, peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) has gained widespread recognition in recent years for having the potential to translate diverse theories into universal practices. Proposed in the late 1990s by Kenneth Bush and Luc Reyhler, PCIA was initially intended to be a methodology that would allow developing countries to regain some control over their own development while at the same time, demonstrating the impact of foreign interventions.¹⁶ Bush and Reyhler's belief that there needs to "a means of evaluating (ex post facto) and anticipating (ex ante as far as possible) the impact of proposed and completed development projects"¹⁷ on structures which both build and inhibit peace, has become an increasingly popular idea. In addition to this, the growing number of actors involved in the development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding communities has amplified competition for scarce

resources, and the need to be able to show results and demonstrate success has led to PCIA receiving more attention than ever before. However, Bush

"The aid effectiveness debates of the 1990's shone a light on the negative impact of some humanitarian aid, but they also illuminated the development enterprise and its failings."

and Reyhler did not "provide details on how to carry out conflict impact assessment"¹⁸ and the resulting confusion and frenzy caused Bush to observe recently that what has, in fact, evolved is a "mechanistic northern led quest for mainstreamable products..."¹⁹

To date then, the general purpose of this quest has been to narrow the search down to find one universally applicable methodology that would facilitate the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity. Given that the foundation of any mainstreaming process is "agreement around basic concepts"²⁰ numerous approaches have been developed that have attempted to foster consensus in this context. For example, one attempt to create a widely applicable PCIA methodology has been developed by INTRAC for the UK Department of International Development (DFID). Their goal has been to "develop a smart planning and management tool that can assist policy makers and practitioners to mitigate conflict and promote peace in a more systematic manner."²¹ While this framework has encountered criticism, for, among other things, its emphasis on the strategic level,²² it does provide a useful framework to discuss some of the "different components of an overall conflict assessment methodology."²³ It has also facilitated a discussion focused on the challenges of building consensus

¹⁸ IDRC. (October 2002) *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-Building. Editorial: PCIA – A Perspective from IDRC*. 1(1), 2.

¹⁹ Gsanger, H. & Feyen, C. (April 2003). PCIA Methodology: A development practitioner's perspective. In D. Bloomfield, M. Fischer, & B. Schmelzle (Eds.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 68.

²⁰ Lange. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice*, 10.

²¹ Hoffman. *PCIA Methodology*, 26.

²² Ibid., 26.

²³ Ibid., 28.

¹⁵ Hoffman, M. (April 2003). PCIA Methodology: Evolving art form or practical dead end? In D. Bloomfield, M. Fischer, & B. Schmelzle (Eds.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 19.

¹⁶ Leonhardt, M. (April 2003). Towards a Unified Methodology: Reframing PCIA. In D. Bloomfield, M. Fischer, & B. Schmelzle (Eds.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 54.

¹⁷ Hoffman. *PCIA Methodology*, 19.

around each of the three categories as outlined by INTRAC: 1) strategic conflict assessment (SCA); 2) conflict impact assessment (CIA); and 3) a peacebuilding framework.²⁴ However, as will be demonstrated, the diversity of approaches to each of these components of PCIA continues to reveal the difficulty of creating a universal PCIA methodology, even one as broad as the one proposed by INTRAC.

STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESEMENT (SCA)

The FEWER et al. *Resource Pack* lists 15 different methods for doing conflict analysis, one of which is the INTRAC strategic conflict assessment.²⁵ While these various methods may differ significantly in their approach or target audience, they share the common goal of attempting to analyze the conflict context. In development circles it is generally agreed upon that such conflict analysis is at the "core of conflict sensitivity"²⁶ because without an intimate knowledge of the context in which the conflict is occurring, it is virtually impossible to 'anticipate and evaluate' the impact of development projects, or even to know where to look for results. However, because there are many variables that produce stunningly different pictures of the same situation, it follows that based upon their definition of what constitutes conflict, their level of focus, and their perceived role in that context; different actors would analyze the same conflict very differently.

The problem of articulating a universal methodology for conflict analysis, therefore, starts with the challenge of coming up with a universal definition of the key concepts such as conflict, security, development, and peacebuilding. For example, the concept of conflict, which is both dynamic and complex, is commonly defined as the "perceived incompatibility of goals or aspirations,"²⁷ and yet there is little agreement about how it manifests itself or about its possible usefulness. So, for example, there is an ongoing tendency to equate

conflict with violence, even though violence is only one "potential form that conflict may take."²⁸ The resilience of this narrow definition is perhaps most apparent in the way it impedes the creation of a 'culture of prevention,' because the international community has demonstrated that it is unlikely to believe that conflict exists in an area until it becomes violent. Yet, Bernard Wood contends that it is the prevention of this escalation towards violence that should be the goal of development, rather than the prevention of all conflict,²⁹ which William Zartman sees as an "inevitable aspect of human interaction that cannot and perhaps, should not be avoided."³⁰ Wood's conviction, however, overlooks the fact that violence has at times been used to bring about what were seen as necessary changes, as for example in India's struggle for independence and South Africa's fight against apartheid.³¹ In addition, the continued emphasis on violence as the primary indicator of conflict also ignores the more subtle underlying tensions and structural forms of violence. In Rwanda, for instance, a more comprehensive understanding of conflict may have exposed the hostile tensions beneath The Arusha Peace Agreement which subsequently exploded in genocidal violence only a few months later, and in South Africa it might have shed a light on some of the structural and political forms of violence inherent in the system of apartheid. According to Bush, the danger of this disconnection, both conceptually and pragmatically, is that in failing to appreciate the existence of different forms of conflict, development efforts limit their response, in terms of both project design and evaluation, to the aspects of conflict that are more obvious.³² In contrast, the FEWER et al. *Resource Pack* has attempted to correct this narrow focus by using the word 'context' instead of conflict, arguing that an understanding of underlying tensions and more covert forms of violence is

²⁴ Hoffman. *PCLA Methodology*, 26.

²⁵ The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) et al. *A Resource Pack*, Chapter 2, 12.

²⁶ Lange. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice*, 13.

²⁷ Samarasinghe, S., Donaldson, B., & McGinn, C. (1999). *Conflict Vulnerability Analysis*. Arlington, VW: Tulane Institute for International Development, 2.

²⁸ Stedman. *Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa*, 370.

²⁹ Wood, B. (June 2001). *Development dimensions of conflict prevention and peace-building*. An independent study prepared for the Emergency Response Division. New York: UNDP.

³⁰ Deng, F., & Zartman W. (Eds.), (1991). *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 8.

³¹ Samarasinghe et al. *Conflict Vulnerability Analysis*, 2.

³² Bush, K.D. & Opp, R.J. (1999). Concept: Peace. Chapter 9: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. In D. Buckles (Ed.), *Cultivating Peace: Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management*. IDRC/World Bank. Online document.

crucial to an accurate analysis of the situation.³³ However, overwhelmed by the amount of information it takes to fully understand a particular context, many actors continue to focus their attention on only the more obvious, and seemingly more urgent issues.

The impact of this conceptual confusion however, which contributes, in large measure to the difficulty

of coming up with a universal methodology for analyzing conflict, extends beyond just these ideas of violence and conflict. Security, development, and peacebuilding are three terms that have also gained widespread currency, although, once again, there continues to be little

agreement on what they mean. Granted, all three are “broad and elusive concepts”³⁴ whose definitions have changed and evolved over time, but the lack of consensus that surrounds them leads to very real problems both on the ground and in generating meaningful discussions on related issues such as capacity. For instance, Adam Barbolet et al. note that depending on how PCIA is understood, one could answer the question, “Has the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) developed its own PCIA capacity?”³⁵ very differently. While DFID has created a general PCIA framework, which is being used to outline this discussion, the degree to which it is actually being used as well as the degree to which it contributes to mutual learning, would lead some to conclude that DFID does not, in fact have a PCIA capacity.³⁶ Manuela Leonhardt gives another example from the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), in which NPI defined peacebuilding as “qualitative, liberating and humanizing change”³⁷ while their donors thought of peacebuilding as the absence of

violence. Not only do these different definitions involve different evaluation criteria and times frames, but conceptual confusion and the application of “the same terminology [the interdependence between security and development] for distinct goals at different levels of policy intervention,”³⁸ have led to misunderstandings and oversights which have been an impediment to effective communication between academics and

practitioners, as well as among actors in the field.

Ryszard Kapuściński reminds us that this is much more than a theoretical issue, with his timely warning that, “‘development’ is no indifferent, abstract concept”³⁹ and that

the discrepancies and abstractions that impede effective communication also result in contradictions and risks that affect real people’s lives.

Different levels of analysis can also result in very different perceptions of the same situation. Donors, who are often geographically distant from the conflict, for instance, are generally more concerned with the big picture and often focus on the strategic or country level. Implementing agencies on the other hand, are usually more concerned with how the situation affects the day to day operations of their organization, and therefore tend to zero in at the local level. Affected communities and civil society, while they may have the same local focus, often see the conflict from only one side of the fence, making it difficult to understand the larger picture.⁴⁰ These strikingly different perspectives become apparent when one compares two approaches to conflict analysis that focus on different levels. The ‘Do No Harm’ (DNH) framework for instance, focuses on the local level, while the conflict vulnerability analysis (CVA)

³³ The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) et al. *A Resource Pack*.

³⁴ International Peace Academy (IPA). (February 2006). *The Security-Development Nexus: Research Findings and Policy Implications*. New York: International Peace Academy, 2.

³⁵ Barbolet et al. *The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity*, 4.

³⁶ Ibid., 4.

³⁷ Leonhardt. *Towards a Unified Methodology*, 58.

³⁸ International Peace Academy (IPA). *The Security-Development Nexus: Research Findings and Policy Implications*, 2.

³⁹ Stedman. *Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa*, 370.

⁴⁰ Leonhardt. *Towards a Unified Methodology*, 56.

framework focuses on the national level.⁴¹ So, where DNH might see opportunity in conceptualizing the conflict in terms of “dividers and connectors,”⁴² identifying areas that might connect people and offering them potential avenues for reconciliation even in the worst conflicts, CVA, in focusing on the national and strategic level would be more likely to perceive and respond to whatever could be viewed as a threat. USAID which uses CVA, recognises the importance of having its projects support American foreign policy, which it defines as a desire to “create a more secure, prosperous, and democratic world for the benefit of the American people.”⁴³ Therefore, instead of seeing local opportunity in conflict, USAID might be more likely to see threats to the United States and its goals.

It is clear then that there are numerous ways to analyze conflict. The FEWER et al. *Resource Pack* outlines 15 different approaches, and certainly more exist, or are in the process of being developed.⁴⁴ Attempting to create a universal PCIA methodology, let alone a framework to analyze conflict, overlooks the degree to which each approach has so far been tailored specifically to the interests and needs of a particular organization. However, these various approaches to conflict are more than a reflection of a particular mandate, they are also a reflection of deep-seated “theories about how the world works,”⁴⁵ and while these vary significantly from organization to organization, they often vary even more dramatically between actors who may be either internal or external to a conflict. Coming up with a universal methodology that accommodates different definitions and perspectives on analysis will be extremely difficult; coming up with a universal world view might be impossible.

⁴¹ The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) et al. *A Resource Pack*, Chapter 2, 12.

⁴² Lange. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice*, 13.

⁴³ The Payson Centre for International Development and Technology Transfer. (2000). *Conflict Vulnerability Analysis: Annex B: Conflict Vulnerability Assessment*, 2.

⁴⁴ The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) et al. *A Resource Pack*.

⁴⁵ Ross, M.H. (April 2003). PCIA as a Peacebuilding Tool. In D. Bloomfield, M. Fischer, & B. Schmelzle (Eds.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 77.

CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT (CIA)

The second component of the INTRAC framework and a key part of any PCIA methodology is conflict impact assessment (CIA), which is also a difficult and demanding task, especially in “fluid emergency settings.”⁴⁶ The purpose of CIA is to identify where conflict can be mitigated and peace can be built, as well as to anticipate and evaluate both the intended and unintended positive and negative impacts the project might have on those areas.⁴⁷ It relies on conflict analysis both in helping to identify areas where actors believe they will have an influence, as well as in selecting indicators to measure their impact.

Given that “the particular analysis of any problem is tied directly to an understanding of the nature of solutions,”⁴⁸ Leonhardt has observed that based on an analysis of the context, “stakeholders hold specific views on how they can bring about change to the conflict situation.”⁴⁹ She refers to these views as ‘theories of action’ and argues that although they are often implicit rather than explicit, they manifest themselves in both the design and implementation of projects, in the selection of indicators, as well as in the definition of success. Leonhardt goes on to discuss different theories of action and demonstrates how the analysis of the causes of conflict directly informs the identification of a solution and the subsequent action that is taken. The ‘root causes approach,’ for instance, assumes that conflict erupts due to political and material grievances. Therefore, solutions focus on the disbursement of developmental and political aid. On the other hand, the ‘individuals and attitudes and relations approach’ assumes violence erupts when “when relationships have been disturbed by prejudice, past experience and lack of communication”⁵⁰ and solutions therefore focus on confidence building measures as well as public participation and dialogue. The significance of this is that the indicators used to assess the impact of a

⁴⁶ Barnett, M. (2005). Humanitarianism Transformed. 723-740. *Perspectives on Politics*. 3(4), 730.

⁴⁷ Hoffman. *PCIA Methodology*, 26.

⁴⁸ Bush & Opp. *Concept: Peace. Chapter 9: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment*, online document.

⁴⁹ Leonhardt. *Towards a Unified Methodology*, 58.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 59.

particular development project will be profoundly influenced by the choice of approach used to analyze the causes of the conflict in which the project is being carried out.

Attempting to find a universal set of indicators, the basis for measuring impact, is even more challenging. One of the key focuses on developing a universal PCIA methodology has been to try and conceive of what the KOFF Centre for Peacebuilding calls, a “good mix”⁵¹ of local and universal indicators, although what constitutes a ‘good mix’ has proven difficult to agree on. This is in large part due to the fact that where one chooses to look for impact, the indicators that are selected, and what those indicators actually indicate, are neither obvious nor objective, but are a reflection of the values, theories and perspectives that have so far been discussed.

As an alternative, therefore, Bush, among others, have attempted to identify broad, yet universal areas where impact can be assessed using locally determined indicators. Bush’s list includes: “institutional capacity to manage/resolve violent conflict and to promote tolerance and build peace; military and human security; political structures and processes; economic structures and processes; social reconstruction and empowerment.”⁵² The weakness of this approach is that he fails to identify the links between sectors, and therefore one of the dangers is to isolate the different areas.⁵³ For instance, an actor who believes that conflict is caused by problems in the political economy, would likely only look for impact within economic structures and processes. In reality, the types of distinctions among sectors which Bush and others have made, do not exist, and conceptualizing of them as such, may actually be detrimental.

Indicators are incredibly powerful. While they have the ability to indicate both success and failure, even the same indicator can be read dramatically differently by various actors. As will be discussed later, what indicates success in peacebuilding can

often be read as failure for development and vice versa. Similarly, an organization who equates conflict with violence is likely to view a decrease in fatality rates (a measure used by USAID/CVA) as a positive indicator of the de-escalation of violence. On the other hand, an organization who focuses on structural and violent forms of conflict, might interpret this as simply a sign of exhaustion rather than a sign of peace.

PEACEBUILDING FRAMEWORK

The third component of the INTRAC methodology is the peacebuilding framework “used to assess, monitor and evaluate projects with an explicit and dedicated focus on peacebuilding.”⁵⁴ The idea that actors should not simply seek to avoid doing harm, but should actively contribute towards building peace has been a defining feature of PCIA that has set it apart from previous frameworks. However, monitoring and evaluation, especially in the context of peacebuilding, have their own challenges. Different and often competing interests in the evaluation process and the information it produces have been further complicated by the resistance from the development community to adopting the peacebuilding agenda.

Leonhardt makes the point that different stakeholders have different interests in evaluation and that this has an effect on their selection of indicators, as well as on their dedication to an effective and objective evaluation process. The functions of evaluation, Leonhardt notes, range from marketing to institutional learning.⁵⁵ Because evaluation has the ability to demonstrate either success or failure, it often involves a strategic consideration that can negate the opportunity for evaluation to lead to learning and growth.

Many authors have commented that the question of ownership is in fact, at the heart of the confusion over PCIA and the process of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity.⁵⁶ Kenneth Bush initially promoted PCIA as an “emancipatory tool,”⁵⁷ allowing individuals in developing countries to take

⁵¹ Jakob, L. (Ed.), (May 2004). *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Info Sheet*. KOFF Centre for Peacebuilding, 5.

⁵² Hoffman. *PCIA Methodology*, 23.

⁵³ Ibid., 25.

⁵⁴ Hoffman. *PCIA Methodology*, 26.

⁵⁵ Leonhardt. *Towards a Unified Methodology*, 56.

⁵⁶ Leonhardt. *Towards a Unified Methodology*, 53.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 56.

back some of the control over their livelihood, a process that he concludes "was subsequently appropriated by donors and their entourage of NGOs hoping to gain money and reputation by taking up a promising idea."⁵⁸ It is certainly true that the information that evaluation produces and the opportunity it creates for increasing learning and effectiveness, are lost when it becomes just another marketing tool of Western organizations. At the root of ongoing problems regarding identification of the causes of conflict, as well as the selection of indicators, may be the more challenging question of who should be in charge of PCIA methodologies and the information they produce. As new development orthodoxy claims to focus on grassroots and local participation, such questions of ownership of tools and the information they generate will become even more important.

Finally, the "overwhelming tide favouring the engagement of development agencies in peacebuilding work"⁵⁹ has been met with considerable resistance that has prevented the integration, both conceptually and practically, of these two important areas. When Kofi Annan made the distinction in the 2001 *Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict* between peacebuilding which he described as "a new generation of development projects specifically focused on conflict prevention"⁶⁰ and other development projects, he may have done so with the intent of keeping peacebuilding from becoming a large, amorphous term. However, what has happened is that rather than seeing conflict sensitivity as something that should be part of the organizations ethos, they have simply hired one or two specialists or created separate peacebuilding units or offices, in effect "ghettoizing"⁶¹ the peacebuilding agenda. Because peacebuilding, by its very nature is assumed to be conflict sensitive, the creation of an office or the hiring of a specialist has been seen to be sufficient

to make the whole organization conflict sensitive.⁶² Indeed many organizations, such as CARE noted strong resistance among its workers against the rolling out of yet another idea and found that creating a separate entity avoided the issue of having to make any fundamental organizational changes.⁶³ The result has been that 'normal' development has remained fundamentally uncommitted to issues of conflict, the most obvious example being the Millennium Development Goals, which established a "narrowly cast development agenda irrespective of security conditions."⁶⁴

There are indeed challenges to integrating peacebuilding and development, and because peacebuilding is often equated with conflict sensitive practices, it is an important issue and challenge to overcome. The development community, for instance, fearing the loss of crucial humanitarian principles such as neutrality, is often ambivalent about engaging in what it perceives to be explicitly political activity. Furthermore, because peacebuilding often involves a closer engagement with the military, development actors often try to avoid this association. Complicating this picture is the way in which

"There are indeed challenges to integrating peacebuilding and development, and because peacebuilding is often equated with conflict sensitive practices, it is an important issue and challenge to overcome."

peacebuilding has been marginalized at the organizational level, making the tensions and tradeoffs seem like a competition in which "positive development outcomes thus might produce negative peacebuilding outcomes."⁶⁵ Bush gives the example of "an education project that fails to achieve its targets in terms of numbers of students passing exams, yet succeeds in reducing inter-group/communal tensions. In narrow terms, such a programme would be

⁵⁸ Ibid., 55.

⁵⁹ Uvin, P. (2002). The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A typology and history of changing paradigms. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*. 1(1), 6.

⁶⁰ Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General. (7 June 2001). UN Doc A/55/985-S/2001/574.

⁶¹ Bush, K. (1998). A Measure of Peace. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones. Working Paper No. 1. The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Programme Initiative & Evaluation Unit. Available online, 1.

⁶² Lange. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice*, 12.

⁶³ Ibid., 21.

⁶⁴ International Peace Academy (IPA). *The Security-Development Nexus*, 3.

⁶⁵ Hoffman. *PCIA Methodology*, 20.

deemed a failure; but in wider peacebuilding terms, it would be a 'success.'⁶⁶ Because peacebuilding and development have been conceived of as being fundamentally different, a perspective that is reinforced by the creation of a competing office, the shared ground where education can be a success both in terms of development and in building peace is lost.

DISCUSSION

The current literature supports the belief that the lack of a universal methodology is the primary reason that conflict sensitivity has not been mainstreamed. However, as the discussion thus far has demonstrated, a universal methodology is unlikely to ever be created given the number of stakeholders involved and the various perspectives they bring to the table. The diversity of opinions over the meaning key concepts such as conflict and its causes, which influence the goals and types of activities actors are involved in produce very different results which are then evaluated against unique definitions of success. Far from being simply differences of opinion, these beliefs reflect particular world views and are deeply ingrained in the individual and organizational minds of those involved. It is perhaps no wonder then, that PCIA methodologies, as Hoffman observed, "are slowly grinding themselves into the ground,"⁶⁷ as they attempt to find the perfect mix of indicators and actors. The continued focus on detailed frameworks and narrow methodologies, such as the step by step procedure offered by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation lack flexibility and adaptability and are unlikely to facilitate greater mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity amongst various actors. On the other hand, broad frameworks such as the one offered by the FEWER et al. *Resource Pack*, which attempt to address the needs of those involved at all levels of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding intervention make everything important and therefore nothing practical. Their attempt to use a language and a terminology that all actors can agree on leaves them unable to offer sufficient detail to be considered a

useful toolkit to any of the actors they have targeted.

Perhaps it is time to consider that the problem has been diagnosed incorrectly. Perhaps the reason why conflict sensitivity has not been mainstreamed is not simply a lack of appropriate tools. Indeed conflict sensitivity, as defined earlier by the FEWER et al. *Resource Pack*, demands not only an understanding of context and the interaction between intervention and context, but the ability to act upon this understanding.⁶⁸ The focus thus far has been on developing the proper methodologies to do so. However, in this process 'methodology' has been conceived in purely technical terms, an unfortunate hallmark of Western thought, with the result that issues of theory and questions of principles and operating skills, the very elements that Vijay Padaki argues make methodologies functional, have been left out of the equation.⁶⁹ Understanding and appreciating the challenges of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity throughout development so that it not only avoids doing harm, but is able to contribute towards building peace, will require a move away from an emphasis on tools and methodologies, to questions that strike at the very heart of the development enterprise.

Perhaps the problem is that the development community, with non-governmental organizations (NGO) at the forefront, lacks the fundamental capacity to be able to work effectively in conflict and mainstream an ethos of conflict sensitivity. While the discourse has focused on the development of PCIA methodologies and the challenge the external conflict environment poses, the question of whether NGOs have the appropriate organizational culture to operationalize such frameworks and actually give them purpose and meaning within the organizations has remained largely absent from the discussion. Before turning to the internal organizational environment, which Goodhand calls a critical "blind spot,"⁷⁰ we must

⁶⁸ The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) et al. *A Resource Pack*, Chapter 1, 1.

⁶⁹ Padaki, V. (2007). The Human Organization: Challenges in NGOs and development programmes. 65-77. *Development in Practice*. 17(1), 66.

⁷⁰ Goodhand, J. (2006). *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 6.

⁶⁶ Hoffman. *PCLA Methodology*, 20.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 33..

first look at the role and nature of development NGOs.

ASSUMPTION 2:

THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE OF NGOS

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have grown exponentially in the past decade, both in number and in the scope of their activities. When the sanctity of state borders diminished with the end of the Cold War, NGOs were presented with new opportunities for interventions. New discourses of both security and development challenged the state-centric approaches that had prevailed during the Cold War and focused on the importance of civil society and ideas of participation and empowerment. NGOs quickly became the driving force on the "other path"⁷¹ to development, and as the links grew between security and development, NGOs took on a larger role in the areas of peace and conflict. In 1992, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized in the *Agenda for Peace*, that "peace required not only the dedication of governments, but that 'non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional communities, the media and the public at large must all be involved.'"⁷² As of 2002, according to the UNDP, NGOs controlled approximately 30% of the total Overseas Development Aid (ODA) budget.⁷³

In this new context, many of the qualities that were seen to make NGOs perfectly suited for development work also made them attractive to address issues of security and because they have the reputation of being "everything that governments are not,"⁷⁴

"Indeed conflict sensitivity demands not only an understanding of context and the interaction between intervention and context, but the ability to act upon this understanding."

NGOs have been hailed as the embodiment of "disinterested humanitarianism"⁷⁵ with the added benefit of having a superior "internationalist, moral position."⁷⁶ Unlike governments, it is assumed that NGO's are free from cumbersome bureaucracies and therefore able to do more with less money, as well as having the freedom to engage with various other actors as "facilitators, brokers and translators,"⁷⁷ without worrying about diplomatic pressures. Despite their prevalence, however, it is debatable whether NGOs "live up to these supposed comparative advantages"⁷⁸ with some people claiming that they do not deserve the title 'non-governmental' while others argue that as alternative organizations stacked with idealistic hippies, they cannot live up to their "democratic, grassroots rhetoric."⁷⁹ The literature now generally recognises that NGOs are not the magic bullet they were envisioned to be for development, but there is still little agreement on whether or not they can overcome all the challenges that they face.

The sheer number of NGOs, many of them differing dramatically in their origins and mandates, make it difficult to talk about NGOs in general terms. Goodhand makes the point however, that one area of common ground is that NGO practice is about making decisions, and given that decisions are never made in a vacuum, it is possible to talk about the various "filters that shape the decision-making process, which span the macro, meso and micro levels: these are the political context, the organizational environment, and individual values and preferences."⁸⁰ To look at all three is beyond the scope of this paper, and therefore the focus will be on the

⁷¹ Feldman, S. (1997). NGOs and Civil Society: (Un)stated Contradictions. 46-65. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 554, 50.

⁷² Watson, A. (2006). Saving More Than the Children: The role of child-focused NGOs in the creation of Southern security norms. 227-237. *Third World Quarterly*. 27(2), 228.

⁷³ Walsh, E. & Lenihan, H. (2006). Accountability and effectiveness of NGOs: adapting business tools successfully. 412-423. *Development in Practice*. 16(5), 412.

⁷⁴ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 2.

⁷⁵ Sirrat, R. L. & Henkel, H. (1997). The Development Gift: The problem of reciprocity in the NGO world. 66-80. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 554, 70.

⁷⁶ Van Tongeren, P., Brenk, M., Hellema, M., Verhoeven, J. (Eds.), (2005). *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 513.

⁷⁷ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 167.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁹ Petras, J. (1999). NGOs: In the service of imperialism. 429-440. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*. 29(4), 433.

⁸⁰ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 5.

organizational environment and specifically the component of organizational culture, because of the crucial effect the culture has on the learning process within NGOs which, in turn, determines the capacity of NGOs to operationalize conflict sensitivity.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

According to Goodhand, "How problems are framed and responded to is influenced by a range of organizational factors that are independent of the problem itself."⁸¹ The factors that make up an organization's environment include its goals, composition, structure and culture, all of which have the ability to both influence and constrain the choices and actions of practitioners. Therefore, as Lange argues, the prerequisites for an organization to develop the capacity to make conflict sensitive choices are that it not only has the relevant tools and policy frameworks, but also a conducive internal environment.⁸² This requires a proper mix of what Goodhand calls "heart and mind,"⁸³ which in this case means the combination of a normative foundation and values conducive to learning about and integrating conflict sensitivity, as well as 'organizational intelligence' and the capacity to act. However, Michael Edwards argues that although all NGOs strive to be "learning organizations,"⁸⁴ numerous factors within their organizational environment combine to create a culture with "a powerful mix of learning disabilities that produce the direct opposite of what those who sustain and enforce the systems hope to achieve."⁸⁵ Since learning is defined as not only the acquisition of information, but also as the "modification of behavior through practice, training or experience,"⁸⁶ without an ability to learn, the third component of conflict sensitivity, which is to act upon the

information that is gathered through conflict analysis and impact assessment in a responsible way, is difficult if not impossible. In addition to this, the purpose of PCIA, which is "to learn from the experience and to use the lessons to design better projects,"⁸⁷ is lost.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Organizational culture is just one aspect of the organizational environment, but it is fundamental to how the organization views "both itself and its environment."⁸⁸ If as Lange argues, the organizational culture provides the "lens" through which an organization sees the world,⁸⁹ then any attempt to make NGOs adopt a lens that is conflict sensitive must involve a discussion of organizational culture, which can be defined as "the way of life in an organization"⁹⁰ and refers to "shared values and practices that evolve within organizations."⁹¹ An organization's culture emerges from the founding principles, remembered history and values within the organization, all of which are then reinforced and further maintained by the external environment, making the culture of any organization difficult and slow to change.⁹² While the heterogeneity of NGOs makes them difficult to talk about as a single entity, three different aspects of NGO culture that they all tend to have in common will be examined, with an emphasis on how they each affect the learning process. This is important because the ability to learn from experience as well as theory is crucial to the integration of new information in any organization. The three aspects of NGO culture that can interfere with learning are a value-oriented culture, a risk averse culture, and an activist culture.

VALUE ORIENTED CULTURE

Shared values are a defining feature of the culture of any organization, but they are of central importance

⁸¹ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 7.

⁸² Lange. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice*.

⁸³ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 155.

⁸⁴ Edwards, M. (1997). Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations: What have we learned? 235-250. *Public Administration and Development*. Vol. 17, 235.

⁸⁵ Smillie, I. (1999). At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and issues in the relationship between Northern NGOs and Northern governments. In I. Smillie & H. Helmich (Eds.), *Stakeholders: Government-NGO Partnerships for International Development*. 7-35. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 27.

⁸⁶ learning. (n.d.). *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)*. Dictionary.com website.

⁸⁷ Reyhler, L. (2001). Chapter 1: From Conflict to Sustainable Peacebuilding - Concepts and Analytical Tools. In L. Reyhler & T. Paffenholz (Eds.), *Peace-building: A Field Guide*. 3-20. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 11.

⁸⁸ Lange. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice*, 21.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 21.

⁹⁰ Hatch, M.J. (1997). *Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives*. New York: Oxford University Press, 204.

⁹¹ Ibid., 204.

⁹² Lange. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice*, 21.

in NGOs. Patrick Kilby observes the prevalence of the language of values within the NGO literature as well as its centrality in the definition of NGOs themselves, as “self-governing independent bodies, voluntary in nature, [that] tend to engage both their supporters and constituency on the basis of values...”⁹³ Indeed many NGOs, especially those that are religiously inspired, are built on a foundation of explicitly stated and shared values. While some may argue that this gives NGOs a humanity that distinguishes them from big business whose only value is profit, NGOs’ claim to moral high ground has insulated them from much of the criticism and demands for accountability and consistency that fall upon other types of organizations.

Given therefore, that values are often the *raison d’être* of NGOs, it is perhaps not surprising, going back to Goodhand’s analogy, that they are often willing to sacrifice the ‘mind’ for the sake of the ‘heart.’ Lange observes that all bureaucracies struggle to deal with contradictory and challenging information.⁹⁴ However, where this may, in many cases, test institutional objectives or operations causing an organization to rethink its objectives and values, in NGOs information that challenges their fundamental values and beliefs is all too often ignored and discounted in an effort to preserve the status quo. Indeed, Edwards observes that ‘selective’ and ‘superficial’ learning that “excludes information that challenges an agency’s ‘sacred cows,’”⁹⁵ is common among NGOs. Good intentions and “an underlying conviction in the rightness of the cause”⁹⁶ are claimed to adequately substitute for accountability and learning. Given that NGOs are generally staffed by “people who have strong beliefs, values and commitments to the work they are doing...they may therefore be driven more by what they believe in than what they learn.”⁹⁷ Furthermore, their beliefs may prevent them partaking in new opportunities to learn. For

instance, even though it could be beneficial to some NGOs working in conflict areas to cooperate and share information with the military, the belief that the military holds values that are at complete odds with those of development NGOs often prevents them from even engaging in a dialogue. If it is indeed people and not institutions that learn, as Edwards claims, then NGOs, staffed by value driven individuals have a particular challenge to overcome.⁹⁸

RISK ADVERSE CULTURE

Despite claiming to help the disadvantaged and at risk populations of the world, NGOs themselves also tend to have risk adverse cultures. Mark Walkup claims that this emerges as the result of psychological coping strategies of individuals who work in uncertain and risky situations. “A myth of proficiency and success is often fabricated”⁹⁹ he goes on to say, to deal with the magnitude of the danger of failure in such situations. These methods of individual self-preservation however, are eventually institutionalized in organizations and all too often become the way that NGOs justify their existence and actions to the public.¹⁰⁰ As Goodhand observes, humanitarian and development organizations often have a strong culture of self-justification,¹⁰¹ which is then reinforced and maintained by their insecure position between governments and international institutions, as well as by their dependency on donors for survival. According to Kim Riemann, dependency on official sources of aid has reinforced the risk adverse nature of NGOs, not only as an individual coping strategy, but as an organizational coping strategy.¹⁰² In their struggle to win one of a limited number of contracts, NGOs have become “politically muzzled and have shied away from any meaningful ‘empowerment’ activities that could lead to real change for the poor they seek to serve.”¹⁰³ The

⁹⁸ Ibid., 238.

⁹⁹ Walkup, M. (1997). Policy Dysfunction in Humanitarian Organizations: The role of coping strategies, institutions, and organizational culture. 37-60. *Journal of Refugee Studies*. 10(1), 47.

¹⁰⁰ Walkup. *Policy Dysfunction in Humanitarian Organizations*, 48.

¹⁰¹ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 155.

¹⁰² Reimann, K. (2005). Chapter 3: Up to no good? Recent critics and critiques of NGOs. In O. Richmond & H. Carey (Eds.), *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of the NGO Peacebuilding*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 43.

⁹³ Kilby, P. (2006). Accountability for Empowerment: Dilemmas facing non-governmental organizations. 951-963. *World Development*. 34(6), 952.

⁹⁴ Lange. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice*, 22.

⁹⁵ Edwards. *Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations*, 237.

⁹⁶ Smillie. *At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and issues in the relationship between Northern NGOs and Northern governments*, 31.

⁹⁷ Edwards. *Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations*, 238.

tendency to avoid evaluation and analysis is a symptom of the fear of failure and the 'defense' that Walkup identifies as an individual coping strategy,¹⁰⁴ but it is also a symptom of the organization's fear of demonstrating negative results to donors.

The disincentives to learning that the risk adverse culture of NGOs presents not only reinforce their subjective "preoccupation with appraising performance rather than enhancing it,"¹⁰⁵ but they also raise fundamental questions about the ability of NGOs to work effectively in conflict settings. If, as John Paul Lederach argues "violence is known; peace is the mystery," then by its very nature, "peacebuilding requires a journey guided by the imagination of risk."¹⁰⁶ If, NGOs are incapable of and/or unwilling to take that risk, should they even have a role in building peace? Is it possible that organizations such as the military, which are more comfortable coping with and managing risk, will increasingly take on development tasks as Provincial Reconstruction Teams have in Afghanistan? These are important and timely questions that a larger discussion of the risk adverse nature of NGOs and its effect on conflict sensitivity needs to address.

ACTIVIST CULTURE

Finally, it is the activist culture of NGOs that attracts many impassioned and dedicated individuals, who just want to 'get the job done.' At the same time however, Edwards observes that "activist cultures often see learning as a luxury, separate from and secondary to 'real work.'"¹⁰⁷ Sacrificing 'understanding' for 'doing' is believed to be "warranted by an underlying conviction in the

rightness of the cause,"¹⁰⁸ whereby the strength of the value-oriented culture in NGOs reinforces and legitimizes a tendency towards activism and away from learning. Furthermore, investing in the organizational capacity to strengthen its learning process is often seen as a misappropriation of funds that are intended to be directed towards the people the programmes are created to assist.¹⁰⁹ With this perspective and with donors often using low overhead, or as Padaki clarifies "the ratio of what is spent on ourselves to what reaches the people for whom we exist and work,"¹¹⁰ as an indicator of success, a culture that does not value learning and innovation is essentially celebrated and reinforced.

What is valued in this scenario is the 'real work' those NGOs engage in, which is often focused on the active delivery of services. Powell notes that a 2005 *Newsweek* article which referred to NGOs as a "billion dollar industry," accredited their growth to the general expansion of the service economy, given that "most NGOs are after all, service providers, delivering things like health care and education."¹¹¹ Envisioning health or education as services to be provided is difficult both ethically and practically, but envisioning peace as a service or commodity which NGOs have the audacity to believe they can actually 'deliver' is incredibly problematic. When "know-how is more important than know what,"¹¹² a type of learning quite unique to NGOs develops in which learning is done by doing, or by trial and error.¹¹³ To go back to Ryszard Kapuściński's warning, this type of learning may be low on overhead, but it can be costly in lives, especially in sensitive conflict situations. This is not

"NGOs act as service industries, rather than knowledge industries, and in the process adopting the structures and tools that reflect and reinforce 'the linear processes of the service industry.'"

¹⁰⁴ Walkup. *Policy Dysfunction in Humanitarian Organizations*.

¹⁰⁵ Padaki. *The Human Organization: Challenges in NGOs and development programmes*, 68.

¹⁰⁶ Lederach, J.P. (2005). *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*. New York: Oxford University Press, 39.

¹⁰⁷ Edwards. *Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations*, 238.

¹⁰⁸ Smillie. *At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and issues in the relationship between Northern NGOs and Northern governments*, 31.

¹⁰⁹ Walsh & Lenihan. *Accountability and effectiveness of NGOs*, 414.

¹¹⁰ Padaki. *The Human Organization: Challenges in NGOs and development programmes*, 71.

¹¹¹ Powell, M. (2006). Which knowledge? Whose reality? An overview of knowledge used in the development sector. *Development in Practice*. 16(6), 519.

¹¹² Edwards. *Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations*, 237.

¹¹³ Carey, H. (2005). Chapter 22: Conclusion. In O. Richmond & H. Carey (Eds.), *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of the NGO Peacebuilding*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 238.

to imply that any organization has a sure-fire solution, but NGOs' tendency to learn by doing, yet not incorporate what has been learned into ongoing planning and management, is a critical problem.

What appears to be the prevailing trend then, is for NGOs to act as service industries, rather than knowledge industries, and in the process adopting the structures and tools that reflect and reinforce "the linear processes of the service industry."¹¹⁴ Indeed, Goodhand and others have noted that in recent years, many NGOs have adopted "rational planning tools"¹¹⁵ such as the Logical Framework Approach (LFA), or Logframe, which is a project planning and management methodology with widespread usage among NGOs. Hoffman notes that there are several benefits to adopting such an approach. For example, Logframes help to "clarify and to set the project objectives and the assumptions underpinning specific interventions."¹¹⁶ However, Logframes also have multiple drawbacks and limitations. For instance, their "tendency to reinforce linear causal relationship between inputs, activities and outcomes"¹¹⁷ Goodhand argues, limits flexibility and innovation, leading to what he calls a "'mismatch' between the complexity and dynamism of the operating environment and the planning methods employed by NGOs."¹¹⁸ Logframes, he asserts, tend to reduce conflict to "being located as a risk – often a killer assumption that poses a serious threat to a project."¹¹⁹ In organizations that are risk averse, the use of such methodologies only reinforces beliefs that are then culturally and structurally institutionalized. Goodhand further notes, that the tendency for Logframes to give the "illusion, which Logframes tend to support, that everything can be controlled,"¹²⁰ makes conflict a risky externality that on the surface may appear to be controlled, without there being any real leaning going on about how to understand or effectively cope with it.

DISCUSSION

It is clear that the 'other path' to development will not necessarily be the one of least resistance. Despite their growth in numbers, the scope of their activities and the financial resources behind them, development NGOs have faced persistent challenges. In keeping with the development discourse, which is sorely missing a counter narrative, the tendency has been to look to external factors and occurrences to account for the challenges NGOs face. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that the internal organizational environment and the profound influence it has on the way problems are recognised, defined and responded to by NGOs, has remained largely overlooked.

The learning process in NGOs has been likened "to an iceberg, with a huge underwater mass representing all the learning that goes on in the field, and a small tip emerging above the surface representing the formalization of lessons learned in policy statements, good practice manuals etc..."¹²¹ While often rich in information or raw materials, NGOs tend to lack knowledge, which is information that has been processed and analyzed, and according to Edwards they are also devoid of wisdom, which he defines as "the ability to utilize knowledge and experience in action."¹²² There are many reasons why lessons learned in NGOs are not translated into practical wisdom, but one crucial factor is revealed in a journey into the inner workings of NGOs which exposes an organizational culture that is unique, powerful and incredibly important to how NGOs learn, or rather fail to learn. This begs the question that Edwards poses of whether there is actually a need for more information before NGOs can mainstream conflict sensitivity or whether what is, in fact required, is simply an ability on the part of NGOs to use the information that they already have more effectively.¹²³

However, the culture in any organization is slow and difficult to change, and in the case of NGOs,

¹¹⁴ Powell. *Which knowledge? Whose reality? An overview of knowledge used in the development sector*, 526.

¹¹⁵ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 161.

¹¹⁶ Hoffman. *PCLA Methodology*, 6.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 6.

¹¹⁸ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 164.

¹¹⁹ Hoffman. *PCLA Methodology*, 6.

¹²⁰ Goodhand. *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*, 163.

¹²¹ Edwards. *Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations*, 240.

¹²² Edwards. *Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations*, 237.

¹²³ Ibid., 242.

various aspects of their culture reinforce each other and are supported and maintained by internal structures as well as external relationships. Three different aspects of development NGO culture that are frequently mentioned in the literature have been discussed with a focus on how they impede the learning process that essentially transforms information into wisdom and makes conflict sensitivity an ethos that guides and informs operations, rather than just a checklist of activities. The strength of values in the culture of NGOs has led to selective and halfhearted learning that protects the moral foundation on which many NGOs are built. At the same time, the risk adverse culture of NGOs has traditionally led them to work *around conflict*, while the changing global scene, combined with the activist culture has led increasingly to work *in or on conflict*.¹²⁴ However, the tendency to sacrifice 'learning' for 'doing' has led to a sizeable knowledge gap. To go back to Edwards, this does not necessarily need to be filled with the acquisition of more information but rather requires a change in the way NGOs operate and value the processes of both learning and thinking.

Wood goes on to argue that "to listen and to learn" must be fundamental principles of the development community.¹²⁵ Principles are important and it was the development and humanitarian communities that were the first to develop codes of conduct and principles after their tragic involvement in Rwanda. But having our 'hearts' in the right place is of no use without our minds. Principles can provide the ethical foundation for behavior, but as De Waal has noted, principles tend to go out the window when actors in the field are being shot at, witnessing tragic suffering or are under incredible stress.¹²⁶ Unless the ability to listen and to learn is "carefully structured"¹²⁷ in non-governmental organizations, it will become just another idea that sounds great, but is never actually put into practice.

"Lack of consensus makes it difficult for various actors to cooperate or coordinate in developing cohesive conflict sensitive approaches."

assumptions: first that a universal methodology is possible, and second, that the lack of such a

CONCLUSION

The need for conflict sensitive approaches to development is perhaps, greater than ever. Not only did the World Bank's *Voices of the Poor* report find that the desire for security was the number one priority over other basic needs,¹²⁸ but "of the 34 poor countries farthest from reaching the Millennium Development Goals, 22 are in, or emerging from conflict."¹²⁹ With an unprecedented amount of financial support and with the potential positive contributions development can make codified in numerous international documents, the development community has an opportunity to respond where the need is greatest. But given that where the need is greatest is often where there also is conflict, the development community is under pressure to fill the knowledge gap that exists in development theory regarding issues of security and peace and adopts a conflict sensitive approach to its projects. Given the rapidly changing security norms in a post-9/11 world as well as the nature of contemporary conflict, the development community faces a difficult challenge.

The focus of much of the development literature has been to try to develop the proper methodologies to "translate terms such as conflict sensitivity, avoiding negative impact and promoting positive peace into agencies' strategies and practice."¹³⁰ Underlying this focus are two

methodology is the primary, if not sole impediment to mainstreaming conflict sensitivity. In response to these assumptions, this paper has put forth two arguments: first, that the development of a universal methodology is not possible, given the way it is currently conceived and second, that the lack of a

¹²⁴ Tschirgi. *Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development*, 8.

¹²⁵ Wood. *Development dimensions of conflict prevention and peace-building*, 54.

¹²⁶ De Waal. *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster of Relief Industry in Africa*.

¹²⁷ Edwards. *Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations*, 234.

¹²⁸ Fitz-Gerald, A.M. (2004). Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for joined-up government. 2-24. *Policy Matters*. 5(5), 3.

¹²⁹ UN Millennium Project. (2005). Available at <www.unmillenniumproject.org>

¹³⁰ Leonhardt. *Towards a Unified Methodology*, 58.

universal framework is, not in fact, the main obstacle to mainstreaming conflict sensitivity.

The first section focused on the search for a universal PCIA methodology and revealed a diversity of opinions about the meaning of key concepts such as conflict and its causes which in turn influence both the goals and types of activities that actors are involved in. In this scenario, development projects can produce very different results which are then evaluated against unique and often subjective definitions of success and/or failure, with the potential for each actor to understand the interaction between their intervention and the context they are working in quite differently. This lack of consensus makes it difficult for various actors to cooperate or coordinate in developing cohesive conflict sensitive approaches. This is an important challenge for development in the world today, given the complexity of interventions in conflict areas and the number of different actors involved. While some sort of general methodology is needed, we may need to accept that the diversity of opinions, beliefs and objectives, which it can be argued accurately represent the complexities of the real world, will never be subsumed under one universal methodology. If, in fact, this diversity emerges from a critical and informed engagement with complex issues and not a naïve or superficial understanding of conflict and development, then rather than being a problem to be done away with, it may have the potential to present new ideas and opportunities for how to engage with conflict.

However, in our "quest for mainstreamable products"¹³¹ we seem to have put the cart before the horse, in attempting to come up with the appropriate tools and frameworks without understanding or developing the internal environment and knowledge base to support them. 'Methodology' has been conceived in purely technical terms, an unfortunate hallmark of Western thought, with the result that issues of theory and questions of principles and operating skills, have been overlooked. Therefore, the second discussion attempted to look at the internal environment of development NGOs. An examination of the value-oriented, risk averse and activist aspects of NGOs

revealed an organizational culture unfavourable to learning, a 'disability' which impedes the capacity of NGOs to operationalize methodologies and to effectively use the information they gather to plan and implement more conflict sensitive projects, instead of relegating conflict sensitivity to a back office or making it the job of a token specialist. Organizational culture is indeed slow and difficult to change and emerges from specific histories and beliefs. What is perhaps more realistic therefore, rather than trying to change the organizational culture of NGOs, is for the development community to be aware of and realistic about what they are capable of achieving and what they might have to sacrifice and change in the pursuit of more ambitious goals. For instance, if the development community is unwilling to take risks, then perhaps they need to re-think their role in conflict situations.

This discussion has demonstrated that the obstacles within the development community itself may be even harder to overcome than the challenges the current global situation poses. Fundamental questions regarding ownership and responsibility, motivations and goals, and values and beliefs are yet to be answered. If the development community is unwilling to critically and honestly look at these issues, then perhaps the question that really needs to be asked is whether it can evolve to meet the current challenges, or whether it is time to retire.

¹³¹ Gsanger & Feyen. *PCIA Methodology*, 68.

A Heartfelt Apology: Democratic Governance in International Law

Nicole Journal

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: BETWEEN UTOPIA AND APOLOGY

A possible positive to result emerging from the terrorist attacks of September 11th is their illustration of the need for a critical examination of the emerging right to democratic governance in international law.¹ Martti Koshenniemi argues that international law pivots between apology, for the accurate description of state power, and utopia, an unrealised vision of progressive justice.² The utopian approach to international law describes how states ought to behave and provides a critical normative framework for judging state practice. It recognises the importance of the directive nature of normative rules in international law. The apologetic approach lacks this directive quality because it derives international law from the actual practice of states. It claims that law becomes irrelevant when it ceases to interact with reality.³ Actual public international law reflects both the history of state practice and the dominant normative values of the international community. It is evident that state practice and *opinio juris* comprise the main body of customary international law. The normative function of international law is evident in the ratification of human rights treaties, like the *International Convention on Human Rights*, by the majority of states and the international recognition of universally inalienable rights. Not surprisingly, it seems that the more dominant a state's ideology is in the global community, the more willing they are to follow the rules of international law.⁴ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, "U.S. interests were once again served by the promulgation and enforcement of international norms. The result was that previous differences within the discipline of public

international law became blurred and a large degree of consensus formed around a common project".⁵ This project was the expansion of liberal democracy and the promotion of the right to democratic governance.

The "temporary coincidence" between American foreign policy in the nineteen nineties 1990s and the normative direction of international law appeared to dissolve the tension between the apologetic and utopian approaches to international law.⁶ It was in the early stages of this convergence between liberal ideology and the exemplar of the world's single remaining superpower that Thomas Franck wrote "Democratic Governance." With two thirds of the world's states declaring an intention to hold free, legitimate democratic elections by the end of the nineties, it appeared that the spread of liberal democracy was a *fait accompli*.⁷ However, as soon as the U.S.'s interests no longer corresponded with the letter of the law, the importance of international legality was trumped by national security. The 9/11 attacks, the events that followed, and the subsequent reaction of the international community illustrate the continued tension between action and intention in international law, particularly in regards to the United States.⁸ It is difficult to forecast the possible future effect on international law of the United State's break from the United Nations and their doctrine of preemptive strike. However, the results of the aggressive pursuit of liberal democracy and a global free market system by the United States and the Western world in the last half-century are clearer.

IS THERE A RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE?

Utopia: The Normative Perspective

The origins of the right to democratic governance again speak to the prescriptive function of international law. The inclusion of the prohibition of the use of force in the United Nations Charter in 1945 and the UN's subsequent adoption of *The*

¹ Euan Macdonald, "International Law, Democratic Governance and September the 11th" (2002) 3 German Law Journal. 1

² Ibid. 7.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid. 10

⁸ Ibid. 14.

Universal Declaration of Rights and Freedoms in 1948 marks a turn from international law as the mere description of state practice to the acceptance of normative goals and values within the international community.⁹ Article 21.3 of *The Declaration* states: "will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." This endorsement of peace and democracy is unsurprising given the recent victory over fascism in Europe and the looming threat of communism as an alternative to both capitalism and democracy. A half century later all but twenty-nine states have signed and ratified *The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights*, a document which safeguards the right of all peoples to "take part in the conduct of public affairs" and "to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections... guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors".¹⁰ Similar regional treaties confirm these rights in Europe, Africa and the Americas.¹¹ Although technically legally binding, these treaties primarily represent the acceptance of the democratic process as an international norm. Even Roth, who argues vehemently against the right to democracy in international law, admits that the discourse of democracy is becoming both more pervasive and more standardized:

"The prohibition of the use of force marks a turn from international law as the mere description of state practice to the acceptance of normative goals and values within the international community."

A new, more uniform terminology is evident in the following trends: 1) more States have ratified instruments protecting participatory rights; 2) regional bodies from Europe, Latin America, and

Africa have pursued virtually identical agendas of consolidating electoral democracy; 3) leaders' credibility in describing their States as 'democratic' turns increasingly on the judgments of international actors; 4) the criteria of fairness applied by UN monitors has become so widely accepted that their terms are repeated virtually verbatim from mission to mission; and 5) all parties to the major human rights conventions also have voted to establish the UN monitoring missions and to approve reports detailing participatory rights scrutinized by observers.¹²

Human rights treaties, UN and regional elections monitoring bodies, and a general body of standards, commitments, resolutions and joint statements, all indicate an emerging right to democratic governance. This right is further evidenced by state practice. Unilateral or UN intervention in areas such as Panama, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Kosovo have all been wholly or partially justified, according to the intervener, by the establishment or defence of democracy.¹³

Various States and scholars contest the legality of each of these actions, but the mere act of invoking the protection of democracy to legitimate forceful intervention suggests that a right to democratic governance is an established international norm. Despite this the right to democratic governance is treated as soft law by the international community. That is, "although [it] remains legally unregulated" democratic governance has become "the object of agreed guidelines, or statements of common positions or policies."¹⁴ There are three main reasons that the right to democratic governance is not recognised as a binding legal principle in the international community. First, as has been suggested, is the normative nature of a right to democratic governance. Second, the right to democratic governance has been subsumed within a broader

⁹ James Crawford. "Democracy and the body of international law". *Democratic Governance and International Law*. Ed. Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth. (Cambridge, 2002) 97.

¹⁰ Article 25, 1-2. *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*. University of Minnesota: Human Rights Library Website. Jan 2009 <<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm>>.

¹¹ Brad R. Roth, Rev. of *The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology*, by Susan Marks". *International Affairs*. Vol. 77, No. 2 (Apr 2001): 411-412. Jan 2009 (JSTOR) 86.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Carsten Stahn. "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?" *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jan 2007): 99-120. Jan 2009 (JSTOR)

¹⁴ Antonio Cassese. *International Law*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005.) 196.

human rights discourse. Third, numerous non-Western states are skeptical of the right to democratic governance and its implications for state sovereignty.

Apology: The Descriptive Perspective

In describing how the international community perceives things should be, instead of how they are, a right to democratic governance would be difficult to apply and enforce in the real world of international politics. This is particularly true when the kind of pluralistic self-governance envisaged in Article One of *The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights* runs counter to the mainstream ideology of the West. The promotion of liberal democracy is not divorced from geopolitical strategy and self-interest and governments legitimate military and economic policy under the guise of the protection of democracy.¹⁵ This kind of arbitrary application would weaken the rule of law in international relations if the right to democratic governance was viewed as hard law.¹⁶ Similarly, adherence to a real right to democratic governance would likely result in "a radical change in the discipline's very *raison d'être*" as it would "begin to function as the meta-conceptual framework through which all rights would be viewed and thus understood."¹⁷

Instead of emphasizing the ideologically loaded "right to democratic governance," recent human rights discourse has focused on the right of peoples to self-determination and the inalienable rights of individuals. The right to democratic governance is subsumed within these rights but it is no longer advocated as a reason for humanitarian intervention. The establishment of democratic elections is an almost inevitable part of the ongoing process entailed in the "responsibility to rebuild" but the specific right to democratic governance has been

de-emphasized.¹⁸ In its place, the "responsibility to protect" has emerged, with a primary focus on the responsibility of the broader community of states to protect all peoples from mass atrocity and crimes against humanity.¹⁹ The responsibility to protect is gaining prominence as an emerging legal principle in international law but some States would prefer to couch it in moral rather than legal terms.²⁰ Significantly, the United States refused to accept that "either the United Nations as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual states, have an obligation to intervene under international law".²¹ The subservience of the ideal of humanitarian intervention to self-interest is evident in the logic of this statement. Although the ability to intervene can be useful, the obligation to intervene will likely be detrimental. Ironically, all states emphasize the necessity of both UN Security Council authorization and the collective nature of intervention.²² The "responsibility to protect" is not yet a legal norm, but it seems to have replaced the right to democratic governance as the justification for legitimate intervention in international law. As an emerging principle of international law the responsibility to protect relies on a much broader, and more palatable, human rights discourse. This discourse encompasses the rights to self-governance and self-determination, but does not place the right to democratic governance at the forefront of the ongoing struggle for human rights.

Arguably the right to democratic governance is no longer broadly debated in international forums because it is a largely excepted norm. However, some non-Western states, specifically Cuba and China, condemn the violation of the principle of sovereignty entailed in the right to democratic governance.²³ This condemnation is particularly understandable from non-liberal democratic societies. While the principle of radical democracy would have ramifications for even the most complacent of first world liberal democracies, the

¹⁵ Richard Falks Rev. of "The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology, by Susan Marks". *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 96, No. 1 (Jan 2002): 264-268. Jan 2009 (JSTOR) 65.

¹⁶ Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman. "You, the People: pro-democratic intervention in international law". *Democratic Governance and International Law*. Ed. Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth. (Cambridge, 2002) 267-8.

¹⁷ Euan Macdonald. "International Law, Democratic Governance and September the 11th" 14.

¹⁸ Carsten Stahn. "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?" 64.

¹⁹ Ibid. 99.

²⁰ Ibid. 108.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid. 106.

²³ Thomas M. Franck, "Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement" *Democratic Governance and International Law*. Ed. Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth. (Cambridge, 2002) 43.

right to democratic governance as it is practiced would only impact the sovereignty and economy of non-liberal countries, leaving the dominant global ideology untouched. It is widely recognised that sovereignty is no longer a valid excuse for human rights abuses:

The principle of non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) are meant 'to protect the citizens of a state, rather than the state as an entity. This rationale ceases to apply in favour of the state when the domestic sovereign violates the rights of its own population.'²⁴

However, a state that undertakes the primary responsibility of protecting the rights of its citizens need not conform to the Western conception of liberal democracy. Despite the evident appeal of a rule which enables all people to "determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development," in practice the predominance of the right to democracy over sovereignty comes dangerously close to neo-imperialism.²⁵ Instead of freeing people for political, economic, social and cultural development, it would only serve to reinforce the global order such that "the inequalities of the existing unevenness of gains and losses between peoples in the world seem frozen in the container of a supposedly peaceful world composed of liberal democracies".²⁶ It is primarily this tendency toward the export of a particular species of liberal democracy that generates skepticism for the right to democratic governance, particularly as described by Franck and his disciples.

Democratic Governance and International Legitimacy

The separation of utopian theory and self-interested state practice that keeps the right to democratic governance from becoming a universally

"The 'responsibility to protect' is not yet a legal norm, but it seems to have replaced the right to democratic governance as the justification for legitimate intervention in international law."

enforceable international law is evident in both the value-laden tenor of Franck's arguments and the pitifully "thin" version of democracy that he sees as fulfilling the right to democratic governance. Franck's arguments seem to be founded in examples

of significant state practice and *opinio juris*. However, there is also evidence that effective control is still considered the main test of legitimacy.²⁷ Brad R. Roth argues that effective control is a sign of popular consent and adherence to the rule of sovereign equality, except in instances of widespread human rights abuse, is merely the acceptance of plural ideologies.²⁸ His main contention that practicality and the rule of sovereign equality continue to

dictate legitimacy in international law is particularly persuasive in light of United State's welcome of non-democratic regimes such as Pakistan into the international coalition against terrorism.²⁹ Popular consent and democratic governance both play a role in the recognition of state legitimacy but recognition is also based on other political and economic considerations. Similarly, a stable, if non-democratic, government conforms to the declarative theory of statehood by performing the functions of a state both domestically and internationally, regardless of recognition. This descriptive assessment of the role of democratic governance in determining state legitimacy within the international community illustrates the normative quality of Franck's arguments.

Despite the evidence he presents, Franck's argument remains largely prescriptive in its suggestion that the acceptance of the international community of a state's genuine democratic governance should be the test of global legitimacy. Franck himself admits that although there is a trend towards international rules and processes for basing state legitimacy on democratic governance, these are

²⁴ Carsten Stahn. "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?" 113.

²⁵ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, Article 1.1.

²⁶ Richard. Falks Rev. of "The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology, by Susan Marks." 266.

²⁷ Alain Pellet. Rev. of "Government Illegitimacy in International Law", by Brad R. Roth." *The American Journal Of International Law*. Vol. 94, No. 2 (Apr 2000): 419-421. Jan 2009 (JSTOR) 420.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid. : Euan Macdonald. "International Law, Democratic Governance and September the 11th" 11

not yet recognised in international law.³⁰ The difficulty with Franck's attempt to identify the right to democratic governance and its legitimizing force within the international community is that it undermines his normative argument. He uncritically conflates the normative goal of "the right of people to be consulted and to participate in the process by which political values are reconciled and choices made" with the promotion and practice of liberal democracy, electoral monitority and military intervention.³¹ The impoverishment of the ideal of democratic governance in practice is particularly evident in Franck's use of UN election monitority in Nicaragua as an example of the "recent surge of [democratic] entitlement" coming, as it did, on the heels of unilateral US intervention against a democratically elected leader in that country.³² Even if the international community considers that these governments are not actually legitimate, "foreign officials must act as if they were legitimate, that is, must not make war against them" because to do so is to forgo "the respect that foreigners owe to a historic community and to its internal life".³³ An examination of Franck's uncritical salutation of the rise of democratic governance illustrates that this right as it is expressed in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* is far from the reality of liberal democratic practice that is promoted by the West throughout the globe.

SHOULD THERE BE A RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE?

Democratic Peace Theory: The Justification of Peace

One central argument for the universal promotion of liberal democracy is the democratic peace theory, which was first presented by Emmanuel Kant in the essay *Perpetual Peace*. Kant suggests that in a republic the people who bear the burden of war are the same as those who must consent to war, making them

unlikely to do so.³⁴ This principle is taken up and expanded upon by numerous supporters of liberal democracy and the right to democratic governance.³⁵ The argument reads as follows: Since peace is of the highest concern to the international community, and since liberal democracies are invariably pacifist, the right to democratic governance should have pre-eminence as the right that brings peace. Michael Doyle defines the requirements for a perpetual peace as "formal democracy; a market economy based on private property rights; respect for other civil and political rights" and a separate judicial system committed to the rule of law".³⁶ This makes logical sense; states that are economically interdependent and share similar values, ideological convictions and governments structures seem less likely to disagree and more likely to avoid aggressive solutions to any disagreements that do arise.³⁷ Similarly, it seems natural that states whose citizens bear the cost of war will vote for peaceful representatives and vote against any political parties who unwisely enter or prolong war. If it is the case that joint liberal democracies are inherently peaceful, both a right to democratic governance and forceful intervention in defence of democracy seem justified.

However, in contradiction to the logic of the democratic peace theory, empirical evidence suggests that joint liberal democracies are not always peaceful, particularly with regards to terrorist activity, and that the variable of liberal democracy may not be the determining factor in peace. Susan Werner argues persuasively that political similarity of any kind greatly reduces the risk of conflict between states.³⁸ In fact, "when data from the 20th century are excluded...similar democratic states are generally *more* conflict prone than are other types of politically similar states, not less as generally presumed".³⁹ Although the study also

³⁴ Emmanuel Kant. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. (1795) Vincent Ferraro Website. Jan 2009
<<http://mtholyoke.edu/adad/ntrel/feros-pg.html>>.

³⁵ Euan Macdonald. "International Law, Democratic Governance and September the 11th"

³⁶ Ibid. 5.

³⁷ Suzanne Werner. "The Effects of Political Similarity on the Onset of Militarized Disputes, 1816-1985." *Political Research Quarterly*. Vol. 53, No. 2 (Jun 2000): 343-374. Jan 2009 (JSTOR) 344.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid. 365.

³⁰ Thomas M. Franck, "Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement" 27.

³¹ Ibid. 25.

³² Ibid. 35.

³³ Michael Walzer. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critiques." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring 1980): 209-229. Jan 2009 (JSTOR) 216, 212.

showed that joint liberal democracies are usually pacific, there remains compelling evidence that democracy is not inherently peaceful. If peace is a function of political similarity, then the 'democratic peace' is merely a reflection of the status of liberal democracy as the dominant global ideology. Liberal democracies may actually be more prone to conflict with other non-liberal states as "the liberal ideology upon which democratic institutions rest may in fact inherently produce such crusading tendencies".⁴⁰ Similarly, although joint liberal democracies tend to be pacifism at the state level, a study by Eubank and Weinberg found that "terrorist attacks occur most often in stable democracies and that both the perpetrators and victims of those attacks are from the same democratic states".⁴¹ However, this study is not uncontested. It does seem likely that certain aspects of liberal democracy, such as the marginalization of minority groups, the suppression of genuine pluralism and general subservience to the market, would promote terrorist activities.⁴² However, other integral aspects of democracy, like democratic participation and increased political efficacy, are equally likely to reduce transnational terrorism.⁴³ Regardless, the prevalence of both terrorists from democratic states and terrorist attacks in democratic states contradicts the democratic peace theory in a way Kant could not have foreseen. The democratic peace theory seems to justify international support for the right to democratic governance in the interests of peace. However, empirical evidence suggests that liberal democracy is not always the form of governance most conducive to peace on the level of both the state and the individual. Further, empirical studies also suggest that the liberal and democratic quality of governments may be irrelevant to their peacefulness, with political similarity being the deciding factor in peace.⁴⁴ An additional critique of the democratic peace theory does not disprove it empirically but attempts to dismantle the ideology of liberal democracy and illustrate the danger of

promoting a single form of global governance and economic practice.

Ideal Democracy: Liberal Ideology and Illiberal Action

The ideal of a right to democratic governance as the self-determination and self-governance of all peoples is discernable in international law. However, this "utopian" goal is in tension with both the liberal democratic ideology of Western states, transnational corporations and some transnational organization, and the reality of global democratic practice. Although this gap between reality and ideal generates a positive space for critiquing the growing liberal democratic hegemony, it leaves little hope for achieving radical democracy and self-governance in either the developed or developing world.

Democracy is defined as government by the will of the people. The only recognised way to determine the will of the people is through the mechanism of genuine, periodic and competitive elections, ensured by civil rights, equal access to media, and the rule of law.⁴⁵ However, concentration on standardized electoral procedures as the instrument of democratic rule has diminished the understanding of democracy as "self-government, and not just about legitimating government by others".⁴⁶ This is because citizens of the liberal Western states that stand as a template for successful democracy have themselves forgotten, or perhaps have never experienced, the power of radical democracy and true self-government. Democracy in its true form embodies the belief that "freedom is our natural right and essential need" as human beings.⁴⁷ Even in the most well established of democracies this vision of radical freedom and self-governance remains unrealised. For Chomsky the remarkable fact is not that humanity yearns toward radical freedom but that the few are largely content to be ruled by the many.⁴⁸ The more nominally free a population is,

⁴⁰ Ibid. 346.

⁴¹ Quan Li. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 49, No. 2, (Apr. 2005): 278-297. Jan 2009 (JSTOR) 279.

⁴² Ibid. 294.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Suzanne Werner. "The Effects of Political Similarity on the Onset of Militarized Disputes, 1816-1985." 365.

⁴⁵ Thomas M. Franck, "Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement" 25-26., Susan Marks. *The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology*. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.) 1., Euan Macdonald. "International Law, Democratic Governance and September the 11th" 1-2.

⁴⁶ Susan Marks. *The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology*. 2.

⁴⁷ Noam Chomsky. *Chomsky on Anarchism*. Ed. Bary Pateman. (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005) 162.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 155.

the more deeply entrenched the ideology of passivity and submissiveness must become.⁴⁹ The need to subdue the "ignorant masses" from "interfering with public affairs" comes from the fear of genuinely popular government and the protection of inequality by the wealthy:

"Control over investments, production, commerce, finance, conditions of work, and other crucial aspects of social policy lies in private hands, and the same is true of articulate expression, largely dominated by major corporations that sell audiences to advertisers and naturally reflect the interest of the owners and their market".⁵⁰

Because all major parties running for office within most liberal democracies have fundamentally similar economic policies, that is, they support varying degrees of liberal free market capitalism, the central democratic tenant of choice becomes a mere illusion.⁵¹ In the United States, for example, "since both major political parties accept the main precepts of neo-liberalism, political debate and outcomes, especially with regard to economic issues, lose most of their relevance for the citizenry".⁵² This goes a long way to explaining political apathy and poor voter turnout in the US. When individuals do attempt to exercise their democratic right to present an alternative to the ruling elite they are forcibly rebuffed. This brand of "militant democracy" places "certain core foundational values beyond the reach of the democratic process".⁵³

Recent examples include "the 2004 banning by the Belgian High Court of the Vlaams Blok, a Flemish independence party," the 2005 proposal in the United Kingdom "to ban an Islamic political party, Hizb-ut-Tahrir," the 2003 proscription of Batasuna, "a political party which supported the formation of a separate Basque state," and the 1998 dissolution of

the United Communist Party of Turkey, among numerous others.⁵⁴ Total democracy cannot be allowed both because radical political parties threaten the status quo and because there remains an elitist perception that "the people" are not actually capable of determining their own interests.⁵⁵ Here, democracy is not understood as the right to any choice of government, but only a legitimate choice, where legitimacy is no longer conferred solely by the people but is now dictated by some outside body.

Emerging democracies are similarly hobbled in their ability to shape their own identity by economic and political pressure from dominant world powers.⁵⁶ In the Haitian intervention, often touted as an example of legitimate multilateral intervention in defence of

"The liberal and democratic quality of governments may be irrelevant to their peacefulness, with political similarity being the deciding factor in peace."

democracy, President Aristide was reinstated only on the condition that "economic policies be adopted which essentially reflect those required by the IMF—an export-driven trade and investment policy intended to open Haiti to both foreign investment and imports".⁵⁷

New democracies are also more at risk of being subsumed within the processes of globalisation by which "the fate of national communities is increasingly shaped by decisions taken outside the framework of national political institutions—in other countries, but also in international organizations, informal meeting of national and international officials, and the 'private' domain of global markets.⁵⁸ It is possible that the current financial crisis may result in further questioning of the dominance of transnational free market economic

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 157.

⁵¹ Mansell, Meteyard and Thomson. "Legitimation, Sovereignty and Globalisation." from *A Critical Introduction to Law* (Cavendish 3rd ed 2003) 127.

⁵² Richard. Falks Rev. of *The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology*, by Susan Marks." 266.

⁵³ Henry J. Stiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman. *International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals*. 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008.) 980.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 981.

⁵⁵ Noam Chomsky. *Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World*. Int. David Barsamian. (New York: Metropolitan, 2005.) 151-162.

⁵⁶ Mansell, Meteyard and Thomson. "Legitimation, Sovereignty and Globalisation." 158.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 131-2.

⁵⁸ Susan Marks. *The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology*. 2.

practice. The almost entirely unregulated liberalism currently practiced and promoted by the United States, the IMF and the WTO limits most peoples' freedom to choose a government that endorses socialist or protectionist economic practices. Developing countries may themselves buy into the dominant Western ideology, but as although often they, or at least some of their citizens, are often aware of the dangers of unfettered liberalism and consumerism, yet they remain powerless in the face of first world investment, aid, political pressure and military force. In a Western poll of Iraqis "50 percent said the United States wants to establish a democracy in Iraq but would not permit the Iraqi government to carry out its own policies without U.S. influence".⁵⁹ Such a regime might take the form of democracy but it will be devoid of all essential content of self-government and rule "by will of the people."

When states do practice real self-determination that runs counter to liberalism, the principle of democratic governance is quickly forgotten in favour of first world interest. One of the clearest examples of the predominance of liberalism over democracy is the US action in Nicaragua.⁶⁰ Franck is right to assert that the principle cause of war has become "how the means of a good life are distributed among peoples and person and whether people and persons are adequately consulted in the decisions that determine their life prospects".⁶¹ But he seems blithely unaware that the distribution of 'the means of a good life' in liberal democracies is based primarily in the economic system of free market capitalism, and only secondarily in the political system of democracy. The model of democratic governance promoted by the West entails capitalism.

As such, Western interest in 'free and fair' elections and 'the basic principles of equality and the rule of law' extend only so far as free markets and liberal

ideology can follow. The ideal of democratic governance as "the basic democratic ideas of popular self-government and political equality" deserves to be protected and enforced.⁶² However, in real terms, the so-called right to democratic governance means the right to hegemonic liberal ideology and the liberal democratic model of democracy.

CONCLUSION:

THEORETICAL DISTANCE AND POSSIBLE UTOPIA

The rhetoric of the right to democratic governance implies dangerous ideological undertones, but more problematic is the intersection between "utopia" and "apology" asserted by Franck in his identification of this right. Normative prescription must stay 'ahead' of state practice if there is to be any possibility of critique or transformation in international law. This is the central problem of the right to democratic governance. In its ideal form the right to democratic governance holds transformative power for all peoples to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development," but this ideal is always subject to the self-interested actions and ideology of reality.⁶³ The "thin democracy" copy of liberal templates envisaged by Franck and practiced in many countries, including the West, is an impoverished ideal. However, the project of radical democracy and the right to real democratic governance should not be abandoned. As Chomsky hopefully declaims: "The instinct for freedom can be dulled, and often is, but it has yet to be killed".⁶⁴ With constant critique from a normative perspective that describes how democracy *should* function and constant vigilance in not conflating the right to democratic governance with the neo-imperialist liberal democratic paradigm of the West, human freedom as it can only be realised under self-government remains a possible goal that is grounded in the international legal principle of the right to democratic governance.

⁵⁹ Noam Chomsky. *Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World*.

⁶⁰ Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman. "'You, the People': pro-democratic intervention in international law." 280., Noam Chomsky. *Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World*. 154, 165., James Crawford. "Democracy and the body of international law." 99.

⁶¹ Thomas M. Franck, "Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement" 24.

⁶² Susan Marks. *The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology*. 4.

⁶³ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 1.1

⁶⁴ Noam Chomsky. *Chomsky on Anarchism*. Ed. Bary Paterman. (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005) 171.

The Utility of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era

Sarah Lewis

With 63 operations around the world¹, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping is an institution which embodies those principles of the UN that are championed worldwide including impartiality and the pursuit of peace. Although the details of each operation are conflict-specific, the wider principle of peacekeeping has remained intact for six decades, suggesting that there is some utility in such operations. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of peacekeeping in a post-Cold War world by understanding changes in peacekeeping from its inception to the present day. This evaluation will show that there is utility in continuing peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War world although a new understanding of what peacekeeping should entail and achieve needs to be developed and accepted. It will be established that peacekeeping operations, traditionally conceived, are no longer effective at maintaining impartiality and protecting an already established, even if fragile, peace. Peacekeeping operations are now merely a facet of larger UN-sponsored intervention operations and can only effectively promote peace in conflict zones as part of a larger operation. Peacekeeping as it was classically conceived no longer exists since there is no real need for it, and yet the concept has remained for decades even amidst the changing global political landscape. This is because as a part of a larger, more complex operation, peacekeepers can continue to offer continuity to UN principles across decades, particularly the principle of the UN as an impartial institution promoting peace.

There have been many inherent changes to peacekeeping operations since the Cold War, and many problems that hinder the ability of these forces to achieve their objectives. Peacekeeping operations continue to be effective at saving lives and advancing the peace process within very specific conflict regions. They are not, however, always

effective at maintaining impartiality or halting ongoing conflicts. To maintain continuity in this discussion, references made to "peacekeeping" refer to United Nations peacekeeping missions so that this discussion can consider the effectiveness of the principle of peacekeeping put into action. Maintaining this continuity is also important because the term "peacekeeping" has become somewhat ambiguous² and, this way only one peacekeeping context (UN forces) must be established. Missions by a single country or coalitions of states set their own standards and are therefore different from UN peacekeeping forces, and will not be considered here, even if they consider a component of their operation to be keeping the peace. Borrowing from O'Neill and Rees (2005) this discussion will consider UN Peacekeeping to be operations conducted by the UN "involv[ing] international military, police and civilian personnel, and [have] as their general objective, the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security."³ Even given this definition, there continues to be ambiguity between

"Peacekeeping operations, traditionally conceived, are no longer effective at maintaining impartiality and protecting an already established, even if fragile, peace."

UN operations where peacekeeping includes both missions that do not allow for the use of force (Chapter VI), as well as some that are sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows for engagement and the use of force in times other than in self-defence⁴.

Of important note is that this discussion will reserve judgment on the effectiveness of the United Nations as an intergovernmental institution; focusing solely on the utility of the principle of peacekeeping put into action. Although this is a

² Often we talk of operations working to keep the peace, but these may not be UN-sanctioned Peacekeepers.

³ O'Neill and Rees (2005), 7

⁴ (Matheson, 2006: 100). Engagements under Chapter VI involve the "pacific settlement of disputes" whereas Chapter VII allows for more peace enforcement missions where action is mandated "with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." (UN.org, *Charter of the United Nations*).

¹ There are currently 16 active operations (UN, "Peacekeeping," 2008).

critical aspect of the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers, this paper aims to determine the effectiveness of peacekeeping during, and after, the Cold War to determine if there is utility in continuity to engage peacekeepers in today's conflicts.

TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING: COLD WAR ERA

During its early years, in the midst of the Cold War, the principle of UN peacekeeping, designed to rectify a stalemate at the UN, faced challenges of its own. It is by a UN Security Council resolution that a peacekeeping force can be sent into a conflict, and the format of the Security Council allows for any of the five permanent members: the United States (US), Soviet Union (Russia post-Cold War), China, Britain, and France⁵, to veto decisions or operations of which they do not approve. Throughout the Cold War, the UN was unable to effectively engage in collective action because of the East-West division that existed within the Security Council as a result of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union.⁶ Peacekeeping was created as a way to overcome the stalemate that was plaguing the Security Council at the hands of the two great power rivals who could simply veto any operation they deemed to be unfavourable to them. The aim of this peacekeeping initiative was to maintain fragile ceasefires and stabilize conflict areas so that tension could then be resolved diplomatically. By keeping small regional conflicts (proxy wars) contained, the US and the Soviet Union would not become involved in escalating conflicts; the end result was thought to be a nuclear third world war. As such, neither state supplied troops to UN peacekeeping forces in an effort to maintain their non-involvement. This inhibited UN forces since the US and the Soviet Union were the strongest states militarily after World War II, but this was deemed a necessary sacrifice for international security.

These early missions consisted of military observers and lightly armed troops whose primary tasks were to monitor the situation and report back to the

political leaders, all with the aim of supporting any pre-existing ceasefires or peace agreements.⁷ It should be noted that forces only entered a conflict region once limited peace or a ceasefire had been reached, and they also required the support of all members of the conflict to ensure the force's impartiality and to honour the principle of consent. In order to establish the effectiveness of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era where the nature of conflicts are much different than those before and the main goal of peacekeeping operations is different, it should be determined if peacekeeping was ever an effective means of maintaining peace and order in conflict regions. O'Neill and Rees (2005) explain that the policies of consent, impartiality and non-use of force appeared morally supportive of peacekeeping operations, yet in practical application these often hindered UN forces.⁸ Forces were to be employed in situations where all parties to the conflict were interested in restoring peace but for some reason or another, were unable to do so without an impartial third party⁹. This would ensure that keeping the already established peace was the object of the mission rather than a military intervention to end the conflict, sometimes referred to as peace-making. This was also important because it ensured that forces were not seen as invading forces, but protection for innocent civilians and help for those parties to the conflict to pursue a resolution. As many good points as this policy of impartiality had, it was also a hindrance to putting the principle of peacekeeping into action. The effectiveness of missions can only be judged based on those conflicts to which peacekeepers actually responded, posing a problem for helping to resolve armed conflicts where UN forces were not welcomed.

The UN documents the first peacekeeping mission as that of 1948 in the Middle East when the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) was established to supervise a truce already in place, in an effort to end the Arab-Israeli war.¹⁰ Mere observer missions like UNTSO,

⁷ UN, "Peacekeeping," 2008.

⁸ O'Neill and Rees (2005), refer to the principle of consent as "one of peacekeeping's major weaknesses," (29).

⁹ O'Neill and Rees, 2005: 33.

¹⁰ 50 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Panel Discussion. United Nations Headquarters, 11 June 1998.

⁵ UN, "The Blue Helmets," 2005: 4.

⁶ O'Neill and Rees (2005), 1.

were much less demanding than more complex conflicts such as the Suez Crisis¹¹ in 1956 which required far more activity on the part of peacekeepers, including overseeing the withdrawal of invading forces. As the first Emergency Force to be deployed under the banner of the UN, the mission to Suez in 1956 (UNEF 1) is an exemplar of Cold War UN Peacekeeping. The immediate objective of this mission was to create a situation whereby a peace agreement could be reached and maintained, while overseeing the withdrawal of the invading forces and the creation of a buffer zone in the conflict region.

Considered a success for having helped resolve the immediate crisis at Suez, UNEF was able to help resolve the specific conflict of 1956 for which it was deployed, yet holding true to the principle of consent, UNEF withdrew from Egypt at the request of the Egyptian government in the spring of 1967, even in the midst of intense tension in the region between Israelis and Palestinians.¹² Yilmaz (2005) argues that although there were a few missions in which UN peacekeeping forces were ineffective in completing their mission including Cyprus in 1974 and Lebanon in 1982, UN peacekeeping operations between 1948-88 were largely successful in that they reduced conflict¹³ and protected lives. UNEF 1 was a pre-condition for securing both the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the invading forces in Suez, making it an invaluable asset to the resolution of that crisis. Most importantly, peacekeeping operations were effective in keeping the US and the Soviet Union out of smaller conflicts, thus also protecting international security.

A NEW AND COMPLEX PEACEKEEPING: POST COLD WAR

With the end of the Cold War, there was no longer a need for UN peacekeeping operations to keep the great powers out of conflicts. Peacekeeping operations however remained in demand because

they were now considered generally helpful aids to the resolution of conflicts. The number of UN peacekeeping missions soared dramatically as a result of the changing global political landscape at the end of the Cold War. Ethnic conflicts became more prevalent and internal wars within countries, rather than between them which was common during the Cold War, emerged as a result of failed states,¹⁴ which increased the demand for UN operations. A number of such conflicts emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, when particular nations or regions were vying for independence.¹⁵ A significant portion of new UN missions that began after the Cold War were dispersed throughout these formerly US or Russian-controlled areas, or to newly independent regions that had been previously part of the Soviet Union.

Free of the tension within the Security Council that had existed between Eastern and Western rivals during the Cold War, the situation seemed promising for the UN to be able to more effectively undertake even more peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War world. This optimism was sparked by the hope that both the US and Russia would now be able to supply UN forces, making those forces stronger than they had been.¹⁶ Since each state was no longer as interested in protecting its own sphere of influence in the same way it had throughout the Cold War period, both states were also no longer as committed to managing security within those same regions by themselves,¹⁷ opening the door to the possibility of collaboration within the Security Council. This involvement by the great powers also meant the overarching purpose of peacekeeping operations was no longer valid (to keep the US and Soviet Union out). It is for this reason that the utility of peacekeeping operations is often questioned because the very purpose and objective of peacekeeping no longer applies.

¹¹ Suez Crisis – in 1956 Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, much to the chagrin of Britain, France and Israel, who proceeded to invade Egypt and occupy Egyptian territory. (50 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Panel Discussion. United Nations Headquarters, 11 June 1998.)

¹² UN, "The Blue Helmets," 1996:54.

¹³ Yilmaz, 2005, 16

¹⁴ Failed state – one where governmental authority and public infrastructure has been suspended (UN, "The Blue Helmets," 1996: 4)

¹⁵ Matheson, 2006: 105.

¹⁶ As MacQueen (2006) points out, there was now no obvious reason why the US and Russia could not participate in the peacekeeping process as well, since the Cold War was over and the risk of a third world war was not as high (130).

¹⁷ MacQueen, 2006, 129.

Even given this optimism for cooperation, operations after the Cold War have tended to be much more complex and multi-dimensional than before, now including humanitarian work, overseeing elections, and a number of reconstruction operations, all of which has made the pursuit of a straight-forward goal of the mission much more difficult. Mingst (2008) differentiates between traditional peacekeeping, and the now complex peacekeeping where both military and numerous civilian personnel partake. This complex peacekeeping is often more dangerous than traditional missions because not all parties in the conflict have necessarily consented to UN presence, and force is sometimes utilized by those making up the operation.¹⁸ Both of these new characteristics of peacekeeping operations are new to the post-Cold War era, and are problematic if the theoretical concept behind UN peacekeeping operations (impartiality, consent, non-use of force) is to remain as it was throughout the Cold War era.

The complex post-Cold War operations are also much more multi-dimensional than traditional ones were, since they consist of political, economic, humanitarian, and social components in addition to the military component.¹⁹ They can include confidence-building measures, power-sharing agreements, and electoral support,²⁰ and are no longer seen as a strictly military endeavour, but rather a coordinated, multi-dimensional, intervention. As a result of this, the distinction between keeping and enforcing peace can become blurred.²¹ Matheson (2006) explains that although UN operations maintain the mandate of impartiality, many of the conflicts in which they are now engaged are such that the UN force becomes a direct party in the conflict²² which in effect negates impartiality. This in itself is cause for a few dilemmas. Firstly, if a UN force intervenes in a conflict without consent of all parties, it is in effect

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choosing a side, or inserting itself as a third adversary. For any government fighting against an insurgency or rebel group, the peacekeepers are effectively choosing to side with the government's adversary when they intervene without governmental consent and vice versa. Secondly, by using force and becoming engaged in active fighting, the line between keeping peace and making peace by enforcing a resolution decided upon from outside state actors becomes quite blurred. With these new conditions and dilemmas, UN peacekeeping has had to choose between maintaining the traditional conception of peacekeeping operations, or moving in a new direction to ensure the utility of these operations continues.²³ The problem is that when force is used to establish order in a situation where

no cease-fire or peace agreement has been reached, the UN and/or its member states taking part in the operation risk being accused of acting in a colonial manner,²⁴ or intruding on a state's sovereignty.

The UN currently has an operation active in Darfur, Sudan, named UNAMID.

This resulted from the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May of 2006.²⁵ The government of Sudan accepted the presence of UN peacekeepers in June of 2007, which involved the implementation of a three-phased approach for a joint mission with the African Union which was already deployed in the area. The mandate has since been extended to July 2009, with the protection of civilians, contributions to humanitarian assistance and security, and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law as just a few of the many tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the force.²⁶ The complexities of the mission, as well as the hindrance of the principle of

¹⁸ Mingst, 2008, 330.

¹⁹ UN, “The Blue Helmets,” 1996: 5.

²⁰ Yilmaz, 2005:15, 19.

²¹ O'Neill and Rees, 2005: 1.

²² Matheson, 2006: 128.

²³ As Yilmaz (2005) explains: “this, then, [has] made UN peacekeeping forces face a serious dilemma: remaining passively impartial or establishing order, even at the cost of the use of force” (24).

²⁴ Yilmaz, 2005: 25. This is particularly relevant in the post-Cold War era since the US and Russia have begun to contribute to UN forces, with missions that may be going to regions that were once under the sphere of influence of either state.

²⁵ UN, “Darfur,” 2008.

²⁶ UN, “Darfur,” 2008.

consent, are evident in this scenario. The UN force waited until it had consent from the Government of Sudan before deploying a mission to the conflict zone (years after the conflict began), and even though they have since begun their mission, they have encountered a lack of cooperation at the hand of the same government which has resulted in a number of set-backs. This is yet another incidence of the force being either impeded by the principle of consent, or becoming another party to the war if it continues to act even without the permission of one side; e.g.: the government.

Yilmaz (2005) argues that another problem faced by UN peacekeeping is that it is not able to keep pace with developments in international security that demand action.²⁷ Although the US military is at present the most powerful in the world, its contributions to UN forces are not as readily available since the US currently has its military personnel deployed in its own unilateral and coalition missions, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as part of its War on Terror. As of September 30, 2008, the US was actively supplying 0.3% of the UN Peacekeeping Forces.²⁸ Since the main contributors to UN peacekeeping operations are then developing countries with limited resources and less qualified personnel²⁹ the second-rate nature of this organization calls in to question its utility, especially since the UN remains reliant on the participation of its member states for any mission to field enough personnel and materials. This was evident in Rwanda in 1994, where too few troops and supplies were not able to accomplish their main goal to oversee a lasting peace agreement between the Rwandan government and the rebel force, the Rwandese Patriotic Front. Any use of the operation in Rwanda as a case study would no doubt determine that peacekeeping is set for failure. The failure of the force in Rwanda goes back to the bureaucracy of the UN and a lack of support from the main states contributing to the mission. Much of this lack of support came from the fact that Rwanda was not a country of high value to the world's major powers, nor was a conflict here much of a threat to

international security.³⁰ Rwanda was proof once again that the success or failure of UN peacekeeping operations rests significantly with the cooperation and support of the world's greatest powers; whoever those may be at the time, not merely a moral principle.

Even considering these dilemmas for post-Cold War peacekeeping, there have been many successes. The UN proclaims that since the first mission in 1948, 63 missions have been undertaken which have worked to disarm hundreds of thousands of former combatants and have allowed citizens in over 45 countries to participate in free and fair elections.³¹ Yilmaz (2005) argues that in fact peacekeeping is often a "necessary element of conflict management" and continues to play an important role in the process of peacemaking. If peacekeepers are successful in protecting lives and preventing conflict escalation, then they have been successful in their mission.³² Perhaps the reality is merely that peacekeeping is now a component of a conflict intervention, rather than the solution in itself.

TODAY'S PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE?

Determining the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in any era, but particularly in the post-Cold War context depends on the interpretation of "peacekeeping." Is it to keep the conflict from escalating and protect lives in the process, or is it to end the conflict completely? Based on the choice of interpretation, different missions will be labeled "successes" or "failures." For example, UN peacekeepers have not been able to successfully end fighting in Darfur. They have certainly protected the lives of civilian non-combatants though, which is the main premise of UNAMID's mandate.³³ During the Cold War, peacekeeping existed to keep the major powers out of conflicts, and they did succeed in doing that. Now that the same threat to international security no longer exists, the concept of peacekeeping must adapt to suit international demands if it is to remain. As of late, it had taken on

²⁷ Yilmaz, 2005, 21.

²⁸ This includes police, military observers, and troops which total 309 people contributed by the United States of a total UN Force of 88,754 people (UN, "contributors," 2008).

²⁹ Yilmaz, 2005: 23.

³⁰ Dallaire, Romeo. *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 71. 2003. Vintage Canada.

³¹ United Nations Peacekeeping, 2008.

³² Yilmaz, 2005: 18 - 19.

³³ UN, "Darfur," 2008.

a more humanitarian objective, where protecting innocent lives has been the main goal, and in that, most peacekeeping operations have been successful.

Peacekeeping seems to resemble nothing of its traditional self, but is the “new” form of peacekeeping better or worse? MacQueen argues that peacekeeping has not undergone any qualitative transformation, although it has undergone a significant quantitative change, in that many more missions have been deployed in the post-Cold War period than were prior to that.³⁴ The political landscape in which the UN is now deploying peacekeeping operations has changed significantly from the Cold War context, with internal ethnic conflict predominantly defining present-day missions, rather than ideological clashes like before. Peacekeeping classically conceived is not effective in the present political landscape since many of these new conflicts require the use of force, and with many more parties than simply two state governments involved, consent from all parties is not always possible.

Returning to the idea that perhaps today peacekeeping can be merely a component of a larger conflict intervention, the UN has been forced to adapt the purposes of its peacekeeping operations to meet global needs post-Cold War. It is difficult to argue that UN peacekeeping is effective today, because that original concept really no longer exists, and yet peacekeeping operations continue to take place. The term is still used because it connotes a familiar sense of morality and impartiality, but forces labeled as such do much more today than work to keep the peace. Their involvement in “nation-building” initiatives has expanded their missions and history has not yet ruled on the true effectiveness of this change.

Given these new aspects (eg: overseeing of elections, ensuring no human rights violations, etc.) necessary to conflict resolution in UN operations, the peacekeeping component cannot be separated from other sections of the operations, and its effectiveness goes hand-in-hand with the effectiveness of the larger mission. As these missions become more multi-dimensional, they will

require more time to complete, and will no doubt encounter controversy as they become entwined in more areas of the society in which they have been deployed. It is evident however, that the blue berets³⁵ will remain a significant aspect of any force deployed to a conflict zone, if only for the moral assurance they provide; that an impartial party is looking out for the interests of the innocent, and working toward securing a lasting peace in the region. This is evident from the fact that UN peacekeeping operations have continued over six decades which suggests that there is something worthwhile in such forces. As a result, they will no doubt continue to

be an important facet of larger intervention operations sponsored by the UN. Peacekeepers working singlehandedly however, are no longer effective in a post-Cold War theatre at respecting the same policies of impartiality, consent, and the non use of force which were the basis of the inception of peacekeeping. They can however, still positively influence the pursuit of peace in any conflict zone if they work to support the adversaries and do not themselves become a direct party to the conflict. In conclusion, peacekeeping operations resemble nothing of their classic selves, and yet they remain an integral part of any intervention in conflict regions; if merely for the reassurance to civilians that the sight of the blue beret provides.

“It is difficult to argue that UN peacekeeping is effective today, because that original concept really no longer exists, and yet peacekeeping operations continue to take place.”

³⁴ MacQueen, 2006: 234.

³⁵ The Blue beret has become the internationally recognised symbol for peacekeepers because of the blue hats worn by UN peacekeepers, regardless of their nationality.

Kosovo & the Canadian Decision

Aldous Sperl

International gestures, however seemingly small, can have giant repercussions in the relations between nation-states. Every international decision, taken by a national government, has far reaching implications, many of which are not obvious. For Canada, the decision to endorse Kosovo's declaration of independence was one of those.

On February 17, 2008, the parliament of Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. It was a bold move and one that created strong tensions in the international community. This paper explores why Canada was reluctant to endorse Kosovo's declaration and provides a rationale for why that decision was made. To put the situation into context, I first provide a brief background of Kosovo and explain how its declaration affected the international community. Next, I argue why Canada was reluctant to approve this independence movement, and lastly, I speculate on the reasons for Canada's eventual endorsement of Kosovo.

KOSOVO'S PAST

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Kosovo has been one of the most explosive zones in Europe.¹ The region is situated in the centre of the Balkans, surrounded by Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, and Macedonia.² Both Serbian and Albanian leaders have repeatedly laid exclusive claims to the area but there has always been a strong movement for independence of the region. As part of Yugoslavia there were numerous protests for independence, but because Kosovo was relatively autonomous the protests were relatively small. In 1990, as Yugoslavia was beginning to unravel, an unconstitutional Kosovo government declared Kosovo to be an independent country: this action, however, was only recognised by Albania.

Unfortunately, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, the autonomy of the region was revoked by the Serbian government. This had the effect of creating a much stronger force for independence. Throughout the 1990s the majority Kosovo-Albanians claimed the right to independence while Serbia insisted that the region of Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia. Tensions rose and by 1998 there was a full-scale conflict between the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian Special Police forces as well as the Serbian military.³ The Racak Massacre of 1999, which killed 40-50 Kosovo-Albanian villagers, brought new international attention to the conflict, raising fears about ethnic cleansing by Serbia.⁴ In 1999 NATO backed the new Rambouillet Agreement, which called for the restoration of Kosovo's autonomy as well as the deployment of NATO peacekeeping troops in the region. Serbia refused this agreement prompting NATO to begin its mission: the first use of force by NATO since its inception.⁵ The controversial bombing campaign that NATO undertook left Kosovo under international control, though it killed over 10,000 people and created over 800,000 refugees.⁶

On June 10, 1999, following the ceasefire, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 which placed Kosovo under UN administration and authorised peacekeeping force KFOR to help administer the province and maintain the peace. This action formally ended the 'civil war' and brought respite to the region.⁷ After six years, some of which was marked by conflict and ethnic unrest, the question of Kosovo's independence was again raised. Drafts for a UN Security Resolution proposing supervised independence for the region, called the Ahtisaari Plan, were discarded in the face of Serbian and Russian refusal: they argued that such drafts jeopardized the principle of state sovereignty. All drafts were discarded in 2007.⁸ In

³ Albrecht Schnabel et al., 19.

⁴ Tim Judah, "A History of the Kosovo Liberation Army" in William Joseph Buckley, ed., *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*, 121.

⁵ Mark Biondich, "The Status of Kosovo: Political and Security Implications for the Balkans and Europe," *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Commentary* (spring 2005, no. 87) 1.

⁶ Albrecht Schnabel et al., 29.

⁷ Mark Biondich, 1.

⁸ Craig S. Smith, "Serbia Rejects Plan That Could Lead to Kosovo Independence," *New York Times* (Feb 3 2007).

¹ Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship* (New York: United Nations Press, 2000) 19.

² William Joseph Buckley, ed., *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000) xii.

2008, after a Serbian election, the region of Kosovo again declared independence, this time to be met with international recognition.

INDEPENDENCE AND THE WORLD REACTION

February 17, 2008, was a historic day for Kosovo. Independence was again declared but this time it was met with support from around the world. Kosovo's parliament unanimously endorsed a declaration of independence from Serbia: 109 members voted for the independence of Kosovo while eleven members, representing Serbian minorities, boycotted the proceedings. The news was met with celebration throughout Kosovo and in numerous cities worldwide. In Serbia the declaration was met with violence, protestors stormed the American embassy, and damaged American symbols such as McDonald's restaurants.⁹

Immediately after the declaration, the Prime Minister of Serbia denounced the proclamation calling Kosovo a "false state" and that it was illegal for Kosovo to declare independence under the UN Charter, specifically under Resolution 1244.¹⁰ On the same day Russia called for the United Nations to declare the separation illegal, which prompted an emergency Security Council meeting. The US, France, and the UK all supported Kosovo's independence bid, Russia firmly opposed it.¹¹ The legality question was passed on to the United Nations General Assembly which on October 8, 2008 voted to have the International Court of Justice look into the matter and provide an advisory opinion to the assembly in February 2009.

For its part, the Serbian government officially felt that Kosovo was an integral part of its territory despite the substantial autonomy of the region. The Prime Minister of Serbia blamed the United States for "being ready to violate the international order for its own military interests"¹² and the Government of Serbia issued an action plan which, among other things, included arrest warrants for Kosovo leaders

accusing them of high treason, and the recalling of Serbian ambassadors to any state that recognises Kosovo's independence.¹³

Unlike the 1990 declaration, which was only recognised by Albania, the 2008 declaration has been to date recognised by 51 UN member states. Key among these states is the US, Australia, and the majority of the EU. Important states that opposed the declaration have been Serbia, Russia, China, Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Cyprus, Greece and New Zealand – all of which have their own separatist concerns. Canada debated the issue for thirty days before recognizing Kosovo as an independent nation-state on March 18, 2008.¹⁴ This was a decision made with much reluctance.

THE CANADIAN DECISION AND OTTAWA'S RELUCTANCE

Canada was reluctant to endorse the independence of Kosovo but on March 18, 2008, the Canadian government formally recognised the new country. The true causes for the delay and the government's reluctance are unavailable to the general public but in analyzing news reports, historical concerns, and government documents, one can uncover strong elements that were likely the cause of Ottawa's reluctance. I argue that Canada's delay was primarily due to three factors: fears of aiding Québec separatists, the improbability of Kosovo succeeding as a viable state, and concern for bypassing the authority of the United Nations.

Québec separatism has always been a thorn in the side of Canadian Federalism. Perhaps 'thorn' is a mild statement, as according to Robert A. Young, "the biggest threat to the integrity of the Canadian state and the well-being of all Canadians is the possible secession of Québec."¹⁵ With two referendums already in Canadian history over the separation of Québec, as well as a strong federal party, which has a main goal of separatism, the issue of Québec independence has featured prominently

⁹ "Kosovo MPs proclaim Independence," *BBC News*, (Feb.17, 2008).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Ellie Tzortzi, "Serbia Pledges Long-haul fight over Kosovo," *Reuters*, (Feb, 17, 2008).

¹³ Government of the Republic of Serbia, "Protest Conveyed to France, Britain, Costa Rica, Australia, and Albania," (Feb 20, 2008).

¹⁴ "Canada Recognises Kosovo, Serbia Pulls Ambassador," *CBC News* (March 18, 2008).

¹⁵ Robert A. Young, *The Struggle for Québec: From Referendum to Referendum*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) 3.

in Canadian federal politics since confederation. The issue at stake with Kosovo is that by recognizing the ability of a province to unilaterally declare independence from a mother country, Canada is arguably setting a precedent in how it will respond to other independence movements.¹⁶ Though Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared that the "recognition of Kosovo's independence was born out of a very unique situation that does not create any parallel with Québec,"¹⁷ others would disagree. Prominent among those who believe this verdict will influence future decisions, both for Québec and other nations, is Canada's former Yugoslavia ambassador James Bisset. In expressing his disappointment shortly after Canada's announcement, he stated that it does indeed "set a precedent" and though "the United States and [Canada][...] can say that it is unique and that it doesn't set a precedent [...] already, other countries who aspire for independence are beginning to [renew their campaigns]."¹⁸ Indeed, Québec nationalists greeted the news joyously, and the Parti Québécois applauded the decision.¹⁹

The argument presented by Québec separatists is that Ottawa's decision has set the stage for an eventual recognition of an independent Québec – if Québec's citizens were to demonstrate a democratic will to separate.²⁰ However, there is no denying that the situation is drastically different; indeed, Robert

"Canada's delay [to endorse Kosovo's independence] was primarily due to three factors: fears of aiding Québec separatists, the improbability of Kosovo succeeding as a viable state, and concern for bypassing the authority of the United Nations."

Austin, a University of Toronto political scientist, stated that "the situations are apples and oranges."²¹ The reason for this difference is that, to many, including Austin, Québec separatists can claim little legitimacy from Kosovo's independence movement. This movement, which gained Western sympathy during a civil war that claimed thousands of lives, has experienced persecution and violence on a large scale and because of this Kosovo's bid for independence is seen as more just. In fact, in a landmark 1998 ruling Canada's Supreme Court declared, "The right to unilaterally declare independence is only an option for a people facing oppression or exploitation from a colonial master, and denied any meaningful self-determination."²² There is no doubt that the people of Kosovo have faced serious oppression in the past and as such there is a clear distinction between this case and the bid for independence found in Québec's separatists.

This being said, there is still a powerful argument to be made that regardless of the differences Canada's recognition of Kosovo's independence has in effect shown that under the right circumstances the Canadian government will recognise unilateral declarations of independence. Even if Québec cannot claim legitimacy from Kosovo's independence movement, it could have easily fuelled separatist passions hopes and desires. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that Canada's reluctance to recognise Kosovo was in part due to fears of rekindling secessionist momentum in Québec. According to André J. Bélanger, "The French-Canadian collective consciousness has roots that are deep and too resilient to be destroyed even if the distinctive characteristics of contemporary Québec are less definite."²³ Fear of the separatist

¹⁶ This may have been the primary reason why Biafra was not recognised by the Canadian government when it broke away from Nigeria in 1967-1970.

¹⁷ "Harper defends Kosovo recognition as a unique case," *CBC News* (March 19, 2008).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ "Canada Recognises Kosovo, Serbia Pulls Ambassador," *CBC News* (March 18, 2008).

²⁰ Nationalism in Québec, according to W.L. Morton, is based primarily on "language and culture." In this context it has very little to do with oppression and suffering, other than perhaps in a psychological sense, and as such it cannot be compared to Kosovo. W.L. Morton, "Nation, Identity, Rights: Reflections on W.L. Morton's *The Canadian Identity*," in Ramsay Cook, *Canada, Québec and the uses of Nationalism*, 2nd ed., (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1995) 228.

²¹ Steven Edwards and Peter O'Neil, "Kosovo Independence a touchy issue for Canada" *Ottawa Citizen* (Feb 18, 2008).

²² Ibid.

²³ André J. Bélanger, "The Evolution of Nationalism in Québec," in Ramsay Cook, *Canada, Québec and the uses of Nationalism*, 2nd ed., (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1995) 97.

movement, even if there is no direct link between the Kosovo case and Québec, may well have contributed to Canada's leaders treating the issue with caution.

Another probable reason explaining the reluctance of the Canadian government in making a decision is in regard to the future of Kosovo; the success of the nation remains dubious. For the past decade Kosovo has been administered and militarily aided by UN forces and NATO. This is not likely to change in the near future. With an average annual salary of \$1800 Kosovo is one of the poorest states in Europe: over thirty-seven percent of the population currently lives below the poverty line which equates to less than two dollars a day.²⁴ There is also a heavy level of crime found in the region: primarily in sex trafficking and the drug and arms trade. In 2004 Mark Biondich argued that "organized crime [was] a daunting problem for Kosovo and the Balkans" and that "politics and organized crime [were] closely linked."²⁵ This remains the case today. The region is heavily dependent on foreign aid and independence does not change anything: Kosovo still needs international support to survive; it cannot do so on its own at this time. Indeed, independence may have increased the likelihood of its failure as now if Serbia retaliates – by cutting off electricity or trade for example – Kosovo will be unable to cope. Though Serbia was unlikely to take such drastic actions and has shown no indication of doing so since the declaration, it does serve to highlight the extreme vulnerability of the new nation. Ottawa may have feared that independence would create further problems, requiring more aid and more Canadian assistance. This would not have been likely to be found in Canada's interest.

Similarly, the Canadian government may have feared the precedent Kosovo's declaration would set for other Balkan states. According to Alexander Rahr, a political analyst at the German Council on Foreign Relations, "Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, and especially its recognition by European countries, [has] opened up a Pandora's

Box. It [has] created a precedent for other separatist republics and autonomous regions, which [may] demand similar action and the same rights [as the] Kosovars."²⁶ Some main examples of other groups who may now do the same thing include: the Basques of Spain, Triloeans from Italy, Hungarians from Romania, Caucasians from Russia, and Barvarians from Germany. Not to mention, the possible repercussions in the neighbouring countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia where, according to Mark Biondich, any change to Kosovo was likely to change these states as well.²⁷ Indeed, the fear of other separatist groups stepping up their campaigns in light of the international attention given to Kosovo would not bode well for international security and stability: one of Canada's general foreign policy aims.²⁸

Lastly, the recognition of Kosovo by Ottawa was difficult for one more reason – the violation of UN authority. Canada has had a traditional foreign policy of respecting the UN and its decisions. However, Kosovo has not been recognised by the UN and, in effect, Canada is bypassing UN authority through declaring support for Kosovo, something that Serbia claims is breaking international law. In light of this claim it is important to have some small knowledge of both the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and the UN Resolution 1244 (1999). The Helsinki Accords, of which Canada was a signing member, declare that states will "respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty." More specifically the document states that signatories will "consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement."²⁹ The UN Resolution 1244 was a Security Council document, adopted in 1999 that, among other things, including sending a UN force to ensure security, reaffirmed Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo.³⁰ Therefore, Serbia's

²⁴ Vesna Peric Zimonjic, "Kosovo: Independence will not improve Economy," *Inter Press Service* (Feb. 20, 2008).

²⁵ Mark Biondich, 12.

²⁶ Ria Novosti, "Kosovo Independence: End of Europe" *Global Research* (Feb. 16, 2008).

²⁷ Mark Biondich, 9-11.

²⁸ Ibid, 2.

²⁹ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, (Helsinki, 1975).

³⁰ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1244," (June 10, 1999).

claim of the separation being “illegal” under international law is indeed justified. Certainly as Canada is a signatory to the above two declarations it is violating international law by recognising independence. Without UN recognition, Canada loses moral high-ground in supporting a handful of states that have acted unilaterally to support Kosovo.³¹ By following such actions Canada cannot claim to be a prominent supporter of the UN, and this may well have caused Ottawa to pause in its deliberations.

However, it is important to note that Canada’s previous participation in the NATO bombing campaign of 1999 was a complete violation of international law. Indeed according to Marjorie Cohn, “it violated the United Nations Charter, the NATO treaty, the Nuremburg Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and many other provisions of international law.”³² In light of this, one might speculate that conceivably the UN is no longer a significant factor in Canada’s foreign policy, or at least that its importance has been reduced. Nevertheless, the historical precedent of supporting the United Nations would likely have had some effect on Canada’s decision.

The reasons behind Canada’s reluctance in endorsing Kosovo’s bid for independence are now relatively clear. Québec separatism, the stability of Kosovo and of the Balkans, and regard for UN authority, loomed large in the decision process of Canada’s leaders. Though the arguments against the recognition of Kosovo were strong, the Canadian

government concluded that to support Kosovo’s independence was ultimately in Canada’s interest.

CANADA’S DECISION

According to Boba Borojevic, “it is not easy to find the exact reason for Canada’s recognition of Kosovo.”³³ This is certainly the case as government documents are unavailable and the true reason for Canada’s decision will not be known for some time. However, through various media reports, the advice of experts, and the comments of retired military personnel, a fairly clear picture can be uncovered. Canada, as far as can be surmised at the moment, made the decision for three primary reasons: commitment to NATO and partner countries, Canadian interests and reputation in the area, and public sentiment. There is also the possibility that Canada acted as a direct favour towards the US to help with other Canadian interests.

Canada’s commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has remained strong from its inception till the present. Indeed, for post-1945 Canada, internationalism and alliances have dominated Canadian security policy: NATO has been the primary alliance. Of the twenty-seven countries that had recognised Kosovo’s independence prior to Canada’s decision, fourteen of them were members of NATO: Denmark, Estonia, France, the United States, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.³⁴ For Canada, pressure to recognise Kosovo as part of this alliance was strong, especially from the US and the UK. Canada’s participation in NATO has largely been to ensure good trans-Atlantic relations and keeping these relations strong is always of top priority. As mentioned previously, Canada’s participation in KFOR was extensive and NATO has played the primary role in the region over the last decade – NATO’s public motive for going into Kosovo was humanitarian. By not recognising the new country Canada’s actions would reflect poorly on the unity of NATO and on

During almost ten years of NATO/UN occupation none of the provisions of Resolution 1244 have been carried out. James Bisset, “No to Kosovo Independence: Canada should not have recognised the Independence of Kosovo,” *Global Research* (April 2, 2008).

³¹ This indeed would support Niall Ferguson’s prediction that “the decision to circumvent the UN will come back to haunt the NATO powers.”

Glenn Brown, “Noble Cause or March of Folly?” in David G. Haglund, Ed., *New NATO, New Century: Canada, the United States, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance*, (Canada: Centre for International Relations, 2000) 21.

³² Marjorie Cohn, “The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo,” in Aleksander Jokic, *Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention*, (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2003)

³³ Refer to p. 131 for a detailed explanation of each violation of international law.

³⁴ Boba Borojevic, “Montreal Forum on Kosovo,” *Serbianna.com* (May 27, 2008).

³⁵ “Who recognised Kosovo as an Independent State,” online website.

NATO's mission in the region. To keep NATO an effective institution in order to guarantee trans-Atlantic cooperation, Canada must support the organization at every possible opportunity. Therefore, in order to show a unified front and keep relations in NATO harmonious, Canada had to follow suit in recognizing Kosovo.

Another strong factor in Canada's decision was the fear of international backlash. Canadian forces have played a large role in Kosovo over the last decade, and because of this Canada has a certain international reputation in that area. As Mark Biondich states, "at any given time [since] 1992, Ottawa has deployed an average of 1200 to 2000

peacekeepers in the region." As well, Canada's participation in KFOR was the "largest Canadian involvement in any military campaign since the Korean War."³⁵ Though the attack is widely disputed in terms of its humanitarian purpose,³⁶ Canada did participate extensively and thus to not recognise the new country could be seen as an admittance to claims that our 'humanitarian intervention' was motivated by other factors. Indeed, not recognizing the unilateral declaration of independence, Canada would, according to Major General Lewis Mackenzie, be "acknowledging that

the bombing campaign was a mistake – which it was."³⁷

Adding to Canada's contribution in the region is the fact that one of Canada's refugee programmes has helped over 30,000 refugees from the area enter Canada since 1996, and that, prior to 2003, Canada had provided over \$200 million for peace-building activities.³⁸ Indeed, as demonstrated by Canada's involvement, Kosovo has loomed large in our foreign policy. In terms of recognizing independence, Robert Austin, who was interviewed before the declaration of independence, believed that "qualified independence, or supervised independence, [was] the only solution that provide[d] us with a way forward."³⁹ It is easy to understand then, that by not recognizing Kosovo publicly the Canadian government could easily be accused of hypocrisy and experience a loss of soft power and respect on the world stage.

Public sentiment in Canada is also a strong factor in understanding Ottawa's decision. First of all, the Canadian forces have been involved in Kosovo for a over a decade so to not recognise the new state would anger both supporters and army personnel, as the Canadian contribution could, in effect, be seen as inconsequential. Secondly, to justify the war and Canada's participation in Kosovo, the situation has been repeatedly labeled as a humanitarian mission. Independence would thus seem to be in accordance with this goal; if Ottawa did not recognise Kosovo it would discredit itself, and its role in Kosovo to the Canadian people.⁴⁰ Lastly, there was the direct pressure from the Albanian community. Over 20,000 Canadians identify themselves as Albanian,⁴¹ many of whom were quite vocal in their support for Kosovo. Indeed, on Feb 17, 2008, thousands of Albanian-Canadians demonstrated this support in

³⁵ Mark Biondich, 2.

³⁶ Geostrategic concerns of the US are most likely to have been responsible for the campaign. Indeed, these geostrategic objectives included: for the US to maintain its role as sole superpower in the world, to ensure hegemony over the transportation of rich oil deposits of the Caspian sea, as well as control of European markets, and lastly to provide a strong counterweight to Russian dominance of the area. For further reading refer to Marjorie Cohn in Aleksander Jokic, *Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention*, (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2003) 121-123.

³⁷ Boba Borojevic, "Montreal Forum on Kosovo," *Serbianna.com*, (May 27, 2008).

³⁸ These include humanitarian aid, helping re-establish security and rule of law, supporting human rights and free media projects and fostering economic cooperation. Mark Biondich, 2.

³⁹ "Becoming a Country: What are the next steps on Kosovo's road to independence?" *CBC News, In Depth: The Balkans*, (Dec. 11, 2007).

⁴⁰ This might also have repercussion on Canada's role in Afghanistan.

⁴¹ "Albanians: Social and Cultural Life," *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, (2008).

front of Ontario's legislature building in Toronto.⁴² There can be no doubt that public pressure on the Canadian government to recognise Kosovo was strong.

Last is the tenuous claim that Canada eventually recognised Kosovo as a way to try to get more help from the US in Afghanistan. This claim was put forward anonymously at the Montreal Forum on Kosovo⁴³ and has little evidence to support it. However, there exists the very real possibility of Canada recognizing Kosovo as a way to get the United States to respond in kind with an unknown objective of the Canadian government. At many points in Canada's history, the government has acted in ways that have had the objective of influencing US decisions towards Canadian interests.⁴⁴ Recognition of Kosovo may well have been part of a bigger scheme involving the US.

CONCLUSION

The true reasons for Canada's endorsement of Kosovo's declaration of independence, as well as its hesitation to support that declaration are unknown to all but a few Canadian government officials. In time this will likely change, but for now one can only speculate as to the factors that allowed this decision to be made.

Through careful analysis one can deduce the likely elements involved in Canada's reluctance to endorse the fledgling nation. Separatist tensions in Québec have always been a political minefield and, though the cases of Québec and Kosovo are not really comparable, the event could nevertheless have fueled separatist tensions yet again. Kosovo is not at this time a currently viable state, in essence it is a failed state and to support it may have brought grave repercussions to the Balkan area, as well as to the Kosovars themselves. Lastly, Canada's international, UN-following, reputation was at stake,

and the risk involved with recognizing a non-UN sanctioned country was considerable in terms of Canada's worldwide reputation. It is primarily for these three reasons that Canada was reluctant to endorse Kosovo's independence. These concerns were eventually trumped primarily by Canada's commitment to NATO, by the international perception of our presence in the area, and by pressure from Canadian public sentiment. Other unknown factors may also have played a part in Ottawa's ultimate decision, but this is impossible to know for the time being.

Kosovo's declaration of independence and the resulting worldwide repercussions have created strong tensions in the international community and within certain nations themselves. Canada's decision on this matter was difficult and complex, but for better or worse, Canada endorsed the new nation of Kosovo and will have to live with the consequences that arise out of this decision.

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⁴² "Albanians in Canada say Kosovo's Independence shouldn't raise fears about Québec," *Red Orbit* (Feb 17, 2008).

⁴³ Boba Borojevic, "Montreal Forum on Kosovo," *Serbianna.com* (May 27, 2008).

⁴⁴ Canada's role in promoting the Soviet threat to US fears is one of these. Canada's stance on fisheries in the Washington Treaty of 1871 is another. Indeed, Canada's role of interdiction in US politics has a long history.

Afghanistan: A Case Study on Canada's International Policies

Simon Ketcheson

Canada's involvement in Afghanistan is the result of foreign policy decisions made by both Liberal and Conservative governments following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York City. These decisions have led Canada into a country that has been invaded and conquered numerous times, and is known as the "graveyard of empires". The international troops stationed there as part of the United States' War on Terror are experiencing difficulties implementing successful policies. One needs to look no further than the poppy eradication policy: the Senlis Council asserts that "the opium crisis in Afghanistan is worse than ever [...] five years ago, the total area of cultivated hectares of poppy was less than half of the current total".¹

Canada's unyielding support for this War makes the issue an important one for all Canadians, and thus merits a closer examination. The war in Afghanistan and the larger War on Terror have important implications for Canada's international relations. Indeed, one may look at Afghanistan as part of a larger trend which involves the convergence of Canadian and American foreign policy. Michael Byers, a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia, asserts that "already, in Europe and elsewhere, Canadian foreign policy on some issues is seen as largely inseparable from that of the United States".² This paper aims to discuss this convergence in order to show the dependent nature of Canadian foreign policy upon that of the United States. Furthermore, it is shown that the War in Afghanistan is essentially against the interest of Canadians and that the choice to contribute has never been adequately debated in the Canadian public realm.

¹ The Senlis Council. "Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan". <http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Canadian_Policy_Paper_October_2006>

² Michael Byers. "Canadian armed forces under United States command," *International Journal*. Winter 2002-2003, pp. 89-114. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs.) 93.

First, this paper discusses the emergence of a Canadian foreign policy following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror, with emphasis on integrationist policies or tendencies evidenced by the Canadian government. In the second section Canada's actual involvement in Afghanistan is examined through discussion of Canada's aid, operations, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Finally, the domestic side of the war in Afghanistan is discussed, from the financial cost to Canadians to the impact of friendly fire incidents and other influences on public opinion of the war.

THE 1994 WHITE PAPER

Following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Western world had to readjust its foreign policy. Gone was the arch-enemy which made policy-making a simple art of opposing communism wherever it appeared to rear its head. As early as 1994, the Government of Canada came out with a White Paper on defence. John Warnock, a former professor of political economy and sociology at the University of Regina, tells us this document concluded that the Canadian government needed to "support the United States through the continuation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), participation in [North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and] the continuation of the Canada-US Defence Production Sharing Agreement".³ Although the main purpose for NATO's existence, the defence of Europe against the USSR, was no longer pertinent, the Canadian government decided to follow the lead of the United States and maintain NATO for future possible use. The Canada-US Defence Production Sharing Agreement is essentially an agreement which aims to maintain the balance of trade between the two countries by shifting production accordingly. Thus, beginning in the early 1990s, one can see the convergence of Canadian with American foreign policy in a post-Cold War environment.

³ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. (Halifax & Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.) 158.

ARTICLE 5

Just twenty-four hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States approached NATO about invoking Article 5 of its Charter, which states that an armed attack on one member constitutes an attack on all members.⁴ On October 4th the Secretary-General of NATO, George Robertson, announced that NATO was implementing Article 5, and it was not long until the Canadian government echoed this sentiment. John Warnock explains that the Chrétien government "strongly supported this decision"⁵ and that on October 14th, Jean Chrétien announced that Canada was giving "unqualified support" for a "fight we did not pick but [will] finish".⁶ The immediate actions taken were to send Her Majesty's Canadian Ship(s) *Halifax*, *Iroquois*, *Preserver*, *Vancouver* and *Charlottetown* to serve under American command in the both the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.⁷ There was not a word of dissent or even a request for patience and planning when the United States decided upon its course of action. Although worldwide public opinion was riding high in favour of the United States in the months following 9/11, further discussion shows that the decision by Canada to unequivocally support the United States is part of a larger trend.

THE THREE D'S

When Paul Martin was elected Prime Minister in late 2003, he launched a major review of Canadian foreign policy, released in 2005 as *The International Policy Statement*.⁸ This statement iterated the "Three-D" approach to Canada's foreign policy, which as then Defence Minister Bill Graham explains, "integrates defence, diplomacy and development assistance in our international operations".⁹

Warnock goes as far as to say that "to no one's surprise, these are also the major policy goals set forth by the US government".¹⁰ Indeed, there is a definite convergence of policy goals between the United States and Canada, especially in terms of defence. The ratio of military expenses to aid expenses in Afghanistan is "ten to one in favour of military spending".¹¹ In fact, in 2005 the government announced an increase in defence spending of \$13 billion over a five-year period.¹²

"Beginning in the early 1990s, one can see the convergence of Canadian with American foreign policy in a post-Cold War environment."

Furthermore, the 2005 *International Policy Statement*, although similar to the 1994 White Paper, differed in one major aspect - the "emphasis on

the intensity of the threats Canada faced in a post-9/11 world".¹³ The result of this emphasis was a drive to reconstitute the Canadian Forces and to co-operate militarily with the United States.

In the economic or development 'D' of the Three-D's, there is also convergence. Consistent with Canada's aid policy, Warnock explains that "most of the economic assistance the Canadian government is providing for Afghanistan is channeled through [institutions] like the World Bank and the [United Nations Development Programme]".¹⁴ He also notes that through this channeling of aid, Canada is essentially supporting the development programme set out by the United States for Afghanistan, which closely resembles a Washington Consensus style development programme. In relinquishing direct control of its aid and assistance, Canada is submitting itself to the policies and goals of other actors such as the United States, or the United Nations; in other words, those who control the aid programmes in general.

⁴ Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang. *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. (Toronto: Viking Canada.)

⁵ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 157.

⁶ Ibid. 153.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Brian W. Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Osler Hampson. *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press)

⁹ Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre.) 43.

¹⁰ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 160.

¹¹ Ibid. 165.

¹² Brian W. Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Osler Hampson. *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics*.

¹³ Ibid. 153.

¹⁴ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 168.

In the final aspect of the Three-D approach, diplomacy, there are a couple examples from Afghanistan which show how Canada subordinates itself to American policy. For instance, Warnock mentions bringing war criminals before the courts, for which there is "widespread support in Afghanistan"¹⁵ and also the advancement of women's rights. The US government opposes efforts to bring war criminals, be they former regional warlords or members of past governments, to court.¹⁶ The Canadian government also supports this position, and may indeed be employing "alleged war criminals as allies in its stabilization and reconstruction strategy".¹⁷ Although they are but 'alleged' war criminals, the fact that the Canadian and American governments are unwilling to pursue the allegations does not aid their image in the eyes of the average Afghani. Secondly, the US imposed constitution follows basic Shariah law, meaning that women's rights are extremely limited. The Canadian government evidently supports this constitution, putting the effort to advance women's rights on the sideline. Warnock explains that "these policies show the extent to which the Liberal and Conservative governments in Ottawa have been willing to surrender basic liberal and human-rights ideals in order to support US foreign policy".¹⁸

THE BONN AGREEMENT

In a further example of Canada's unwillingness to bring criminals to trial and uphold "basic liberal and human-rights ideals"¹⁹, one needs to look no further than the governments' unwavering support for the Bonn Agreement. On November 27, 2001 the United States brought together a group of Afghan representatives at Bonn in Germany, and the result was the appointment of Hamid Karzai as the new Afghan leader. In his article *Covering up Karzai & Co*, Arthur Kent, a Canadian journalist who writes for various Canadian and international newspapers, quotes Shukria Barakzai, a MP from Kabul as saying

"the Bonn agreement was a very bad start for a new political life in Afghanistan, the old criminals were given new places".²⁰ Indeed, most information found that is not from official Canadian government sources decries the enormous amount of corruption present in the Karzai regime and generally in Afghanistan.²¹ And yet the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade insists that "Canada stands firmly behind the Bonn Agreement as the greatest hope for establishing peace and security, reconstructing the country, re-establishing key institutions and protecting human rights".²² Canada's unwillingness to challenge the Bonn agreement is yet another example of its acquiescence to American policy.

NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION

On the home front, Canadian-American relations have taken a turn towards closer integration. Because of Canada's geographic proximity to, and economic dependence upon, the United States, this is hardly surprising. However, since the end of the Cold War and especially after 9/11 there has been even deeper integration, as "the US government could always count on the support of Canada and Israel, referred to as the 'safely predictable allies'".²³ After 9/11, the obvious course of action was to shore up security agreements between the two countries, and by December of 2001 the governments had issued a "Joint Statement of Cooperation on Border Security", and shortly thereafter signed an agreement for a "Smart Border for the 21st Century". The Joint Statement recognised that "the economies of our respective sovereign nations are inextricably intertwined".²⁴

¹⁵ Ibid. 163.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Michael Skinner. "Afghanistan: Why Canada Should Withdraw Its Troops."

<http://www.canadiansagainstawar.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=135&Itemid=52>

¹⁸ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 164.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Arthur Kent. "Covering Up Karzai & Co" <<http://www.global-sisterhood-network.org/content/view/1853/76/>>

²¹ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*, Michael Skinner. "Afghanistan: Why Canada Should Withdraw Its Troops.", Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press.), Arthur Kent. "Covering Up Karzai & Co", Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?*

²² Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Building Bridges in Afghanistan," *Canada World View* Autumn 2003, issue 20. <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/Canada-magazine/issue20/01-title-en.asp>>

²³ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 154.

²⁴ US Government. "Joint Statement on Cooperation on Border Security and Regional Migration Issues." <<http://ottawa.usembassy.gov/content/textonly.asp?section>

Similarly, the Smart Border agreement is couched in terms of commerce and economic security in order to “guard Canadian economic security from a ‘Fortress America’ mentality south of the border”.²⁵ Indeed, John Warnock explains that the 9/11 attacks were “a window of opportunity for big business interests in Canada who wished to expand on the continental free trade agreements”.²⁶

Furthermore, Warnock explains that the Canadian Conference of Chief Executives, which represents the 150 largest corporations in Canada, The Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient Borders, and the Canada-US partnership forum were all pushing for deeper integration with the United States – the ‘Big Idea.’ The Big Idea refers to the ever closer integration between the two countries, a process which would undoubtedly settle in favour of American interests. Andrew Jackson²⁷ discusses the fact that the European Union speaks with one voice at the WTO, and that conceivably the Big Idea would lead to the United States and Canada doing the same. It is simply hard to imagine Canada having much pull in an environment of deep economic integration. The Big Idea would subordinate Canadian economic interests into a broader North American context – limiting the choices for Canadian businesses in terms of exports and investment. Indeed Michael Byers tells us that the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG) report in 2006 sought “nothing less than the complete integration of Canada’s military, security and foreign policy into the decision-making and operating systems of the United States”.²⁸ Warnock also asserts that “in all the cooperative arrangements between [Canada and the United States], the United States is in full control”.²⁹

In terms of integration of the Canadian Forces, the Bi-National Planning Group had many things to

assert. Michael Byers explains that “a remarkable aspect of the BPG report is how many of its recommendations concerned how best to persuade Canadians to accept further military integration”.³⁰ Indeed, in other areas this integration is also apparent. The creation of the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which was negotiated between Canada and the United States shortly after the 9/11 attacks “placed Canadian Forces under the umbrella”³¹ of the United States military. NORTHCOM built on the earlier North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which, as Byers asserts “while supposedly based on an equality of the two countries [Canada and the U.S.], is always headed by a senior U.S. officer”.³² He thus argues that the BPG, in supporting NORTHCOM, NORAD and further integration was “advocating co-operation at the level of a single, U.S.-dominated command for all of Canada’s territory and our surrounding seas”.³³ These military defence initiatives have increased the military integration of Canada into the military command structure of the United States. They also limit the ability of Canada, regardless of its actual military capabilities, to make separate decisions on where, when and how to deploy its own forces. Indeed, Byers asserts that these defence initiatives are “part of a deliberately fostered trend that includes Canada’s involvement in the U.S.-led counter-insurgency in southern Afghanistan”.³⁴

THE WAR ON TERROR AND AFGHANISTAN

The ‘War on Terror’ is an American concept, initiated by George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks. The war originally focused on Afghanistan, the country in which Osama Bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was located. The Canadian government and Canadian Forces (CF) actively participate in this war through their contributions to the war in Afghanistan, in addition to intelligence sharing and other agreements. Warnock explains that this means “Canadian forces will follow where

=can_usa&subsection1=borderissues&document=borderissues_state ment_120301>

²⁵ Brian W. Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Osler Hampson. *Canada’s International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics*. 12.

²⁶ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 158.

²⁷ Andrew Jackson. “Why the ‘Big Idea’ is a Bad Idea.” Canadian Labour Congress. <<http://strategis.gc.ca/pics/ra/jackson1.pdf>>

²⁸ Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?* 174.

²⁹ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 171.

³⁰ Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?* 176.

³¹ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 176.

³² Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?* 176.

³³ Ibid. 174-5.

³⁴ Ibid. 177.

the US government leads".³⁵ This relationship has led to the aforementioned increase in military spending, and also a loss of decision-making capability for the Canadian government. Indeed, Byers explains that in developing the capabilities of the CF and of Canada's ability to intervene in humanitarian situations, Canada should "seek to do more than simply duplicate the military capabilities of the United States".³⁶ This duplication of American capabilities goes hand in hand with what Byers terms "interoperability"³⁷ – the necessity for the Canadian Forces to be interoperable with the United States military in order to cooperate with them in training exercises and in combat. Furthermore, Byers asserts that the consequences of Canadian participation in the War on Terror and in Afghanistan could be the "development of a Canadian Forces that is focused almost entirely [...] on aggressive missions conducted in concert with the United States".³⁸ By participating in the Afghan theatre of the War on Terror, Canada is consciously subordinating its military to that of the United States.

Officially, Canada is in Afghanistan in order to "prevent the relapse [of Afghanistan] into a failed state where the Taliban regains political control".³⁹ Immediately after 9/11, Peter Pigott, a former Department of Foreign Affairs employee and now full time writer, tells us that Canada was "in the forefront, committing its forces to oust the Taliban".⁴⁰ The Canadian Forces drew its contribution largely from the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) regiment, in addition to the rapid deployment of Joint Task Force 2 Special Forces to aid in the early stages of the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan.⁴¹ Canada has essentially been directly involved with the war in Afghanistan since the very beginning in 2001.

CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Looking at Canadian operations in Afghanistan, one can see many similarities to the way in which the United States carries out its operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Byers explains that "civilian contractors are often sent with [the CF] to provide food and sanitation services, maintain and repair equipment and manage ammunition supplies".⁴² This is concurrent with the United States' operations in Iraq, where private companies such as Halliburton, Blackwater, Bechtel and Fluor are given contracts to supply the United States military (2006b). Indeed, the Department of National Defence (DND) initiated the Contractor Augmentation Programme (CANCAP) in 2000.⁴³ The CANCAP programme aims to replace supportive operations such as food services, health services, and ammunition support, which were usually carried out by the military as a holistic part of its operations, with private companies which

"Canada should 'seek to do more than simply duplicate the military capabilities of the United States'."

render these services.⁴⁴ Pigott explains that "with so much of its military in Afghanistan, [the DND] now wanted private industry to be there, as well".⁴⁵ In particular, SNC Lavalin Pro-Fac, a Montreal based company, was awarded "CDN\$200 million to construct [Camp Julien, outside of Kabul] and manage its office, warehouse, laundry, maintenance, utilities, cleaning service, and food preparation".⁴⁶ Camp Julien was the "first large-scale camp largely run by a third party".⁴⁷ Thus one can see another convergence in military policy – the hiring of private contractors to carry out supply missions.

³⁵ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 162.

³⁶ Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?* 49.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid. 51.

³⁹ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 150.

⁴⁰ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 85.

⁴¹ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*.

⁴² Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?* 179.

⁴³ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*.

⁴⁴ Department of National Defence. "Canadian Forces Contractor Augmentation Program."

<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1409>

⁴⁵ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 93.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 93-4.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 94.

CANADA IN KANDAHAR

Furthermore, just as the United States is hiring 'private armies' in Iraq by employing security companies as mercenaries⁴⁸, Canada has begun the same practice. Warnock explains that the Canadian members of the Strategic Advisory Team in Kandahar are "protected by a private British firm, Hart Security"⁴⁹ – a company that "worked for the apartheid government in South Africa".⁵⁰ It would seem that Canada is utterly incapable of developing any military practices separate from the United States, and with such similar ways of projecting our image, message and power across the globe, it is not hard to see how Canadian and American foreign policies are converging.

One positive example of Canadian policy in Afghanistan was the cantonment initiative. Cantonment is a term used to describe a temporary military quarters. This involved the stockpiling of heavy weaponry such as the tanks and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) that had been left behind by the retreating Soviets in the late 1980s. Nonetheless, Peter Pigott explains that it took "weeks and months to build a small international consensus that this was a policy initiative to pursue" and that "it took until the end of [2003] to get the first heavy weapons moving."⁵¹ Not only was it difficult for the Canadians to convince others that this was an important facet of the demilitarization of Afghanistan – arguably an absolute necessity if Afghanistan is to be stabilized, but the initiative did not encompass the small arms and weapons that were used by warlords to control their regions and illegal narcotics operations.⁵² This initiative demonstrates the reticence of the international community to pursue policies which have obvious import, and it also demonstrates Canada's difficulty and inability to actively pursue policies which it considers important.

When the first Canadian troops from Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry landed in Afghanistan, they were stationed in Kandahar as part of the U.S. counter-insurgency task force.⁵³ Then, "between August 2003 and October 2005, some six-thousand Canadian soldiers were rotated through Kabul"⁵⁴ at Camp Julien, in a more subdued peace-keeping role. The decision was subsequently made to return to Kandahar in 2005. Michael Byers explains that the motivation behind this decision was actually "amending the damage caused to the Canada-U.S. relationship by [the] refusal to participate in the Iraq War".⁵⁵ Indeed, it is readily admitted by the Canadian government that "Kandahar is one of the most difficult operating environments in the world"⁵⁶, and yet, despite Canada's relatively limited military capability, the decision to send troops to the region was still made.

Another factor in the decision to return to Kandahar was the Chief of Defence Staff at the time, General Rick Hillier. Hillier held this position from 2004 until his retirement in July 2008. Pigott quotes Peggy Mason, a former U.N. disarmament ambassador who worked for Hillier as saying that Hillier "has a clear political agenda and he's been very successful at advancing it for some time now".⁵⁷ Indeed, Hillier was pivotal in getting Canada back into Kandahar, where he believed Canada would have a "chance to have sufficient profile".⁵⁸ The political role played by General Hillier is an indication of the preponderance of the military in the Three-D approach to foreign policy, in which spending is already heavily weighted towards the military.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Pigott describes Hillier as being "'American' style"⁶⁰ in his approach, thus potentially leading to further convergence between American and Canadian policy, given the influence that the American military holds in American policy.

⁵³ Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?*

⁵⁴ Ibid. 41.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 41-2.

⁵⁶ Government of Canada. "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan." <<http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca>>

⁵⁷ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 104.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*.

⁶⁰ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 103.

⁴⁸ Thabit A.J. Abdullah. *Dictatorship, Imperialism and Chaos: Iraq since 1989*.

⁴⁹ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 163.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 97.

⁵² John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*.

Another way that Canada has been involved in Kandahar is through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). There are currently twenty-six active PRTs in Afghanistan⁶¹ which Pigott explains are "conceived as a way to integrate diplomats, development experts, police officers and 'military assets'".⁶² As a matter of fact, PRTs owe their origin to U.S. military forces from Operation Enduring Freedom in early 2002, and it was not until 2004 that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began to take control of various PRTs.⁶³ The Canadian team in Kandahar is "dominated by the military but includes representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs, CIDA and the RCMP".⁶⁴

In a 2006 report, the Senlis Council, a European-based and funded think tank (more recently renamed the International Council on Security and Development or ICOS), is highly critical of Canada's PRT initiative owing to the fact that the PRT system was created by the U.S. military in an approach that "has failed to produce sustainable results in terms of security, stability and overall reconstruction".⁶⁵ Indeed, the Council decries the "dominantly military approach" of the PRTs which fail to "integrate humanitarian assistance, poverty relief and development".⁶⁶ Canada and other members of the ISAF are following a reconstruction effort originally conceived by the United States military, and although the approach has been criticised they have not sought other means to achieve their goals. Due to their highly military characteristics, the U.S. Institute of Peace explains that PRTs are "better suited to security-related tasks than to delivering development assistance".⁶⁷ The Institute goes so far as to recommend that PRTs be re-named 'Provincial Security Teams' because of this military orientation.⁶⁸

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

There have been many official and unofficial estimates of the cost of the War in Afghanistan, but there has never been a coherent, straightforward announcement of these costs to Canadians. In the October 2008 report by the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) on the *Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan*, it is explained that "Parliament has not yet been provided with annual estimates or the total costs of the operation incurred by all of the relevant departments".⁶⁹ Given the lack of information, even this official report can only postulate at the costs of the war, giving a discrepancy of CDN \$4.2 billion between its high and low estimates of the overall costs from 2001 to 2011.⁷⁰ This estimate, between \$13.92 and \$18.14 billion, is for a scenario in which the level of troop commitments remains the same at 2,500. Furthermore, in a report also released in October of 2008, the Rideau Institute on International Affairs, an Ottawa based public policy research group, estimated the costs of the war up until 2011 at \$28.4 billion!⁷¹ This lack of coherent estimates or actual reporting of costs accrued makes public discourse on the costs of the war extremely difficult. Admittedly, it is not easy to gather all the required financial information into one easy estimate, but the Government of Canada may be considered responsible for not presenting the costs in an adequate and transparent manner to Canadians. The October PBO report explains that "CIDA DPRs [Departmental Performance Reports] do not provide annual spending in Afghanistan for individual projects" and that the DND does not release mission specific details and thus "it is impossible to determine how many reservists were deployed for each year of the mission; how much fuel was consumed; or the level of expenditure on equipment reset and betterment." Furthermore,

⁶¹ USAID. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams."

<<http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.PRT.aspx>>

⁶² Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 135.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 169.

⁶⁵ The Senlis Council. "Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan".

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ United States Institute of Peace. "The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified."

<<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.html>>

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. "Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan".

<<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/PBO-DPB/documents/Afghanistan%20-%20Fiscal%20Impact%20FINAL-E-WEB.pdf>>

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ The Rideau Institute. "The Cost of the War and the End of Peacekeeping: The Impact of Extending the Afghanistan Mission".

<<http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/file-library/costofthewar.pdf>>

Veteran Affairs Canada “does not report basic financial data specific to the Afghanistan mission”.⁷²

There is also the question of what exactly it is that Canada is funding. Beyond the costs of military operations, Canada contributes approximately \$100 million a year in aid.⁷³ This aid, though channeled through organizations such as the UN and the World Bank⁷⁴, must pass through the Interior Ministry of the Karzai regime. Arthur Kent indicates that the UN-ministered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) “has yet to come up with a way to place international aid directly into the hands of individual policemen”.⁷⁵ Furthermore, he describes the fact that “so much international aid money has vanished into the concentric rings of corruption that make up the Karzai administration that no reliable estimate exists of its total dollar value”.⁷⁶ If Canada cannot put its funds to good use in Afghanistan, it is arguable that it should not be in the country, and that it should not be spending billions on military operations if the most basic aid initiatives are siphoned off into the ‘concentric rings of corruption’ present in the Afghan government. Canadian tax-payers are literally seeing their money disappear into Afghanistan.

PUBLIC OPINION

Finally, the costs of the war are not only financial. “Sadly, the first [Canadian casualties in Afghanistan] were not from the Taliban”.⁷⁷ Indeed, the Tarnak Farm incident, as it would come to be known, was the accidental bombing of Canadians on a training exercise by an American F-16 on April 12, 2002.⁷⁸ Pigott iterates another incident, on September 4th, 2006 when an American A-10 helicopter strafed a

Canadian Company in Kandahar province.⁷⁹ These two incidents provoked an outcry from the Canadian public. If the war in Afghanistan had been popular before these incidents, support certainly dropped immediately following them. Certainly in recent years, support for the war has been low, but even from the beginning John Warnock explains that “there was no indication that the public was willing to support a Canadian role in a long counterinsurgency war”.⁸⁰ He furthermore cites two major polls taken, one in 2006 and one in 2008. The first, carried out by the Strategic Council – a market-research group based in Toronto – showed that 62 percent of Canadians supported a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, something the Harper government was completely unwilling to pursue at the time.⁸¹ The second, taken in January 2008 by Angus

Reid Strategies, found that “61 percent of Canadians did not want to extend Canada’s military commitment [in Afghanistan] beyond the Feb. 2009 deadline”⁸², and yet the Canadian government decided to extend the deadline to 2011. As Pigott explains:

“To some, their country was wading deeper and deeper into the morass of Afghanistan without a clear mandate, something retired Major-General Lewis MacKenzie blamed on the fact that ‘the deployment was never debated in Parliament, nor was it explained to the Canadian public. As a result, there is a high level of confusion throughout the country regarding the mission...’”⁸³

Indeed, Warnock agrees in that “the general public [...] has been left out of this debate”.⁸⁴ Public opinion is blatantly ignored in the formation of policy regarding Afghanistan – evidently higher concerns such as appeasing the United States must

⁷² Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. “Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan”.

⁷³ Michael Byers. *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?*

⁷⁴ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*.

⁷⁵ Arthur Kent. “Covering Up Karzai & Co”

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 89.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 154.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid. 172.

⁸³ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 101.

⁸⁴ John W. Warnock. *Creating a Failed State: The US and Canada in Afghanistan*. 172.

come into play – and, as was evidenced above, the financial side of the war is not openly debated either. Arthur Kent goes as far as to say that “even the Kremlin was less manic in its information control during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s”.⁸⁵

The Canadian public has been denied accurate information regarding nearly every aspect of the war in Afghanistan, and the implications are grave. According to the British Royal Statistical Society, “a Canadian soldier in Kandahar was nearly six times more likely to die in hostilities than an American soldier serving in Iraq”.⁸⁶ With the current economic climate, it may be easy to shunt aside debate on the war in Afghanistan in favour of issues which touch a little closer to home. However, nothing touches closer than those who lose family members in a war

of which few have a comprehensive understanding. In terms of acquiescence to the United States, as Michael Byers puts it “at issue here is not Canada’s legal sovereignty, but its practical sovereignty – its ability freely to make choices at the international level”.⁸⁷ Indeed there are many converging trends apparent, mostly in economic and militaristic terms. Again, arguments supporting economic integration are ever stronger in the face of a worldwide economic downturn. If Canada wishes to be distinguishable from the United States, it needs to re-examine its role in Afghanistan and begin redefining its foreign policy and its relationship with the United States. Although Canada is geographically reliant upon the United States, this is no reason to blindly follow wherever the U.S. may lead.

⁸⁵ Arthur Kent. “Covering Up Karzai & Co”

⁸⁶ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 130.

⁸⁷ Michael Byers. “Canadian armed forces under United States command,” 93.

Talking With Taliban:

A Political Solution to a Political Problem.

NATO, Afghanistan and the Taliban's motivations to negotiate

Sarahh Irving

A political discourse with the Taliban has been advocated by many members of the international community as a way to end the War in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, the president of the Afghan state, has extended many gestures of reconciliation toward the Taliban and its members and has even personally assured the security of the Taliban 'Leader of the Faithful,' Mullah Muhammad Omar, if he were to return to Afghanistan and negotiate with the government.¹ Foreign actors in Afghanistan have also been speaking of political

settlements; Britain's Brigadier General Mark Carleton-Smith has reportedly said that, "If the Taliban were prepared to sit on the other side of the table and talk about a political settlement, then that's precisely the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this. That shouldn't make people uncomfortable."²

Unfortunately for those parties who are looking favourably upon open dialogue, not all actors have expressed their comfort with the idea. What is the likelihood that the Taliban, or NATO, will participate in this type of solution? Negotiating with the Taliban is becoming an increasingly desirable option as the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate in military effectiveness. These talks, if pursued, could be an important contemporary event leading to the success or failure

¹ BBC a. “Karzai offers Taleban safety deal.” *British Broadcasting Company*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7732301.stm (November 24, 2008).

² Telegraph. “War in Afghanistan cannot be won, British commander Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith warns.” *Telegraph Media Group Limited*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/3139702/War-in-Afghanistan-cannot-be-won-British-commander-Brigadier-Mark-Carleton-Smith-warns.html> (November 24, 2008).

come into play – and, as was evidenced above, the financial side of the war is not openly debated either. Arthur Kent goes as far as to say that “even the Kremlin was less manic in its information control during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s”.⁸⁵

The Canadian public has been denied accurate information regarding nearly every aspect of the war in Afghanistan, and the implications are grave. According to the British Royal Statistical Society, “a Canadian soldier in Kandahar was nearly six times more likely to die in hostilities than an American soldier serving in Iraq”.⁸⁶ With the current economic climate, it may be easy to shunt aside debate on the war in Afghanistan in favour of issues which touch a little closer to home. However, nothing touches closer than those who lose family members in a war

⁸⁵ Arthur Kent. “Covering Up Karzai & Co”

⁸⁶ Peter Pigott. *Canada in Afghanistan: The war so far*. 130.

⁸⁷ Michael Byers. “Canadian armed forces under United States command,” 93.

of which few have a comprehensive understanding. In terms of acquiescence to the United States, as Michael Byers puts it “at issue here is not Canada’s legal sovereignty, but its practical sovereignty – its ability freely to make choices at the international level”.⁸⁷ Indeed there are many converging trends apparent, mostly in economic and militaristic terms. Again, arguments supporting economic integration are ever stronger in the face of a worldwide economic downturn. If Canada wishes to be distinguishable from the United States, it needs to re-examine its role in Afghanistan and begin redefining its foreign policy and its relationship with the United States. Although Canada is geographically reliant upon the United States, this is no reason to blindly follow wherever the U.S. may lead.

Talking With Taliban:

A Political Solution to a Political Problem.

NATO, Afghanistan and the Taliban's motivations to negotiate

Sarahh Irving

A political discourse with the Taliban has been advocated by many members of the international community as a way to end the War in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, the president of the Afghan state, has extended many gestures of reconciliation toward the Taliban and its members and has even personally assured the security of the Taliban 'Leader of the Faithful,' Mullah Muhammad Omar, if he were to return to Afghanistan and negotiate with the government.¹ Foreign actors in Afghanistan have also been speaking of political

settlements; Britain's Brigadier General Mark Carleton-Smith has reportedly said that, "If the Taliban were prepared to sit on the other side of the table and talk about a political settlement, then that's precisely the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this. That shouldn't make people uncomfortable."²

Unfortunately for those parties who are looking favourably upon open dialogue, not all actors have expressed their comfort with the idea. What is the likelihood that the Taliban, or NATO, will participate in this type of solution? Negotiating with the Taliban is becoming an increasingly desirable option as the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate in military effectiveness. These talks, if pursued, could be an important contemporary event leading to the success or failure

¹ BBC a. “Karzai offers Taleban safety deal.” *British Broadcasting Company*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7732301.stm (November 24, 2008).

² Telegraph. “War in Afghanistan cannot be won, British commander Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith warns.” *Telegraph Media Group Limited*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/3139702/War-in-Afghanistan-cannot-be-won-British-commander-Brigadier-Mark-Carleton-Smith-warns.html> (November 24, 2008).

of the 'war on terror' in Afghanistan and could also create a powerful precedent for future counter-insurgency missions.

SECTION I: THE ACTORS

There are many state and non-state actors who have a stake in the War in Afghanistan. To contextualize the central players in order to later discuss how they may react to political settlements, let us briefly discuss the origins and roles of the Taliban, the Afghan Government and NATO.

PRIMARY ACTOR ONE: THE TALIBAN

The Taliban began as a popular movement in southern Afghanistan during the post-Soviet occupation era. The word "Taliban" comes from the root "Talib" which means 'religious student', these students were the base of the movement when it began in Kandahar in 1994.³ During October of that year, the Taliban was noticed by the international community for the first time when they protected a Pakistani government trade convoy to Turkmenistan from a group of attackers. From there they proceeded to take over Kandahar with very little resistance: the Taliban disarmed the population and restored a semblance of security and order.⁴ The Taliban took to arms in order to oppose the corruption of the seven mujahedin parties of the Afghan Interim Government, which were battling one another for power in Kabul. The Afghan Interim Government was formed from the 'seven-party-alliance' that had taken over after the Soviet backed 'Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan' government collapsed in 1992. This coalition of mujahedin forces was supported militarily by the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet occupation, and then was formed into a 'government-in-waiting'.⁵ The reason these nations supported this government was because "the international community (...) anticipated that the

Soviet-backed government of President Najibullah would fall immediately after the Soviet withdrawal".⁶

The Taliban were said to have "felt outrage at the behaviour of the Mujahidin leaders fighting for power in the city and to have decided to take action to end what they saw as corrupt practices, drawing in Islam as a justification for their intervention".⁷ The Taliban continued from Kandahar to take over the rest of the country, removing the Afghan Interim Government from power when they took the capital, Kabul, in 1996. By 1998, all of the country was under Taliban control, except a small section in the north occupied by the Northern Alliance.⁸ The formation of this coalition was another incident of Mujahedin forces coming together, despite their differences, to fight a common enemy: this time, not the Soviets but the Taliban.

After the events in the United States after Sept 11, 2001, the Taliban entered the media limelight once again as they refused President George W. Bush's demand to 'hand over' Osama bin Laden. The United States invaded Afghanistan in late 2001 and allied with the Northern Alliance. Operation Enduring Freedom pushed the Taliban from Kabul, and then from their last stronghold in Kandahar in November, 2001.⁹ Currently the Taliban is being fought by the NATO-commanded International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. They are viewed as rebel insurgents by the Western forces, and according to George W. Bush, "the United States of America is an enemy of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name".¹⁰

PRIMARY ACTOR TWO: THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

The current democratic government of Afghanistan was formed after the Taliban were removed from power in 2001, and after the adoption of a new constitution in 2003 democratic elections were

³ Hafizullah Emadi. *Culture and Customs of Afghanistan*. (Westport: Greenwood.) 48.

⁴ Peter Marsden. *The Taliban, War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*. (London: Zed Books. 1998.) 45.

⁵ Peter Marsden. *The Taliban, War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*. 33-42.

⁶ Ibid. 36.

⁷ Ibid. 43.

⁸ Ibid. 54-5.

⁹ Hafizullah Emadi. "Culture and Customs of Afghanistan." 50.

¹⁰ David J. Whittaker. *The Terrorism Reader*. (Routledge 2003.) 49.

finally held in 2004.¹¹ Hamid Karzai was installed as head of the interim government by the USA, and then took the title of first democratically elected president of Afghanistan. He has since been re-elected, still holding this position today.¹² Karzai and the international community have adopted a plan for development in the country called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) initiative, which includes 3 pillars: 1. Security, 2. Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights, 3. Economic and Social Development.¹³

PRIMARY ACTOR THREE: NATO

NATO has been involved in Afghanistan since the summer of 2003, when it took over control of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VI.¹⁴ This is the multinational force that was originally created by a United Nations Security Council Resolution in 2001, to stabilize the area in and around Kabul, and was expanded after NATO command took over to include all of Afghanistan. Since this time the ISAF has been "supported and led by NATO, and financed by the troop contributing nations. The Alliance is responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force".¹⁵ Their mission is one "that assists the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction".¹⁶ They are also responsible to provide a 'Senior Civilian Representative,' who advances NATO's "political-military aspects" in

Afghanistan, and who has ties with the ISAF, the Afghan government, international organizations, and neighbouring countries.¹⁷ They concentrate primarily on "a substantial programme of cooperation with Afghanistan, concentrating on defence reform, defence institution-building and the military aspects of security sector reform".¹⁸

SECTION II: WHO WILL PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS?

After outlining the different actors in Afghanistan, what parties involved are *likely* to participate, and why would it be in their interest to do so?

PRIMARY ACTOR ONE: THE TALIBAN

The Taliban will likely talk to the international community because, most importantly, they are fighting toward a decidedly political goal: the formation of an Islamic State.¹⁹ Yet more specifically there are great challenges which face the Taliban, and thus there are many incentives to pursue this type of negotiation method. In their factionalized movement, the Taliban are unable to take control by military means alone. Additionally, bad infrastructure and mysterious chain of command will prove to be more than inhibiting. Lack of coordination between the different foot soldier 'cells' across the region means the Taliban will have great difficulty ever actually 'defeating' NATO militarily. In the end, the divided nature of the Taliban means that some may talk while others will only pursue military solutions.

Coordination issues pointing to the divided nature of the Taliban are evident because different 'cells' or regional groups of Taliban differ in their military plans or views on a particular issue. This issue has been apparent since the time of the Taliban government: one can see evidence in the differing policies enforced by different military commanders in the four major cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Marzari-Sharif and Herat. For example, women were permitted to work in the health sector in Kandahar,

¹¹ Hafizullah Emadi. "Culture and Customs of Afghanistan." 50.

¹² Office of the President, "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Office of the President." <http://www.president.gov.af/> (November 24, 2008).

¹³ ANDS, Afghanistan National Development Strategy. "Executive Summary." http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/ANDS%20Executive%20Summary_eng.pdf (2008.)

¹⁴ NATO e, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: International Security Assistance Force. "Chronology." <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/chronology/index.html> (November 24, 2008).

¹⁵ NATO c, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Topics: International Security Assistance Force. "ISAF History." <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/history/index.html> (November 24, 2008).

¹⁶ NATO d, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Topics: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO in Afghanistan." <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html> (November 24, 2008).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Globe and Mail. "Talking to the Taliban." *CTV Globe Media*. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban> (November 24, 2008).

yet this policy was not accepted in Herat. Kabul was outstandingly oppressed in comparison: the city was seen as "corrupt and decadent" and as the country's centre of Western influence.²⁰ Current events have also lead to questions about the Taliban's unity; when girls walking to school were sprayed with battery acid, it was largely suspected to be the work of the Taliban, yet a Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi denied Taliban involvement.²¹ The Taliban is not one homogenous group and cannot be boiled down to a single shared ideology, and the divisions are becoming even more evident to the public.

Chain of command can be regarded as another point of unease for the Taliban. Their 'Leader of the Faithful', Mullah Omar, is not present in Afghanistan but works somewhere in exile and has little contact with low-level Taliban soldiers. It is arguable that, indeed, these soldiers are faithful to him and the cause, but as 'Talking with the Taliban' revealed, some of the soldiers would accept an Islamic government in Afghanistan even if Mullah Omar was not the head of state.²² Thus, chain of command problems may serve as an incentive for some Taliban to talk to the international community. Foot soldiers will undoubtedly continue to fight despite the elusive leadership, lack of infrastructure, and issues with coordination, but Taliban leaders will likely see negotiations as a more viable option for achieving their bigger political goals.

Taliban foot soldiers may not oppose dialogue because many are aware of how ineffective non-negotiated military solutions lacking political reinforcement have been. After the siege of Kunduz in north Afghanistan by Coalition and Northern Alliance forces in late 2001, Taliban fighters were dictated terms by the military: they could lay down

their arms and surrender, or be killed. It is estimated that eight thousand Taliban fighters surrendered their weapons, were tied up, and were taken as prisoners to Northern Alliance leader Dostum's base and were eventually destined for Sheberghan prison. The prisoners were put into containers by the hundreds and shipped off to this location; due to suffocation and execution, only three thousand people made it to this prison alive. The dead and the wounded were directed into the desert for extermination and burial by US Special Forces. This incident has been exposed by a documentary in 2002 by Irish filmmaker Jamie Doran, in the film "Afghan Massacre – Convoy of Death".²³ Many Taliban, because of this atrocity, may know the real consequences of surrender and are much less likely to throw down their arms without real assurance that they will be able to return to their families. Thus, Taliban fighters may be more likely to seek strong political settlement rather than military conditions that make no credible promises. On top of this lack of trust of the military, the continued bombings of Afghanis by NATO forces will continue to be seen as a daily threat to civilians and Taliban alike, and will only be solved by an agreement like a politically negotiated ceasefire. This

"Taliban fighters may be more likely to seek strong political settlement rather than military conditions that make no credible promises."

is why a political settlement would be favourable to the foot soldiers: they will be able to have real political protection against military persecution through negotiated agreements.

Pursuing a political solution instead of a military one is a much more appropriate solution to the political problem of how Afghanistan should be ruled. The problem is that, in the eyes of the Taliban, Afghanistan should be an Islamic state and should have an Islamic government that is not a puppet of non-Muslims (as Karzai is believed to be).²⁴ So if there was a negotiation where this issue was on the agenda, it is far more likely that the Taliban – soldiers and leaders – would participate.

Finally, talks with the group would also, to a degree, legitimize the group as an official actor in the

²⁰ Peter Marsden. *The Taliban, War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*. 51-2.

²¹ Washington Post. "Acid attacks keep Afghan girls away from classes." *The Washington Post Company*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/14/AR2008111401180.html> (November 24, 2008).

²² Globe and Mail. "Talking to the Taliban."

²³ Produced by Atlantic Celtic Films. 2001.

²⁴ Ibid.

country. Seeing the faces of the fighters published in newspapers and their voices on the radio throughout communities in Afghanistan during the talks would ultimately be good exposure, something of which they may take advantage. Also, it would give them weight as a group abroad: they would be less a group of masked insurgents, far away down the scope of a machine gun, and seen more for the people that they really are: husbands, sons, and brothers, all with faces and names, all fighting for their religion and their country.

PRIMARY ACTOR TWO: THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

The Afghan government will likely support the proposed talks with the Taliban because they have set a distinct precedent by encouraging the return of Taliban members to Afghanistan. In 2003, Karzai offered amnesty to Taliban foot soldiers and commanders, allowing them to disarm and return to daily life as citizens. "The commission did prove to have a positive effect as many Taliban commanders accepted the amnesty and joined the government".²⁵ This offer of amnesty was one of the government's more effective strategies to overcome the civil unrest, because they do not have the resources, infrastructure, or policing abilities to properly handle an insurgency militarily. The police are chronically underfunded, uncoordinated and in some cases corrupt. "Improving the quality of policing remained the biggest challenge" for the Canadian forces, who "found some detachments and checkpoints led by corrupt officers and manned by drug addicts".²⁶

In terms of resources and infrastructure, conditions are slow to improve. For example, the roads are insufficiently repaired, which impedes the development of the economy and prevents commerce from flourishing. This prevents the accumulation of wealth and slows increases in standards of living. If physical infrastructure does not improve more quickly, poppy will continue to be an essential crop, smuggling will continue across

the porous borders, and black markets will perpetually be one of the only ways to do business in Afghanistan. Yet, as the Afghan government has discovered, reconstruction is a long process. If the government continues to struggle in providing infrastructure, conditions will permit economic activity to be pursued through the black market. This inevitably increases criminal activity and creates wide networks through which the Taliban can continue to hold power, gain resources and weapons, and continue fighting the insurgency. Without an increased ability to fight poverty through building of infrastructure, there will continue to be conditions for the Taliban to maintain its hold in many regions. President Karzai realises quite openly his downfalls, saying "I have to do a million times better by the Afghan people".²⁷

On top of governance issues, the civilian deaths associated with Western bombings and military operations have become unbearable for the civilians and the Afghan government. Karzai has called on the US president-elect Barack Obama to halt civilian casualties from airstrikes. "Our demand is that there will be no civilian casualties in Afghanistan. We cannot win the fight against terrorism with airstrikes," Karzai said. "This is my first demand of the new president of the United States, to put an end to civilian casualties".²⁸ Karzai also speaks in this report of villagers complaining about NATO forces bombing a wedding in late October, effectively killing 37 Afghans, none of whom were Taliban members. It can be guessed that Karzai is running out of excuses to give to the people of his country, and needs effective action on the side of his allies to change their tactics in the pursuit of security. Thus, it is very likely that the challenges faced by the Afghan government would provide incentives for fruitful discourse with the Taliban in hopes of finding real solutions to Afghanistan's problems.

²⁵ Hekmat Karzai. "Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan: Coping with the Taliban." in *Building a New Afghanistan*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg. Washington: Brookings. (2007.) 75.

²⁶ Lee Windsor, David Charters and Brent Wilson. *Kandahar Tour*. (Mississauga: Wiley. 2008.) 135.

²⁷ BBC b. "Afghan president stands up to critics." *British Broadcasting Company*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7730230.stm (November 24, 2008).

²⁸ Huffington Post. "Karzai Demands Obama Ends Civilian Deaths." http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/06/karzai-demands-obama-end_n_141842.html?page=5 (November 24, 2008).

PRIMARY ACTOR THREE: NATO

NATO has recently finished Defense Minister meetings in Brussels and "the Military Committee confirmed that military operations alone will not provide a long-term answer to creating a secure and peaceful environment in Afghanistan, while only a comprehensive approach, involving all interested parties, will enable a successful outcome for the Afghan people".²⁹ The media has also reported that US General John Craddock, NATO's supreme operational commander has said "he is open to talks with the Taliban as long as any peacemaking bid is led by the Afghan government, not Western forces".³⁰ Britain had earlier expressed similar sentiments through a few of its commanders, saying that the military progress that is possible is becoming increasingly costly to the lives of Afghans and Western soldiers alike, considering this is the deadliest year yet for NATO forces in terms of casualties.³¹

There are many reasons why NATO is allowing the Afghan Government to head talks with the Taliban: one of the main pillars of NATO's mission is to "enable Afghanistan to provide security without the support of the ISAF".³² This is why they focus so heavily on capacity building in governance, and want Afghan authorities to be able to deal, independently of NATO, with security issues.

"If physical infrastructure does not improve more quickly, poppy will continue to be an essential crop, smuggling will continue across the porous borders, and black markets will perpetually be one of the only ways to do business in Afghanistan."

Besides their officially stated mandate there are important incentives for NATO to enable political reconciliation. Decreasing support for the war, provoked by many reputation-shattering incidents, and increasing disillusionment in military tactics by Afghans and ISAF soldiers alike are big motivators for a change in tactics.

The very offensive displays of victory by Western troops have continued to embarrass the mission and articulate the often disregarded collateral damage done in the country. As Hekmat Karzai's has outlined in his paragraph "Foreign Troops and Cultural Blunders: A Major Liability" it is through these types of incidents that the full impact of war is revealed, and the truth severely stains the reputation of the mission and NATO. When a journalist caught on videotape the scene of five US soldiers standing over a bonfire, with two dead Taliban

bodies facing Mecca smoldering over it, this "raised countless complaints about the soldiers' behavior, especially since Islamic belief prohibits cremation".³³ This type of incident gives Western soldiers a bad image, in the eyes of the Afghans and abroad, and articulates a lack of knowledge, respect and authority in the mission. We can relate these shocking images to others the media has exposed in the past, namely those coming out of Somalia and Iraq's Abu Ghraib. These types of injustice, coupled with uncoordinated bombings which have led to increasing numbers of civilian casualties, are severely undermining efforts to 'win hearts and minds.' "Targets have been clinics, wedding parties, and groups of tribal elders traveling to attend official business. In addition, 'US soldiers routinely conduct search operations without the permission of the village elders, and they further lose our goodwill.' There have also been countless cases where male soldiers have entered houses and frisked women when relatives were not present".³⁴ After

²⁹ NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: International Military Staff, IMS News Release. "NATO Military Committee concludes two days of meetings in Brussels."

<http://www.nato.int/ims/news/2008/n081121a-e.html> (November 24, 2008).

³⁰ CBS News. "US may rethink talking to the Taliban." *CBS Interactive Inc.*

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/08/terror/main4511185.shtml> (November 24, 2008).

³¹ CTV. "NATO to consider talks with the Taliban?" *CTV Globe Media*

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20081008/nato_meeting_081008/20081008?hub=World (November 24, 2008).

³² NATO a, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Afghanistan Briefing. "Helping Secure Afghanistan's Future."

<http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/briefing/afghanistan/afghanistan2008-e.pdf> (November 24, 2008).

³³ Hekmat Karzai. "Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan: Coping with the Taliban." 71-2

³⁴ Ibid. 72.

repeatedly dealing with these accidents, and other cultural mishaps, NATO has an interest in trying to keep a better image among the Afghani and global public.³⁵

To some degree, NATO commanders also know that they are not going to 'win' militarily, in a traditional sense, against the Taliban in Afghanistan. As they state in their 'Afghanistan Briefing' "security cannot be achieved by military means alone".³⁶ Why will they not 'win' this way? Well, it is no surprise to many that the Taliban can disappear into groups of regular citizens in towns and cities, making them invisible among the other Afghans. This simply is because most Taliban fighters are regular Afghani citizens.³⁷ This is why Community Development Councils have been elected to promote dialogue within communities, including with Taliban members. Through this outlet, "ISAF, aid agencies, PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams] and battle group soldiers were, in effect, talking to the Taliban all the time in early 2007".³⁸ This tactic proved to be very effective, and often involved "hiring those young men, who a year before had conscripted into the Taliban insurgency to work on the various reconstruction projects".³⁹ This strategy of involvement is a promising one, especially considering the demographic challenge that faces the war. According to US terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, there is no shortage of Afghan youth, which means the Taliban keep coming back, fight after fight. "And they'll keep coming back, he says. Not all young Muslims, of course, want to kill Westerners. But for at least another generation, likely two, the Taliban and other terrorist groups will have no problem replenishing their stock of young fighters, suicide bombers, explosives experts and logistical planners, virtually at will".⁴⁰ The demographic shift that has occurred across the Middle East stems from decreasing mortality rates

and continually high birth rates, at three to seven children per woman.⁴¹ NATO forces have come to understand that Taliban fighters are willing to put their lives at stake for their cause and their country. With a large demographic base to work from, coupled with sophisticated recruiting campaigns by the new technology-embracing Taliban, a large strategic problem exists.⁴² In the *Globe and Mail's* series 'Talking with the Taliban' this idea is succinctly expressed; many fighters described how their father, brother, uncle, or cousin, had already died as a martyr for Islam, and that they had joined the Taliban primarily to take their place. In total, negotiations with the Taliban can only help NATO's image and mission in Afghanistan.

Many tensions remain between these three actors, most of which have not been covered in this essay. Negotiations are still likely to be inhibited by these differences of opinion, and there are many disincentives facing each party despite the weight of the positive forces outlined in this paper. It is difficult to know the true intentions of each actor outside of officially publicized material, in the case of NATO and the Afghan Government, and there is a lack of accurate information on the intentions of the new 'insurgent' group of Taliban. Also, cases of corruption in the Afghan Government, and the 'politically correct' reports sent out by NATO, need to be read critically and backed up with reports of their actions, to fully understand the intentions of each actor. Although each party will weigh out their interests, both those publicized and those drawn up 'behind closed doors', and come to an independent conclusion, there are many factors which are pushing each party toward political settlements. If these positive inclinations toward discourse prevail over the multitude of disincentives, then there is an opportunity at hand which could be fundamental in easing conflict in Afghanistan. Political discussions between these three parties may seem like an impossible event, but each party does have certain motivations for participation, lest the war on terror continue unabated for years to come.

³⁵ BBC. "US Apologize over Afghan Strike." *British Broadcasting Company*. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7714279.stm> (November 24, 2008).

³⁶ NATO a. "Helping Secure Afghanistan's Future."

³⁷ *Globe and Mail*. "Talking to the Taliban."

³⁸ Lee Windsor, David Charters and Brent Wilson. *Kandahar Tour*. 123.

³⁹ *Ibid*. 123.

⁴⁰ *The Star*, "Deep well of Taliban Fighters." *Toronto Star*. <http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/96001> (November 24, 2008).

⁴¹ *Ibid*.

⁴² NATO b, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO Review. "Afghanistan (Part One): the Issues."

http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/06/SUMMER_INT/EN/index.htm (November 24, 2008).

In Search of an Identity:

The Case for Niche Diplomacy in Canadian Foreign Policy

Andrew Blencowe

In the period after the Second World War, Canada emerged as a major power in international affairs. Canada had one of the largest militaries in the world and was economically strong due to the demand for raw materials during the war. This period was the epitome of strength for Canada in international affairs. Canada was strong as a nation and played a leading role in the development of the United Nations framework. Since then, however, Canada's strength and role in international affairs has steadily declined, restraining its capabilities and the avenues that Canada can pursue in foreign policy. Throughout this decline, Canada has followed the major trends of international relations including multilateralism and structural adjustment. In recent years, there has been a strong tendency towards unilateralism and occupation spearheaded by the United States in its involvement in Iraq and its pattern of action outside of the major international organizations. Canada, however, does not have the power and capabilities that the United States and other major powers have, and as such, it cannot continue to behave in the same manner. Canada's foreign policy must reflect its international capabilities. The purpose of this paper is not to condemn current actions undertaken by the Canadian government nor argue for specific engagements, but rather to propose a means of addressing Canada's international identity crisis. Currently, the best option for Canada would be to model its foreign policy to reflect the concept of niche diplomacy. Niche diplomacy effectively reflects Canada's international strength and national identity and provides an avenue for the most benefit for both Canada and its diplomatic partners.

WHERE CANADA EXISTS

Canada's position in the hierarchy of international affairs largely influences what course Canada can pursue in foreign affairs. It would be a far-fetched argument to suggest that Canada is a global

superpower and it is arguable whether or not Canada is even a regional power. As a country, Canada is stuck in that "grey area" between the great powers and the non-powers. Canada is a "middle power", an identity it has played for quite some time. A middle power is, "in its most basic form, a state which is neither a great power nor a small power. 'Middle power' is therefore a relative term".¹ This presence, as is the case for almost all states, is determined through the economic and military strength a state has, and the ensuing diplomatic strength that is afforded by the previous two areas. However, "by definition, today's so called middle powers are not really middle powers, and the true middle powers do not want to be regarded as such".² This realization refers to the fact that many states hold positions of influence within the international community and the UN Framework that are not legitimate reflections of their current capabilities and influence. The allocation of permanent seats and vetoes in the UN Security Council is an excellent example of this. The council continues to be structured in terms of the global power structure of 1945, when the five Second World War victors cemented their privileged status; "virtually the only current common factor among the five is that all are legal nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty".³ Under-represented are new powers like Brazil, India and South Africa in favour of the old powers, of which some are more like middle powers now (e.g. Great Britain, France).

The reality is that Canada is neither an economic power nor a military power. Jennifer Welsh explains that her home country:

"Lacks the economic and military capabilities of a great power. We do not seek superiority over our neighbours, nor do we inspire jealousy and suspicion. But neither are we on the bottom rungs of the international hierarchy. To put it another way, while we cannot do some of the things

¹ Adam Chapnick. "The Middle Power." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 7. 1999. 73-82.

² Ibid.

³ J. Mohan Malik. "Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto." *World Policy Journal*. 22(1). 2005. 19-29.

that great powers can do, we can do things that smaller powers cannot".⁴

Existing in the middle, Canada has been able to play truly influential roles in international affairs. At times, it has been able to play above its weight class, figuratively speaking, and at other times has been unable to sway the type of influence to get things done.

As of recent, Canada has been largely representative of the latter of those distinctions. "Canada's population base, and thus its manufacturing infrastructure, is too small and too limited in capability to sustain the living standards of Canadians, including the level of government services necessary not only for a good life, but even for survival. Thus Canada must trade".⁵ This fact does not escape other states in their deliberations with Canada. Canada's dependence on trade decreases its leverage in negotiations. For example, Canada's dependence on trade with the United States for economic survival prevents Canada from taking too strong and determined positions against the US in many debates concerning their relations.

Canada's place is also affected by its strength militarily. "In a world of ever increasing interdependencies, unhampered by Cold War divisions, it is often argued that peacekeeping is no longer a sufficient response and that peacemaking or peace enforcement is now required".⁶ Canada's military, which before 9/11 had been largely structured to fulfill a peacekeeping role (as part of a larger, multilateral force) has fallen out of date due to cut backs, ideological disputes and scandal and, thus, can no longer keep pace with the current needs of a modern military. This becomes a problem for the Canadian state because "the shrinking of Canada's international capabilities directly undermines Canada's ability to protect its

interests and diminishes Canadian sovereignty by limiting Canadian options".⁷

This decrease in power, however, has largely been unrecognised by the Canadian public. Canada is still held to its post-1945 levels of influence by its citizens; influence that no longer exists in the same manner. "The often self-congratulatory and self-serving rhetoric of Canadian involvement in solving the world's many problems increasingly outstrips by far Canada's very limited capacity to use its military to these ends".⁸ The public demands that Canada is held to its previous levels of influence, an image that Canada cannot maintain with its current strength in international affairs.

Former Conservative Prime Minister Joe Clark believes "Canada is at risk of losing its international reputation due to the inaction of the Harper government".⁹ While one's agreement with this may be influenced

by political affiliations, any decline of Canada's international strength cannot be ignored. It would be tough to deny "Canada is in need of a place on the world

"The public demands that Canada is held to its previous levels of influence, an image that Canada cannot maintain with its current strength in international affairs."

stage, having let slip over the past few decades its once well-recognised internationalism".¹⁰ Canada appears to lack a contemporary identity in international affairs that would help to streamline and clarify where exactly Canada exists in the world and how it should act abroad. Gone are the days of

⁷ David J. Bercuson et al. "National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World."

⁸ Dan Middlemiss. "A Military in Support of Canadian Foreign Policy: Some Fundamental Considerations." Paper prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. May, 2003.

⁹ Mary Jo Laforest. "Joe Clark has some 'concerns' about Harper." *The Globe and Mail*. March 13, 2008.

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.2008.0313>

¹⁰ Robert S. Barrett. "Composite Diplomacy: Canadian Innovation Amidst Global Uncertainty." *Innovations: A Journal of Politics* 5. 2005. 33-48.

⁴ Jennifer Welsh. *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*. (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishing. 2004.)

⁵ David J. Bercuson, John Ferris, J.L. Granatstein, Rob Huebert and Jim Keeley. "National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World." Report prepared by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute for the Canadian Council of Chief Executives. September, 2003.

⁶ Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer. "The 'new look' in Canada's foreign policy." *International Journal* 48. 1993. 720-748.

the British Commonwealth, the fight against Communism or even Axworthy's human security that served to guide Canadian foreign policies of the past. As such, Canada's position in the world is a topic of great debate. It is uncertain where exactly Canada exists in the hierarchy of nation-states and as such creates problems for Canada when determining how to engage oneself internationally.

Canada's complex situation regarding its place requires a change in how things are done. No longer can it act as if it is still an influential power; the nation possesses neither the economic strength nor the military capabilities to back that position and our sense of righteous morality has been tarnished by scandals like the Somalia Affair. Despite this, Canadians maintain certain expectations that their nation be one of the "good guys" and help to make this world a better place.

WHAT SHOULD CANADA DO?

Canada can, however, rebuild its strength and influence through the use of niche diplomacy. "Niche diplomacy involves concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having rather than trying to cover the field".¹¹ Rather than focusing on engagements in specific theatres where attention and resources are shared amongst a number of areas like security, rebuilding and institutional reform, actors decide to focus on single issues or theme, like the human security agenda championed by Lloyd Axworthy in the 1990's, that transcends traditional concepts of sovereign boundaries. The difference being that the traditional mission-oriented style of diplomacy favours addressing multiple problems in a specific location while niche diplomacy proposes tackling a specific problem or theme in multiple geographic locations.

This strategy "prioritizes the 'economic pillars' of comparative advantage, efficiency, and maximum impact in the national interest rather than broader

human security".¹² These pillars return results that are in the best interests of the country providing the diplomacy and the people who are on the receiving end. Using comparative advantage, where actors choose to concentrate the majority of their energy and resources on the products or processes that will provide them with the greatest returns, states can focus their efforts in the areas that they are best at or most suited to do, providing for a maximum return for the people who receive the diplomatic efforts. Efficiency creates an economically wise pattern of use for the efforts of diplomatic bodies. The less amount of waste that is accumulated in acting abroad, the better for all parties concerned. The recipients need not worry about the social fallout from inefficient operations and the acting body is more willing to act and act more often because they will see quick, tangible returns on their investments and will be able to justify their decisions. Operations must be efficient in order to maintain the support of those at home and abroad to counter arguments against any perception of unjust interference. Lastly, maximum impact is important to foreign policy considerations because, like efficiency, maximum impact reverberates at home and abroad. In both cases, achieving maximum impact creates public support for the mission. Those abroad must see benefit from the foreign efforts to support them. They must be willing to ignore the intrusion into their sovereignty; a goal that becomes much more likely when they see that they benefit from any decrease in their inherent independence. An example of this is the debate over Canada's continuing presence in Afghanistan. Questions, as to the efficiency and effect of the Canadian mission in Kandahar, have arisen due to the continuing insurgency of the Taliban after 7 years. These questions threaten the future of the mission and are largely indicative of the current state of Canadian foreign policy.

For a smaller power, this method of diplomacy has many advantages, which endear its use. These pillars are politically and economically advantageous for the engaging country. Results are favourable for politicians come election time as is economic

¹¹ Andrew F. Cooper. "Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview." In *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, edited by Andrew Cooper, 1-24. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1997.)

¹² Rosalind Irwin. "Linking Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy" in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Rosalind Irwin, 3-13. (Vancouver: UBC Press. 2001.)

growth created by foreign investment opportunities. "Niche diplomacy can be best understood as a strategy for achieving particular policy ends. But strategy is not isolated from guiding principles".¹³ States are no longer primarily interested in defending their sovereignty as often as was seen in the past, rather "their concerns have been extended to cover not only economic well-being but a broad range of social issues which are essentially global and interdependent in nature".¹⁴ The growing social, economic and political movement towards globalisation has created a world where issues transcend the sovereign boundaries imposed by men and as such foreign policy must resemble this. Niche diplomacy accounts for this, focusing not on individual states but on issues that are suitable for a nation's capabilities. The niches that states choose to follow reflect functionalism in foreign policy and "functionalism legitimizes the application of issue specific strengths and skills possessed by individual countries".¹⁵

States must focus their energies on what they do best. Foreign policy expert and scholar at the University of Waterloo, Andrew Cooper "implies that niche selection, if not niche diplomacy, takes place in middle powers that might otherwise exhibit different behaviour".¹⁶ This is what defines them from the major powers and those who do not engage in niche diplomacy. "Major powers usually have a broader cultural impact and a larger reservoir of messages and images that they represent and that represent them".¹⁷ In following this path, middle power states can be selective in their foreign policies

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and achieve positive results for all involved, arriving at the pillars previously mentioned.

A further positive aspect of niche diplomacy is that it takes advantage of the growing trend of the democratization of foreign affairs in connection with its domestic sources. The practice of international diplomacy and public policy, "previously an exclusive realm managed by diplomats behind closed doors, is increasingly [being] democratized – citizen activists, NGOs, domestic ministries, private enterprises, academics and other actors, participate directly in foreign policy and form public debates about foreign policy issues in value-based terms".¹⁸ The increased dialogue lets foreign policy reflect the values and beliefs of the citizens

of a nation. Heather Smith argues that "niche diplomacy has the potential to foster internal and external democratization of foreign policy. NGOs and other civil-society actors are integral to many of the recent foreign policy initiatives".¹⁹

In terms of the different forms of diplomatic practice, niche diplomacy fits into the Track II classification of diplomacy. A scholar at the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Robert S. Barrett, defines that "Track II is often used more generally to refer to the work of professional conflict resolution practitioners engaging in citizen-level diplomacy – a practice typically accomplished by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)".²⁰ By incorporating a wide range of methods and parties, niche diplomacy has a greater chance of being successful. This method involves many different

¹³ Heather A. Smith. "Niche Diplomacy in Canadian Human Rights Policy: Ethics or Economics?" In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Rosalind Irwin, 77-94. (Vancouver: UBC Press. 2001.)

¹⁴ Andrew F. Cooper. "Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview."

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Heather A. Smith. "Niche Diplomacy and Mission-Oriented Diplomatic Behaviour: A Critical Assessment." In *Worthwhile Initiatives*, edited by Andrew Cooper and Geoffrey Hayes, 13-22. (Toronto: Irwin. 2000.)

¹⁷ Jozef Batora. "Multistakeholder Public Diplomacy of Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada Compared." Paper prepared for the International Conference on Multistakeholder Diplomacy. February 11-13, 2005.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Heather A. Smith. "Niche Diplomacy and Mission-Oriented Diplomatic Behaviour: A Critical Assessment."

²⁰ Robert S. Barrett. "Composite Diplomacy: Canadian Innovation Amidst Global Uncertainty."

parties who gain a stake in the outcomes of the diplomatic missions; their interests providing the initiative to make sure those efforts are successful.

Niche diplomacy, thus, emphasizes efficiency and return while providing positive outcomes for all those involved; all traits very much suited to middle powers.

WHY CANADA SHOULD DO IT

If Canada is in fact a middle power and niche diplomacy is the diplomatic tool of the middle power, then it is logical that Canada should embrace this method in guiding its future foreign affairs. However, the case for Canada's pursuit of niches is stronger than just this logic. Niche diplomacy is suited to the national identity that Canada possesses and reflects this internationally.

Canada can use its multicultural identity to develop its niche in foreign affairs. Recently, former Prime Minister Joe Clark has said that "the problems facing the world involve conflict between people who come from different cultures and belief systems and yet have to live together. He said Canada deals with that essential diversity better than any other country".²¹ Canada's population is one of, if not the most diverse nation in the world. Canada's "immigration and refugee policy, combined with [its] changing ethnic makeup, constitutes one of these key drivers. Canada has quite literally opened itself to the world, and many parts of the world live within our boundaries".²² This identity endows Canada with a unique ability to that few others can profess to have. Canada can argue that it can be objective when dealing with multicultural issues, a claim that is important when playing the role of an objective mediator in cultural disputes. These types of conflicts are becoming more and more prevalent in world affairs and Canada is in the best position to become a leader in solving these types of disputes. Canada is "trusted internationally, in a world where it's very important that someone is able to come in and draw others together".²³

Multiculturalism is not the only aspect of the Canadian identity that can be administered by niche diplomacy. Canada is a liberal democracy much like many other states in the Western hemisphere; however Canada's history endears it to many of the developing states. Under Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, "Canada came to have the lead [with France] on north-south relations [...] until Ronald Thatcherism put paid to negotiations over a 'new international economic order' in 1981".²⁴ Its history, both as a former colony and as a champion of the south, creates a dialogue that is conducive to the spreading of the liberal democratic ideology; an ideology that Canada has built its identity on. This is something that Canada does well and can be part of its niche. One vital aspect of

"Canadian foreign policy today is simply being what we are: a particular, and highly successful, model of liberal democracy. Our model values pluralism, as reflected in our federal structure, our official policy of bilingualism, and our immigration and refugee policy. It prizes mixed government, by balancing legislative decision-making with an activist court and a robust human rights culture."²⁵

Canada's presence as a liberal democracy supports its multicultural identity, protecting equality and freedom.

Canada is a beacon of light for countries struggling with cultural conflicts. Canadian niche diplomacy could address this, emphasizing the creation of democratic processes and the protection of human rights. Former Member of Parliament and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, has argued, "human rights and democracy are not just Canadian values, but are universal values shared by the rest of the world. Our foreign policy should not be understood as an exportation of Canadian values,

²¹ Mary Jo Laforest. "Joe Clark has some 'concerns' about Harper."

²² Jennifer Welsh. *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*.

²³ Mary Jo Laforest. "Joe Clark has some 'concerns' about Harper."

²⁴ David M. Malone. "Canadian Foreign Policy Post-9/11: Institutional and Other Challenges." Paper prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. May, 2003.

²⁵ Jennifer Welsh. *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*.

but rather as our contribution to the common goals of humanity".²⁶

Furthermore, niche diplomacy makes sense for the Canadian government. In the eyes of the politicians, "the government views Canada as 'a middle power with limited military might, well placed to wield soft power, based on the idea that knowledge and information confer international influence'".²⁷ Niche diplomacy embraces the use of soft power to obtain

its objectives and it is appealing to the policy makers in Ottawa. "It is a strategy that is informed by the dominant idea of the day, managed internationalism, and it supports the prevailing norms of the international system".²⁸ Canada

does not have the capabilities to engage in forceful or "hard power" diplomacy, which has become negatively perceived in the United Nations framework. Unilateral intervention, in the style of larger powers, is not a viable or even realistic option for Canada as we do not have the ability to even attempt this avenue. Niche diplomacy accounts for these weaknesses in the Canadian context and provides a more suitable strategy for Canadian diplomats to follow. Furthermore, niche diplomacy is a fiscally responsible form of foreign policy in a time of limited spending. In 2007, Canada's percentage of Gross National Income devoted to development assistance was 0.28%, far off from the set international goal of 0.7% (OECD). With so few resources to work with, Canada must strive to get the most quality out of their ODA that they can; a

goal that niche diplomacy can assist with. "Niche diplomacy is premised on the view that, in an era of fiscal restraint, Canada must make some hard choices if its foreign policy is to remain credible".²⁹ By focusing on a specific niche in foreign policy, the Canadian government would maximize the output received from its limited resources.

Employing this type of strategy would be a marked difference from the type of foreign policy that has guided the nation through recent years. Since entering Afghanistan in 2001, Canada has become engaged in a mission that is neither strategically wise nor reflective of the Canadian identity. This mission in Afghanistan has come to dominate much of Canadian foreign policy thought. Canada has essentially staked its international image on the success of that mission; a wager that is beginning to appear less and less like a wise move. Rather than focus on the ideals that have been successful for Canada in the past, the mission in Afghanistan has become more like an occupation than a peacekeeping mission. Resources are becoming over-stretched and less effective, the financial cost is rising, public support is waning, and the chances that a favourable outcome will be reached are diminishing. This type of commitment to specific missions and not just a single niche or two is putting Canada in a risky position in world affairs. The Canadian international presence is not suited for this type of commitment.

Thus, Canada should adopt niche diplomacy as its foreign policy because it is suitable for Canada's multicultural and liberal democratic identity and because it is an attractive choice for Canada's government.

CONCLUSION

Canada must make a decision; what will the Canadian identity be in international affairs? This decision must be grounded upon a coherent and realistic analysis of Canadian interests and capabilities. Canada may have the broad interests of a major power but not the necessary capabilities to pursue those interests.

²⁶ Rights and Democracy. "A Canadian Foreign Policy Founded Upon the Bedrock of Human Rights, Democratic Development, Renewed Multilateralism, and the Sharing of Growth and Prosperity." Rights & Democracy's Contribution to the Dialogue on Foreign Policy Proposed by the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2003.

²⁷ David Bashow (L.Col). "Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Canada's Foreign and Defence Policy Linkage." *Canadian Military Journal* Spring, 2000. 23-32.

²⁸ Heather A. Smith. "Niche Diplomacy and Mission-Oriented Diplomatic Behaviour: A Critical Assessment."

²⁹ Heather A. Smith. "Niche Diplomacy in Canadian Human Rights Policy: Ethics or Economics?"

Niche diplomacy offers the prospect of furthering do not have abundant resources to allocate to foreign affairs. It advocates the use of "soft power" and expertise to develop constructive relationships with diplomatic partners for the benefit of all involved.

Canada should adopt the use of niche diplomacy in developing its foreign policies. It is a middle power that requires the influence of a major power despite the resources of a smaller power. This agenda is served by niche diplomacy's compatibility with the Canadian identity. Canada is a multicultural, liberal democracy that has positive relationships with many developing and developed states. It espouses

one's interests while catering to those nations that democracy and equality to those willing to hear and possesses a more than respectable record in international involvement. This is Canada's niche and should become the forefront of foreign policy directions. The Canadian government and its citizens would be well served by this policy direction. It effectively utilizes the resources that Canada does possess while providing an international identity that Canadians can be proud of. The logic behind this is convincing and the prospects for success enticing. Canada must address its position in international affairs and niche diplomacy is the way to accomplish this.

Projected Inaction: Tripartite Canadian Foreign Policy and Climate Change-Induced Forced Migration

Laurel Carlton

There is "high agreement and much evidence" that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have caused the observed increases in global average temperature since the mid-20th century. This 'global warming' is resulting in "abrupt or irreversible" environmental changes¹, including melting permafrost, increasingly extreme temperatures, rising sea levels, and increased natural and humanitarian disasters.² As the global average temperature is projected to continue rising, these consequences are expected to worsen.³ Ironically,

the world's poorest, those who have contributed least to greenhouse gas emissions, will bear the immediate brunt of climate change despite being the least equipped to adapt.⁴ Consequently, climate change is expected to reinforce global inequalities, "exacerbate[ing] inequities in health status and access to adequate food, clean water, and other resources".⁵

As the effects of climate change set in, they will challenge many communities' "adaptive capacities," overwhelming some and destroying the carrying capacity of their land, ultimately driving mass displacement.⁶ Some effects, like natural disasters,

that the global average temperature will rise by less than 1.5°C by 2100 (IPCC 2007b:12).

⁴ UNDP. "Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World." *Human Development Report 2007/2008*. United Nations Development Programme. 2007.

http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf. 43-

5. Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development (Chapters 3-6)." *Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006.) 20-40.

⁵ IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." In *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*. Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2001. <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-2001/synthesis-spm/synthesis-spm-en.pdf>. 12.

⁶ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." *Human Development Report Occasional Paper*. Geneva: International Institute for Sustainable Development. 2007. 12.

¹ IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." In *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*. Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007a

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. 13.

² IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." In *Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis*. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007b.

<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf>. 5.

³ The International Panel on Climate Change estimates suggest an increase of 2 to 4.5°C by 2100, estimating that it is "very unlikely"

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⁴ UNDP. "Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World." *Human Development Report 2007/2008*. United Nations Development Programme. 2007.

http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf. 43-

⁵ Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development (Chapters 3-6)." *Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006.) 20-40.

⁶ IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." In *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*. Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2001. <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-2001/synthesis-spm/synthesis-spm-en.pdf>. 12.

⁷ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." *Human Development Report Occasional Paper*. Geneva: International Institute for Sustainable Development. 2007. 12.

¹ IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." In *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*. Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007a

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. 13.

² IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." In *Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis*. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007b.

<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf>. 5.

³ The International Panel on Climate Change estimates suggest an increase of 2 to 4.5°C by 2100, estimating that it is "very unlikely"

will temporarily force the migration of many⁷, while slow-onset processes like rising sea levels and desertification are projected to permanently displace millions.⁸ This issue will significantly shape future global politics, as it is projected that there will be "as many as 200 million" 'environmental refugees' within the next 50 years.⁹ Critically, regional and international infrastructure for addressing this issue remains undeveloped.

Many dynamics of these migratory flows remain speculative, and the debate about those forcibly displaced by climate change is inconclusive. Nonetheless, the incidences of natural disasters are increasing¹⁰ and the effects of slow-onset processes are becoming ever more apparent: melting permafrost has displaced the Yup'ik Inuit of Alaska¹¹, and rising sea levels have begun to force the permanent migration of the inhabitants of Tuvalu¹² and the Carteret Islands.¹³ As more incidences of climate change-induced forced displacement emerge, a global response to this crisis will be absolutely necessary.

As a member of the global community, these patterns of mass migration will have significant implications for Canada. Therefore, through an examination of the three 'pillars' of Canadian foreign policy – humanitarian impulses, political interests, and economic goals – I will both consider the effects of this forced displacement on foreign policy, and will speculate about Canada's most probable actions. To do so, I will first review the projected impacts of climate change on migration, followed by a brief justification of the semantics

used in this paper. From there, I will examine this issue through the lens of Canadian foreign policy to ultimately demonstrate that Canadian action on this issue is highly unlikely. Finally, I will briefly discuss how the fulfillment of Canadian commitments to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change represents the most promising path to addressing the root of this problem.

CLIMATE CHANGE: A MIGRATORY 'PUSH' FACTOR

Although often overlooked in favour of scientific and political discourses, the social implications of climate change are expected to be devastating. These issues are highly complex, as demonstrated by the most recent Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme¹⁴, and the following will but briefly discuss the human impacts, with an emphasis on the projected impacts on human migratory patterns.

It is predicted that even the slightest changes in global average temperature will have significant repercussions. The glacial melting is projected to threaten water supplies for millions, while others are forecast to face increased flood risks.¹⁵ Both agricultural production and food security are also expected to suffer considerably: for example, some regions will be rendered completely infertile¹⁶ and the "additional number affected by malnutrition could rise to 600 million by 2080".¹⁷ On a related note, climate change is projected to exacerbate the spread of diseases and parasites.¹⁸ Furthermore, infrastructure of all types is threatened by slow-onset processes like rising sea levels¹⁹, as well as the ever-increasing²⁰ trend in "climate disasters" like monsoons, droughts, floods, and hurricanes.²¹ Ultimately, in light of these projected challenges,

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Norman Myers. "Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences* 357.1420: 609-613. 2002.

⁹ Ibid. 609.

¹⁰ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 11.

¹¹ Ed Pilkington. "The Village at the Tip of the Iceberg." *The Guardian*. 28 September, 2008. Guardian News and Media Limited. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/mar/10/climatechange>

¹² Fabrice Renaud, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun, and Koko Warner. *Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?*

Intersections: Interdisciplinary Security Connections. Bonn, Germany: United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security. 2007. 20.

¹³ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 18.

¹⁴ UNDP. "Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World."

¹⁵ Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development." 7.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ UNDP. "Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World." 17.

¹⁸ Ibid. 99; 105-6.

¹⁹ Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development." 7.

²⁰ IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." 2007b. 12.

²¹ UNDP. "Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World." 75-6.

global climate change is expected to thwart the accomplishment of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals.²² Indeed, as well articulated by the UNDP report, "the danger is that [climate change] will stall and then reverse progress built-up over generations not just in cutting extreme poverty, but in health, nutrition, education and other areas".²³

All of these factors are expected to interact with migratory flows – in 1990, the IPCC projected that the greatest impact of climate change could be on human migration.²⁴ Environmental factors have long driven migration and forced displacement²⁵, however climate change presents unprecedented dynamics: it is expected to exacerbate already existing environmental degradation²⁶ and to completely and permanently destroy many regions' carrying capacity.²⁷

Among the many projected problems, glacial lake outbursts are expected to cause flooding, displacing many in places like Nepal and Peru.²⁸ The hydrological cycle is also forecast to intensify, changing rainfall patterns and resulting in the increased frequency of extreme weather events like storms, floods, and droughts.²⁹ Furthermore, more

damaging droughts are projected to cause both temporary and permanent displacements, particularly in Western Africa.³⁰ As "the proportion of land suffering extreme drought is predicted to increase from 1 percent at present to 30 percent by the end of the 21st century," the region's carrying capacity will likely diminish significantly.³¹ Indeed, Sahel women already walk up to 25 kilometres a day for water, and they will be forced to migrate if this journey becomes any longer.³²

"It is projected that there will be as many as 200 million 'environmental refugees' within the next 50 years."

It is also predicted that rising sea levels will be a major 'push' factor for migration with "devastating implications," as one-third of

the world's ever-increasing population currently lives within sixty kilometres of a coastline.³³ Millions are expected to be displaced in countries like Egypt, India, China, and Bangladesh, where low-lying deltas are highly populated.³⁴ Furthermore, the Pacific small island states are highly vulnerable to rising sea levels, a fact well demonstrated by the plight of the Carteret Islands of Papua New Guinea³⁵, the Maldives³⁶, and Tuvalu.³⁷ All three have recently sought different solutions: inhabitants of the Carterets have been relocated to the nearby island of Bougainville³⁸, the President of the Maldives is attempting to purchase a new island for his people³⁹, and New Zealand has responded to a

²² SCN. "5th Report on the World Nutrition Situation: Nutrition for Improved Development Outcomes." Standing Committee on Nutrition, United Nations System. 2004.

²³ <http://www.unsystem.org/scn/publications/AnnualMeeting/SCN31/SCN5Report.pdf>, 5-24., Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development." 7., UNDP. "Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World." 1.

²⁴ Ibid. 1.

²⁵ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 2.

²⁶ Jean Lambert. "Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability." The Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. Brussels: European Parliament. 2002. http://www.jeanlambertmep.org.uk/DocumentStore/0206Ref_Env_Rep.pdf, 3-4., Steve Lonergan. "The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement." *Environmental Change and Security Project Report* 4: 5-15. 1995. 7.

²⁷ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 11.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid. 10.

³⁰ Ibid. 9., IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." In *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson. Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge. 2007c.

³¹ <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf>, 13.

³² Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 14.

³³ Ibid. 9.

³⁴ Ibid. 11.

³⁵ Aurelie Lopez. "The protection of environmentally-displaced persons in international law." *Environmental Law* 37.2: 365-410. 2007. 372.

³⁶ Ibid., John Podesta and Peter Ogden. "The Security Implications of Climate Change." *The Washington Quarterly* 31.1: 115-138. 2007. 117-8.

³⁷ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 18.

³⁸ Jon Henley. 2008. "The Last Days of Paradise." *The Guardian*. (Guardian News and Media Limited. 2008.)

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/nov/11/climatechange-endangered-habitats-maldives>.

³⁹ Fabrice Renaud et al. *Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?* 20.

⁴⁰ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 18.

⁴¹ Jon Henley. 2008. "The Last Days of Paradise."

plea by Tuvalu's Prime Minister by allowing seventy-five Tuvaluans to relocate annually.^{40,41}

In general, the carrying capacities of many regions will likely be compromised by climate change, displacing millions.⁴² It is important to note, however, the problematic nature of causal links between migration and environmental degradation, whether climate change or otherwise. Many have asserted that social, economic, and political factors, like population density, poverty, and totalitarianism, work in tandem with environmental degradation to drive migration. Because of these many influencing factors, it is difficult to estimate the number displaced specifically by climate change. Nonetheless, the most commonly cited estimate is that by environmental scientist Norman Myers, who estimated that in a "green-house affected world," around 2050, there could be 150 million climate change "refugees"⁴³, a number he later inflated to 200 million.⁴⁴ Their exact numbers are of no consequence to the following discussion, but it is important to note the incredible magnitude of this displacement.

THE DISPLACED: REFUGEES OR MIGRANTS?

Before discussing the impacts of climate change-induced forced migration on Canadian foreign policy, it is important to briefly consider the terms involved in this debate, as various semantics imply different legal definitions, power relationships, actors, and appropriate solutions.

Those forcibly displaced by environmental degradation have been frequently referred to as "refugees".⁴⁵ The term is used in a very literal sense, implying that "such people need to 'seek refuge' from the impacts of climate change," and it is employed to emphasize the seriousness and involuntary nature of their displacement.⁴⁶ However, the term "refugee" is problematic for many reasons. First and foremost, this term is legally inapplicable to those displaced by environmental degradation because Article I of the United Nations' Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Canada subscribes⁴⁷, defines a "refugee" as a person who,

"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".⁴⁸

As articulated by Aurelie Lopez, persecution is "an act of government against individuals"⁴⁹ and therefore only those suffering under an oppressive regime using environmental destruction to their advantage can be considered 'refugees'.⁵⁰ As global

⁴⁰ This relocation is only open to those aged 18 to 45 and is through New Zealand's Pacific Access Category. This programme is also open to citizens of Tonga, Kiribati, and Fiji, and it is a "labour migration programme" and has not been implemented specifically for Tuvaluans threatened by rising sea levels.

Fabrice Renaud et al. *Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?* 20.

⁴¹ At this rate, it would take 140 years to relocate the Tuvalu population, yet scientists hypothesize, however, that the island will be completely submerged within ninety years.

Aurelie Lopez. "The protection of environmentally-displaced persons in international law." 372-3.

⁴² Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 10.

⁴³ Norman Myers. "Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World." *BioScience* 43.11: 752-62. 1993. 757.

⁴⁴ Norman Myers. "Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century." 609.

⁴⁵ Jean Lambert. "Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability." Steve Loneragan. "The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement." Norman Myers. "Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World." Alan E. Nash. "Environmental Refugees: Consequences and Policies from a Western Perspective." *Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society* 3: 227-238. 1999., Fabrice Renaud et al. *Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?*, Astri Suhrke. "Environmental degradation and population flows." *Journal of International Affairs* 47.2: 473-496. 1994., Evan Vlachos. "Environmental Refugees: The Growing Challenge." *Conflict and the Environment*, edited by Nils Petter Gleditsch. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 293-312. 1997.), Arthur H. Westing. "Environmental Refugees: A Growing Category of Displaced Persons." *Environmental Conservation* 19: 201-207. 1992.

⁴⁶ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 7.

⁴⁷ CIC (Citizenship and Immigration Canada). "Refugee claims in Canada—Who can apply." Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 2008.

⁴⁸ UNHCR. *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. Geneva: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2007. <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Aurelie Lopez. "The protection of environmentally-displaced persons in international law." 378.

⁵⁰ Examples of these 'refugees' could include those affected by US use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, those who cannot be

climate change is not the result of deliberate persecution, those projected to be displaced have no legal claim to refugee status.

As expressed in the above definition, a refugee must be "outside the country of his nationality".⁵¹

However, the majority of those displaced by environmental factors do not fit this definition – they generally relocate regionally rather than trans-nationally.⁵²

"As global climate change is not the result of deliberate persecution, those projected to be displaced have no legal claim to refugee status."

Furthermore, as articulated by Oli Brown, project manager and policy researcher for the International Institute for Sustainable Development, "the concept of a 'refugee'

implies a right of return once the persecution...has ceased," but because of the nature of climate change-induced displacement, many, like those fleeing rising sea levels, will be unable to return.⁵³

Not only is 'refugee' legally inaccurate, some argue that using it to describe these migrants could "dilute the available international mechanisms and goodwill to cater for existing refugees".⁵⁴ The international refugee regime is already so overburdened by those within the UNHCR category that expanding it could result in even worse conditions for refugees generally.⁵⁵

To avoid this problem of categorization, some have used "climate migrant," but this presents its own problems: 'migrants' are associated with a high

degree of agency, and this phrase emphasizes the 'pull' of the destination rather than the involuntary nature of their displacement.⁵⁶ Therefore, I have chosen instead the term "forced migrant," as proposed by Oli Brown.⁵⁷ Like Brown, I use this term "in the knowledge that it is not a universally accepted term but in the hope that it conveys a reasonably accurate impression of the increasing phenomenon of non-voluntary population displacement likely as the impacts of climate change grow and accumulate".⁵⁸ That being said, many of those referenced in this study have made different semantic choices; consequently some citations will refer to 'refugees' or 'migrants' despite my objections.

FORCED MIGRANTS AND CANADIAN TRIPARTITE FOREIGN POLICY

International infrastructure for addressing forced migrants' plight remains severely undeveloped – Oli Brown even suggests that "there is a collective, and rather successful, attempt to ignore the scale of the problem".⁵⁹ Indeed, there is no international body to address their concerns, and aside from New Zealand, Sweden is the only country to even consider granting asylum to those fleeing environmental degradation.⁶⁰ However, despite this major lack of international attention, forced migrants are rapidly becoming a global problem. Therefore, the following will speculate about Canadian foreign policy regarding these forced migrants, by considering its three principle objectives – "the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture".⁶¹ Like David R.

repatriated because of landmines, or the Marsh Arabs who suffered persecution by the Iraqi Government between 1991 and 1997. Ibid. 345-6.

⁵¹ UNHCR. *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*.

⁵² John Podesta and Peter Ogden. "The Security Implications of Climate Change."

⁵³ Oli Brown, Alec Crawford and Christine Campeau.

"Environmental Change and the New Security Agenda: Implications for Canada's security and environment." Geneva: International Institute for Sustainable Development. 2008. 7.

⁵⁴ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 8.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Gil Loedischer. "The international refugee regime: Stretched to the limit?" *Journal of International Affairs* 47.2: 351-377. 1994.

⁵⁶ Ian Traynor. "EU told to prepare for flood of climate change migrants." *The Guardian*. 10 March, 2008. Guardian News and Media Limited.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/mar/10/climatechange.eu>, Elisabeth Meze-Hausken. "Migration Caused by Climate Change: How Vulnerable Are People in Dryland Areas?" *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change* 5: 379-406. 2000.

⁵⁷ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 8.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 27.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ann Denholm Crosby. "Myths of Canada's Human Security Pursuits: Tales of Tool Boxes, Toy Chests, and Tickle Trunks." In *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*, 90-107. Edited by C.

Morrison, who used this “trinity of mixed motives” to discuss trends in overseas development assistance⁶², I will break down this ‘trinity’ into humanitarian impulses, political interests, and economic goals, to demonstrate the unlikelihood of significant Canadian action.

HUMANITARIAN IMPULSES

The links between humanitarian values and forced migrants are quite clear: whether fleeing from long-term drought, from rising sea levels, from natural disasters, or from resultant extreme poverty, the projected suffering of millions will likely inspire humanitarianism globally.⁶³ These impulses should be particularly strong, however, because ‘developed’ countries have a direct responsibility for climate change-induced mass displacement, as they bear the majority of the responsibility for global climate change.⁶⁴ The historic differences in the contributions of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ states to climate change are well-encapsulated in the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” recognised by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and reaffirmed in the Convention’s 1998 Kyoto Protocol.⁶⁵ This principle places the responsibility for climate action with the ‘developed’ states.⁶⁶

Canadian officials have a history of flaunting moral superiority both at home and abroad – presenting

Canada as “a white horse in a dark world”.⁶⁷ This national self-image has been cultivated with “embarrassing enthusiasm” by many, including government officials, bureaucrats, and educational professionals.⁶⁸ A brief survey of statements by Canadian officials highlights the truth in this:

“All countries have national interests, but Canada has defined its national interest more broadly, less selfishly, than many others”.⁶⁹

“[Canada] should be the standard by which other nations measure themselves”.⁷⁰

“Putting people first is a foreign policy approach suited to Canadian experiences, needs, interests and capacities”.⁷¹

Notably, “Canadian humanitarianism” has become a foundation of national identity as well as a “point of pride held out by national representatives in international forums”.⁷² This self-image has been reinforced by international recognition for humanitarian causes – for example, Canada is the only country to have received the Nansen Refugee Award, recognizing its contributions to refugee causes.⁷³ Ultimately then, because humanitarianism is considered to be one of the driving forces of Canadian foreign policy, one might expect Canada to take an active stance on forced migration.

Turenne Sjolander, H.A. Smith and D. Steinstra. (Toronto: Oxford. 2003.) 94.

⁶² David R. Morrison. *Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance*. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.) 12-6.

⁶³ Norman Myers. “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century.”

⁶⁴ The extreme disparity in these contributions are well highlighted by the fact that “if every person living in the developing world had the same carbon footprint as the average for high income countries, global CO₂ emissions would rise to 85 gigatonnes of CO₂—a level that would require six planets.”

UNDP. “Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.” 48.

⁶⁵ United Nations. *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. 1992.

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>, United Nations. *Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. 1998.

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Christopher D. Stone. “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law.” *The American Journal of International Law* 98.2: 276-301. 2004. 276-7.

⁶⁷ Leslie Ann Jeffrey “Canada and Migrant Sex-Work: Challenging the ‘Foreign’ in Foreign Policy.” *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 12.1: 33-48. 2005. 39.

⁶⁸ Denis Stairs. “Trends in Canadian Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” *Behind the Headlines* 59.3:1-7. 2002. 1.

⁶⁹ Former Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, 1997, as cited in Heather A. Smith “Disrupting Internationalism and Finding the Others.” In *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Claire Turenne Sjolander, Heather A. Smith and Deborah Stienstra. (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 24-39. 2003.) 24.

⁷⁰ Paul Martin. “Speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P. Minister of Finance.” Department of Finance Canada. 2000. <http://www.fin.gc.ca/ec2000/speeche.htm>.

⁷¹ Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy 2000 as cited in Heather A. Smith “Disrupting Internationalism and Finding the Others.” 24.

⁷² Catherine Dauvergne. *Humanitarianism, Identity, and Nation: Migration Laws in Canada and Australia*. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 2005.) 49, 130.

⁷³ Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill. “Rejecting ‘Misfits’: Canada and the Nansen Passport.” *International Migration Review* 28.2: 281-306. 1994. 281.

That being said, a brief consideration of Canada's particularly poor performance in the climate change regime suggests that humanitarianism has not played a role, particularly as the government continues to fail at enforcing emissions reductions. Indeed, in 2004, Canadians were among the highest per capita emitters in the world at 20 tonnes of CO₂ per person, which can be contrasted against the United Kingdom's per capita footprint of 9.8 tonnes, Japan's of 9.9 tonnes, and Ethiopia's 0.1 tonnes of CO₂ per capita.⁷⁴ Canada has completely neglected its Kyoto targets, to the point that the UNDP singled it out as "an extreme case in point" of developed countries' failures to reduce emissions⁷⁵. By continuing to exacerbate the problem, Canada is perpetuating the "systematic violation of the human rights of the world's poor and future generations".⁷⁶

Ultimately, it is unlikely that Canada will address forced migrants' plight from a humanitarian perspective.

Primarily, despite claims to moral superiority, Canada will likely refrain from action because this would acknowledge the country's responsibility for climate problems. Jean Lambert, the Green Member of European Parliament for the London Region, articulated: "By recognising environmental refugees, you recognise the problem. By recognising the problem, you start on the road to accepting responsibility and implementing solutions".⁷⁷ Canada has failed to make progress towards its Kyoto targets and even attempted to block agreements at the 2007 Bali Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention⁷⁸; these

actions both suggest that the country continues to refuse to recognise its own culpability in this global problem.

More generally, Canada is unlikely to act on humanitarian impulses simply because its claims to humanitarianism are largely unfounded. Leslie Ann Jeffrey argues that Canada's global benevolence is a "myth"⁷⁹, sentiments that are echoed by feminist Heather Smith's work who suggests that this 'myth' "masks the nature of Canadian foreign policy".⁸⁰ The discrepancy between myth and reality is well highlighted by Canada's failure to even come close

to the United Nation's target that 0.7% of Gross National Income be given to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).⁸¹ Although the establishment of this target was a Canadian initiative, Canada's 1975-76 ODA/GNI ratio of 0.53% was the

highest ever achieved.⁸² In 2006, despite a multi-billion dollar surplus, Canada's ODA contribution was only 0.3% of GNI, well below the average of OECD Development Assistance Committee members.⁸³ With regards to climate change, several of the country's twenty-five "Development Partners"⁸⁴ will be affected by rising sea levels or

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071215.wbalidealyork1215/BNSStory/International/home>.

⁷⁹ Leslie Ann Jeffrey "Canada and Migrant Sex-Work: Challenging the 'Foreign' in Foreign Policy." 39.

⁸⁰ Heather A. Smith "Disrupting Internationalism and Finding the Others." 24.

⁸¹ UNICEF. "0.7% Background." United Nations Children's Funds. 2007.

http://www.unicef.ca/portal/Secure/Community/502/WCM/HEL/P/take_action/G8/Point7_EN2.pdf. 1.

⁸² David R. Morrison. *Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance*. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.) 16.

⁸³ UNICEF. "0.7% Background." 12.

⁸⁴ Marcus Pistor. "Canadian International Development Agency's 25 Development Partners." Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Political and Social Affairs Division. 2005.

<http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/PRB-e/PRB0504-e.pdf>. 3.

⁷⁴ UNDP. "Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World." 310-3.

⁷⁵ Through the Kyoto Protocol, Canada agreed to target a 6 percent cut in emissions of 1990 emissions, however these emissions have increased by 27 percent.

Ibid. 10.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 4.

⁷⁷ Jean Lambert. "Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability." 1.

⁷⁸ Geoffrey York. "Isolated Canada Grudgingly Expects Bali Deal." *The Globe and Mail*. December 15. CTVGlobeMedia Publishing Inc. 2007.

droughts in the African Sahel⁸⁵, which might attract particular Canadian ODA attention regarding forced migrants. However, through Canada's ODA record, it is evident that the country has little claim to self-righteous moral superiority, and it is thus unlikely that humanitarian impulses will drive Canadian action.

Finally, one might suggest that because of Canada's low population density, the country should take a humanitarian position on this issue, following New Zealand's lead and allowing for resettlement here. However, because Canada does not grant refugee status to those suffering environmental degradation, forced migrants would be admitted only as immigrants. The Canadian immigrant selection process is driven by objectives of economic advantage⁸⁶ because the country "depends on immigration to achieve the demographic equilibrium required for economic growth and for social reproduction"⁸⁷, and therefore humanitarian impulses would not drive this resettlement. Additionally, forced migrants are generally displaced regionally rather than trans-nationally, and because Canada is so far from the regions that will be most affected, this is unlikely to ever be seriously considered.

Clearly, despite the fact that one might expect forced migrants' suffering to inspire Canadian foreign policy's humanitarian priorities, this is highly unlikely. Indeed, the country's performance in the climate change regime, its tenuous claims to humanitarianism, and the improbability of resettlement in Canada, all demonstrate that it is doubtful that Canada will broach this issue from a humanitarian perspective.

POLITICAL INTERESTS

Aside from humanitarian impulses, Canada's foreign policy is also directed by its international political interests⁸⁸, and the political dynamics of climate change migrants are significant. Through a brief discussion of environmental security and Canada's poor performance in the climate regime, I will demonstrate that Canadian action on this issue is unlikely.

First, Canada's political interests will likely be affected because of forced migration's expected impact on environmental security. The concept of environmental security considers the ways that "environmental degradation, deprivation, and resources scarcity" can interact with human security problems, ultimately contributing to instability and violence.⁸⁹ This subject has attracted much attention which, according to Roland Dannreuther, can be divided into two camps: a Malthusian argument that environmental degradation leads to social collapse and another that suggests that scarcity of key resources results in conflict.⁹⁰ Günther Baechler has suggested that regardless of their cause, environmental conflicts manifest themselves as political, social, economic, ethnic, religious or territorial conflicts.⁹¹ Notably though, causal links between degradation and conflict must be made with caution, as environmental change is rarely the direct causes of social unrest, but rather contributes to various socioeconomic and political stressors like poverty and totalitarianism.⁹²

Significantly, the United Nations Security Council also recognises mass displacements as potential threats to international peace and security, particularly when pre-existing ethnic and social

⁸⁵ Oli Brown, Alec Crawford and Christine Campeau.

"Environmental Change and the New Security Agenda: Implications for Canada's security and environment." 11.

⁸⁶ Christina Gabriel. "Charting Canadian Immigration Policy in the New Millennium." In *Canada Among Nations, 2006: Minorities and Priorities*, edited by Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 187-208. 2006.) 191-2.

⁸⁷ Audrey Macklin. "Public Entrance/Private Member." In *Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism*, edited by Brenda Crossman and Judy Fudge. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 218-264. 2002.) 218.

⁸⁸ David R. Morrison. *Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance*. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.) 14-5.

⁸⁹ P.H. Liotta. "The Uncertain Certainty: Environmental Stress Indicators and the Euro-Mediterranean Space." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 14.2: 21-45. 2003. 24.

⁹⁰ Roland Dannreuther. *International Security: The Contemporary Agenda*. (Malden, MA: Polity Press. 2007.) 66.

⁹¹ Günther Baechler. "Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence" *Environmental Change and Security Project Report* 4: 24-44. 1998. 24.

⁹² Ibid. 27.

tensions are involved.⁹³ Astri Suhrke, Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway, suggests that rural-urban flows, driven by environmental degradation, can lead to urban conglomerates becoming "centres of social unrest".⁹⁴ Moreover, political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon presents the Malthusian argument that increases in the scarcity of croplands and freshwater, among other necessities, will have a complex interaction with migratory flows, providing an important 'push' factor and resulting in conflict.⁹⁵ Indeed, he suggests that this could lead to state collapse, which could pose many political problems: "it would produce outflows of migrants" and "it would prevent the country from effectively negotiating and implementing international agreements on collective security, global environmental protection, and other matters of critical concern to the international community".⁹⁶

These environmental security issues are expected to be generally aggravated by climate change. As argued by a report by eleven

"Causal links between degradation and conflict must be made with caution, as environmental change is rarely the direct causes of social unrest, but rather contributes to various socioeconomic and political stressors"

retired American military and naval officials, climate change is a "threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world," and it will "exacerbate the problems in these regions and add to the problems of effective governance".⁹⁷

⁹³ Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." 24.

⁹⁴ Astri Suhrke. "Environmental Degradation, Migration, and the Potential for Conflict." *Conflict and the Environment*, edited by Nils Petter Gleditsch. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 255-272. 1997.) 258.

⁹⁵ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999.) 63-9, 93-6, 136-48, 166-70.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 167.

⁹⁷ Gordon R. Sullivan, Frank Bowman, Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., Paul G. Gaffney II, Paul J. Kern, T. Joseph Lopez, Donald L. Pilling, Joseph W. Prueher, Richard H. Truly, Charles F. Wald and Anthony C. Zinni. *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*. Alexandria, VA: Centre for Naval Analysis. 2007.
<http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf>. 3.

Furthermore, the 2006 *Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change* projects that "increased climate variability" will result in conflicts "as work opportunities are reduced, making recruitment into rebel groups much easier".⁹⁸

These climate change-related problems are expected to interact in specific ways with migration, resulting in instability. For example, John Podesta and Peter Ogden forecast that as the population of Bangladesh increases and the effects of climate change set in, many will be displaced inland causing unrest in India, while others will move abroad "creating heightened political tension not only in South Asia but in Europe and Southeast Asia as well".⁹⁹ Moreover, China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are expected to experience a spike in rural-to-urban migration which may lead to "urban unrest"¹⁰⁰, and the Stern Review forecasts that "long-term climate deterioration...will exacerbate the competition for resources [and] may contribute to forced dislocation and migration that can generate destabilizing pressures and tensions in neighbouring areas".¹⁰¹ Significantly, forced migration-induced regional conflicts may become a self-perpetuating phenomenon: migratory flows are expected to contribute to conflicts – conflicts that are projected to drive further migration.¹⁰²

These kinds of conflicts could have significant impacts on Canadian foreign policy. For instance, conflicts are projected to occur in Bangladesh¹⁰³ and the Sahelian countries like Niger and Burkina

⁹⁸ Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development." 112.

⁹⁹ John Podesta and Peter Ogden. "The Security Implications of Climate Change." 117.

¹⁰⁰ IPCC. "Chapter 10: Asia." In *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 469-506. 2007d.
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter10.pdf> 488.

¹⁰¹ Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development." 112.

¹⁰² IPCC. "Chapter 10: Asia." 488.

¹⁰³ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. 17-8.

Faso¹⁰⁴, which are among Canada's major development partners. As such, major challenges will likely arise for Canadian development efforts. More generally though, it is in Canada's political and diplomatic interests to operate in a world free of conflict and collapsed states, particularly when highly populated countries like China, an important diplomatic partner¹⁰⁵, are projected to experience migration-related instability. As will be demonstrated below, political instability resulting from forced displacement will probably prevent some states from fully benefiting from, or participating in, international trade.¹⁰⁶ Because political and economic interests are closely interlinked, this could be highly problematic for Canada.

Despite the possible implications for Canadian political interests, it is highly doubtful that the government will take a strong stance on this issue. Primarily, "Canadians have come increasingly to exaggerate the significance of their past performances in world affairs"¹⁰⁷ – Canada is a "middle-power"¹⁰⁸ and would be therefore unable to take global leadership on such a complex security issue. Indeed, because of its middle-power status, multilateralism "represents Ottawa's primary method for the satisfaction of its foreign policy objectives"¹⁰⁹, and therefore Canada is unlikely to take a stance without considerable international support – support that has not materialized thus far.

Secondly, a research group from the International Institute for Sustainable Development suggests that increased conflict due to forced migration and environmental insecurity will "trigger greater

demand for expensive and dangerous peacekeeping missions".¹¹⁰ Consequently, Canada would be unable to be a global leader on conflicts involving forced migration because of its diminished role in global peacekeeping missions. Indeed, Canada is nowhere among the top 20 contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, well surpassed by less 'developed' countries including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Ethiopia.¹¹¹ True, Canada is the eighth highest contributor to the budget for peacekeeping operations, but these contributions are much less than those of more prominent donor countries like Japan and France, and only marginally more than others including Belgium and Greece.¹¹² Clearly, because of the potential importance of peacekeeping operations to the political dynamics of forced migration, Canada will be unable to take a leadership role.

Because of this unlikelihood of success, Canada should not even attempt a leadership stance on this issue – if it were to fail, it would only add to the countries' poor performance in the climate change regime, damaging already strained diplomatic relations. Last December, Yvo de Boer, the UN climate chief, practically accused Canada of being "an environmental hypocrite" at the Bali COP last December, stating that "I personally find it interesting...to hear Canada just a little while ago indicating it would not meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, and now calling on developing countries to take binding reduction targets".¹¹³ Beyond these allegations, the head of the German delegation felt Canada's position at Bali was "not constructive," and a Chinese official declared Canada and Japan to be the "most uncooperative of all countries".¹¹⁴ The international community is clearly frustrated by Canada's environmental

¹⁰⁴ Steve Loneragan. "The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement." 10-1.

¹⁰⁵ Ontario. "Canada's Main Trading Partners – 2006." The Government of Ontario. 2006.

¹⁰⁶ http://www.2ontario.com/welcome/coca_401.asp.

¹⁰⁷ Hilary Benn. "Trade and Security in an Interconnected World." In *Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change*, edited by Felix Dodds and Tim Pippard. Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 92-103. 2005. 94-6.

¹⁰⁸ Denis Stairs. "Trends in Canadian Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future," 1.

¹⁰⁹ David R. Morrison. *Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance*. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.) 20.

¹¹⁰ Costas Melakopides. "Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1995." (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1998.) 5.

¹¹¹ Oli Brown, Alec Crawford and Christine Campeau.

"Environmental Change and the New Security Agenda: Implications for Canada's security and environment." 18.

¹¹² United Nations. "Factsheet: United Nations Peacekeeping." United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Department of Public Information. 2008.

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf>. 8.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ de Boer as cited in Alexander Panetta. "Canada assailed from all sides at climate talks." The Toronto Star. December 10, 2007.

<http://www.thestar.com/News/article/284178>.

¹¹⁵ Ibid source.

performance, and if the country were to renege on another climate change commitment, diplomatic ties and the country's international image could be permanently damaged.

There are many more political dynamics of forced migration that will likely affect Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, the ways that this issue will influence immigration policy and the changing flows of 'illegal immigrants' are but two of countless concerns that merit attention. Nonetheless, the limited discussion above demonstrates that it is unlikely that Canada will be able to address the challenges posed by forced migrants, even though political interests of foreign policy are implicated in these problems.

ECONOMIC GOALS

National economic objectives are the final 'pillar' of Canadian foreign policy.¹¹⁵ The effects of climate change are expected to cause a complex array of regional and global economic problems which have been thoroughly considered, most notably by the *Stern Review*. However, despite the extensive literature on these economic impacts, there is almost nothing written about the economic consequences of forced migration. Certainly, the *Stern Review* focuses primarily on economic instability as a cause of migration, but does not consider migration to be a driver of this instability¹¹⁶, and the recent World Bank publication, *International Trade and Climate Change*, contains no reference to migrants of any kind.¹¹⁷

The lack of attention is likely the result of the highly speculative nature of forced migration: long-term economic projections about such an unprecedented issue would be tenuous at best. Indeed, although there is "high agreement and much evidence" that the increases in global average temperature have

been caused by anthropogenic emissions, and that this 'global warming' is resulting in "abrupt or irreversible" environmental changes, the extent of these changes

remains unclear, as do their sociopolitical and economic consequences.¹¹⁸

Moreover, a wide range of other dynamics, including varying ideologies, shifting international relations, and changing

economic development, will shape the global economic landscape in unforeseeable ways. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to predict how the economic repercussions of forced migration will interact with Canadian foreign policy.

That being said, a few highly speculative projections are possible. Primarily, because forced migration is expected to contribute to environmental insecurity, and because countries that are affected by conflicts cannot fully participate in international trade¹¹⁹, forced migrants could affect global markets. As such, Canada's economic interests would be affected, particularly because some states that may suffer such insecurity, like China¹²⁰, are major Canadian trading partners¹²¹. Moreover, the projected disruption of regional "breadbaskets" – like Bangladesh's Gangetic plain and Egypt's Nile Delta – could possibly cause global shortages of staple goods. Thirdly, as suggested by Stern, it is plausible that these conflicts could result in increased involvement in "rebel groups".¹²² The problem of Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden highlights that rebels and other 'terrorist' groups can

"If the country were to renege on another climate change commitment, diplomatic ties and the country's international image could be permanently damaged."

¹¹⁵ Ann Denholm Crosby. "Myths of Canada's Human Security Pursuits: Tales of Tool Boxes, Toy Chests, and Tickle Trunks.", David R. Morrison. *Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance*. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.)

¹¹⁶ Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development." 111-2.

¹¹⁷ World Bank. *International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal and Institutional Perspectives*. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. 2008.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT/PUB/3876078-1192582946896/21513448/ITCC_Booklet_rev2.pdf.

¹¹⁸ IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." 2007a. 8-9, 11-3.

¹¹⁹ Hilary Benn. "Trade and Security in an Interconnected World." In *Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change*, edited by Felix Dodds and Tim Pippard. Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 92-103. 2005. 94-6.

¹²⁰ Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development."

¹²¹ Ontario. "Canada's Main Trading Partners – 2006."

¹²² Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development." 112.

pose serious obstacles to international trade¹²³, and therefore increased membership in such groups, motivated by the effects of forced migration, would likely contribute to global economic problems. While these economic concerns require much more attention as they become more definite, it is already evident that Canada will potentially face significant economic challenges because of the impacts of forced migrants.

However, as in the case of the humanitarian and political 'pillars' of foreign policy, Canada is unlikely to take major action on these economic problems. First, much of these projected challenges are rooted in political and security issues, and as previously discussed, Canada is unlikely and unable to take a leadership role on these matters. Moreover, as a 'middle-power,' Canada has little sway over the global economy and therefore would have to rely on foreign leadership. Most significantly, because these unprecedented economic implications are so speculative, it is unlikely that Canada will take any major actions until the situation becomes much more certain, which may be well after forced migration is already a major global phenomenon. Generally then, it is highly doubtful that Canada will choose to take an active foreign policy stance on the economic issues created by forced migrants.

ADDRESSING A ROOT OF THE PROBLEM: CANADA'S UNFCCC COMMITMENTS

This paper has painted a bleak picture of Canadian action, demonstrating that the government is unlikely to take a stance on forced migration from any of the 'pillars' driving its foreign policy. However, while Canada has little hope of directly tackling this issue, a more feasible course of action would be for the country to attempt to address the actual root causes of the problem. Indeed, it would be more effective for Canada to fulfill its commitments to the UNFCCC¹²⁴, contributing to mitigation and adaptation efforts to indirectly minimizing the possible volume of forced migrants.

The emissions scenarios forecast by the IPCC remain speculative and the actual increases in global average temperature will be determined, in part, by mitigative actions taken in the next few years.¹²⁵ The severity of climate change and the threat of mass displacement will depend on the extent of this global warming – for example, as projected by the *Stern Review*, a global increase of only 2° would result in roughly 10 million more people being affected by coastal flooding annually, while a 4° increase would expose 7 to 300 million more to this problem.¹²⁶ By actually committing to mitigation strategies, Canada would not only improve its damaged environmental reputation, but would also help minimize the number of future forced migrants. Furthermore, Canada could also play an important role in helping increase the adaptive capacities of the most threatened regions. Some of these states are already among Canada's major development recipients¹²⁷, and by maintaining a focus on these partners, Canada could help diminish the possibility of degradation-induced displacement.

Although it is doubtful that Canada will directly address forced migration through its foreign policy interests, by fulfilling its prior commitments to mitigation and adaptation, the country could still indirectly broach this problem. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the disparaging comments about Canada's behaviour at the 2007 Bali Conference, these commitments have yet to be kept.¹²⁸

CONCLUSION

The plight of the Yup'ik Inuit, the Maldivians, the Tuvaluans, and the Carteret islanders are but glimpses of the mass displacement expected to come. Indeed, the rising global average temperature is projected to increase the incidences of natural disasters¹²⁹, temporarily forcing the migration of many, and to cause slow-onset processes like rising sea levels and desertification, permanently displacing

¹²³Roger Middleton. *Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars*. Chatham House briefing paper. 2008.
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203_1008piracysomalia.pdf
f. 9-10

¹²⁴United Nations. *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. 6, 8.

¹²⁵IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." 2007a. 7-8.

¹²⁶Nicholas Stern. "Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development." 7.

¹²⁷Marcus Pistor. "Canadian International Development Agency's 25 Development Partners." 3.

¹²⁸Alexander Panetta. "Canada assailed from all sides at climate talks." 8.

¹²⁹IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers." 2007b. 5.

millions.¹³⁰ Significantly, it is predicted that this forced migration will seriously impede the success of the Millennium Development Goals.¹³¹ However, despite the seriousness of these consequences, this problem has received remarkably minimal international attention and there remains no established international infrastructure to address it.

As a member of the global community, forced migration will also affect Canada and its foreign policy interests. However, by examining these impacts through the three 'pillars' driving foreign policy – humanitarian impulses, political interests, and economic objectives – I have demonstrated that Canada is both unlikely and unable to take strong action on these issues. Factors including Canada's poor performance in the climate change regime, its actions on a variety of foreign policy issues including peacekeeping and ODA, and its international status as a political and economic middle-power, all contribute to the unlikelihood of Canadian action on forced migration. Ultimately, rather than independent foreign policy action, Canada's should instead abide by its commitments to the UNFCCC, addressing the problem at its roots through mitigation and adaptation measures.

This study has been significantly limited by the speculative nature of the debate about climate change and its impacts on migratory flows. As these complex problems unfold and their impacts on Canada and the international community become more certain, it is critical that this issue be reconsidered in much more detail. Indeed, it must be further examined because although this issue has become "a game of political pass-the-parcel" as "no one wants to be left holding the problem of [forced migrants]"¹³², inaction will eventually cease to be an option, and a global response will become absolutely necessary.

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¹³⁰ Norman Myers. "Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World." 12.

¹³¹ SCN. "5th Report on the World Nutrition Situation: Nutrition for Improved Development Outcomes."

¹³² Andrew Simms as cited in Megan Rowling. "Climate Refugees in Political Pass-the-Parcel." *AlterNet*. 13 May 2008. Reuters Foundation. 2008.

<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L10842290.htm>.

It Takes Three to Tango: Multinational Corporations and Their Role in Resolving Violent Conflict and Extensive Human Rights Abuses in Weak States

Kelly O'Connor

It is a dark, almost stiflingly humid night in downtown Buenos Aires, and the tango clubs are full of sweeping dresses, the sound of mournful accordions, and daring moves. One two three four, one two three four; two dancers, chest-to-chest, move as one across the dance floor. Eye contact, fast feet, communicating through touch, the two dancers lean in to one another. The music begins to pick up, and another dancer storms from the shadows to take the dance floor. Muscling its way into what was once a duo; this tango becomes a power struggle between three different individuals.

With global governance setting the tempo, the dance between economics, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and governments is much the same. If one is to fail, so will the other; without a stable political environment to prevent market failures as well as attract and regulate investment, there can be neither lasting economic growth nor meaningful, sustainable development. The rise of globalisation has resulted in the rise of the non-state actor, and MNCs in particular; and thus, with the addition of this extra partner, the dance has become a little more complicated. Globalisation has caused the rapid and, at times, destructive creation of linkages between previously far-flung states and peoples, fundamentally altering the dynamics of the international stage and the concept of sovereignty itself. For example, the annual profits generated by some major multinational corporations now outstrip the GDP of small countries¹, while the infamous New York based bond rating agency Poor's and Moody's affects the policy of governments anxious

to attract investment. Development funding from private investment capital also outstrips that of bi- and multilateral aid from government and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs).² Whereas the globalisation debate once focused on trade flows and economic issues, it has now shifted to the political side of globalisation, as the impacts of international investment on institutions in the developing world become progressively more apparent.³ For better or for worse, MNCs are playing an increasing role in breaking the previously sacrosanct tripartite relationship of state, territory and authority as they begin to directly influence the course of civil wars. If the international community is to address peace and security issues effectively in the twenty first century, it must recognise the risks and take advantage of the new opportunities this major non-state actor offers in violent conflict zones or in states suffering from abusive regimes⁴. The business of war often conjures images of giant fighter jets, small arms manufacturers, and even hired mercenaries such as those of the controversial Blackwater firm; global military spending, in fact, surpassed the one trillion dollar mark in 2006. While some companies directly sustain civil wars through the production of physical goods such as tanks, antipersonnel mines and the like, other MNCs, especially those in the extractive industry, can play an equal or even greater role in the provocation of violent conflict.⁵ Failing or weak states have had a difficult time adjusting to the open market policies demanded by increasing globalisation, leaving some unable to provide vital public goods. This makes them particularly vulnerable to competition and

² Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns. *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.)

³ Prakash S. Sethi. *Setting Global Standards: Guidelines for Creating Codes of Conduct in Multinational Corporations*. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2003.)

⁴ In this essay I have declined to provide a definition of "violent conflict" or "widespread human rights abuses" as I was not satisfied with the ones found in the literature and felt that I lacked the expertise to create definitions that were comprehensive enough. Instead, I have chosen situations for my case studies where there have been so many deaths and/or human rights abuses extensively documented by a number of respected NGOs that they would fit the vast majority of definitions of "violent conflict" or "widespread human rights abuses" already in the literature.

⁵ United Nations. "Role of business in armed conflict can be crucial - 'for good and for ill', Secretary-General tells Security Council open debate on issue." 15 April 2004.

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9256.doc.htm>

¹ For example, the sales generated by General Motors and Ford outstrip the combined GDP of Sub Saharan Africa. Abdulah quoting Virginia Haufier. "Consolidation of the GC Policy Dialogue on the Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict: Expert Workshop #2 Identifying Public Policy Options to Promote Conflict-Sensitize Business Practises." United Nations. 13 Dec 2004. http://www.unglobalcompact.org/issues/conflict_prevention/meetings_and_workshops/expert_workshop_2_NY2004/ReportWkshop2.pdf

exploitation by MNCs. These corporations, along with global financial markets and transnational policy networks, can provide such critical public goods, an important source of cash for the local population, as well as a modicum of governance.⁶ While Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been shown to have a definite positive effect in some developing states through the injection of badly needed capital, new technology, organizational skills, and the creation of more competitive business environment, the success stories of FDI have all relied upon strong and healthy political and institutional frameworks.⁷ FDI has also been shown to exacerbate the gap between the rich and the poor, with the World Bank reporting a ten-fold increase in income disparity over the last thirty years.⁸ The confluence of weak or corrupt governments and the potential revenues generated by MNCs thus has the potential to create a volatile situation.

The economies of many poor, unstable countries such as Angola, Sudan, Burma, and Azerbaijan are mainly oriented towards extractive industries; this is no coincidence.⁹ Recent studies have shown convincing links between the level and structure of income of a state, the degree of development of critical political institutions, and the reliance of economies upon the extraction of natural resources and the incidence of civil strife.¹⁰ Instances of civil conflict have also been steadily rising since the end of the Cold War, especially in Africa.¹¹ While other foreign investors might shy away from such unstable areas, extractive industries must follow the natural resources (such as oil, diamonds, narcotics, and coltan), wherever they may be found.¹² The fluid mobility of capital as well

as ease of communication and transport means that, for MNCs, this task has become increasingly easy; conversely, the very forces of globalisation and development which have facilitated this mobility also make it increasingly risky. In order to fill the ever rising global demand for natural resources, MNCs are driven to find new reserves. As more and more reserves are tapped, MNCs are left with an increasingly slim selection of new areas to survey, forcing them to operate in otherwise questionable zones. While on the international scale these commodities only count as a tiny fraction of global trade flows, the effects on a state's people, as well as on a state's stability, can be enormous.¹³ Through payments to corrupt governments in the forms of taxes, royalties, and bribes; the misuse or inadequacy of security forces to protect the local population from human rights abuses; illicit trafficking; poor labour practices; limited transparency; and mismanaged resettlement of people dislocated by developments, MNCs may blatantly or inadvertently stoke civil wars and lend implicit support to abusive regimes.¹⁴ Some MNCs may even begin to find it is in their interest to continue to provoke conflicts in

"For better or for worse, MNCs are playing an increasing role in breaking the previously sacrosanct tripartite relationship of state, territory and authority as they begin to directly influence the course of civil wars."

their areas of operation, as seen with the dearth of front companies for rebel groups and corrupt officials mining coltan in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. These companies actively encourage the ongoing unrest which has plagued the country's richest mining area for years in order to keep prying eyes away from their illicit operations.¹⁵

Many of these problems can be seen in the Angolan interpretation of the tango, in which economic regulations have been relegated to the shadows while MNCs and Angola's corrupt authorities are

⁶ Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns.

⁷ Prakash S. Sethi., OECD. Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs. "Working Paper on International Investment Number 2002/1: Multinational Enterprises in Situations of Violent Conflict and Widespread Human Rights Abuses." May 2002.

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/31/2757771.pdf>

⁸ Prakash S. Sethi.

⁹ OECD. 2002.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Jill Shinkleman. *Oil, profits, and peace : does business have a role in peacemaking?* (Washington, DC : United States Institute of Peace, 2006.)

¹³ OECD. 2002.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ United Nations. Security Council. "Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo." New York: United Nations, 2002. <http://www.natural-resources.org/minerals/CD/docs/other/N0262179.pdf>

locked in an increasingly tense dance that sways to a music all its own. Angola emerged in 2002 from a twenty seven year long independence struggle that went horribly awry. Armed groups opposing Portuguese rule began forming in 1960, and when the Portuguese revolution in 1974 led to the snap decision to declare Angola an independent state, there were three distinct military groups¹⁶ opposed not only to the Portuguese but also to each other.¹⁷ Despite several power sharing deals, democratic elections, and international peacekeeping missions, the MPLA and UNITA continued their bloody struggle for control while the FLNA was sent into exile. An estimated 750 000 people died from conflict-related causes while an additional four million were displaced and 440 000 became refugees.¹⁸

Angola also commands impressive offshore reserves of oil, currently drawing in four of the world's five biggest oil companies (including Chevron Texaco with the biggest stake, followed by ExxonMobil) in addition to a number of government owned enterprises from China, Brazil, Norway, Portugal, Malaysia, and independent companies despite continuing instability and corruption in the country.¹⁹ Oil now counts for nearly half of Angola's GDP and 90 percent of government revenues and export earnings.²⁰ In Angola, however, it is not only illegal for oil and gas companies to

disclose they payments to the government, but they are also obligated to enter in to a joint partner venture with the state in domestic oil and gas development.²¹ These laws only serve to further obfuscate fiscal flows and allow the political elite to "privatize" funds with impunity.²² Keeping track of the impressive financial flows stemming from the oil reserves is made all the more difficult by the fact that the central government still has shaky control over UNITA areas.²³ The MPLA controlled Angolan government makes up for it, however, by forcing oil companies to do business with firms that have links to the political elite.²⁴ Very little of the revenues generated by spin-offs from the oil industry makes it to the rest of the population.²⁵ The Angolan government has also laundered an exuberant amount of money through European banks; in 2000, authorities in Switzerland confirmed that banks had reported receiving the equivalent of about US\$ 480 million from Nigeria's former president General Abacha and his entourage.²⁶ Fiscal analysts have found an additional US \$500 million to US \$1.4 billion unaccounted for from the Angolan treasury; to put this into context, Angola's GDP was only US \$5.9 billion in 1999.²⁷ Further investigation revealed that when the Cold War powers decided to stop funding Angola's military, oil revenues took over to directly "finance the government's military operations".²⁸ A World Bank official for Angola explains the severity of the situation:

"Successive IMF/WB missions during the last few years worked with data supplied by the authorities and found large unexplained outlays equivalent to between one third and one-half of total reported fiscal

¹⁶ The three groups were the National Liberation Front of Angola (FLNA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

¹⁷ Jill Shinkleman.

¹⁸ While a peace agreement was signed between the MPLA government and rebel group UNITA shortly after the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, violence continues to simmer in the oil-rich Cabinda province. Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the MPLA, who has lead Angola since 1979, won in the September 2008 parliamentary elections (the first polls to be held in sixteen years). Presidential elections have been slated for the first time in nineteen years in 2009. While oil exports and foreign loans have sparked a reconstruction boom, most Angolans continue to live on less than US \$1 a day.

Ibid., "Angola's big boost." *BBC* 22 Feb 2009.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/africa/7899839.stm>.

¹⁹ China has also promised significant aid and oil-backed loans to Angola, who is its second largest supplier of oil after Saudi Arabia. Ibid Sources.

²⁰ Angola is Africa's third largest oil producer with proven reserves of 9 billion barrels in 2008. The country was expected to produce about 2 million barrels per day in 2008 and became a member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on January 1, 2007 (EIA 2008).

²¹ OECD. 2002.

²² Ibid.

²³ Jill Shinkleman.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ OECD. 2002.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ The Soviet Union and Cuba backed the MPLA, while South Africa, the United States, and briefly China supported the FLNA and UNITA. The estimated \$800 million of Soviet Union aid for MPLA's military activities lines up suspiciously with the \$900 million earned from signature bonuses from companies to use the offshore oilfields. Benjamin Petrini. "The Role of Diamonds in the Angolan Civil War." *Devex*. 28 August 2008. <http://www.devex.com/articles/the-role-of-diamonds-in-the-angolan-civil-war>, Jill Shinkleman.

revenues...These calculations are solely derived from government data. The information on current payments made by oil companies is still scant, since some companies claim confidentiality clauses and no framework has been established for an ongoing reporting of oil-related payments".²⁹

The Burmese version of the tango is very much like the Angolan interpretation; the uneasy balance between MNCs, the state, and international economic institutions can be seen in the Yadana pipeline project, which serves to highlight how MNCs can not only finance abusive regimes but also directly support egregious human rights abuses against local communities. Despite ratifying the ILO's convention on forced labour in 1955, the ILO has been calling on the Burmese government to halt its widespread use of forced labour since the early 1960's; numerous NGOs and the UN have documented further human rights abuses (including rape, forced resettlement, and torture) of the military junta against the Burmese people for decades.³⁰ In 2005, Chevron entered into a joint venture project with the Burmese authorities³¹, Total, and Thai-based company PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited (PTTEP) when it took on the Yadana Pipeline Project.³² The Yadana project represents "the single largest foreign investment project in Burma and the single largest source of income for the Burmese military," as it links offshore gas reserves in remote south-eastern Burma to a refining facility in Thailand.³³ In order to protect its investments, Chevron was obliged to hire security forces; here, the Burmese military. Observers have noted that incidences of human rights abuses (including extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, and extortion) by hired security forces in the area of the pipeline have increased since the 1990s, as has forced labour and the relocation of entire communities to not only clear the way for the

pipeline but also to provide additional sources of forced labourers.³⁴ The project participants deny any wrongdoing, claiming full knowledge of army activities (which they say were peaceful) and that village relocations were simply in furtherance of the pipeline.³⁵ Similar incidents have occurred in oil and gas developments in Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Indonesia, Nigeria and Sudan.³⁶ As the local becomes global, multinational corporations directly connect the forces of the world market to civil conflicts and abusive regimes. This becomes a central issue for global governance.

A critical prerequisite for any good tango is good music; and thus far, the band has been almost as uncoordinated as the dancers. In a concerted effort to confront MNCs who provoke violent conflicts and support abusive regimes, a new era of collaboration between major IGOs (such as the UN), NGOs, the private sector, governments, and trade unions has begun. This evolution of multi-stakeholder initiatives is a relatively recent phenomenon, developing only within the past decade; they are an innovative attempt at overcoming age-old tensions in order to tackle some of the most complex and wide-reaching issues of the twenty first century.³⁷ Inspired by motives as diverse as the self-interest of firms who see unstable civil wars as an impediment to profitable business, moral outrage against mass killings and human rights abuses, and concerns over collective security threats, various ad hoc formal and informal guidelines have been created to address the issue of the political economy of violent conflict.³⁸ A brief examination of the literature reveals a few leading policy documents which attempt to address the link between security, development, and the behaviour of MNCs in instances of violent conflict: the UN's Global Compact, the Sullivan Principles, various International Monetary Fund (IMF), Group of Eight (G8), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Labour Organization (ILO) and World

²⁹ "Angola's big boost." *BBC 2*

³⁰ OECD. 2002.

³¹ Just as in Angola, it is compulsory in Burma to enter into a joint venture with the state when engaging in domestic gas and oil development; it is also prohibited to disclose payments made to the government by oil and gas companies.

³² "Chevron and the Yadana Pipeline." EarthRights International. 2008.

³³ http://www.earthrights.org/campaignfeature/yadana_pipeline.html

³⁴ Ibid. OECD. 2002.

³⁴ "Chevron and the Yadana Pipeline." EarthRights International.

³⁵ OECD. 2002.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Virginia Haufler, ed. "Case Studies of Multistakeholder Partnership: Policy Dialogue on Business on Zones of Conflict." UN Global Compact. April 2002. 21.

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/7.2.1/MultistakeholderInitiativeinZonesofConflict.pdf

³⁸ Virginia Haufler. 2004.

Bank regulations, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and the US UK Voluntary Principles on Security and Human rights all focus on corporations' roles in the fight against corruption, money laundering, human rights abuses and forced labour. The UN's Global Compact in particular has taken a different tack from traditional sanctions and confrontations to a more dialogue based, flexible set of guidelines meant to facilitate learning through experience and the sharing of best practices.³⁹

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), however, seems to have the most exhaustive and effectively backed framework to explicitly address the unique role of MNCs operating in violent conflict situations through its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Adopted by the 30 member states of the OECD, these guidelines serve as a corporate responsibility instrument by stating principles, standards and obligations by which corporations are to abide. All of these voluntary principles aim to build upon the positive role FDI can play in areas of weak governance and pre, during, and post violent conflict. Through job creation, the importation of new skills, and sound investment, MNCs can play a pivotal role in poverty alleviation and the encouragement of the "structural stability" of the host community and state. Given this important role in infrastructure development, MNCs are potential players in conflict prevention.⁴⁰ For example, a Security Council mission to Afghanistan in 2003 found that combatants were more willing to lay down their arms if they were provided with an

"By recognizing the risks inherent in operating in violent conflict zones and their own limits to economic peacebuilding, MNCs can respond in a constructive manner that allows them to play a positive role in all stages of conflict."

opportunity to earn their livelihoods.⁴¹ The jobs created by MNCs are not always for the local populace, however, and they often import their labour; indicative of this is the construction of soccer stadiums in Angola for the 2010 African Nations Cup. Out of the roughly 900 workers involved in the project, the vast majority are Chinese nationals.⁴² Although Beijing insists that its \$12 billion dollars worth of loans to Angola are free of riders, seventy per cent of tenders for public works taken out in Angola must use Chinese firms.⁴³

During conflicts the modicum of normalcy which responsible MNCs provide can save lives, however; some companies have even played a pivotal diplomatic role in bringing conflicting factions to the negotiating table or influencing governments on sensitive topics.⁴⁴ Post-conflict, MNCs can support peacebuilding initiatives through aiding in economic reconstruction, such as through trust funds financed by oil revenues to fuel future social infrastructure in Chad.⁴⁵ By recognizing the risks inherent in operating in violent conflict zones and their own limits to economic peacebuilding, MNCs can respond in a constructive manner that allows

them to play a positive role in all stages of conflict.⁴⁶ Whether this can be taken as solid evidence behind the rhetoric of the much-touted paradigm shift to the new "triple bottom line" of profitability, social and environmental responsibility is yet to be seen.⁴⁷

Learning to dance the tango well, with all its complexities and subtleties, can be a tricky process, especially when there are three individuals trying to

³⁹ United Nations. "Private Sector Has Huge Responsibility, Potential Influence In Search For Peaceful Solutions To Conflict, Secretary-General Tells Bogotá Global Compact Meeting." 27 May 2004.

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9333.doc.htm>

⁴⁰ Peter Davis. "The role of companies in post-conflict reconstruction." Ethical Corporation Institute. Jan 2008.

http://www.ethicalcorp.com/resources/downloads/20082895715_EC%20-%20ECI%20-%20Companies%20in%20post-conflict%20reconstruction.pdf, OECD. "The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict." 2001.

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf>

⁴¹ United Nations. "Security Council discusses role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building." 15 April 2004.

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8058.doc.htm>.

⁴² "Angola's big boost." BBC 2

⁴³ "Chinese reaching out to Angola." BBC 4 Dec 2007.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7047127.stm>.

⁴⁴ Premier Oil, for example, provided human rights training to Burmese officials in the army, police, energy ministry, labour, and immigration departments.

Peter Davis., OECD. 2002.

⁴⁵ Ibid Sources.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ OECD. 2001.

move as one. In Azerbaijan, MNCs, international economic institutions and the government are still wobbling through this learning process together; although it is evident their hard work is paying off. Despite grappling with a somewhat troubled democracy, serious issues with accountability and poverty, and a festering military conflict, Azerbaijan has served as a sterling example of the power of corporate social responsibility in reducing the conflict risks posed by natural resource revenues.⁴⁸ Azerbaijan was ranked 140 out of 145 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2004 and is caught in an ongoing "frozen" conflict with Armenia over the geographically, culturally and economically significant area of Nagorno-Karabakh; with some impressive management and multi-stakeholder collaboration, however, the development of the country's oil reserves have actually served as an incentive for peace rather than another cash cow for the military.⁴⁹ With the MNC British Petroleum (now BP) as the operator of the \$4 billion Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and oil rigs, a strong corporate social responsibility approach combined with effective cooperation between the government, oil companies, NGOs and multilateral organizations has helped Azerbaijan overcome the "curse of oil".⁵⁰ With the safeguard policies of the IMF and World Bank Group, and the encouragement of the oil companies themselves, finances from the oil field are being tracked. Oil companies are also able to use the threat of the halting of production to discourage conflict.⁵¹ FDI and the promise of further investment have made peace the most attractive option. While these policies have been effective thus far, only time will tell if they will continue to hold true into the future.

One partner leans in right, the other spins out left, while the third decides they feel like doing a lift. Without a steady tempo and some common, agreed-upon moves, the tango stands no chance to work among two, much less three different actors.

⁴⁸ Jill Shinkleman.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Also known as 'Dutch disease' or the 'paradox of plenty', it is the phenomenon whereby countries rich in natural resources experience a decline in growth rather than an increase.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

Similarly, despite a seemingly widespread consensus that something needs to be done to regulate the actions of MNCs operating in weak governance areas or zones of conflict, there is equally shared disagreement on how to address the problem or even on what behaviour can be deemed "unacceptable".⁵² Although there is a growing endorsement of corporate behaviour guidelines (as seen in the success of the Kimberley Process in the diamond industry, the recent overwhelmingly positive vote at the UN in favour of an Arms Trade Treaty, and the signing of a treaty to ban the production of cluster bombs by 110 countries), the UN, World Bank and other NGOs attempting to address the role of MNCs in violent conflict have yet to pass the stage of "norm entrepreneurs".⁵³ With such diverse opinions and policy documents, developing effective monitoring mechanisms and a framework to deal with unacceptable behaviour has been extremely challenging. For example, a UN sub-commission recently attempted to draft a document setting out universal legal norms and responsibilities for transnational corporations⁵⁴ but was met with strong resistance from the business community.⁵⁵ Many states, including Canada, have been very slow to take a strong stand on the overseas behaviour of their corporate citizens as they are anxious to respect the sovereignty of other countries and provide a legislative environment which is friendly to investment.⁵⁶ Canada has argued that it has no place in regulating the behaviour of its corporate citizens overseas because the government's first priority is to respect the laws of the host country.⁵⁷

⁵² Karen Ballentine. "The Role of the Private Sector in Conflict Prevention: Progress, Prospects, and Challenges." UN Global Compact. May 2004.

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/7.2.5/keynoteballentine.pdf.

⁵³ Peter Davis, "Control Arms." Amnesty International, UK. 5 Nov 2008. <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID=10079>.

⁵⁴ This document was called: *Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations*.

⁵⁵ Karen Ballentine.

⁵⁶ Canada also acts as a major hub for raising capital, playing host to sixty per cent of the world's exploration and mining companies. Jim Freedman. "International Remedies for Resource-Based Conflict." *International Journal*. 62.1 Winter 2006/2007. 108-119., Canada. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing Countries: Advisory Group Report." 29 March, 2007. <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/Advisory%20Group%20Report%20-%20March%202007.pdf>

⁵⁷ Ibid.

This is a false argument, as such international agreements are meant to fill the legislative vacuum left by countries struggling to deal with internal conflict and prevent abusive regimes from stealing public funds.⁵⁸ Even MNCs which have been taken to task with the OECD Guidelines due to unethical business practices have loudly protested the charges laid against them or claimed ignorance of the Guidelines, frantically lobbying their own governments and the UN Security Council to discredit the allegations.⁵⁹ In the case of questionable mining practices in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many OECD signatory governments gave in to this exact pressure and declined to investigate the charges leveled at MNCs based within their borders.⁶⁰ Setting an explicit global agenda may be the best hope to force MNCs to change their business practices however, as many corporations are afraid of taking independent action to address corruption and other illegal activities that give them a competitive advantage in weak states.⁶¹ Further government regulation could also damage the reputation and socio-political legitimacy of many MNCs, and place fetters on the free flow of goods and services upon which they have built their legacies.⁶²

Critics have accused the UN of "selling out" and tarnishing its reputation by allying with the private sector even as the now intimate role of MNCs in civil wars has raised the question of the privatization of peace and conflict.⁶³ Concerns have been raised over the efficacy of voluntary agreements, as some corporations free ride off of the good publicity afforded by signing on without inheriting an equal obligation to follow through; this is a difficult worry to address as global governance, by definition, lacks the recourse of police or other analogous forces to support agreements, relying instead on shared norms and expectations.⁶⁴ The tension between

obligatory and self-imposed norms of behaviour has led to a debate about the role of enforceable, rigid, and transparent global frameworks versus voluntary and flexible self regulation in setting the bar for MNC behaviour (especially in areas of weak governance). The latter may make more sense as MNCs are starting to behave as their own independent mini states in their overseas operations by building schools and hospitals, providing employment and security, dealing with human rights abuses in their areas of operation, and acting as a source of taxes to state authorities.⁶⁵ Many CEOs worry that the public will now expect them to "fix the world", only contributing to the widening gap between societal expectations and corporate performance.⁶⁶ While it may not be fair to expect MNCs to mediate conflicts at the level which they have been in the past, "...in dire situations, there may be no other actor able to intervene effectively".⁶⁷ Another ideological tension exists between the Neomercantilist tendencies that drive many MNCs to seek ever greater profits and the cooperation demanded of them in finding solutions to the problems which plague their volatile areas of operation.⁶⁸ Even when operating with the best intentions, however, the involvement of MNCs in conflict zones is never neutral.⁶⁹ For example, US \$4.5 million of Chad's "future generations" trust fund designed to finance social development from the profits generated by the oil industry was used to buy arms instead.⁷⁰ Chadian President Derby later defended his purchase, claiming, "It is patently obvious that without security there can be no development".⁷¹ Such disconnect between international expectations and domestic actions highlights the debate over the role of foreign states in the dictating resource use and the validity of such international economic interventions.

Despite the riot of voices feeding the debate over the appropriate role of MNCs in weak states, the importance of demographics seems to have been

⁵⁸ Jim Freedman.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ "UN Panel of Experts: Illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DR Congo". Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID). April 2007. http://www.raid-uk.org/work/un_panel.htm.

⁶¹ Karen Ballentine.

⁶² Prakash S. Sethi.

⁶³ Jean-Philippe Thérien and Vincent Pouliot. "The Global Compact: Shifting the Politics of International Development?" *Global Governance*, No. 12, 2006, pp. 55-75.

⁶⁴ Peter Davis., Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns.

⁶⁵ Virginia Haufler. *A public role for the private sector: industry self-regulation in a global economy*. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.)

⁶⁶ OECD. 2002., Prakash S. Sethi.

⁶⁷ Peter Davis.

⁶⁸ Karen Ballentine.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ OECD. 2002.

⁷¹ Ibid.

overlooked. While many of the aforementioned guidelines for corporate behaviour in conflict situations mention in passing the specific concerns of youth in these conflicts, none seem to recognise the real potential of this age group. Of the 1.5 billion people between the ages of twelve and twenty four in the world, approximately 1.3 billion of them live in the developing world; this is the largest spike in youth in recorded history, leading some experts to christen the rise of the youth demographic as the “youth bulge”.⁷² According to UN projections, the majority of these developing world youth will live in Asia, Africa and Latin America; Africa in particular, with its increasing incidences of civil war, is predicted to see its youth demographic continue to grow beyond 2050.⁷³ This trend must be taken into consideration in the creation of any meaningful multi-stakeholder initiatives and by any MNCs that plan to operate in conflict areas as youth are not only observers or victims but also combatants. While job creation mitigates this issue to a certain extent, youth must be actively engaged in the creation of peacebuilding policy and its implementation for multi-stakeholder initiatives to have lasting effects.

Similarly, action to engage and address the special concerns of rising mega economies such as India and China in the dialogue seems to have been limited at best; these two rising powers were only placed on the “enhanced engagement” list by the OECD in 2007 (India and China are not yet members), and many of the biggest MNCs to sign the UN Global Compact (including Nokia, Petro-Canada, Nike, Lufthansa, DuPont, Bayer, and Volkswagen among others) are from Europe or North America.⁷⁴ With China and India beginning to consume an ever increasing amount of natural resources, the importance of bringing these states’ MNCs onside only increases in urgency as they stand to become some of the most important battlegrounds in the fight for states to keep their corporate citizens accountable overseas.

The global governance mechanisms to address corporations which directly fuel conflict through the sale of arms and even machetes is also weak at best, as are the regulations to stem the flow of illegal arms sales. As seen by Angola’s extensive money laundering, the international guidelines to prevent global flows of investment (through pension funds, the investment policies of banks, etc) which feed unethical corporations have been thus far relatively ineffective. Also, despite the rhetoric that the key goals of the UN and global corporations are continuing to converge in terms of peace, development, and equity, there seems to be a definite lack of policy in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) to explicitly address and integrate the involvement of MNCs in UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations. Addressing this regulatory gap could serve to consolidate the ad hoc guidelines for MNC behaviour, and add legitimacy to MNCs already taking on critical peacebuilding roles in weak or failing states.

“Quereme así, piantao, piantao, piantao... Abrite los amores que vamos a intentar la mágica locura total de revivir...”

Infamous rebel and influential anarchist Emma Goldman once said, “If I can’t dance I don’t want to be part of your revolution.” Ironically, despite her anarchist leanings, she describes the revolution in global governance beautifully; with MNCs, governments and international economic institutions working together as one, the international community is better able to address the current realities of globalisation, corporate governance and civil conflicts. The ongoing debates over legitimacy and enforcement mechanisms are not a sign of failure, but rather of a healthy international community grappling with the contradictions of attempting to superimpose law and order in situations characterized by a distinct lack thereof. With time, as MNCs, governments, and international economic institutions learn to communicate, trust, and cooperate with one another, the three-way tango will become the work of ever changing art it has the potential to be.

⁷² David Lam. “The Demography and Economics of the World’s Youth Bulge”. World Bank Institute. 2006.
<http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/june07/article.asp?id=408>

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ OECD. “About OECD.” 2008.
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html, Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns.

Development Against Development?

An Examination of International Development in Cambodia.

Jessica McKeil

Since the United Nations Transitional Authority on Cambodia (UNTAC) wrapped up its activities in 1993, it is not hard to see what the affects and side-effects of international development have been. While on the one hand the Kingdom of Cambodia has embraced their new free-market economy, officially become a democratic constitutional monarchy, and finally enjoyed a disbanding of the Khmer Rouge communist forces, on the other Cambodia has also suffered from a rise in inequality, violent political repressions, and an increasingly authoritarian style of governance. Since it has been nearly twenty years since the world stepped in to 'fix' the Cambodian problem, this article will go on to argue that the solution may prove to be a problem in and of itself. By critiquing the current development programme from an alternative development perspective, this article will demonstrate that international involvement has done little to benefit the people who need it most.

This is by no means an effort to criticise the incredible amount of people, time, and energy that have been invested over the last two decades, because on the ground most international development is done with the best of intentions. Instead this article hopes to build a critique of the mentality and overarching scheme of the international community¹ (which is expressed through specific activities, but should not be blamed on the people carrying out these tasks). Unless one

takes a step back to examine the whole picture, it would be very difficult to see how these specific development programs are in fact coming together to inhibit the Cambodian people from taking control of their own development. The main argument holds that the international community has forgotten to involve the very people they are trying to help.

A LOOK INTO AN ALTERNATIVE VISION

Development is portrayed as something that will happen by itself as soon as the obstacles to development are removed. In fact, virtually all of the changes that take place under the ideology of development are of an entirely different sort. Villagers are driven out and dams are built; forests are cut down and replaced by plantations; whole cultures are smashed and people are recruited into quite different cultures; people's local means of subsistence is taken away and they are placed under the power of the world market. It is not correct usage to apply the term development to the process of knocking down one thing and building something else in its place.²

From a Cambodian perspective, and arguably from the perspective of many other countries which have been deeply entrenched in the international development programme, development is not working. Although there are successes, such as an increased GDP or a democratically elected government, the reality is that today's development ideology is flawed. An alternative is alternative development, however its practices have never been attempted on a nationwide scale and there are still far more questions than answers as to its viability. The alternative vision argues that if the current development model is proven to be faulty than it should at least be reworked, if not thrown out all together. Jan Neder Veen Pieterse states that, "Doing 'nothing' comes down to an endorsement of the status quo,"³ and endorsing a broken product is not exactly productive. Alternative development wants to occupy the space where the traditional

¹ International community refers to the various international organizations (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, etc.), bilateral and multilateral donors, and the Great Powers. All have the ability to exert some level of influence over Cambodia's internal affairs. Under most circumstances the international community operates or speaks as a united front. It is "the collectively which faces the challenge of what to do or what not to do in the face of humanitarian suffering in other countries" as quoted by Caroline Hughes, "International Intervention and the People's Will: The Demoralization of Democracy in Cambodia," *Critical Asian Studies* 34 (2002): 543.

² C. Douglas Lummis, "Development Against Democracy," *Alternatives* 16 (1991): 48.

³ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "After post-development," *Third World Quarterly* 21 (2000): 182.

model has failed to make a difference: mainly making a difference for the poor and giving a voice to the voiceless.

Going up against the giant of development is a difficult task, especially considering it is the political elites in third world countries who have typically been profiting from the actions of international development. This is partially why there are few truly empowering initiatives in Cambodia: Hun Sen and the rest of the Cambodian government are threatened by any changes in the status-quo. Despite the fact that international human rights groups call for action against the abuses of Hun Sen's government, much of the world continues to conduct business as usual with Cambodia. As there is little chance that those within the system will change it, others must step up to the plate. Unlike the anti-development rhetoric of post-development theory, alternative development theory does believe that there is a significant role to be played by the international community. Development will always be an intervention ideology; it cannot escape its true nature. However being an intervention does not mean it has to involve "telling other people what to do – in the name of modernization, nation building, progress, mobilization, sustainable development, human rights, poverty alleviation and even empowerment and participation."⁴ What if international development became a way to help the people on the bottom develop in directions *they* choose, instead of being developed the way the world chooses?

To reiterate the words of the Buddha, "Peace must come from within, do not seek it without." Ultimately, the people who know what is best for the poor are the poor themselves. The traditional ideology that "most of the things people really want are economic, hence most social problems are economic, so ... that the ultimate solution to them

is economic development...,"⁵ needs to be replaced by the idea that "the *freedom* to make meaningful choices between various options is the essence of development and a precondition for personal well-being."⁶ International development essentially must be the factor that enables people to be in a position to make choices, and which provides support (financial, technical, etc...) wherever it is needed. In essence, alternative development is promoting what could be called a donor-supported version of self-help. It is a way of providing the tools and the resources to people and communities so that they can take ownership of their own development. In a perfect situation it would empower the community, give those who wanted it the chance to participate and direct the initiatives, create sustainable

projects by generating local ownership of them, and provide opportunities for capacity development.

By using alternative development theory to critique the dominant development discourse the first section will thus examine the impact of foreign aid, which is always the first step in any development project. It will look at how Cambodia has been diagnosed with the aid equivalent of the "Dutch Disease" (the explosion of the aid sector which has been detrimental to the growth of other areas). It will be a discussion on the ramifications of the massive amount of aid which Cambodia receives every year and specifically look at the problems of capacity development and governance.

The second section deals specifically with how development has proven detrimental to the formation of a strong, functioning democratic state. Instead of creating a mobilized and empowered populous the international community has focused its efforts on political and economic stabilization. Foreign aid, directed at democratic initiatives, has

⁵ Lummis 34.

⁶ Erhard Berner and Benedict Phillips, "Left to their own devices? Community self-help between alternative development and neo-liberalism," *Community Development Journal* 40 (2005): 18.

⁴ Pieterse 182.

failed to stimulate the ruling class into democratic reform despite the fact that most aid now comes with conditionalities meant to encourage good governance.

The third section uses the Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning (IRAP) programme to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the international development programme in Cambodia. The IRAP programme was developed to coincide with the Commune Councils which are a decentralized local government structure being used across the country. Unfortunately, although IRAP's methodology looks very appealing, in practice its approach has been riddled with problems. Its structure which was supposed to address gender inequality and inclusion has actually continued to exclude and emphasize the hierarchical structure of the Cambodian society. The IRAP initiative which was imported from other countries in the hopes of facilitating and opening up the local government to all levels of the Cambodian society has ultimately failed to translate.

AID AGAINST DEVELOPMENT

The basic motivations behind foreign aid are rarely neutral. Aid is used as much by the donor as it is by the recipient. It is directly tied to trends in international relations as well as national political interests. Just as "Every political act is motivated by some form of self-interest"⁷ so too are humanitarian acts, especially considering they more often than not are attached to massive sums of money. This understanding of foreign aid is one of the most important parts to understanding why development is not simply a neutral benevolent act, but rather something more calculated, complex and at times more biased than we are led to believe. It is unlikely that foreign aid would exist to the extent it does today if it did not offer some sort of political or economic kickback for the donors themselves. Keeping this two-way relationship in mind is essential when examining any kind of foreign aid; having an understanding of where the aid is coming from, why it is being given, and especially what

form it takes is valuable to developing a better understanding of aid's successes and failures.

Over the past two decades there have been billions of dollars in aid directed at Cambodia by the international community and as a consequence, it is important to examine the political motivations behind this. From 1993 to 2003, US\$5 billion of aid has been funneled into Cambodia.⁸ Between 2005 and 2008 another US\$1.5 billion was pledged⁹ and nearly another billion has been pledged to the country for 2009 (interestingly, the most since 1994).¹⁰ Considering aid has accounted for on average 13% annually of GDP and continues to represent half the national budget, donors will continue to hold a tremendous amount of influence over Cambodia's national affairs.¹¹

During UNTAC Cambodia began a shift towards market oriented policies which was part of a trend across the so-called developing world. In part this was a response to the final failure of state-directed economic approaches, but it was also due in large part to a push by multilateral donors through initiatives like the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund and conditionalities placed by bilateral donors on aid packages. According to Belgrad et al, "With [these] reforms, Third World countries are likely to succeed economically, the rich countries argue; without them, they will fail, and the financial help from the rich will be wasted."¹² Although originally most aid was free from conditionalities in Cambodia, at a recent press conference Keat Chon, the Minister of Finance, revealed that the only donor whose aid was unconditional for 2009 was China.¹³

According to the information on the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board and the

⁸ Sophal Ear, "The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 15 (2007): 74.

⁹ Guy De Launey, "Cambodia aims to shake off aid dependency," BBC News, 26 May 2005, January 8, 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4584003.stm>.

¹⁰ Ek Madra, "Cambodia promised aid worth nearly \$1bln for 2009," Reuters, 5 December 2008

http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSBKK316459.CH_2400.

¹¹ Ear 74.

¹² Rose 6.

¹³ Madra.

⁷ General Sir Michael Rose, forward, *The Politics of International Humanitarian Aid Operations*, ed. Eric A. Belgrad and Nitza Nachmias (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997) 5.

Council for the Development of Cambodia (CRDB-CDC) website the top five donors for the period of 1992 to 2001 were Japan, the UN System, the European Union (EU), France and the United States.¹⁴ In 2002 these donors (with the exception of the UN and the EU) were all on the 'top ten' list of foreign direct investors in the country.¹⁵ China was also a top ten investor in 2002, and if it follows through on its pledges for 2009 it will be the number one donor, with over US\$257 million pledged.¹⁶ Although this is by no means a fully tested hypothesis, it does raise questions with regard to the political and economic motivations behind foreign aid. There seems to be a relationship between a country's foreign direct investment and a country's foreign aid contributions. To some extent aid seems to be directed at creating stability and the necessary infrastructure to stimulate the economies of Third World countries in the hopes that it will also benefit the donor's economic needs.

Like many heavily aid-dependent countries, Cambodia suffers from the aid equivalent of the Dutch Disease. This 'disease' originated in the

"It is unlikely that foreign aid would exist to the extent it does today if it did not offer some sort of political or economic kickback for the donors themselves."

Netherlands in the 1970s with the massive expansion of its natural gas production, which worked to the detriment of its other sectors. In a few words, Dutch Disease describes the problems which occur as one sector experiences rapid expansion. The

booming sector gravitates production around itself and dramatically increases production prices, and other sectors of the economy cannot compete. At the same time, the extra income generated by the expanding sector is invested into non-tradable goods, which increases their price relative to tradable goods. This spending effect creates a situation where exchange rate appreciation forces tradable goods to be non-competitive in both international and domestic markets.

The Cambodian industry experiencing such an economic boom is surprisingly not in the industrial or natural resource sectors but rather the foreign aid sector. Foreign aid in Cambodia is so colossal that it has distorted the economy. According to Sophal Ear, in Cambodia "aid crowds out other sectors, becoming a tradable sector financed by 'revenues' in the form of aid."¹⁷ This foreign aid created version of the Dutch Disease becomes increasingly noticeable as aid begins to worsen the quality of government. Firstly, it decreases a government's dependence on taxes from its population base, meaning it no longer needs to satisfy the needs of its own people. Secondly, it diverts skilled workers from government positions to external aid organizations, thereby destroying capacity development. Finally, it allows the government to hand off social services to international organizations, which allows the government to neglect its own responsibilities.¹⁸

Many affects of the Dutch Disease have been traced back to extremely low government wages. Even today many Cambodian civil servants are paid somewhere between US\$20 to US\$40 a month, which places them barely over the poverty line and means they inevitably have to find other sources of income in order to feed themselves and their families.¹⁹ This often means resorting to corruption, moving away from government positions and into the external aid sector, or agreeing to work with the external aid sector in order to receive salary

¹⁴ "Disbursements by Donor," Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) and Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) 2001: 53, 16 December 2008 http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/development_coop/disbursement_donor.htm.

¹⁵ Hing Thoraxy, "Cambodia Country Report," Cambodian Investment Board for the Development of Cambodia Foreign Direct Investment: Opportunities and Challenges for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, Hanoi, 16-17 August 2002 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2002/fdi/eng/pdf/t_horaxy.pdf.

¹⁶ According to the CRDB-CDC website, China was one of the key donors who increased their assistance dramatically between 2000 and 2001, which is the last year of available data. See "Disbursements by Donor."

¹⁷ Ear 75.

¹⁸ Martin Godfrey, Chan Sophal, Toshiyasu Kato, Long Vou Piseth, Pon Dorina, Tep Saravy, tia Savora, and So Sovannarith, "Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in an Aid-dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia," *World Development* 30 (2002) 357.

¹⁹ Ear 76.

supplements. Sophal Ear, who has a decade of experience in development consulting and focuses specifically on Southeast Asia, notes that as Cambodia's skilled workers leave the government for more profitable posts within the aid sector they inevitably stop working for Cambodian driven projects and begin working for donor-driven ones. Although both sectors likely have Khmer prosperity in mind, it is here that the disputed neutrality of foreign aid should be remembered. In these externally driven projects "it is more often than not the donor country's foreign policy and national interest that take precedence."²⁰

The procedure of salary supplementation in the aid sector has become a huge problem in itself. Salary supplementation is the practice of paying and otherwise providing benefits to government officials in return for their support of specific development activities. Although claimed to be a necessary evil, it is ultimately a destructive practice undertaken by donor agencies in an attempt to gain the support of the Cambodian government. According to Godfrey et al.,²¹ 72 percent of agencies surveyed admitted to practicing it, while another 20 percent of agencies agreed they bent the rules in order to somehow supplement the wages of their government accomplices. As quoted in Godfrey et al, "salary supplementation threatens sustainability, leads to competition between agencies, pays people to perform their normal jobs..., and cushions the middle class on consequences of government inaction on revenues collection and salaries."²² In short it uses aid as a form of bribery.

"In these externally driven projects 'it is more often than not the donor country's foreign policy and national interest that take precedence.'"

Ear, in his study "The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia" has attempted to uncover the relationship between Cambodia's scores on Kaufmann et al.'s²³ six dimensions of government and the massive influx of aid since 1993. His study focused on informants from within the Cambodian aid sector, who all had a minimum of three years experience in the country as well as being involved with ODA flows in an "intense way".²⁴ According to Ear "These key informants overwhelmingly agree that... foreign aid has *not* had a positive impact on governance in Cambodia," except in one area, that of political stability.²⁵ Political stability was something both the Cambodian political elite as well as the international community both strived toward after the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement in an attempt to bring Cambodia out of the turmoil of war and political upheaval. This new-found political stability also allowed the Cambodian economy to stabilize, creating a relatively healthy market. This allowed for a massive influx of foreign direct investment, which opened up the Cambodian domestic market for exports from the developed world.

Cambodia seems to be trapped in a cycle of poor development caused by colossal reliance on foreign aid. The Cambodian government has little need to focus on raising internal revenues because of the massive amounts of aid; subsequently its civil servants, who are not being paid a living wage, seek to survive elsewhere, often by finding employment in the external aid sector. Government officials, instead of looking to improve the system from the inside, find external NGO activities to sponsor, which supplement their salaries and thus there is little incentive to actually put aid to sustainable and effective use.²⁶

Aid, although an essential aspect of any development activity (even alternative development

²⁰ 76.

²¹ Godfrey et. al. carried out research between September 1998 and November 1999 in association with the Cambodian Development Resource Institute in Phnom Penh. Among other things it included interviews with NGOs, donor heads and government officials, as well as a data analysis on the official aid coordination agency. The research attempted to answer the question: to what extent can technical assistance develop local capacity in an aid dependent country like Cambodia, where aid is so large that it distorts the economy and hinders the governments response to economic problems?

²² Godfrey et. al. 365.

²³ Ear.

²⁴ Ear 69.

²⁵ Ear 69

²⁶ Godfrey et. al. 370.

activities) is not the answer to all social, political and economic issues. Aid can just as easily be the problem as the solution. There is a fine balance that needs to be walked between aiding the Cambodian government in the establishment of social safety nets and allowing the government to ignore its own responsibilities. At the moment Cambodian political elites have little motivation to create actual change for the people they supposedly serve.

These supposedly untold stories of aid are in fact no secret at all. The current development discourse has known about the problems of foreign aid in Cambodia for at least a decade, and still aid continues to flow into the country at unprecedented rates. Grant Curtis highlights a report by the United Nations research Institute for Social Development from 1993 which states,

"[External] assistance should be subsidiary to local efforts, and that the main responsibility and control should ultimately remain with local actors....in order to promote a self-reliant and sustainable pattern of development. In practice, however, external assistance, rather than being a subsidiary to local efforts, becomes a substitute, and worse destroys the local coping and resistance mechanisms and controls emerging local institutions and solutions".²⁷

Alternative development sees this un-reflexive nature as a major barrier to any sort of successful development programme, alternative or not. Instead of taking initiative to fix the problem, multilateral and bilateral donors have continued to promote and in the case of Cambodia expand an already problematic system. Another point worth noting is that aid has been focused on political stability to the virtual exclusion of all else. This was valuable to the expansion of the Cambodian market, considering Cambodia experienced on average 11.1 percent economic growth between 2004 and 2007 (and this was not the first time its economy has experienced double digit growth since the end of UNTAC),²⁸ but

according to Ear, aid has failed to improve the living conditions of most, if not all, of Cambodia's poor. According to the UN resident coordinator for Cambodia "Recent years have seen Cambodia's economy grow rapidly. For ordinary Cambodians this growth has brought hope and optimism. But so far the benefits have not been evenly spread."²⁹ Rights groups within the country warn that both economic development and inequality are intensifying at an alarming rate.

DEVELOPMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY

Initiatives promoting democracy in the Third World have been one of the prime focuses of development work since the end of World War II and especially since the end of the Cold War. Arguably, Cambodia's democratic development has received more attention from the international community than any other country. After all, when the United Nations stepped into the country it was with UNTAC, whose end goal was to hold the first true democratic elections.³⁰ After four elections, all of which were debatably neither free nor fair, Cambodia is experiencing an increasingly authoritarian style of democracy. The country has struggled from the very beginning with the ideals of good governance and in the words of Donald Bruce St. John, "The essence of Western democracy, separation of powers with checks and balances within a system of democratic institutions, political parties, and free elections, has yet to be achieved in Cambodia." Alternative development arguably takes issue with the use of 'Western democracy' as a sort of be all and end all of democratic evolution, but Ronald Bruce St. John goes on to point out obvious discrepancies between what a functioning democracy looks like and what is currently being experienced in Cambodia. According to him, Cambodian elites have struggled with the concepts

<http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2008121523200/Business/Government-revises-down-economic-growth.html>.

²⁹ Cheang Sokah, "Inequality is fuelling rights violations, UN warns govt," *The Phnom Penh Post* 10 December 2008, 15 December 2008 <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2008121023141/National-news/Inequality-is-fuelling-rights-violations-UN-warns-govt.html>.

³⁰ As opposed to fraudulent or staged elections which were (and still are) a common occurrences among newly independent countries during the decolonization of the 20th century.

²⁷ Grant Curtis, *Cambodia Reborn? The Transition to Democracy and Development* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998) 102.

²⁸ Ngoun Sovan, "Government revises down economic growth," *The Phnom Penh Post* 15 December 2008, 15 December 2008

of dissent, power-sharing, and loyal opposition.³¹ In the end, the development programme in Cambodia has failed to stimulate even the very basics of democratic rule – Western or not.

The problem of emerging democracy is by no means a problem faced by Cambodia alone. There are a growing number of academics who have devoted their careers to theories of democratic transition in an attempt to understand what has worked and what has not. Much of the literature is dedicated to understanding why so many democracies remain fragile, illiberal, and electoral despite massive amounts of international aid and various degrees of coaxing. Why has the Western world, and increasingly non-Western countries as well, been so adamantly involved in the promotion of democracy around the world? Joel D. Barkan, who has worked extensively with international aid organizations like USAID, the World Bank and the UN Development, has gone so far as to label the promotion of democracy as a sort of ‘growth industry’ for both established and newly formed democracies.³² One argument could be that the international community values the spread of political stability and convincing domestic warring factions to drop their weapons and fight through the ballot box instead.

This was certainly the idea in Cambodia, as UNTAC’s mandate, among other things, was to supervise a ceasefire between the warring factions (mainly the Khmer Rouge and the pro-Vietnamese forces), while at the same time taking the necessary steps to conduct free and fair elections in which all factions (even the Khmer Rouge) could participate.³³ It was thought that elections were a relatively easy method to stabilize a country, and even today (despite the mounting evidence) there has only been a gradual shift away from the oversimplified mentality that “the holding of ‘free and fair’ multiparty elections [is] the litmus test of democratic transitions.”³⁴ Other important aspects

of democracy, like the rule of law, respect for human rights, civil society, accountability, and transparency have tended to be ignored in favour of holding elections. This mentality has suited donors well, as election assistance is relatively short-term and is generally more welcome than long-term intervention by the nation in transition.³⁵

The latest election in Cambodia, held on July 28th, 2008, was yet again a sweeping victory for Hun Sen and the CPP, with 73 percent of the votes in their favour. Hun Sen’s win has led to growing fears that the fragile Cambodian democracy has fallen into one-party rule. Over 13 000 international election monitors were in country on election day, and although they found the process and the results had numerous irregularities, none were on a scale large enough to alter Hun Sen’s landslide. This election was deemed to be the most peaceful in Cambodia’s democratic history, possibly thanks in part to international pressure and observers.³⁶ It seems that political stability is taking shape in the country in the form of increasingly authoritarian rule.

“In the end, the development programme in Cambodia has failed to stimulate even the very basics of democratic rule – Western or not.”

Although the international community can be thanked for their efforts to stabilize the country, it has “also served to bolster the 23-year rule of Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is considered a fulcrum of economic stability but an obstacle to the full flowering of democracy, including political dissent and freedom of expression.”³⁷

In his article “Democratic consolidation in the Third World: many questions, any answers?” Jeff Haynes has cited four main problems that have arisen in many new democracies, all of which are

³¹ Ronald Bruce St John, “Democracy in Cambodia – One Decade, US\$5 Billion Later: What Went Wrong?” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27 (2005): 408.

³² Joel Barkan, “Can established democracies nurture democracy abroad? Lessons from Africa,” *Democracy’s victory and crisis: Nobel Symposium No. 93*, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 373.

³³ Ear 74.

³⁴ Barkan 377.

³⁵ 379.

³⁶ Geoffrey Cain, “Strongman tightens grip on Cambodia,” *Asia Times Online* 29 July 2008, 15 December 2008 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JG29Ae01.html.

³⁷ David Montero, “In Cambodia vote, Stability wins,” *The Christian Science Monitor* 29 July 2008, 17 December 2008 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0729/p06s01-woap.html>.

directly applicable to Cambodia. First, recent democratic transitions have failed to create liberal democracies, with many remaining strictly electoral. Cambodia has obviously created a stable electoral democracy as it has held four national elections, but the elected elite still "are deficient in respect of: protecting the interests of minorities, civil liberties more generally, societal toleration, citizen participation in politics – other than at election time,...and appropriate constraints on executive power."³⁸ In the words of Sue Downey and Damien Kingsbury, by the end of 2000 "The government continued to use arbitrary power, it continued its reluctance to accept political opposition, it had not separated the state from the party, nor the executive from the judiciary, and had not established the rule of law and respect for human rights."³⁹

Second, political elites from before the transitions maintain places of power and influence even after elections. Haynes contends that this may be because they have greater resources both politically and economically than their new political rivals and this most certainly was the case in Cambodia. Hun Sen either won or managed to wrestle his way to the top in every single election since UNTAC. He has managed to do so partly because of the patron-client networks and resources he gained through his rule in the Vietnamese-puppet regime.

Third, a weak civil society is blamed for having little effect on the development of a consolidated democracy. As Haynes explains, "civil society is often idealized as an entity uncomplicatedly beneficial for democracy. But civil society is not always united, consensual, a focal point of interest groups and associations collectively pursuing democratic change."⁴⁰ Many positive aspects of civil society were destroyed by the genocide in the 1970s. The Khmer Rouge created an atmosphere of survival at all costs which broke the trust even between family members, and sadly this mentality has carried on into contemporary life.⁴¹ As a point

in case, many of the relationships which do exist in Cambodia are based upon strong patron-client networks. The CPP is a prime example of a group which has risen and solidified its power through these networks, but it is not the only one banking on it. Kate Frieson (quoted in David Roberts) stated that patron-clientelism was "abundantly clear after the [1993] election, when huge crowds of khsae members [patronage seekers] formed outside the offices of the [Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif] FUNCINPEC Party in Phnom Penh to try and cash in on their support by gaining a job in the new government."⁴² Although patron-clientelism is not unusual, the tradition has not been replaced by more democratic means of representation.

Finally, there is the effect of socio-economic inequalities on democratic effectiveness. There are arguments on both sides of this debate, those who believe that massive inequality does not breed democratic conditions and those who demonstrate that even in some of the poorest countries of the world, there has developed at least an acceptable level of democratic ideals. Haynes is of the persuasion that "democracy will not easily develop in such countries because of a welter of inauspicious social, political, and economic factors."⁴³ The countless socio-economic challenges faced by the Cambodian people, were addressed in Chapter Two.

In the end, for Cambodia but also for many other democracies in transition, "it is important to appreciate that these [international] programmes are at best programmes that operate at the margin of the process - as facilitators of transitions that are driven mainly by the internal dynamics of the societies in which they occur and/or by the internal dynamics of the regimes that govern these societies;" it is in the end "a home-grown phenomena."⁴⁴ In spite of the billions of dollars spent by UNTAC to kick start the transition, the billions of dollars since in aid, and the conditionalities calling for good governance, the

³⁸ Jeff Haynes, "Democratic consolidation in the Third World: many questions, any answers?" *Contemporary Politics* 6 (2000) 124.

³⁹ Sue Downie and Damien Kingsbury, "Political Development and the Re-emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 23 (2001) 13.

⁴⁰ Haynes 124.

⁴¹ Downie and Kingsbury. 25.

⁴² qtn. in David Roberts, *Political transition in Cambodia, 1991-99: power, elitism, and democracy*. (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001): 128.

⁴³ Haynes 124.

⁴⁴ Atul Kohli, "On sources of social and political conflicts in follower democracies," *Democracy's victory and crisis: Nobel Symposium No. 93*, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 395.

international community has failed to realise this very simple but essential fact. Despite what each election has demonstrated, that Cambodians still have high hopes for democracy (roughly 97 percent of eligible voters turning out in the 1993 elections⁴⁵ and an estimated to be 75 percent in the 2008 elections⁴⁶), the Cambodian authorities remain unwilling to curb their corruption, impose the rule of law, and continue to "reign in impunity;"⁴⁷ in other words, "the Cambodian political elite [is] not as committed to democracy as the Cambodian people."⁴⁸

The refusal of the Cambodian political elite to embrace the ideals of democracy poses a dilemma to the international community. The failure of donor efforts to create a functioning liberal democracy is obvious, but does this mean that donors should effectively pull out? Does it mean donors should continue to throw money at a problem which will possibly never be fixed? Alternative development argues that the change will have to come from Cambodians themselves if there is to be an effective solution. If large sums of aid continue to be funneled through the elites, there will be no impetus for them to embrace democratic values – to become accountable to their people.

Joel Barkan discusses an alternative to large sums of aid directed at high profile transitions. Bilateral donors like Denmark, Norway and Sweden prefer to fund small to medium size activities which are not directly election related. For example they provide grants for US\$10 000 to US\$300 000 to nurture civil society: trade unions, groups who provide legal assistance, human rights organizations, journalist groups, educational initiatives, etc. Barkan argues that these lower profile development activities are longer lasting than the larger more common electoral development assistance mainly because they foster a sustainable way to strengthen local groups; "these programmes are more likely than electoral assistance to nurture institutions of

countervailing power, institutions which in turn increase the level of state accountability to the governed."⁴⁹

Conditionalities, which are a recent fad among donors, are not accomplishing their objectives either. Although donors receive lip service from the Cambodian politicians, they fail to actually change the realities of what governance means for the Cambodian people. Most recently donors have reprimanded the CPP for its failure to enact a corruption law, something which has been on the books for well over a decade. The CPP agreed to put all its energy into passing such a law in 2009, but the same promises have been repeatedly made for the past few years⁵⁰ and nothing has changed. Again the international community is stuck between a rock and a hard place: to use the stick and penalize the Cambodian elite for their failures and also punish the Cambodian people, or continue to line the pockets of the officials in the hopes that something will change. Either way there are going to be issues, but from an alternative development perspective, to remain stubbornly unchanged in the face of so many problems is a severely troubled approach.

A CASE STUDY WITHIN A CASE STUDY

Despite the efforts of the international community to create a functioning democracy in Cambodia, it has failed to create an empowered Cambodian people. To cite an example used by Caroline Hughes, "the human rights organizations in the mid-2000s appear rather marginal to Cambodian political life – acting as information providers and victim support services, rather than political players in their own right."⁵¹ In their efforts to create stability, internationally funded activities have

⁴⁹ Barkan 381.

⁵⁰ "International donors pledge nearly 1 bln dollars to Cambodia: govt," *AFP* 5 December 2008, 15 December 2008 <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hhLk20SeVZm0QCc0xacj8V5ffRQQ>.

⁵¹ Caroline Hughes, "Transnational Networks, International Organizations and Political Participation in Cambodia: Human rights, Labour rights and Common Rights," *Democratization* 14 (2007) 841.

⁴⁵ Bruce St John 407.

⁴⁶ Montero.

⁴⁷ Ear 81.

⁴⁸ St John 407.

actually had a demobilizing and atomizing affect. Arguably this failure to stimulate the democratic possibilities amongst the poor and rural inhabitants is mainly because "Walking several kilometres everyday to fetch clean drinking water is not a common experience to most policymakers."⁵² In other words, when 90 percent of Cambodian poor live in rural areas, and their basic needs are often neglected by the elites in Phnom Penh, it is difficult for the poor to turn their attention towards other endeavours which may not have immediate results.

As there has always been a huge divide between the ruling elites and the rural poor in Cambodia, both in the socio-economic and political sense, there have recently been attempts by the international community as well as the CPP to address this issue. Primarily it is being tackled by a more decentralized governance style because "Government officials are usually not familiar with the situations in Cambodia's rural areas; therefore the decisions they make do not always meet the real needs of the Cambodian poor."⁵³ Decentralized participatory programmes which link governance more directly to the people, are meant to foster a strong civil society, bring the development and decision-making processes to the grassroots level, and narrow the gap between the political elites and the masses.

Already there are some problems of overlap being witnessed in this decentralization process, as a number of different internationally-partnered programmes are being tried. Just to name a few, there is the Village Development Committee model (which has been used in several other countries), Seila (a government-run decentralization and aid mobilization tool), the Village Networks approach (which is being examined in Chapter Five) and the Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning (IRAP) initiative. These examples all work in conjunction with the Commune Councils, which became democratically elected in 2002.

The IRAP programme is a cost-effective planning process meant to improve access to roads, wells,

and various other services. According to the report put out by the IRAP Third Expert Group Meeting in 2003, "[IRAP's] main features are its simplicity, user friendliness, low-cost application and immediate outputs" which will enhance participation and promote "an efficient bottom up process."⁵⁴ Essentially, IRAP is meant to assist in drafting plans for improving access to what are identified as Basic Minimum Needs, focusing on accessibility, infrastructure, transport, education, health centres and markets.⁵⁵

The International Labour Organization (ILO) introduced this process to Cambodia in May 1999 (in collaboration with the national government). What has become apparent is that IRAP is even farther removed from the local governance and culture of the rural areas than the Cambodian political elites. According to Caroline Ramaekers and Martin de Jong, "The introduction of IRAP is a typical example of the transplantation of a "Western" analytical tool to an alien institutional environment" and "It seems contradictory that importing an institution from even further away than the national officials is needed to bring the decision-making process closer to the Cambodian rural poor."⁵⁶ Ramaekers currently works at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, but worked for the ILO in Cambodia studying cross-national policy transfers. De Jong also studies cross-national policy transfers, as well as cross-cultural management and transport infrastructure policy. He works at the Faculty of technology, Policy and Management of Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands.

On paper, from the perspective of the dominant development discourse, the IRAP methodology looks very appealing. It revolves around a highly participatory structure which brings together government bodies, stakeholders from local organizations and associations, women committee members, NGO representatives as well as

⁵² Caroline Ramaekers and Martin de Jong, "Can Structured Planning Frameworks Fulfill the Needs of Cambodia's Rural Poor?" Knowledge, Technology, & Policy 19 (2007):61.

⁵³ 61.

⁵⁴ "Integrated Rural Assisted Planning," Third Expert Group Meeting, International Labour Organization, Bangkok, 27-28 March 2003: 2.

<<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/eiip/download/ratp/ratp09.pdf>>.

⁵⁵ Ramaekers and de Jong 61.

⁵⁶ 62.

unorganized stakeholders. Its objectives seek to empower people by expanding the democratization process to the local level. There also seems to be an element of capacity development, at least to the extent that IRAP relies on training local participants in data collection. It also works alongside of the government rather than as a competing structure, and falls in line with the government's rural development plans.

The problems begin to arise as one applies the IRAP model to countries which all have quite different sets of political, economic, social and cultural circumstances. This has become apparent in Cambodia, where the practice of bringing together all walks of life for negotiations and decision-making has continued to ignore the poor. Although the IRAP structure has been praised by both the donor community and the Cambodia government,⁵⁷ "Some of IRAP's characteristics are completely alien to Cambodian society and to Cambodia's governance structures."⁵⁸ There are four primary problems of the application of IRAP in Cambodia, which have been identified by Ramaekers and de Jong.

First, although the programme is supposed to be a bottom-up process, it neglected to take the hierarchical culture and value system of Cambodia into consideration. IRAP fails to appropriately address the barrier which exists between people at very hierarchical positions within Cambodian society. Where someone stands in society directly affects the ways they interact with people positioned above and below, and there continues to be "set expectations of appropriate behaviour when people from different levels of society interact."⁵⁹ Traditionally in Cambodia, cultural views of political power are influenced by the tradition of the mandala (where the devaraje, or good-king, is at the centre) and the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Power is greatest at the centre and generally political power is personalized. Also, Cambodian society has long history of patron-clientelism, and non-rational-legal decision making. Both Marxist-Leninist and the mandala ideologies "do not, and by definition,

cannot tolerate meaningful dissent."⁶⁰ Powerful officials are seen by the rest of society as "wise, smart, and capable,"⁶¹ no matter what their true characteristics are.

Because of this tradition, "Challenging, questioning, and holding dissenting views are discouraged, conflict is seen as negative and loss of face should be avoided at all costs."⁶² When IRAP brings together people from all levels of society to discuss and decide on future developments, the discussions still tend to be dominated by the elites in the room. So despite the fact that "IRAP is designed as a bottom-up prioritization process...this cultural factor rather converts the process to an elitist decision-making process in which the power ultimately remains in the hands of the higher ranking people...,"⁶³ essentially negating the entire mentality of decentralization of power, and declining to put the decision-making process in the hands of those who need it most.

As an aside to this problematic structure which emphasizes, rather than minimizes, the power of elites, the IRAP programme functions on an invitation-only basis. The IRAP discussions are not open to the public (in other words they do not accept nominations), and instead rely on selecting specific members of society (government officials, NGO members, and others who are deemed to be important). The invitation list is compiled by the provincial governor, the district chief and the commune chiefs – all of whom enjoy considerable leverage over the rural poor in their area. From the available information on IRAP it seems that there is no room for rural poor participation, and that it is instead focused on representing their needs through their local and regional elites.

Secondly, because IRAP focuses on alleviating rural poverty it must also make a special effort to equally target its activities towards rural women. Just as the Cambodian culture has strict protocols for hierarchical relationships, it also has a strict division of gender roles, and consequently any programme

⁵⁷ "Integrated Rural Assisted Planning," 5.

⁵⁸ Ramaekers and de Jong 64.

⁵⁹ 64.

⁶⁰ Downie and Kingsbury ¶ 12.

⁶¹ Aun Porn Moniroth, as qtn. in Downie and Kinsbury ¶ 16.

⁶² Ramaekers and de Jong 69.

⁶³ 70.

seeking to aid both men and women equally must have “a gender-responsive participatory approach.”⁶⁴ Unfortunately, because IRAP primarily functions through elite (not to mention, invitation only) participation, women are severely underrepresented in its workshops. Of the 41 workshops sampled in Ramaekers and de Jong’s study, there was only a 9 percent female participation rate, which is exacerbated by the fact that because of cultural gender restraints these women generally “did not play a role in the workshop.”⁶⁵ Women tended to remain excluded from the discussions, and when (at the commune level workshops) men and women were both questioned about the participation for women it provoked uncomfortable reactions. Ramaekers and de Jong have concluded that IRAP’s attempt to officially incorporate women, while at the same time neglecting to realise the cultural implications of its approach, is a strongly-donor driven goal. While this critique is by no means an attempt to deny Cambodian women equal rights, it proposes that all aspects of programmes implemented by outsiders needs to be culturally tailored. In the case of IRAP, its failure to understand the very basics of gender roles in Cambodia has led to the further exclusion of women from the decision-making process.⁶⁶

Finally, the last cultural barrier that IRAP failed to incorporate into its process is that of collectivism, which is one of the pillars of Cambodian culture. This mentality can restrict individuals from voicing their opinions in a larger group, unless they have the backing of the group or stand higher up the social ladder. This problem also ties into the invitation only format, which means that even if there are people present who represent the lower stratas of society, their voice is still not heard. In fact IRAP attempts to target the most isolated rural villages, but when the rural poor from these places are invited to the workshop process it “reinforces imbalanced social relations between those with power and those without [instead of] making these relations more even.”⁶⁷

CONCLUSION

From the evidence presented above, and the massive amounts available in the literature on Cambodia, it can be surmised that international development is struggling to create real change for the Cambodian people. There has been a failure to use foreign aid beyond economic and politically stabilizing activities, as well as a failure to foster a government which can wean itself off donations. There has been little progress in the creation of an effective liberal democracy, with the current regime stuck in a strictly electoral and increasingly authoritarian style of governance. Meanwhile, 4.8 million people continue to live in poverty in Cambodia.⁶⁸ The poverty line in 2004 was approximately 1,826 riels per person per day, or about US\$0.45 a day.⁶⁹ Even the World Bank has recognised the bad track record of poverty reduction in the country - by their own data they claim that poverty levels had fallen only by 1 to 1.5 percent between 1994 and 2004.⁷⁰ This is barely a reduction at all.

Ramaekers and de Jong’s example is only one of many which prove how the dominant discourse, despite its good intentions, often serves to exasperate the situation rather than alleviate it. Western ideals through donor-driven initiatives have served to formally change the structures of many third world governments, Cambodia included, but have yet to be adopted in everyday life. In the face of the mountain of evidence it should not come as a surprise that at least US\$7 billion dollars of foreign aid has accomplished so little. Instead of empowering the majority of Cambodians it has served to sanction activities of the political and business elite. The international development model “has largely sanctioned Cambodia’s failures..., continuing to provide massive amounts of aid in the face of overwhelming evidence that even modest democratic reform efforts were bankrupt, if not dead on arrival.”

⁶⁸ “Rural Poverty in Cambodia,” *Rural Poverty Portal*, 17 December 2008

<http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/cambodia>.

⁶⁹ “Frequently Asked Questions about Poverty in Cambodia,” The World Bank, 27 March, 2009 <http://go.worldbank.org/T2890U8730>.

⁷⁰ “Frequently Asked Questions about Poverty in Cambodia.”

⁶⁴ 70.

⁶⁵ 70.

⁶⁶ 70-71.

⁶⁷ 72.

This article has served to demonstrate the realities of international development in Cambodia specifically but also more generally in other supposedly developing 'Third World' countries. Faced with such bleak circumstances, what can be done to reverse these trends? Above all it is necessary to take the reins of development away from those who currently hold them, which would mean international organizations, bilateral donors

and at times the internationally endorsed Cambodian government. Power needs to be handed over to those who are supposed to be benefiting from the development activities – in other words into the hands of local communities and the poor.

⁷¹ St. John 423.

The Rise of Worker Cooperatives in Argentina:

Zanon Ceramics laying out the tiles for Argentine socialism

Ginette Gautreau

In 2001, Argentina suffered a devastating economic crisis that will haunt economists everywhere for decades to come. Following the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) rulebook for over a decade, Argentina was led into a shocking and colossal economic crisis which has established this country as one of the great failures of the Washington Consensus. The resulting unemployment, poverty and nationwide upheavals reflect the severe weaknesses and limitations of the neoliberal institution. However, underneath the ruins of Argentine capitalism something was growing: the movement of factory expropriation.

At the peak of the crisis, unemployment (25 percent) and underemployment combined to reach a staggering 35 percent of the populace. In addition, more than 60 percent of the population of 37 million was below the poverty level.¹ In a country where economic disparity is ubiquitous, the crisis inexorably affected some Argentines more than others, exacerbating this nationwide inequality and

aggravating an already dire situation of misery and poverty for so many people. The crisis served to devise a path for Argentine socialism.irate citizens who overnight lost their entire livelihood, their savings, their jobs, and their dignity would soon learn the true meaning of democracy. These newly unemployed workers took the matter in their own hands and laid the foundation for an unprecedented nationwide movement of factory expropriation².

Inspired by Avi Lewis's and Naomi Klein's documentary film *The Take*, which explores the rise of factory expropriation and worker-cooperatives in Argentina, this paper will attempt to better understand the expropriation movement as well as to bring the movement up to date. It will begin by putting the movement in context by briefly explaining the political and economic conditions that preceded the Argentine crisis and the origins of the movement. It is suggested that the crisis owed its existence to decades of fiscal instability as well as the Argentine president at the time of the crisis, Carlos Menem's resolute trust in the Washington Consensus.³ This combined with a series of unfortunate economic circumstances outside of Argentina's control resulted in the vicious self-reinforcing circle that led to the demise of Argentina's economy in 2001.

² Expropriation is a complicated process aiming for the legitimate recognition of factory recuperation. The system basically entails a procedure whereby workers set up a cooperative or somebody that establishes them as a legal entity and that allows them to 'take-over' a bankrupt or abandoned factory. The process is obviously very complex, involving an array of legal procedures, and can last for several years, as in the case of Zanon Ceramics explored later in this paper.

³ Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein. *The Take*, Co-Production of Barna-Alper Productions and the National Film Board of Canada. Alliance Atlantis, 2005.

¹ Peter Ranis. "Argentina's Worker-Occupied Factories and Enterprises". *Socialism and Democracy*, Vol. 19, Iss. 3, New York, 2005. 93-117.

<http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mta.ca/pqdweb?index=2&did=1146417691&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&ROT=309&VName=POD&TS=1201749064&clientId=13370>

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³ Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein. *The Take*, Co-Production of Barna-Alper Productions and the National Film Board of Canada. Alliance Atlantis, 2005.

¹ Peter Ranis. "Argentina's Worker-Occupied Factories and Enterprises". *Socialism and Democracy*, Vol. 19, Iss. 3, New York, 2005. 93-117.

<http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mta.ca/pqdweb?index=2&did=1146417691&srchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1201749064&clientId=13370>

Subsequently, this paper will explore a case study of the Zanon Ceramics factory, as highlighted in the aforementioned film. It is important to look at what the conditions of the factory were before the crisis, and how it has improved (or worsened) following the occupation? Also, I will discuss the barriers the workers have been facing throughout the process: the workers must carry this battle onwards through the various levels and hindrances of typical red-tape bureaucracy and of the Argentine legal system. There are many occasions for them to falter and veer off track, it is thus important to look at the incentives that carry them through the days and to analyze the process by which they managed to succeed. Finally, I will analyze the movement according to two theories of development: participatory development on the one hand, and the underlying capitalist motivations on the other. The worker-cooperative movement is a direct challenge to the top-down, neoliberal system that governed Argentina into the crisis; the workers are demonstrating that it is possible to build an economy based on a system of solidarity and where rights are respected.

SETTING THE STAGE:

AN OVERVIEW OF ARGENTINEAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY

As with so many of its Latin American neighbours, Argentina's history is laden with political instability and economic disparity. Since the era of colonialism, the country has been divided between the wealthy and the poor. The economic elites of Argentina are usually of European descent, and they often have strong political affiliation and influence. The poor, the indigenous communities and *campesinos* of Argentine society are often forced to follow the rules and struggle against longstanding traditions of discrimination and oppression. Argentina's colonial past will have lasting ramifications on the dynamics of society, and the crisis inevitably shed light on these historically rooted wounds.

Argentina's Golden Years, following World War II, were marked by days when 'everybody had a job',

"Irate citizens who overnight lost their entire livelihood, their savings, their jobs, and their dignity would soon learn the true meaning of democracy."

the economy was ever flourishing and the country became a hot spot for wealthy American and European tourists. Buenos Aires enjoyed glamorous soirees and lavish drinks all around. In 1946, Argentina elected General Juan Domingo Perón, a President distinguished for his 'made in Argentina factory economy'. Perón was an acclaimed leader: he promoted domestic production over foreign

ownership of the economy, and it worked well at the time. Argentines enjoyed every moment! His wife, Eva (Evita) Duarte was acclaimed for acting on behalf of the disenfranchised and helping women obtaining the right to vote in 1947.⁴

However, Perón was also notorious for supporting fascist movements, such as Mussolini's in Italy. In fact, under his government, Argentina became a safe-haven for high-level Nazi members after the Second World War. A controversial move, no doubt, that infuriated the elite class of Argentina. In 1955, he was ousted by a military coup and forced into exile in Spain. Perón returned in 1974 after Argentina's first election in ten years, which inexorably caused controversy and resulted in violent uprisings. He died in 1975 and was succeeded by his second wife whose term is characterized by the strengthening of the armed forces and the growth of the 'AAA' which aimed at the assassination of leftist politicians, writers and activists.⁵

Shortly after, a military junta staged a coup in 1976 and declared a state of siege. For six years, this military government murdered and caused the disappearance of over 30,000 Argentines, mostly students and union activists; it was dubbed the Dirty War. To add to the complexity of the issue, the IMF lent billions of dollars to the military junta under the conditions that they eliminate their nationalistic policies and adopt outward-looking, open market

⁴ *The Take* official website. Klein Lewis Productions, 2005. Good Company Communications Inc.

http://www.thetake.org/index.cfm?page_name=background_articles_and_links

⁵ "Argentina History Timeline"

http://www.thetake.org/index.cfm?page_name=argentina_hostpry_timeline

economic mentality. This would be the beginning of radical new economic policies for Argentina as well as growing dependence on the IMF. Finally, after facing defeat in the war against Britain over the Falkland Islands, corruption in the military junta is made public and results in widespread protests. This was the beginning of the transition towards a democracy – a democracy that is welcomed with over \$45 billion dollars in national debt.⁶

With the arrival of Carlos Menem in 1989, Argentina had hope for a more stable economy and society. At first, Menem was full of promise: “For the first half of the 1990s, capital inflows did increase substantially and the economy expanded at unprecedented rates”.⁷ But Menem did not distinguish between the theory and application of the IMF’s liberal policies; he applied every policy in the neoliberal rulebook – at the same time. Argentines called it *El Modelo* (“The Model”). The fact of the matter is that Menem set the stage for a serious economic crisis:

Almost all national assets [were] privatized, currency markets [were] deregulated, and the peso [was] pegged to the U.S. dollar at one-to-one. While Argentina’s GDP almost double[d], the unemployment rate soar[ed] from 6% to 18% as hundreds of thousands of workers [were] downsized in privatizations. The public debt soar[ed], corruption scandals erupt[ed] on a monthly basis, but the IMF and the World Bank continue[d] to lend Argentina tens of billions of dollars.⁸

Then, “Argentina was hit with a series of external shocks”.⁹ Indeed, what follows Menem’s mistakes was utter chaos: “Argentina was unable to adjust to the volatility exhibited by the external environment at that time”.¹⁰ Menem stepped down and Fernando de la Rúa was elected President in 1999, but did little to improve Argentina’s dilemma. By this time, Argentina’s open market economy allowed the

greater majority of its top 100 companies to rely on foreign ownership. Its dependency on foreign currency devalued is domestic currency and its terms of trade declined sharply following a recession in Brazil, Argentina’s largest trading partner. Succeeding tax hikes, further currency devaluation, soaring inflation rates, the ever increasing foreign debt (reaching over 46% of GDP in 2000) and the pressure to stay within the IMF programme was adding an excruciating burden on Argentina’s evermore fragile economy and politics.¹¹ The situation was clearly unsustainable, and on December 19th 2001, Argentina exploded: \$40 billion dollars cash disappeared in the dead of night! The country reacted: banks were frozen, food riots and protests ripped across the country and a state of siege was declared. Millions of angry Argentines raided the streets chanting “*Que se vayan todos!*” (All of them out!). More than 25 people were killed that single night. The following day, December 20th 2001, de la Rúa resigned from his position as president leaving Argentina with five presidents in three weeks. During that time, on December 21st, Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt and declared bankruptcy. Its currency was devastatingly devalued, losing two thirds of its value, and more than 50 percent of the population fell below the poverty line.¹²

Proponents of the IMF and even the authors of the plan responded by admitting that the adjustment process and tightening of the economy during its restructuring carries the greatest costs. The argument was that “everyone must suffer short-term pain for long-term gain”.¹³ Still, this argument was clearly not sufficiently persuasive for the newly impoverished people of Argentina. Coined the *piquetero* movement, unemployed workers and middle-class citizens abounded the streets of Buenos Aires. They protested, rioted, and blocked roadways, demanding the government to take action and to help them. “The protests were not aimed at

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Dani Rodrik. *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalisation, Institutions and Economic Growth*. (Princeton University Press. Princeton, 2007.) 203.

⁸ *The Take* official website.

⁹ Dani Rodrik. 203

¹⁰ Ibid. 43.

¹¹ Andrew Philip Powell. “Argentina’s Avoidable Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad Economics, Bad Politics, Bad Advice.” Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires. *Brookings Trade Forum* 2002: 1-58.

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/brookings_trade_forum/v2002/2002_1powell.html

¹² *The Take* official website.

¹³ Lindsay DuBois. *The Politics of the Past in an Argentine Working-Class Neighbourhood*. (University of Toronto Press. Toronto, 2005) 125.

any particular politician or policy; people were rejecting the entire model".¹⁴

Out of the crisis grew innovative ideas, the people acted upon what they knew was best before the government could. 'Neighbourhood assemblies' met to discuss national and local issues, politics and possible solutions to their plight.¹⁵ Soon, abandoned factories began to be 'taken over' by their former workers. It was the beginning of an organic, raw, grassroots, bottom-up, democratic approach to a devastating and demoralizing shock. Across the country, these workers formed cooperatives and some 10,000 workers joined forces under the motto "Unity and Strength!" The idea is that worker-cooperatives offer "the promise of new forms of worker control over the productive process, worker political empowerment and a potential revision of traditional relations between capital and labour".¹⁶ The members of the cooperatives grouped together under the National Movement of Recuperated Factories (MNFR in Spanish) and today, over 200 of these worker-run factories exist in Argentina and over 55 000 workers are employed in these factories.¹⁷ Their slogan: *Occupy. Resist. Produce.*¹⁸

Finally, in 2003, Nestor Kirchner is elected as a left-leaning president who would allow the mass protests to flourish. However, he also immediately began talks in the hope of reaching a new agreement with the IMF seeking to solve the country's colossal debt. Truth be told, Kirchner "stopped short of supporting the development of a grassroots "social economy," and many in the recuperated workplace movement view[ed] him with skepticism".¹⁹ Nevertheless, in 2005, he announced a two million dollar credit line to help these worker-cooperatives to improve their performance: "Under the new

scheme, soft loans of up to 65,000 dollars will be made available to the cooperatives, requiring no guarantee, at an annual interest rate of seven percent".²⁰ Later that year, the Buenos Aires city council voted to support the worker-cooperatives. As a result, the cooperatives were exempt from paying taxes and authorised to use the pre-crisis

"Out of the crisis grew innovative ideas... Soon, abandoned factories began to be 'taken over' by their former workers. It was the beginning of an organic, raw, grassroots, bottom-up, democratic approach to a devastating and demoralizing shock."

brand name of their company. In addition, the factories were allowed to buy off the machinery and equipment at the price they fetched at auction.²¹ The government essentially agreed to allow workers to occupy the businesses; but, only on a temporary permit. These permits had

a valid period of two years, and have since been renewed.

The subsequent legal battles to allow these factories to exist and work under the control of the cooperatives have dragged on for over seven years. The case study of the Zanon ceramic factory in this essay will demonstrate one particularly difficult and long battle for legitimacy and definitive ownership of their enterprise. Day by day workers of Zanon face the risk of eviction and continue to battle for their place in Argentine society. These workers are not the enemies, they are not looking to shed blood or overthrow the system. The movement arose from a basic desire to work, a movement in the name of human dignity and solidarity. These workers are simply working for what is fair and what is right, working to feed their children.

CASE STUDY: ZANON CERAMIC FACTORY

Nothing short of a seven year long legal battle, numerous death threats, violent harassment,

¹⁴ Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein.

¹⁵ *The Take* official website.

¹⁶ Peter Ranis.

¹⁷ Viviana Alonso. *Argentina: Workers Salvage Factories and Jobs*, Global Information Network. New York, Jan. 2005.

¹⁸ <http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mta.ca/pqdweb?index=5&did=521397961&SrchMode=1&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1201751337&clientId=13370>

¹⁹ Chris Tilly, and Naomi Klein.

²⁰ Chris Tilly, Marie Kennedy. "From Resistance to Production in Argentina." *Dollars and Sense*, Iss. 262. Summerville, 2005. 28-33.

²¹ <http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mta.ca/pqdweb?index=0&did=958476951&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1201747764&clientId=13370>

²⁰ Viviana Alonso.

²¹ Ibid.

ongoing protests and despair characterize the story of Zanon Ceramics factory located in the province of Neuquén, Argentina. In 2001, it also faced its fate as did so many other neighbouring factories. Roughly 300 employees lost their jobs overnight, the doors were closed, welded shut, never to be opened again.

On March 17th 2002, 170 workers march to Buenos Aires as part of a national campaign to defend factory occupation. Shortly after, 240 workers marched up to the doors of Zanon Ceramics and in an instant occupied the factory without doubting for a moment that this was the right thing to do. These workers formed the cooperative known as FaSinPat, an acronym for *Fabricas sin Patrones* (Factories without bosses). They formed assemblies: one person, one vote, and everyone receives an equal salary. Like their neighbouring counterparts, the Zanon workers also longed to rise against the capitalist system that had oppressed them for the decades leading up to the take. For workers everywhere, they too wanted to show the world that workers can produce even better under self-management.²² A petition in their name reads:

In defense of Zanon and all worker occupied factories! If they mess with one of us, they mess with all of us! Definitive expropriation of all factories and companies producing under worker control!²³

Prior to the occupation, conditions in the Zanon factory were dire, dangerous and bleak. Wages were reduced to a minimum to maximize profits; safety was continuously jeopardized as the employers demanded outrageous levels of production, putting excessive pressure on the workers; workers had no voice in the factory, let alone health care or life insurance. "These conditions previous to the workers' occupation led to an average of 25-30 accidents per month and one fatality per year. In the years of Zanon's production, 14 workers died inside

the factory. Since Zanon's occupation by its workers, not one accident inside the factory has occurred".²⁴ Indeed, under Luis Zanon, the founder and former owner of the factory, there was an average of nearly 300 accidents per year in the factory out of which half were serious, and one death per year. After the occupation, that amount dropped to 33 minor accidents per year. In addition, workers now have access to health care and life insurance. Furthermore, in 2004, the factory employed 420 workers, 180 more than the original 240 that occupied the factory in 2002. They produced some 3,000 meters of ceramic a month increased from 15,000 meters formerly produced under Zanon, and out of which they have donated hundreds of square feet of ceramics to hospitals, schools, churches, libraries, and so on, of the Neuquén community as a sign of gratitude to those that supported them throughout their extensive challenge. As well, the Zanon workers help build a health centre that the impoverished community had been requesting for over 20 years.²⁵ Therefore, the movement has served to improve the life of the workers as well as the conditions of the surrounding communities. Furthermore, the system "helps creditors as well as workers, since keeping the factory open stops machinery deterioration or [vandalism]. It also ensures that standing charges, such as property taxes, are paid. If and when the courts decide to put the plant on the market, all of this would ensure a better price".²⁶

Yet, for over seven years the workers of Zanon have been denied definitive expropriation of the factory. The government and opponents of the movement have been vying for the end of the worker-cooperatives and for the restoration of authority. In the film, *The Take*, Mr. Zanon himself seems pretty confident that he will reclaim the factory and that the government will help him do so. In fact, by 2004, the factory had already successfully resisted six eviction orders.²⁷

²² Marie Trigona. "Zanon, Argentina." ZNet Commentary. March 18th 2004. <http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2004-03/18trigona.cfm>

²³ Alavio Grupo. *March in Defense of Zanon*. Znet Commentary. Sept. 17th 2004.

<http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=42&ItemID=6250>

²⁴ Marie Trigona. "Occupied Factory Movements in Argentina." Oct. 06 2004(a), http://thetake.org/index.cfm?page_name=news_oct_06_04_znet_eng

²⁵ Alavio Grupo.

²⁶ The Economist, "Under Worker's Control – Argentina's Struggling Factories." *The Economist Newspaper Limited*, Nov. 2002; London. http://thetake.org/index.cfm?page_name=news_nov_09_02_eng

²⁷ Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein.

These temporary allocations and the unpredictability of the system have been severely unsatisfactory for Zanon workers. Despite Zanon's success, facing constant threats of eviction, death threats and violent attacks make it difficult to acquire loans and rather discouraging to invest in the factory. The factory risks losing workers who are getting increasingly frustrated and disheartened as well as discouraging new and younger people to work at Zanon or in other worker-cooperatives. Still, a few courageous ones battle on. It is more than a question of salary or a passion for ceramic; it is a question of dignity, principles and values. In the course of those seven years, while waiting for the legal decisions to be made, solidarity gained strength amongst the worker-cooperatives and Argentine communities. It truly has become a nationwide movement, a nationwide battle.

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

The economic crisis in Argentina that gave way to the worker-cooperative movement shed light on the weaknesses and limitations of the Washington Consensus. It highlights the fact that the international financial architecture is still incomplete and flawed – a critique often made about the institution. During the crisis, the IMF was both reluctant to assist by fear of moral hazard or to withdraw support fearing that the private sector would lose confidence in Argentina, thus being disinclined to invest. However, once Argentina collapsed, the IMF was more than willing to run to the rescue: "This implies sustained IMF assistance will be available only once the crisis has been resolved".²⁸

Leading economist, Dani Rodrik argues that "[The Washington Consensus] is far from silly: it is the result of systematic thinking about the multiple, often complementary reforms needed to establish property rights, put market incentives to work, and maintain macroeconomic stability".²⁹ However, he adds that although the consensus represents a logical way to achieve these goals, "trying to come up with an identical growth strategy for all countries, regardless of their circumstances, is

unlikely to prove productive".³⁰ The success of these neoliberal policies is therefore contingent on local circumstances.

Clearly, the way and the timing of which the IMF policies were applied did not work for Argentina. Effectively, "the Argentine strategy may have had elements of a gamble, but it was solidly grounded in the theories expounded by U.S.-based economists and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF".³¹ The experience in Argentina is not uncommon. Poor countries are often caught between an array of multilateral and transnational agreements and the strict conditions of international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. It leaves them with little room to devise their own path out of poverty. Instead, they are time and again expected to implement often asymmetric reforms to achieve in a decade what rich countries achieved through several generations.

It is not the IMF that paid the price for the Argentine crisis; it has been the poor, marginalized, newly unemployed citizens of the country that have suffered and continue to bear the enduring ramifications. Accordingly, the workers in Argentina responded to the stereotypical top-down policies of the IMF with the rise of worker-cooperatives: "the worker cooperative movement, with its critique of the neoliberal business-as-usual ethos, inspires large portions of Argentine civil society".³² This autonomous, bottom-up approach entails the involvement of the people that are most directly affected by the issues of poverty and unemployment.

Indeed, the worker-cooperative movement of Argentina holds two spots on the theoretical spectrum. On the one hand, it embraces the idea of participatory development (PD), or *horizontalidad*, an Argentinean term meaning participatory democracy and decision by consensus.³³ One could define PD as the involvement of beneficiaries whereby participation improves the efficiency of institutions. That is to say that "development" is flawed and only by valorizing other voices, such as those of the

²⁸ Ibid. 56.

²⁹ Ibid. 240.

³⁰ Peter Ranis.

³¹ Chris Tilly, Marie Kennedy.

²⁸ Andrew Philip Powell.

²⁹ Dani Rodrik. 22.

people who are most affected by the policies, can meaningful social change occur".³⁴ This can be seen especially through the one person, one vote mechanism for the decision making processes of Zanon and other worker cooperatives. Furthermore, PD is highly present in the roots of the movement since it has clearly grown from the heart of the people most affected by the crisis. Undoubtedly, the participation and support from the communities affected by the crisis and the expropriation movements are crucial to the movement's success and continuation.

On the other hand, there is an underlying capitalist motivation for these workers to recuperate their businesses. "Here, the governing council of the cooperative often plays a more traditional management role".³⁵ Beyond their moral incentive, workers also need salaries and are looking for profits and for ways to enter the sphere of Argentinean, and perhaps international markets. In fact, the film highlights the impressive networking systems established by these cooperatives. Indeed, mutual support between factories has allowed them to thrive economically and gain legitimacy in the markets. This is also clearly exemplified by Zanon Ceramic's growing production capacity and employment: the movement is not only good for the communities' economy but for the country's economic and social stability as well.

CONCLUSION

Since the crisis in 2001, Argentina has experienced limited economic recovery. Economic disparity and poverty remains widespread in Argentina: "A nighttime walk through Buenos Aires reveals armies of *cartoneros*, cardboard scavengers digging through garbage bags to retrieve cardboard they can trade for a few centavos".³⁶ Nonetheless, the economy has awakened sufficiently to ebb the swell of protests, and owners are all the more motivated to hold onto their businesses. These 200 enterprises or so did not succeed to form a 'parallel economy' in a country of 40 million, but these worker-

cooperatives have discovered ways to barter and foster mutual economic support.³⁷

The success of the worker-cooperative movement is barely due to the 'sympathetic' leaders that have allowed these factories to run, instead of evicting them. Mostly it is owed to the web of support between the workers and the communities that have provided them with the strength and solidarity, the legitimacy and the economic support needed to overcome the ongoing legal and political obstacles. Argentine society (in 2001) consisted of a large middle-class, unwilling to stand by while their income was being stolen, and a vast population suffering from poverty and refusing to allow their leaders to continue on this path of theft and oppression. All they wanted was to restart the silent machines. These individuals have created a thriving micro-economy and a new, conceivably better, life for themselves. They are recuperating their jobs and their dignity – and making history while they're at it.

³⁴ Giles Mohan. "Participatory Development" in *The Companion to Development Studies*. Ed. Desai, Vandana and Potter, Robert B. (Oxford University Press. New York, 2002.)

³⁵ Chris Tilly, Marie Kennedy.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

